JUDGMENT 1. THE petitioner is the trustee of premises No. 133b, Shyama Prosad Mukherjee Road, Calcutta, which is a trust property. According to the petitioner she let out part of the premises, in the ground floor, to her son Sunil Kumar Das Gupta, opposite party No. 5 in this Rule who in his turn sub-let one hall and one room, out of the portion let to him, to Naranarayan Ghosh, opposite party No. 4. 2. NARANARAYAN Ghosh, however, in his affidavit-in-opposition, denies the case as made by the petitioner. He says that he is the Secretary of Naranarayan Institute of Culture, an institution for the teaching of dancing and music to girls. In such capacity, he obtained a lease from month to month of one hall, one room, a privy and a bath, in the ground floor of premises No. 133b, Shyama Prosad Mukherjee Road, from the petitioner directly, some time in the year 1952. He further says that the lease was taken for accommodation of Naranarayan Institute of Culture, an institution registered under the Societies Registration act and aided by the Education Department of the State Government as an institution for imparting education in music and dancing. He makes a definite case that the tenancy consisted not only of a hall and a room but also of a privy and a bath. By an order made under section 3 (1) of the West Bengal Premises Requisition and Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1947, one hall, one room, one privy and a bath, in occupation of Naranarayan Institute of Culture was requisitioned for a public purpose. The order bears the date November 7, 1958. In the affidavit-in-opposition of the respondent Land Acquisition Collector, the nature of the public purpose is: admitted to be "accommodation of the Naranarayan Institute of Culture, which is a public institution for training of dancing and music." 3. THERE is considerable dispute as to whether the bath room was in occupation of the Naranarayan Institute of Culture. According to the petitioner there was no bath room included within the tenancy. According to the affidavit-in-opposition of Naranarayan Ghosh, opposite party No. 4, the bath room formed part of the tenancy. THERE is considerable dispute as to whether the bath room was in occupation of the Naranarayan Institute of Culture. According to the petitioner there was no bath room included within the tenancy. According to the affidavit-in-opposition of Naranarayan Ghosh, opposite party No. 4, the bath room formed part of the tenancy. The Land Acquisition Collector, in his affidavit-in-opposition, states that the possession of the bath room was taken on November 7, 1958 and was made over to the institution but subsequently the petitioner forcibly dispossessed the allottee institution and locked the bathroom and privy under requisition. He goes on to say further: "a notice under section 4 (1) (a) of the Act was served on her on 24-12-58 directing her to hand over possession of the said bath and privy by 5-1-59. The petitioner refused to accept the said notice and the same was, therefore, served by hanging on the outer-door of her residence. But in spite of service of the said notice by hanging the petitioner did not hand over possession of the bath and privy and these were kept under lock and key. As this caused difficulties and inconvenience in the running of the said school meant for girls, Government by an order dated 3-3-59 directed the First Land Acquisition Collector to take over possession of the said bath and privy, under section 9 of the Act, with Police help. Accordingly, possession of the privy and bath was taken over by ' breaking open the lock on 5-3-59 and was made over to the said Naranarayan Institute of Culture. It was then found that the bath room had been completely demolished by the petitioner. She was, therefore, served with a notice dated 27-5-59, under section 4 (1) (b) of the Act, by registered post to reconstruct the bath room which was intentionally demolished by her during her temporary forcible occupation, with the object of creating inconvenience to the school and to force the Government to release the property from requisition." 4. THE statement as to demolition of bath room is not expressly denied in the affidavit-in-reply, although there is a general statement in the said affidavit that there was no bath at all. THE statement as to demolition of bath room is not expressly denied in the affidavit-in-reply, although there is a general statement in the said affidavit that there was no bath at all. Aggrieved by the order of requisition and the subsequent order for reconstruction of the bath room, the petitioner moved this Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution, praying that the two orders be quashed and the respondents be restrained from enforcing the said two orders against her. She obtained the present Rule. Mr. Prodyat Kumar Banerjee, learned Advocate for the petitioner, argued a three-fold proposition for my consideration. He contended, in the first place, that Naranarayan Institute of culture was a private profit-making institution and requisition for the purpose of such an institution cannot be a public purpose, justifying requisition under the Act. He contended, in the next place, that Naranarayan Institute of Culture was already in occupation of the requisitioned premises excepting the bath room and there could be no imaginable necessity for accommodating the institution in the premises already occupied by it. He contended lastly that the bath room formed no part of the tenancy and further that under the Act no order for reconstruction of the bath room could be made. 5. IN trying to repel the first two branches of the argument made on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. Nirmal Chandra Chakravarti, learned Government Pleader, contended that the Institute was a public institution for training of dancing and music and that requisitioning for the purpose of such an institution was a public purpose, within the meaning of the Act. In support of his contention that the institution was a public institution he submitted that inasmuch as the Institute was registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and exempted, by the Income-tax Department, under section 15b of the Indian Income-tax Act and also recommended for exemption, by the Education Department, from payment of amusement tax in respect of its drama performances, it must be a public institution. He also submitted, relying on a passage in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Vol. 3, page 2392, that all libraries, museums, institutions for the promotion of science and art, colleges and schools were public institutions and Naranarayan Institute of Culture being an institution for promotion of art was undoubtedly a public institution. 6. THE argument made by Mr. Chakravarti is not very well conceived. 3, page 2392, that all libraries, museums, institutions for the promotion of science and art, colleges and schools were public institutions and Naranarayan Institute of Culture being an institution for promotion of art was undoubtedly a public institution. 