JUDGMENT Jagdish Sahai , J. - These are two connected writ petitions in which a prayer has been made for the issue of a writ of Habeas Corpus. The questions of law involved are common in both the cases. The petitioner, Km. Pokhraj, was arrested on 30th June, 1962, on a warrant issued by the respondent No. 3 Sri V.P. Sharma, City Magistrate, Allahabad, under Sec. 16 of the Suppress ion of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girl's Act, 1956 Act No. 104 of 1956, hereinafter referred to as the Act. Similarly, Sheila Devi, the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 1790 of 1962 has been arrested under the provisions of the same section under an order issued by the same Magistrate. Both these girls were produced before the City Magistrate, Allahabad. He did not conclude the enquiry under Sec. 17(2) against them and has passed an order directing their detention in the Protective Home at Allahabad during the pendency of the enquiry. In both these cases, the enquiry is still pending. The petitions have been founded on the following grounds: (1) That there is no provision under which the City Magistrate had the jurisdiction to direct the detention of the petitioners in the Protective Home at Allahabad and (2) that the provisions of Sec. 17 of the Act infringe Articles 14, 19 and 22 of the Constitution of India. No other ground has been raised before us. Sec. 16 of the Act reads as follows: "16. (1) Where a magistrate has reason to believe, from information received from the police or otherwise, that a girl apparently under the age of twenty-one years, is living, or is carrying on, or is being made to carry on prostitution, in a brothel, he may direct the special police officer to enter such brothel, and to remove there from such girl and produce her before him. (2) The special police officer after removing the girl shall forthwith produce her before the magistrate issuing the order. What shall be done after the girl is produced before the Magistrate issuing the warrant is provided for by Sec. 17 of the Act which reads as follows: * * * 2. (2) The special police officer after removing the girl shall forthwith produce her before the magistrate issuing the order. What shall be done after the girl is produced before the Magistrate issuing the warrant is provided for by Sec. 17 of the Act which reads as follows: * * * 2. The argument of the learned counsel who have appeared for the petitioners is that there is nothing either in Sec. 17 or any other section of the Act under which the learned City Magistrate has the jurisdiction to direct that the petitioners shall live in a Protective Home during the pendency of the proceedings under Sec. 17 of the Act. It was contended that the power to put a person in a place against her will amounts to the curtailment of her personal liberty and unless there is a provision in the Act expressly authorising the Magistrate to pass such an order, he has no such authority or jurisdiction. Learned counsel also submitted that even if there is a lacuna in the Act, the petitioners cannot, on that basis, be confined in the Protective Home against their will. On behalf of the State, the submission was that there is no lacuna in the Act and that the power to direct that the arrested girl should remain in a Protective Home or shall be transferred to the custody of some one else, as the Court thinks fit, is conferred expressly by sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 17 of the Act. It is contended that as it is not possible in every case to pass an order under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 17 of the Act immediately and an adjournment may some times become necessary, there must be implied ancillary power of issuing direction for the custody of the girl rescued pending the decision of the case under Sec. 17(2) of the Act. (2) of Sec. 17 of the Act immediately and an adjournment may some times become necessary, there must be implied ancillary power of issuing direction for the custody of the girl rescued pending the decision of the case under Sec. 17(2) of the Act. The learned Government Advocate supplemented his submission by drawing our attention to the provisions of Sec. 17(1) of the Act where it is provided that if the girl cannot, for any reason, be produced before .the Magistrate who issued the order, then she will be produced before another Magistrate who shall pass such orders as he deemes proper for her safe custody until she is produced before the appropriate Magistrate." The learned Government Advocate submitted that when power has been expressly conferred upon another Magistrate to make directions with regard to the interim custody of the girl rescued, it would be erroneous to assume that no such powers has been conferred upon the Magistrate who has passed the order. The learned Government Advocate has also contended that it is not a proper way of interpreting a statute to assume lacuna in the Act. 3. Sec. 2(g) of the Act defines Protective Home and reads as follows: "(g) "protective home" means an institution, by whatever name called, in which women and girls may be kept in pursuance of this Act and includes - (i) a shelter where female under-trials may be kept in pursuance of this Act; and (ii) a corrective institution in which women and girls rescued and detained under this Act may be imparted such training and instruction and subjected to such disciplinary and moral influences as are likely to conduce to their reformation and the prevention of offences under this Act." There cannot be any difficulty in holding that the expression "protective home" comprehends a shelter where female under trials are kept. