Judgment :- 1. The plaintiffs sued for the balance due under Ext. A, chitty hypothecation bond dated the 28th Edavam,1104, executed by the deceased father of defendants 1 to 5. The contention of the latter was that there had been a settlement of all their father's debts under S.16 of the Travancore Debt Relief Act, 1116, by Ext. I order. This contention has been accepted by the Subordinate Judge in appeal and hence the second plaintiff has preferred this Second Appeal. 2. The point urged in this appeal was that under S.16 of the Act, the court has jurisdiction to entertain only an application by an "individual" and for the settlement of "his" debts and not, as has happened, by a group individuals like defendants 1 to 5 and for the settlement of the debts of their father. The term 'individual' has been interpreted by a full bench of the Travancore High Court in Chidambara Iyer Azhagappa Iyer v. Nallathayammal Sivakami Ammal,1947 TLR.1, to mean "a single man or woman as contrasted from the species or body of which he or she is a member along with other individuals." Though this precise point did not arise for decision in Swaragiri Krishnan Ramaswami v. Rangaswami Subbayyan Lala,1953 KLT. 98, the above interpretation of the term 'individual' was affirmed as correct by a full bench of the Travancore-Cochin High Court. These decisions were rendered after the passing of Ext. I order. It may now be taken as settled that defendants 1 to 5 were not legally competent to make the application under S.16 for the settlement of the debts of their father. But the question really is whether such lack of competency involved a jurisdictional defect and whether even if it did so, Ext. I can for that reason be treated as null and void. Assuming that a jurisdictional issue is posed thereby, it has to be answered by the application of the following dictum of Lord Esher in Queen v. Commissioner for Special Purposes of the Income-tax, (1888) 21 Q.B.D. 313 at 319: 'When an inferior court or tribunal or body, which has to exercise the power of deciding facts, is first established by Act of Parliament, the legislature has to consider what powers it will give that tribunal or body. It may in effect say that, if a certain state of facts exists and is shown to such tribunal or body before it proceeds to do certain things, it shall have jurisdiction to do such things, but not otherwise. There it is not for them conclusively to decide, whether that state of facts exists, and, if they exercise the jurisdiction without its existence, what they do may be questioned, and it will be held that they have acted without jurisdiction. But there is another state of things which may exist. The legislature may intrust the Tribunal or body with a jurisdiction, which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of facts exists as well as the jurisdiction, on finding that it does exist, to proceed further or do something more. When the legislature are establishing such a tribunal or body with limited jurisdiction, they also have to consider, whatever jurisdiction they give them, whether there shall be any appeal from their decision for otherwise there will be none. In the second of the two cases I have mentioned it is an erroneous application of the formula to say that the tribunal cannot give themselves jurisdiction by wrongly deciding certain facts to exist, because the legislature gave them jurisdiction to determine all the facts, including the existence of the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of their jurisdiction depends; and if they were given jurisdiction so to decide, without any appeal being given, there is no appeal from such exercise of their jurisdiction." It does not seem proper to think, that S.16 says in effect, that if only there is an application by an "individual" as so interpreted the court administering the Debt Relief Act shall have jurisdiction but not otherwise. Speaking in terms of jurisdiction, it is more proper to hold that the legislature has given the court, the jurisdiction to decide whether there are debts to be settled, whether the applicant is unable to pay his debts and whether there is an application in terms of the Section. Speaking in terms of jurisdiction, it is more proper to hold that the legislature has given the court, the jurisdiction to decide whether there are debts to be settled, whether the applicant is unable to pay his debts and whether there is an application in terms of the Section. Adopting the language of Lord Esher it is erroneous to hold that the court cannot give itself jurisdiction by wrongly deciding the existence of the above facts, because the legislature gave it "jurisdiction to determine all the facts, including the existence of the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of their jurisdiction depends", and no right of appeal being granted, "there is no appeal from such exercise of jurisdiction." 