JUDGMENT Takru, J. - This petition by Sri Sharat Chandra Misra, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, prays for the issue of a writ in the nature of certiorary quashing the resolution of suspension dated the 31st March 1962, and a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents not to give effect to the resolution referred to above and not to treat the petitioner as a suspended Secretary of the Board. This petition has come up before us on a reference by Mathur, J., as, in his opinion, it involved many important questions, including the consideration of certain observations made by the Full Bench in Ram Sewak Misra v. The District Board, Allahabad, 1960 ALJ 167 (F.B.), which deserved the attention of a larger Bench. 2. The material facts giving rise to this petition are not in dispute, and, briefly stated, are as follows:- The petitioner was confirmed in the post of the Secretary of the erstwhile District Board, Hamirpur now known as the Antarim Zila Parishad, Hamirpur - on the 31st July 1953, after he had completed the statutory period of one years' probation. On the 8th of December 1959, Sri Nirmal Chand Tandon, an Overseer of the Board hereinafter called the Parishad - made a report against him to the Collector, Hamirpur in which he charged the petitioner of having committed an offence - to quote his own words - of `forged payment.' The Collector as the Adhyaksh of the Parishad took up that report departmentally, and circulated an agenda on the 15th of February 1960 calling for a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Parishad on the 27th February 1960, wherein one of the items, viz. Item No. 4 was whether the petitioner should be suspended or not on account of the allegations made against him by Sri Tandon. The said item was taken up by the Parishad in its meeting, dated the 27th February 1960, when it was decided by a majority not to place the petitioner under suspension. Meanwhile, on the 19th February 1960, the Collector in his capacity as the District Magistrate had already informed the police about the allegations made by Sri Tandon against the petitioner, and had got a police enquiry instituted in the matter. Meanwhile, on the 19th February 1960, the Collector in his capacity as the District Magistrate had already informed the police about the allegations made by Sri Tandon against the petitioner, and had got a police enquiry instituted in the matter. The police held the necessary enquiry, and being satisfied that no case had been made out against the petitioner, it submitted a final report on the 2nd December, 1960 which was accepted by the Judicial Officer, Hamirpur, on the 7th December 1960. Nothing happened thereafter till the 18th March 1962, on which date an Agenda No. 1 MC was issued for a meeting of the Parishad to be held on 31st March 1962, and one of the items of that agenda, viz. Item No. 20, was whether any disciplinary action should be taken against the petitioner, concerning the allegations made against him at item No. 4 of the meeting of the Parishad dated the 27th February 1960. At this meeting, it was resolved that as the direction contained at page 380 of the District Board Manual, requiring the Parishad to consider, what action should be taken on the final report submitted by the police, had not been compiled with, the Parishad should hold further enquiry into that matter, and pending the same place the petitioner under suspension forthwith. The meeting further resolved that a Committee be appointed to hold the necessary enquiry and to submit its report to the President in order to enable him to decide as to whether the matter should be sent for trial to court or departmental action be taken against him. The petitioner was informed about the said resolution on the 4th April 1962, though he avers to have come to know earlier that some resolution to that effect had been passed against him by the Parishad by a majority of 4 votes only. The petitioner, thereupon, filed the writ petition, which has come up before us for decision. 3. In order to appreciate the rival contentions canvassed before us, the material sections of the District Board Act, which bear upon them, may be set out at this very stage. They are Secs. 71 and 90. Sec. 71 lays down the authority, and the method, by which the Secretary can be punished or dismissed. 