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners contended that girls rescued under Sec. 16 of the Act are not under trials because they are not accused of any offence. Consequently, a protective home cannot be construed as a shelter for their interim custody during an enquiry against them. In the first place, we are not satisfied that the word `under trial' has been used in Cl. Consequently, a protective home cannot be construed as a shelter for their interim custody during an enquiry against them. In the first place, we are not satisfied that the word `under trial' has been used in Cl. (g) of Sec. 2 of the Act in the restrictive sense of including only those who are accused of an offence and not those in respect of whom an enquiry is being made under the provisions of Sec. 17 of the Act. Secondly, Sec. 17 provides the procedure under which an enquiry is to be held. It is analogous for all purposes to a trial. It may not be a trial in the same sense in which a person against whom notice is issued under Sec. 112, Cr. P. C. is not an under trial, but we have no doubt that it has all the trappings, the form and the substance of a trial. We are, therefore, of the opinion that inasmuch as Sec. 2(g) of the Act itself speaks of the protective home being a shelter for under trials. the power to direct interim custody therein is apparent in the Act itself and must be deemed to have been expressly conferred. Even if it be assumed that the power has not been expressly conferred, we have no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that such a power exists as an implied ancillary power. That was the view taken by this Court in Smt. Prem v. District Magistrate, A.I.R. 1959 Allahabad 206 = 1958 A.L.J. 869. Learned counsel for the petitioners have contended that that case has not been correctly decided and we should refer these cases to a Full Bench. We are not satisfied that the case of Smt. Prem v. District Magistrate, A.I.R. 1959 Allahabad 206 = 1958 A.L.J. 869 has not been correctly decided. On the other hand, we have come to the same conclusion to which the learned Judges in that case had arrived at. There is good authority for the proposition that in order to administer a provision effectively, ancillary powers can always be assumed. On the other hand, we have come to the same conclusion to which the learned Judges in that case had arrived at. There is good authority for the proposition that in order to administer a provision effectively, ancillary powers can always be assumed. In Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 45 their Lordships of the Supreme Court, while dealing with the question relating to ancillary powers, observed as follows: "Where a power is conferred or a duty imposed by a statute or otherwise and there is nothing said expressly inhibiting the exercise of the power or the performance of the duty by any limitations or restrictions, it is reasonable to hold that it carries with it the power of doing all such acts or employing such means as are reasonably necessary for such execution." It is obvious that it is not in every case possible to conclude the enquiry under Sec. 17 of the Act on the very day on which the rescued girl is produced before a Magistrate. The Magistrate has to take the opinion of five persons. The girl may, if she likes, produce evidence and all that may require adjournment of the case. 4. The question in such a contingency that immediately arises is as to what is to be done in respect of the rescued girl. The girl cannot be left free to go wherever she likes. The very purpose of her being rescued under Sec. 16 of the Act would be lost if that were done. It would be noticed that under the provisions of Sec. 17(2) of the Act, the Magistrate can pass either of the two orders, i.e. he can either direct the detention of the girl in a Protective Home for such period as he considers proper or he may allow her to remain in the custody of some one else who, in his opinion, is suitable for that purpose. It is therefore obvious that the final power itself is not confined to detention in a Protective Home but also extends to the girl being transferred in the custody of some other suitable person. It is therefore obvious that the final power itself is not confined to detention in a Protective Home but also extends to the girl being transferred in the custody of some other suitable person. The ancillary powers, with respect to interim custody, can also, therefore, not be confined only to her detention in a Protective Home and it is quite open to a Magistrate to give her in the custody of some one else whom he considers suitable if, in the circumstances of the case, he thinks that order to be a proper one to pass, it was contended strenuously at the Bar on behalf of the petitioner that even if it be held that the Magistrate who has passed the order for the removal of the girl under Sec. 16 of the Act, can pass interim orders with regard to her custody, the minimum that is necessary must be done and recourse to detention in the Protective Home must be the last resort. The argument was put in an alternative form, it was firstly contended that the principle of the exercise of ancillary powers rules out the existence of any power than minimum. Secondly, that even assuming that the first one is not correct, then in any case, the Magistrate has a wide discretion in the matter and the girl could have been given in the custody of some one else, also of her own choice. With regard to the first submission we may state that no case has been brought to our notice where it has been held that it is the minimum which can he exercised as an ancillary power. The doctrine of ancillary powers has been stated in Broom's Legal Maxim, 9th Edn., at page 311 in the following words: "It is a rule that when the law commands a thing to be done, it authorises the performance of whatever may be necessary for executing its command." In Bane v. Methuen, 2 Bing 63 the argument advanced was that when a statute gives a justice of peace jurisdiction over an offence, it impliedly gives him power to apprehend forthwith (instead of merely summoning) but he should in the first instance send a summons and not a warrant. This submission was overruled and it was held that even if a warrant is issued, it would not be in excess of the implied ancillary power. 