Judgment :- 1. The plaintiff's application for amendment of the plaint was refused by the trial court and he has preferred this Civil Revision Petition from the order. 2. The suit was one for recovery of the money on the basis of two promissory notes. The amendment sought was to convert the suit into one on the original consideration. The application for amendment was made on 20-6-1059 when a suit for recovery of the loan would have been barred, in the absence of acknowledgment of the debt. It is not possible to say at this stage whether there are such acknowledgments. The application was dismissed mainly on the ground that such amendments can be allowed only where the promissory note is executed for an antecedent debt or collateral security for a loan or by way of conditional payment or if the note does not embody all the terms of the contract and that the promissory notes sued on do not fall within these categories. This view is based on a decision of the Madras High Court, Perumal v. Kamakshi (AIR. 1938 Mad. 785-FB). That was a case of revision from the decree in a small cause suit. The promissory note sued on was unstamped but the trial court nevertheless gave a decree on the original loan. The question here is whether a plaint can be amended to get over the difficulties that may arise if the suit is to continue as one on the promissory notes. The question of amendment must be governed by other considerations. 3. It is pointed out by counsel for the respondent that a suit on the original consideration would have been barred on the date of the application for amendment and that the amendment, if allowed, would deprive him of the plea of limitation. There is no inflexible rule that amendment should be refused in such cases. In Leach & Co. Ltd., v. M/s. Jardine Skinner & Co., (AIR. 1957 SC. 357) the Supreme Court has held: "It is no doubt true that Courts would, as a rule, decline to allow amendments, if a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date of the application. In Leach & Co. Ltd., v. M/s. Jardine Skinner & Co., (AIR. 1957 SC. 357) the Supreme Court has held: "It is no doubt true that Courts would, as a rule, decline to allow amendments, if a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date of the application. But that is a factor to betaken into account in exercise of the discretion as to whether amendment should be ordered, and does not affect the power of the Court to order it, if that is required in the interests of justice. In Charan Das v. Amir Khan, 47 Ind App. 255 the Privy Council, observed: "That there was full power to make the amendment cannot be disputed, and though such a power should not as a rule be exercised where the effect is to take away from a defendant a legal right which has accrued to him by lapse of time, yet there are cases where such considerations are outweighed by the special circumstances of the case (Vide also Kisan Das v. Rachappa, ILR. 33 Bom. 644)." 4. This decision was considered by the Supreme Court in a later case, P.H. Patil v. K.S. Patil (AIR. 1957 SC. 363). The Supreme Court held: "Recently, we have had occasion to consider a similar prayer for amendment in L. J. Leach & Co. v. Jardine Skinner & Co., Civil appeal No. 219, of 1953, d/22-1-1957: (AIR. 1957 SC. 357) where, in allowing an amendment of the plaint in an appeal before us, we said: "It is no doubt true that courts would, as a rule, decline to allow amendments, if a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date of the application. But that is a factor to be taken into account in exercise of the discretion as to whether amendment should be ordered, and does not affect the power of the Court to order it, if that is required in the interests of justice" These observations were made in a case where damages where originally claimed on the footing of conversion of goods. We held, in agreement with the learned judges of the High Court, that on the evidence the claim for damages on the footing of conversion must fail. We held, in agreement with the learned judges of the High Court, that on the evidence the claim for damages on the footing of conversion must fail. The plaintiffs then applied to this court for amendment of the plaint by raising, in the alternative, a claim for damages for breach of contract for non-delivery of the goods. The application was resisted by the respondents and one of the grounds of resistance was that the period of limitation had expired. We accepted as correct the decision in Charan Das v. Amir Khan 47 Ind. App. 255, which laid down that: 'though there was full power to make the amendment, such a power should not as a rule be exercised where the effect was to take away from a defendant a legal right which had accrued to him by lapse of time; yet there Were cases where such considerations were outweighed by the special circumstances of the case'. As pointed out in 47 Ind. App. 255 the power exercised was undoubtedly one within the discretion of the learned Judges. All that can be urged is that the discretion was exercised on a wrong principle. We do not think that it was so exercised in the present case. The facts of the present case are very similar to those of the case before their Lordships of the Privy Council. In the latter, the respondents sued for a declaration of their right of pre-emption over certain land, a form of suit which would not lie having regard to the proviso to S.42 of the Specific Relief Act (I of 1877). The trial judge and the first appellate court refused to allow the plaint to be amended by claiming possession on pre-emption, since the time had expired for bringing a suit to enforce the right. Upon a second appeal the court allowed the amendment to be made, there being no ground for suspecting that the plaintiffs had not acted in good faith, and the proposed amendment not altering the nature of the relief sought. In the case before us, there was a similar defect in the plaint, and the trial judge refused to allow the plaint to be amended on the ground that the period of limitation for a suit under 0.21, R.103, Civil P. C.. had expired. In the case before us, there was a similar defect in the plaint, and the trial judge refused to allow the plaint to be amended on the ground that the period of limitation for a suit under 0.21, R.103, Civil P. C.. had expired. The learned judges of the High Court rightly pointed out that the mistake in the trial court was more that of the learned pleader and the proposed amendment did not alter the nature of the reliefs sought". 5. The claim in the suit was against the first defendant and the tarwad of the defendants on the allegation that the consideration was used for tarwad purposes. The defendants who opposed the application admitted in their objections, filed on 30-6-1959, that the tarwad admitted liability for Rs. 600/- under the promissory notes. The execution of two promissory notes, was admitted in the written statement and it was further alleged that provision was made in the deed of partition that the tavazhi of defendants 3 to 9 was to discharge the debt and that they were not liable for the debt. This is not a case in which the defendants were taken by surprise and they do not have to meet a claim set up for the first time. These aspects were not considered by the trial court in exercising its discretion. The court appears to have been swayed by the decision reported in AIR. 1938 Mad. 785 which is not applicable to the question of amendment of the plaint. Thus, even assuming that a plea of limitation is available to the defendants, I consider this a fit case for allowing the amendment prayed for. As pointed out by the Supreme Court, "It is not feasible nor advisable to encase a discretionary power within the straitjacket of an inflexible formula". 6. However this is a case in which the plaintiff should be put on terms as to costs. The civil revision petition will therefore stand allowed without costs in case the plaintiff - petitioner pays to the contesting respondents Rs. 100/- as costs (one set only) irrespective of the result of the suit, within three weeks of this date. If the same is not paid as directed above, the Civil Revision Petition will stand dismissed with costs. Dismissed.