JUDGMENT V. Bhargava, J. - These two writ petitions have been referred by a learned Single Judge to a Division Bench together with another Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 3107 of 1961 as they raised an important question of law about the validity of the rules framed by the U.P. Govt. under the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act. There was further indication that the same question of law also arose in Special Appeal No. 537 of 1961. Consequently, all these three writ petitions and the special appeal were heard together by us on this one question. On hearing learned counsel we find that in these two writ petitions Nos. 3044 and 3106 of 1961 that question of law is the only question of law that needs to be decided, and learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, have clearly stated before us that, apart from that question of law, they do not want to argue or urge any other point. In writ petition No. 3107 and special appeal No. 537 of 1961, certain other points are also involved which require decision. Consequently, having heard learned counsel on the question of law, we proceed to decide that question of law in these two writ petitions and the decision in these two writ petitions of that question will govern the other two connected cases to that extent. 2. In all these cases, election petitions were presented to the proper Sub-Divisional Officer under Sec. 12-C (I) of the Panchayat Raj Act read with Rule 24 of the Panchayat Raj Rules. Subsequently, three of these election petitions were transferred to the Assistant Collector 1st Class and one to the Additional Sub-Divisional Officer and they were ultimately decided by these officers to whom they were transferred. The decisions given by these officers were challenged by presentation of these writs in this Court on the ground that these officers did not have jurisdiction to decide the election petitions and that the rules under which they were transferred to these officers were ultra vires the power of the State Government to make rules under the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act. 3. 3. All these election petitions had been transferred under sub-R. (5) of R. 25 of the Panchayat Raj Rules under which the District Magistrate was given the power to withdraw any application under sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 12-C of the Act pending in the district for disposal and himself try or dispose of the same or transfer the same for trial or disposal to any Assistant Collector of 1st Class in the district or transfer the same for trial or disposal to the officer from whom it was withdrawn. This sub-R. (5) of R. 25 further lays down that the provisions of R. (4) of this rule (R. 25) shall mulatis mutandis apply for trial and disposal of the application so withdrawn or transferred. The point urged on behalf of the petitioners was that, under Sec. 12-c (1) of the Act, an election petition had to be presented to such authority as may be prescribed and the only authority prescribed under R. 24 of the Panchayat Raj Rules was the Sub-Divisional Officer and that, having once been presented to the Sub-Divisional Officer that petition could not be decided by any other authority except that Sub-Divisional Officer. Reliance in support of this proposition was placed on the provisions of sub-Sec. (4) of Sec. 12-C which reads as follows :- "12-C (4): The authority to whom the application under sub-Sec. (1) is made shall, in the matter of (i) hearing of the application and the procedure to be followed at such hearing, (ii) setting aside the election or declaring the election to be void or declaring the applicant to be duly elected or any other relief that may be granted to the petitioner." have such powers and authority as may be prescribed. 4. Mr. Khare, learned Counsel, who argued two of these cases before us urged that this provision made in sub-Sec. (4) of Sec. 12-C indicated the intention of the legislature that an election petition, presented under sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 12-C, must be decided by the same authority to whom it is presented under sub-Sec. (1) because provision was made under this sub-Sec. (4) for conferment of powers only on that authority and not on other authorities. His submission was that in rules framed conferring powers or authority in an authority other than the authority to whom the election petition is presented under Sec. 12-C (1) would be beyond the rule making powers of the State Government and any such rule would also be inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. 5. In dealing with this submissions, we have to keep in view the fact that the rule making power which the State Government exercised is not conferred by Sec. 12-C but by Sec. 110 of the Panchayat Raj Act. The power conferred under that section is very wide. Sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 110 is in the usual wide form of conferring on the State Government the power of making rules consistent with the Act to carry out the purposes of the Act. Then sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 110 enumerates various matters for which such rules may provide in particular and without prejudice to the generality of the power conferred by sub-Sec. (1). The various matters specified in sub-Sec. (2) are very large in number but we are in fact concerned with only three of those matters. They are numbered as (i), (ii-c) and (xvi). Under Cl. (i) the rules can provide for any matter for which power to make provision is conferred expressly or by implication on the State Government by this Act, under clause (ii-c) the rules can provide for presentation and disposal of election petitions, and under Cl. (xvi) they can provide for matters which are to be and may be prescribed. Under Sec. 12-C, various matters are mentioned on which it is contemplated that rules will be framed by the State Government. As an example, under Sec. 12-C (i) there is indication that the State Government will by rules prescribe an authority to whom an application under that section is to be presented and will also prescribe the time within which and the manner in which it is to be presented. Under sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 12-C, there is indication that rules are to be framed laying down what will be the particulars which an election petition must contain. Under sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 12-C, there is