Judgment :- 1. Plaintiff is the appellant. This appeal arises out of a suit for partition and for rendition of accounts by the 1st defendant who was alleged to be in management of the plaint schedule properties. The plaintiff claimed 110th share in A Schedule properties and 1/15th share in B schedule items. The properties belonged to the father of the plaintiff and defendants 2 to 4. They were acquired by one Penchu Nair and Kunchu Nair under Exts. D 1 and D-2,on 20-5-1910. These properties were partitioned in the year 1914 under Ext. P-1 and the parties to the partition deed were Penchu Nair, Kunchu Nair, the father of the plaintiff, and one Rekkunni Nair. These three persons are the sons of three sisters, Chonamma, Meenakshi Amma and Cheru Amma respectively. Under the partition, A schedule properties were allotted jointly to Kunchu Nair and Rekkunni Nair, and B schedule properties were kept in common. The plaintiff and defendants 2 to 6 are the children and the grant-children of Kunchu Nair. Defendants 7 and 11 are the children of the deceased sister of Penchu Nair. The suit was filed by the plaintiff for a partition of the plaint schedule properties on the allegations that Kunchu Nair was entitled to half of the plaint A schedule properties and 13rd of the plaint B schedule properties and that the plaintiff and defendants 2 to 6 were entitled to these properties as they were the self-acquisitions of Kunchu Nair. He also prayed for rendition of accounts by the 1st defendant as regards certain amounts which came into his hands during the course of his management of these properties. Defendants 2 and 4 supported the plaintiff. The other contesting defendants contended that the plaintiff's claim to the plaint schedule properties cannot be sustained as the properties did not belong to Kunchu Nair, but to the thavazhi of Kunchu Nair and as such the plaintiff could not claim any share in the plaint schedule property. 2. The trial court found that the property belonged to the tavazhi of Kunchu Nair and dismissed the suit. The appeal preferred against that decree failed. Therefore, the second appeal has been filed challenging the decisions of the lower courts. 3. It is admitted that these properties have been acquired under Exts. D-1 & D-12. Penchu Nair & Kunchu Nair are described as karanavans of their respective tavazhies in Exts. The appeal preferred against that decree failed. Therefore, the second appeal has been filed challenging the decisions of the lower courts. 3. It is admitted that these properties have been acquired under Exts. D-1 & D-12. Penchu Nair & Kunchu Nair are described as karanavans of their respective tavazhies in Exts. D-1 and D-2. It may not be possible j to infer from this alone that the acquisitions were made for and on behalf of their respective tavazhies. But, apart from that, there are the significant 1 recitals in the documents to the effect that the properties conveyed under them were to be enjoyed by the tavazhies. It was contended that those i recitals by themselves would not indicate that the executes under those documents agreed that the acquisitions were for and on behalf of the tavazhies. Reliance was placed on the decision of the House of Lords in 1937 All England Reports Vol. 4 page 396 for the proposition that a recital in a document need not necessarily be binding on all the parties to the document. The principle laid down in that case can be stated in the language of Patteson, J, in his judgment in Stronghill v. Buck: "When a recital is intended to be a statement which all the parties to the deed have mutually agreed to admit as true, it is an estoppel upon all. But, when it is intended to he the statement of one party only, the estoppel is confined to that party, and the intention is to be gathered from construing the instrument". It was contended by learned counsel for the appellant that the statements in the documents relating to enjoyment of the properties were the statements of the vendors only and were not intended to bind the vendees, On a perusal of the documents I am satisfied that the intention of both parties was to treat those recitals as the basis of the contracts between them. There was no necessity for the vendors to have made the statements. If at all it was necessary to make recitals of this type, it must have been at the request of the vendees. As such, I hold that the recitals in these documents must bind both parties and must operate as admissions on the part of the vendees. There was no necessity for the vendors to have made the statements. If at all it was necessary to make recitals of this type, it must have been at the request of the vendees. As such, I hold that the recitals in these documents must bind both parties and must operate as admissions on the part of the vendees. If that is so, we have got two documents taken in the names of the karanavans of the tavazhies with recitals that the properties conveyed thereunder must be enjoyed by the tavazhies. It was contended by counsel for the respondent that there is a presumption that when a document is taken in the name of a karanavan the acquisition under the document is for and on behalf of the tavazhi or the tarwad as the case may be, and it is for the person averring to the contrary to establish and prove that the acquisition is not on behalf of the tavazhi. In this connection, reliance was placed on the ruling reported in 1925 Madras 430 where it was laid down by Krishnan, J. that: "In the absence of evidence to the contrary there is a presumption that the property acquired by the karanavan of a tavazhi was acquired for the tavazhi and with the tavazhi funds and this presumption must prevail unless the person who avers that such property is the self-acquisition