3. In Ebrahim Aboobaker v. Custodian General of Evacuee Property AIR. 1952 SC. 319, the Supreme Court had to consider an analogous case falling within the purview of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, under which only a party aggrieved by the order of the Assistant Custodian had a right of appeal. After quoting from Lord Esher, the Court observed as follows: "Ordinarily, a court of appeal has not only jurisdiction to determine the soundness of the decision of the inferior court as a court of error, but by the very nature of things it has also jurisdiction to determine any points raised before it in the nature of preliminary issues by the parties. Such jurisdiction is inherent in its very constitution as a court of appeal. Whether an appeal is competent, whether a party has 'locus standi" to prefer it, whether the appeal in substance is from one or another order and whether it has been preferred in proper form and within the time prescribed, are all matters for the decision of the appellate court so constituted. Such a tribunal falls within class 2 of the classification of the Master of the Rolls." The distinction between the two classes of cases was pointed out thus in Raman & Raman Ltd. v. State of Madras, AIR. 1956 SC. 463: "... there may be cases where the jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal may depend upon the fulfilment of some condition precedent or upon the existence of some particular fact. 1956 SC. 463: "... there may be cases where the jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal may depend upon the fulfilment of some condition precedent or upon the existence of some particular fact. Such a fact is collateral to the actual matter which the inferior tribunal has to try, and the determination of whether it exists or not is logically and in sequence prior to the determination of the actual question which the inferior tribunal has to try. In such a case, in certiorari proceedings, a court can enquire into the correctness of the decision of the inferior tribunal as to the collateral fact ... There may be tribunals, however, which, by virtue of legislation constituting them, have the powers to determine finally the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of their jurisdiction depends." The latter comes under the second class of cases envisaged by Lord Esher. Cases coming under the first class are by no means rare. In Ekkavummakutty Umma v. Choiyi Choyikutty,1958 KLT. 686, the jurisdictional issue was as to whether there was a relationship of landlord and tenant, on the existence of which alone the provisions of the Malabar Tenancy Act would apply. M/s. The Travancore Sugars and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 1958 KLJ. 438, Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd., v. Industrial Tribunal, Trivandrum, 1958 KLT. 77, Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd., v. Industrial Tribunal, Trivandrum, 1959 KLT. 470 Dorothy Beale v. George Kurien,1962 KLT. 450, were all cases falling within the first class. It also seems to me, that the question whether defendants 1 to 5 as the legal representatives could make an application under S.16 for the settlement of the debts of their father pertains to their competency to make the application and not to the jurisdiction of the court to proceed in the matter. The plaintiffs did contend, though in a general way, that the application was incompetent, but the point does not appear to have been pressed at the final hearing, and the court proceeded to deal with the application as competent. As it happened, in pursuance of Ext. The plaintiffs did contend, though in a general way, that the application was incompetent, but the point does not appear to have been pressed at the final hearing, and the court proceeded to deal with the application as competent. As it happened, in pursuance of Ext. I the plaintiffs, who had to realise two debts, were allotted an item of property of the debtor in liquidation of one of the debts, the other debt for the realisation of which the present suit has been filed, being incapable of satisfaction under the rules relating to priority, according to which the assets had to be distributed among the general body of creditors. To be consistent, the plaintiffs seem to have ignored the settlement of the other debt too and filed a suit to enforce repayment of the same and that suit has terminated against him. The rule that should apply is what has been laid down thus in Kumaraswamy v. Transport Authority, Travancore-Cochin, 1952 KLT. 652: "Where there is jurisdiction over the subject-matter, but non-compliance with the procedure prescribed as essential for the exercise of the jurisdiction, the defect might be waived." 4. The appellant has no good case even treating the defect as jurisdictional. I have also held that the question does not relate to jurisdiction. This is sufficient for dismissing this second appeal. Accordingly I dismiss the appeal with costs. Counsel prayed for leave to appeal. Leave granted. Dismissed.