3. In order to appreciate the rival contentions canvassed before us, the material sections of the District Board Act, which bear upon them, may be set out at this very stage. They are Secs. 71 and 90. Sec. 71 lays down the authority, and the method, by which the Secretary can be punished or dismissed. According to that section the Secretary can be punished or dismissed only by a special resolution of the Board passed by a vote of not less than two thirds of the total number of members of the Board for the time being. Then follows a proviso which lays down that such a resolution shall not come into effect for a period of one month during which period the Secretary has the right to file an appeal to the State Government and in case an appeal is filed, the resolution shall remain suspended till the State Government have passed orders on the appeal so preferred. It is now settled by a Full Bench, of this Court, in Ram Seulak Misra that this power can only be exercised by the Board, and can not be exercised by the President, acting on behalf of the Board under Section 40 of the District Board Act. Sec. 71, however, does not give any power to the Board to suspend the Secretary pending enquiry. This is provided for in Sec. 90(3), which lays down that :- "(3). where the power of dismissal, whether subject to the sanction of any other authority or not, is conferred by this Act, it shall include power to suspend any person against whom the power of dismissal might be exercised, pending enquiry into his conduct or pending the orders of any authority whose sanction is necessary for his dismissal." 4. The clear effect of this sub-section is to make the power to suspend a person pending enquiry into his conduct, part and parcel, as it were, of the power of dismissal. In other words, we have to read those words in every section of the District Boards Act, and the rules framed thereunder, in which the words `power of dismissal' occur. Such a mode of enactment is frequently resorted to in order to avoid repetitions. In other words, we have to read those words in every section of the District Boards Act, and the rules framed thereunder, in which the words `power of dismissal' occur. Such a mode of enactment is frequently resorted to in order to avoid repetitions. Sec. 71 has consequently to be read as though the words `including the power to suspend the Secretary pending enquiry into his conduct' had been, to quote Lord Esher M. R., `actually written in it with the pen or printed in it In re Woods Estate, Her Majesty's Commissioner of Works and Buildings, LR 31 Ch. D. 607. 5. On behalf of the respondents it was contended that as Sec. 90(3) only confers power upon the Board, the power to suspend the Secretary pending enquiry into his conduct, and does not lay down the manner in which that power is to be exercised, the Board can exercise it by means of an ordinary resolution. Reliance for this contention was placed on R. 1(b) of Ch. II of the District Board's Manual, which states that the appointment of the Secretary, and his punishment or dismissal under Secs. 70 and 71 shall be made by special resolutions. Learned counsel argued that as the power to suspend pending enquiry was not mentioned in this sub-rule, a resolution to that effect did not require to be passed by a special resolution. In our opinion this contention has no merit, for the simple reason, as stated earlier, that by virtue of the deeming clause in Sec. 90(3), the words `suspend any person . . . pending enquiry into his conduct' have also to be read along with the word `dismissal', in this rule. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent then argued that as the object of putting a person under suspension pending enquiry into his conduct was to make it difficult, if not impossible, for him to interfere or tamper with the evidence, that object would clearly be frustrated if the procedure laid down in Section 71 were also to be followed in the case of suspension pending enquiry. He, therefore, contended that Section 90 (3) should be so construed as to make it subserve, and not to defeat the object for which suspensions pending enquiry are made. He, therefore, contended that Section 90 (3) should be so construed as to make it subserve, and not to defeat the object for which suspensions pending enquiry are made. We are alive to the fact that the interpretation which we have placed upon Section 71 read with Sec. 90(3) of the Act, is open to this criticism, but, as is well-established, the Courts have to administer the law as they find it, and the law is to be ascertained by construing the language employed by the Legislature and not by what its supposed purpose might have been. If the language of an enactment is susceptible of only one construction then it matters little whether it advances or hinders the purpose underlying it. It is only when a particular enactment is capable of two interpretations that the rule of construction contended for by the learned counsel for the respondent applies. But if, as stated earlier, the Legislature did not intend, what we have held to be the effect of Section 71 read with Section 90 (3), it is always open to the Legislature to amend the section in express terms. We may further mention that this line of argument was also adopted in the case of Ram Sewak Misra, 1960 ALJ 167 (F.B.) and was repelled by the Full Bench in the following terms:- "The difficulties envisaged by Mr. Khare in connection with the procedure of Section 71 applicable to the cases of suspension do not justify not giving the interpretation of Sub-Sec. (3) of Section 90 and Sch. I, with respect to the power to dismiss a Secretary its correct meaning. Those difficulties, if any, are not such as to reduce the creation