proves that fact by evidence". In a later case reported in (1955) II MLJ. page 36 at page 37 the reason for this rule and the limits thereof were stated: "Undoubtedly in regard to karanavans the presumption is very strong for they are in possession of the whole property of the tarwad and can deal with it as they like. As under the Hindu Law so under the Marumakkathayam and Aliyasanthana systems there is no presumption that the joint family as such owns property. A joint family is the result of relationship by birth and it is not a necessary sine quo non of a joint family, that the entity should be bound by reason of owning property in common. As under the Hindu Law so under the Marumakkathayam and Aliyasanthana systems there is no presumption that the joint family as such owns property. A joint family is the result of relationship by birth and it is not a necessary sine quo non of a joint family, that the entity should be bound by reason of owning property in common. Therefore, the mere fact that a person happens to be the eldest member of a Marumakkathayam or Aliyasanthana tavazhi or tarwad would not enable the Court to presume that all the properties standing in his name are the joint family properties; but if there is evidence to show that at the time the individual became the senior-most member of the tavazhi or tarwad he had to manage sufficient property belonging to the joint group as to leave a surplus income then it can be presumed that the subsequent acquisitions were made in a representative capacity and not in his individual capacity. This presumption therefore, is restricted to cases where it can be shown that there were surplus funds left from which acquisitions could be made". In 1955 KLT. page 368 the same view was expressed. The head note correctly sets out the principle decided in the case. It is as follows: "The acquisitions made by the Kartha of the family or the karanavan of the tarwad which possessed of sufficient nucleus are presumed to be made with family or tarwad funds, provided there are joint properties which would yield sufficient income so as to leave the surplus after meeting the ordinary expenses of that joint family. To raise a presumption that the acquisition was with the help of tarwad funds it is necessary that there should be an appreciable income from the properties of the sub tarwad so as to leave a surplus after meeting the ordinary necessaries of that tarwad". From these cases, I deduce the principle that unless there is proof of some nucleus there is no presumption that an acquisition standing in the name of a karanavan is an acquisition made for and on behalf of the tavazhi. But in this case, not only are the documents taken in the names of the karanavans but there are the statements in these documents that properties conveyed to the vendees were for the enjoyment of the tavazhies. But in this case, not only are the documents taken in the names of the karanavans but there are the statements in these documents that properties conveyed to the vendees were for the enjoyment of the tavazhies. In such cases, in the absence of any other evidence as to source of the consideration, as I have stated, it is for the person who alleges the contrary, to prove that the recitals in the document do not represent the correct state of affairs. In these circumstances I am inclined to agree with the contention of the respondent that the properties were acquired for and on behalf of the tavazhies. 4. Ext. P-1 is a partition deed among Penchu Nair, Kunchu Nair and Rekkunni Nair. Ext. P-1 proceeds as if the properties belonged to these parties in their individual capacity. No reference is made to the fact that the respective acquirers acquired the properties for and on behalf of the tavazhies, and there is no statement in Ext. P-1 from which an inference that the properties, belonged to the tavazhi can be made. But, if originally, these acquisitions were made for and on behalf of the tavazhies, Ext. P-1 partition cannot alter the character of those properties. Therefore, I come to the conclusion that these 3 persons represented their tavazhies in the partition & the partition was really a partition among the three tavazhies represented by these persons. It was contended that there is no evidence that the tavazhies had any substantial nucleus from which the acquisitions could have been made. That is true. But in this case, plaintiff's claim is against the apparent tenor of Exts. D-1 and D-2 and therefore he ought to have adduced evidence to show that the consideration proceeded from the acquirers, and not from their tavazhies. Not having done so, he must fail, as he has not dislodged the presumption arising from the apparent tenor of the documents. Ext. D-4 is a document from which it is clear that the acquisitions under Exts. D-1&D-2 were for & on behalf of the tavazhies. No doubt, it was contended that this document should not be looked into to decide the question of the character of the acquisition made long before the date of that document. Ext. D-4 is a document from which it is clear that the acquisitions under Exts. D-1&D-2 were for & on behalf of the tavazhies. No doubt, it was contended that this document should not be looked into to decide the question of the character of the acquisition made long before the date of that document. But I think that document is evidence of the subsequent conduct of one of the parties to the documents which will show that the acquisitions were for and on behalf of the tavazhi. In these circumstances, I hold that the properties belonged to the tavazhies of the respective acquirers and findings, entered by the lower courts are correct and the Second Appeal has to be dismissed. I do so with costs. Dismissed.