ORDER : Ram Niranjan, husband of Sm. Amravati, was the owner of the property in dispute. He died leaving his wife Sm. Amravati and a daughter. Lal Chand, a collateral of Ram Niranjan, set up a deed of gift alleged to have been executed by Sm. Amravati. She filed suit No. 490 of 1957 in the Court of Munsif, Gyanpur, for cancellation of the deed of gift, on the allegation that She had not executed any deed of gift and She was in possession of the property. The suit was decreed on the 22nd September, 1960, Sm. Amravati was held to be in possession of the property. Lal Chand filed an appeal which is still pending. On the 14th November, 1960 Sm. Amravati made an application under Section 145 Cr. P. C. on the allegation that Lal Chand wanted to obtain forcibie possession and there was an apprehension of the breach of the peace. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate called for a report from the police which reported on the 12th February, 1961 that there was an apprehension of the breach of the peace between the parties. Acting on the police report the Sub-Divisional Magistrate made a preliminary order of attachment on the 1st March, 1961. 2. In spite of the decision of the Munsif holding Sm. Amravati to be in possession of the property, Lal Chand contested the possession of Sm. Amravati. Therefore the parties were required to file affidavits in support of their respective contentions. On a consideration of the affidavits, and particularly the decision of the Munsif, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate came to the conclusion that Sm. Amravati had been in possession of the property. He therefore made an order under Section 145 (6) Cr. P. C. declaring Sm. Amravati to be entitled to possession until her eviction in due course of law and forbidding all interference with her possession. 3. Lal Chand made an application in revision to the Sessions Judge, Gyanpur. In the opinion of the learned Sessions Judge the affidavits were not properly verified and could not be read in evidence, and as the appeal filed by Lal Chand was pending the proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C. were not maintainable. He has therefore made this reference for setting aside the order of the Magistrate. 4. Neither party has disputed the opinion of the learned Sessions Judge that the affidavits were not properly verified. P. C. were not maintainable. He has therefore made this reference for setting aside the order of the Magistrate. 4. Neither party has disputed the opinion of the learned Sessions Judge that the affidavits were not properly verified. The result is that the affidavits could not be read in evidence. However, there was the decision of the Munsif in favour of Sm. Amravati in which it was held that she was in possession of the property. The decision was given on the 22nd December, 1960. It is true that Lal Chand has filed an appeal against that decision, but a decision of a competent Court does not lose its force merely because an appeal has been filed. The decision was not so remote in point of time from the date of the preliminary order that in determining the possession of the parties effect could not be given to it. The Magistrate was therefore perfectly right in holding on the basis of the decision of the Munsif that Sm. Amravati was in possession of the property. 5. Subject to the decision of the appeal, the rights of the parties had been determined by a competent Court. It is the duty of the Magistrate to maintain the rights of the parties when such rights have been determined by a competent Court within a time not remote from that of his taking proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C. The Magistrate has no right to compel a party who has obtained a decree from a civil Court in respect of the property to go back to the civil Court and get something else. What the Magistrate has done in this case is only to give effect to the decision of a competent Court, and he was perfectly right in doing so. It was held in Chandeshwar Prasad Narayan v. Dwarka Singh, AIR 1937 Pat 557 that the criminal Court under Section 145 is bound to support persons placed in possession of property by the civil Court and whose possession has been wrongly disturbed. Magistrates are bound not only to look into events occurring within two months of the date when the proceedings were drawn up but they should consider the whole history of the dispute from the date when a party was put in possession by the civil Court. Magistrates are bound not only to look into events occurring within two months of the date when the proceedings were drawn up but they should consider the whole history of the dispute from the date when a party was put in possession by the civil Court. A similar view was taken by a Full Bench of the Hyderabad High Court in Tekchand v. Sabir Hussain, (S) AIR 1955 Hyd 65 (FB). This Court held in Saheb Khan v. State, 1956 All WR (H.C.) 130 that where the rights have been determined it is the duty of the criminal Court to enforce it, and if any person wrongfully deprives a person of such right and possession, the rights of the rightful person should be recognised and enforced. 6. In the order of reference reliance has been placed upon a decision of the Mysore High Court in Malkappa v. Padmanna, AIR 1959 Mys 122. There it was observed that the provisions of Section 145 should not be invoked when civil litigation about the identical subject-matter is pending. When there is a choice between Section 145 and Section 107 before a Magistrate by reason of the pendency of the Civil litigation, he must choose Section 107 and not Section 145 Cr. P. C. Almost a similar view has been taken in Bipta v. Dwarka, 1961 All LJ 873. Where civil litigation is pending the more appropriate course would certainly be to take proceedings under Section 107 Cr. P. C., but in the instant case the rights of the parties had been determined by a competent Court although an appeal was pending. The Magistrate had a choice between drawing up proceedings under either of the Sections 145 and 107 Cr. P. C., and if in the circumstances of the case he preferred to take action under Section 145 Cr. P. C. and in doing so maintained the fights of the parties as determined by a competent Court, no interference in revision which would neutralise the effect of the decree of a competent Court will be justified. 7. The reference is therefore rejected. Reference rejected.