of this power to suspend to nothing. In fact, these difficulties need not arise as sub-sec. (3) of Section 90 does not equate dismissal with suspension but simply provides that the power of dismissal will include the power of suspension; i.e. to one who has the power to dismiss will have the power to suspend also........." 7. In fact, these difficulties need not arise as sub-sec. (3) of Section 90 does not equate dismissal with suspension but simply provides that the power of dismissal will include the power of suspension; i.e. to one who has the power to dismiss will have the power to suspend also........." 7. As a result of the discussion attempted above, we are satisfied that the power to suspend the Secretary pending enquiry into his conduct, has to be exercised in the same manner as the power of dismissal and punishment is exercisable under Section 71, and as in the instant case the suspension of the Secretary was by an ordinary resolution and without the requisite two thirds majority, the said suspension order cannot be sustained. 8. The next submission of the learned counsel for the respondents was that, as on the interpretation given by us to Section 71, the petitioner had an alternative remedy of appeal to the State Government, the present petition was incompetent. This contention also has no force. The relevant portion to the proviso conferring the right of appeal, reads as follows: - "Provided secondly, that the Secretary shall have a right of appeal to the State Government against such resolution within one month from the date of communication of the resolution to him......." We have italicised the material portion of this proviso in order to highlight the fact that the appeal envisaged under this proviso is an appeal against a resolution passed in accordance with the requirements of that section viz. a special resolution of the Board. As the instant resolution is not a special resolution, it cannot be held to be the kind of resolution against which an appeal would lie to the State Government. The only remedy available to the petitioner therefore was by means of a writ petition filed in this Court. 9. Finally, learned counsel for the respondents contended that as the reliefs claimed by the petitioner could not be given effect to now, in view of the coming into force of the U.P. Kshettra Samitis and Zila Parishads Act No. XXXIII of 61 his petition was liable to fail. 9. Finally, learned counsel for the respondents contended that as the reliefs claimed by the petitioner could not be given effect to now, in view of the coming into force of the U.P. Kshettra Samitis and Zila Parishads Act No. XXXIII of 61 his petition was liable to fail. This contention is clearly untenable having regard to Section 46 of the said Act, which reads thus:- "All officers and servants in the employ of the District Board constituted under the United Provinces District Board Act, 1922, and the Antarim Zila Parishad immediately before the appointed date shall notwithstanding anything in Secs. 39 and 43, but subject to the provisions of sub-sec. (2) be officers and servants employed by the Zila Parishad and until appointed to the posts created under Section 39 shall be entitled to the same salaries and allowances and shall be subject to the same conditions of services to which they were entitled or were subject immediately before the said date." We are informed by the learned counsel for the parties that so far no new Secretary has been appointed under this Act. The result therefore is that if the suspension order in question is quashed, the petitioner would continue to hold the office of the Secretary, until necessary action is taken under that Act. The petitioner is, therefore, entitled to both the reliefs prayed for by him. 10. On behalf of the petitioner, it was also argued that, as in fact and law, no enquiry had commenced against the petitioner, the order of suspension passed against him was illegal on that score also. In view, however, of the fact that this petition is being allowed on the ground discussed above, we consider it unnecessary to go into this question and to record any finding thereon. 11. The observations made by the Full Bench, which Mathur, J. was of the opinion deserved the consideration of a larger Bench concern the scope and effect of Section 71 read with Section 90 (3). Learned counsel for the parties admitted - and we agree with them - that those observations are in the nature of obiter dicta. Nothing more need, therefore, be said about them. 12. Learned counsel for the parties admitted - and we agree with them - that those observations are in the nature of obiter dicta. Nothing more need, therefore, be said about them. 12. For the reasons stated above, we allow this petition, quash the resolution of suspension dated the 31st of March 1962, and issue a mandamus to the respondents commanding them not to give effect to the aforesaid resolution and not to treat the petitioner as suspended Secretary of the Board. The petitioner shall be entitled to his costs of this petition.