5. This submission was overruled and it was held that even if a warrant is issued, it would not be in excess of the implied ancillary power. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners then contended that by virtue of the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, no person shall be deprived of his right of life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. The submission was that in support of the exercise of implied powers, there must be an express provision to justify the exercise of that power. We are of the opinion that Article 21 of the Constitution is not infringed because, in our judgment, Sec. 17(2) of the Act is wide enough to include the power to pass orders in respect of the interim custody of the girl who is rescued under Sec. 16 of the Act. Consequently, the order would be protected by the words "according to procedure established by law" occurring in Article 21 itself. Reliance was placed upon A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27 and the following passage was brought to our notice: "However, the correct question is what is the right given by Article 21? The only right is that no person shall be deprived of his life or liberty except according to procedure established by law. One may like that right to cover a larger area, but to give such a right is not the function of the Court; it is the function of the Constitution. To read the word `law' as meaning rules of natural justice will lend one in difficulties because the rules of natural justice, as regards procedure, are nowhere defined and in my opinion the Constitution cannot be read as laying down a vague standard. This is particularly so when in omitting to adopt "due process of law" it was considered that the expression "procedure established by law" made the standard specific. It cannot be specific except by reading the expression as meaning procedure prescribed by the legislature." (italicised by us). The learned counsel contended that the words italicised clearly amount to saying that the procedure established must be one which is express and not which can be implied. He relied upon the meaning of the word `prescribed' in Webster's Dictionary, 2nd Edn., Vol. The learned counsel contended that the words italicised clearly amount to saying that the procedure established must be one which is express and not which can be implied. He relied upon the meaning of the word `prescribed' in Webster's Dictionary, 2nd Edn., Vol. 3 which amongst others, is to the following effect: "to write, to foretell or make a prophecy in writing." Learned counsel contends that it is an essential requirement of "prescribed" that it must be in writing and has submitted that for that reason the observations of the Supreme Court should be construed to mean that the law of the land requires that the "procedure established by law" must be one which expressly, in writing, provides for a particular thing and that all implied powers are excluded. We are unable to agree with the learned counsel and, in our judgment, that is not the effect of what their Lordships have said in the case mentioned above. Besides, the implied powers also are gathered from the words used. Therefore, even if it be held, though we see no reason to hold it, that the expression "procedure established by law" means only procedure provided for in writing, there would be no difficulty in concluding that in the present case there is no infringement of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is well established that implied powers are as effective as the express ones. Maxwell in his Treatise on Interpretation of Statutes at page 361 10th Edn., has stated as follows: "Where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution. Cui jurisdictio data est, ea quoque concessa esse videntur, sine quibus jurisdictio expliearl non potuit. Thus an Act which empowered justices to require persons to take an oath as special constables, and gave them jurisdiction to inquire into an offence, impliedly empowered them to apprehend the persons who unlawfully failed to attend before them for those purposes. Otherwise, the jurisdiction could not be effectually exercised." We are, therefore, unable to agree with the learned counsel with regard to their first submission. With regard to the second submission, it is admitted that that relates to the merits of the order and not to its legality. 6. After the judgment had been dictated thus far, Mr. Otherwise, the jurisdiction could not be effectually exercised." We are, therefore, unable to agree with the learned counsel with regard to their first submission. With regard to the second submission, it is admitted that that relates to the merits of the order and not to its legality. 6. After the judgment had been dictated thus far, Mr. Khare, the learned counsel for the petitioners in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 1790 of 1960 made a statement that he withdraws his second submission i.e., with regard to the constitutionality of the provisions of the Act in general and that of Sec. 17 in particular on the ground that they infringe Articles 14, 19, 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. In view of this withdrawal, we are not called upon to adjudicate in respect of the second submission of Mr. Khare. We find that the petitions are devoid of all merits and are liable to be dismissed. We would, however, like to observe that the provisions of Sec. 17(2) of the Act clearly contemplate a speedy enquiry. An enquiry under that section is neither complicated nor an elaborate one and it will be in the interest of justice that such cases are decided expeditiously keeping in view not only the provisions of the Act but also the rights of the parties and after giving them reasonable opportunity of producing their evidence. The petitions are dismissed but there is no order as to costs. This judgment governs Criminal Misc. Case No. 1790 of 1962 also.