indication that rules are to be framed laying down what will be the particulars which an election petition must contain. Similarly clause (4) of Sec. 12-C, with which we are concerned, indicates that the State Government can lay down by rules the powers and authority which can be exercised by the authority to whom an application under sub-Sec. (1) is made in the matter of hearing of 6 the application and the procedure to be followed at such hearing, setting aside the election or declaring the election to be void or declaring the applicant to be duly elected or any other relief that may be granted to the petitioner. These rules having been contemplated by Sec. 12-C could appropriately be framed in exercise of the power specifically mentioned in Cl. (i) and (xlvi) of sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 110 of the Act. 6. In spite of the power of making such rules having vested in the State Government under Cl. (i) and (xlvi) of sub-section 2 of Sec. 110, the legislature also thought it fit to give a wider power in Cl. (2-c) of sub-Sec. 2 of Sec. 110 which would be concurrent with as well as in addition to the power conferred by the other clauses in this behalf. Under clause (2-c) of sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 110, the power given to the State Government to frame rules covers the subject of presentation and disposal of election petitions. Even if there had been no provision in Sec. 12-C itself contemplating framing of certain rules relating to presentation and disposal of election petitions, such rules could still have been framed under Cl. (2-c) of sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 110. Consequently, in interpreting the various provisions of the Act conferring powers on the State Government to frame rules, we have to hold that the legislature, in this particular Act, thought it fit to confer a wide power on the State Government to frame rules on all matters relating to presentation and disposal of election petitions by introducing Cl. (2-c) of sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 110 and yet proceed to further amplify those powers or specify some of them by making mention of some of the matters in Sec. 12-C and then laying down in Cl. (2-c) of sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 110 and yet proceed to further amplify those powers or specify some of them by making mention of some of the matters in Sec. 12-C and then laying down in Cl. (i) and (xlvi) of sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 110 of the Act that the rules may be framed on those matters. This position clearly indicates that the legislature in Sec. 12-C did not intend to put down in detail and exhaustively all the matters on which the rules could be framed relating to the matter of presentation and disposal of elections petitions so that in order to judge whether any rules framed by the State Government have been framed within the scope of the power conferred on the Government the fact that certain matters were specially specified in Sec. 12-C will make no difference. Rr. 24 and 25 framed by the State Government under these circumstances have to be treated as rules framed in exercise of the power conferred under all the Cls. (i), (2-c) and (xlvi) of sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 110 of the Act. It is true that in Sec. 12-C (4) there was mention of rules being made for conferring powers and authority, on the authority before whom the election petition is made, in the matter of hearing of the application, the procedure to be followed and the final orders to be passed after hearing of the election petition. But that should not be interpreted as indicating that similar powers could not be conferred on any other authority which may also be dealing with that election petition. In this section the authority, on whom, it is contemplated, the powers be conferred, has been described as as:- "The authority to whom the application under sub-Sec. (1) is made." Even if it be held that by this expression the legislature intended to refer to the one single authority to whom the application is presented under Sec. 12-C (1) in accordance with the rules, the fact that sub-Sec. (4) of Sec-12-C contained an indication to the State Government to make such rules would not in any way curtail the general power conferred on the State Government, under Cl. (2-c) of sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 110, to confer similar powers on another authority who may competently deal with the election petitions. 7. (2-c) of sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 110, to confer similar powers on another authority who may competently deal with the election petitions. 7. Further, we cannot hold that the mere mention in sub-Sec. (4) of Sec. 12-C of the authority to whom application under sub-Sec. (1) is made necessarily implies that the legislature barred the making of rules providing for transfer of the election petition from that authority to another competent authority on whom power may be conferred by rules framed by the State Government. The rule that, after an election petition has been presented under rule 24 read with Sec. 12-C (1) before the S.D.O. it may be transferred to any Assistant Collector of the Ist Class is one relating to the matter of disposal of an election petition, a subject in respect of which power to frame rules was specifically conferred on the State Government. The State Government in framing R. 25, was thus only exercising powers conferred on it by Cl. (2-c) of sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 110 Consequently, R. 25, which permits transfer of election petition from the authority to whom it had been presented to other authorities, was clearly within the scope of the powers of the State Government to frame rules and is valid. 8. We may add that there is one other alternative way of looking at this point which also supports our view that the provision in R. 25 for transfer of election petitions is valid. In sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 12-C, all that is laid down is that the application calling in question an election is to be "presented" to such authority within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed on the grounds mentioned in that sub-section. Sub-Sec. (1) therefore, deals only with the presentation of an election petition and does not deal with the hearing, trial and disposal of the election petition. It is only (4) of Sec. 12-C which touches the latter matter. Sub-Sec. (1) therefore, deals only with the presentation of an election petition and does not deal with the hearing, trial and disposal of the election petition. It is only (4) of Sec. 12-C which touches the latter matter. In this sub-section, when a reference is made to the authority, that authority, is referred to as "the authority to whom application under sub-Sec. (1) is made" and not as "the authority to whom the application under sub-Sec. (i) is presented." We have put this in this form to bring out the distinction that appears to have been introduced by the legislature itself by using the word `presented' in sub-Sec. (1) while using the word `made' in sub-Sec. (4). Normally, it is true that the word `made' is used in the same meaning as the word `presented.' But in a piece of legislation like the one before us, where both the words have been used in the same section of the Act, we think the some significance should attach to the he of the word by the legislature in tho two sub sections. It appears to us that the legislature by using the word made in sub-Sec. (4) gave an indication that the authority being referred to in that sub-section was not merely the authority to whom the application-was presented under sub-Sec. -(1). This is also clear from the fact that the expression "under sub-Sec. (1)" occurs between the word `application' and words `is made' and not after the words `is made.' In such circumstances, we think that the word, `made' in this particular piece of legislation should be given a wider meaning than the word `presentation' should include not only an authority to whom the application is presented but any other authority also to whom it may be deemed to have been presented because of its having been brought before that authority for disposal in accordance with rules competently framed by the State Government. This use of the word `made' instead word `presented' would thus indicate that the legislature in enacting the provisions of sub-Sec. (4) did no intend to lay down that the powers mentioned therein are to be conferred only on the authority to whom the application is presented but even on other authorities to whom it may be deemed to be presented. Sub-R. (5) of R. 25 contains a provision that, after an election petition is transferred to an Assistant Collector of the 1st Class the other rules are to apply to him as if he was the person to whom the election petition had been presented for the purpose of the trial and disposal of the petition. It is for the purpose of trial and disposal of the petition that powers are contemplated to be conferred by rules indicated in sub-Sec. (4) of Sec. 12 so that the wider meaning given to the word `made' indicated by us would lead to the conclusion that the legislature itself contemplated that there may be authorities to whom the petition might be competently transferred for trial and disposal. 9. The meaning and scope attributed to sub-Sec. (4) by the learned counsel for the petitioners, if accepted, would further have the effect of bringing about .a conflict inter se between the various provisions of the Act itself. There is the wide power of making rules under Cl. (2-c) of sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 110 which would have to be held to be limited by the provisions of Sec. 12-C read with Cls. (i) and (x)(vi) of . sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 110, even though the language used in these provisions do not necessarily admit to such restriction. It is one of the essential principles of interpretation of statutes that, if more than one interpretation be possible, the court should accept that interpretation which will ensure to a harmonious construction of the various provisions of that statute. This principle of harmonious construction includes the rule that a court would be justified even in departing from the dictionary meaning of particular words and in interpreting them in such a modified manner as would ensure that all the provisions of the statute can be properly administered. In these circumstances, in order to harmonise the various provisions made by the legislature while conferring powers on the State Government to frame rules, we should interpret the word `made' in the wider sense in which we have indicated above. On that interpretation, Cl. (5) of R. 25 was clearly a valid rule framed by the State Government in exercise of powers vested in it under this Act, so that the order of transfer to another Assistant Collector of Ist Class and the trial of election petition by him would be valid. On that interpretation, Cl. (5) of R. 25 was clearly a valid rule framed by the State Government in exercise of powers vested in it under this Act, so that the order of transfer to another Assistant Collector of Ist Class and the trial of election petition by him would be valid. 10. We may mention that, during the arguments on these petitions, it was not contended before us that the power to frame rules for disposal of an election petition would not include the framing of a rule permitting transfer of that election petition from one authority to another. It is also to be noticed that, in this particular Act, the forum before which the election petition has to be presented was not provided for in the Act itself. Even that forum had to be prescribed by rules framed by the State Government and when the State Government was given the power to prescribe the authority to whom the election petition is to be presented it was natural that further powers should have been conferred on the State Government to designate other authorities who may be empowered to hear and dispose of those election petitions. This question of law raised in these petitions must therefore be decided against the petitioners. 11. The result is that civil Miscellaneous writ petitions Nos. 3106 and 3044 of 1961 are dismissed with costs. So far as civil misc. writ petition No. 3107 of 1961 and special appeal No. 537 of 1961 are concerned orders on them will be passed separately though, on the points decided in these writ petitions this judgment will govern these cases also. We may mention that the learned counsel appearing in civil misc, writ No. 3107 of 1961 and in special appeal No. 537 of 1961 were also given an opportunity of being heard on this point at the same time when these two writ petitions Nos. 3106 and 3044 were heard by us. The stay order passed in writ petition No. 3106 shall stand vacated.