6. THE argument made by Mr. Chakravarti is not very well conceived. Under section 1 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 any seven or more persons associated for any literary, scientific or charitable purpose, or for any such purpose as described in section 15 of the Act itself, may, by subscribing their names to a memorandum of association and filing the same with the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies, form themselves into a society under the Act. A society formed under the Societies Registration Act need not necessarily be a public society. It may be a private society of the persons forming the society. Therefore, the fact that the Institute is a registered society is not a relevant circumstance. Then again, exemption granted in respect of donations to funds or institutions established for charitable purposes (which includes education), under section 15b of the Indian Income-tax Act, does not convert the institution itself into a public institution, if such an institution is not otherwise a public institution. So also is the case with exemption from payment of amusement tax. The passage from Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, relied on by Mr. Chakravarti, is to the following effect: "public institutions, such as libraries, museums, institutions for the promotion of Science and Art, colleges and schools" section 2 Charitable Gifts, Duties Exemption (New Zealand) Act, 1883. " I do not understand haw the illustration given in the New Zealand Act helps Mr. Chakravarty. Libraries, museums, institutions for promotion of science and art, colleges and schools may be public institutions but the passage relied upon by Mr. Chakravarty, does not support the proposition that all libraries, museums, institutions for promotion of science and art, colleges and schools must be, by description alone, public institutions. The tests relied upon by Mr. Chakravarty are not very relevant, as I have already observed. 7. THE question when and how an educational institution becomes a public institution is not free from difficulty. Dealing with public school Fry, L. J. observed in the case of Blake v. The Mayor and Citizens of the City of London (1) [ (1887) 19 Q. B. D. 79 (82)]. Chakravarty are not very relevant, as I have already observed. 7. THE question when and how an educational institution becomes a public institution is not free from difficulty. Dealing with public school Fry, L. J. observed in the case of Blake v. The Mayor and Citizens of the City of London (1) [ (1887) 19 Q. B. D. 79 (82)]. "it seems to me that it would be unwise to endeavour to lay down any definition in the sense of saying what would or would not be a public school in all cases; but I think that the school in this case has certain characteristics which denote a public school. It has a perpetual foundation: a portion of its income is derived from charity: it is managed by a public body: no private person has any interest in the school: no profit was or is in the contemplation of the founders or managers: and lastly, the object of the school is the benefit of a large class of parsons. All these circumstances concurring, I think this institution may be said to be a public school" 8. AND in the case of Dilworth v. The Commissioner of Stamps (2) (1889) A. C. 99 (108 and 109), Lord Watson observed:- "schools founded or maintained by the community, and managed by its representatives, are clearly public, while schools conducted by individuals for their own emolument are as clearly private. All schools, whether public or private in the strictest sense of the words, which have a reasonably large attendance of scholars have one feature in common. They give instruction to the public, or, in other words, to the children of different sections of. the public; and the character of the school, as public or private must depend, not upon the scholars to whom education is given, but upon the terms on which and the circumstances in which education is given. Their Lordships have come to the conclusion not without hesitation, owing to the view taken by the Courts below, that the Ulster Institute, as designed by its founder, does answer the description of a public institution such as a school. Their Lordships have come to the conclusion not without hesitation, owing to the view taken by the Courts below, that the Ulster Institute, as designed by its founder, does answer the description of a public institution such as a school. It appears to them that, if the testator had directed his trustees forthwith to hand/over the administration and management of the Ulster Institute to a public body in New Zealand, or if he had made his bequest directly to such public body for the same purposes, the institute would necessarily have been regarded as a public and not as a private institution. What he has directed to be done is in substance the same thing. His trustees, to whom ho has delegated the duty of building the institute and of superintending its administration, are his trustees in this sense only-that he appointed them. They have no personal interest in the residue, which they hold only for be hoof of those children, members of the public, whom he has directed them from time to time to select as the beneficiaries under the trust. The bequest is an educational endowment in perpetuity, and the beneficial interest in it is not vested in any private person, but belongs inalienably to the public. Such being the character of the charity founded by the testator, their Lordships do not think that the inmates of the Dilworth Ulster Institute could with propriety be described as the recipients of private education. " None of the distinguishing features mentioned in Dilworth's case (supra) was pleaded or established in respect of the Institute, with which I am concerned in this case. I, therefore, do not find any substance in the argument of Mr. Chakravarty that the Institute is a public institution. Faced with this difficulty Mr. Chakravarty took a modified stand and contended that although the Institute may not be a public institution yet then it was sub-serving the cause of public education in a particular branch of art and as such requisition for its purpose was public purpose. 9. THE expression 'public purpose' is not easy to define. Faced with this difficulty Mr. Chakravarty took a modified stand and contended that although the Institute may not be a public institution yet then it was sub-serving the cause of public education in a particular branch of art and as such requisition for its purpose was public purpose. 9. THE expression 'public purpose' is not easy to define. In the case of State of Bihar v. Sir Kameswar Singh (3) (A. I. R. 1952 S. C. 252) the Supreme Court very appositely observed:- "the definition of the expression 'public purpose' is elastic and takes its colour from the Statute in which it occurs, the concept varying with the time and state of society and its needs. " 10. THE expression 'public purpose' includes purposes for advancement of public prosperity, public welfare and public convenience. The word 'public' connotes the general public as well as a section of the public and a purpose may be a public purpose even though the purpose does not benefit all the members of the public but only a section of it. In the matter of acquisition or requisition for a private individual or a private body, there may be a public purpose involved provided the acquisition or requisition ultimately serves a public purpose. But it must always be borne in mind that whatever public purpose may mean, it must involve a purpose which aims at serving the general interest of the community or a section thereof as opposed to a particular interest of an individual or a private body. A requisition of premises for a private dancing and music school may be a public purpose, if it sub-serves a public interest. But because the institution is a dancing and music school, a requisition for its purpose need not necessarily be a public purpose. If the institution is a private profit-making institution, a requisition of premises for its private purposes should not be made under the Act, for the simple reason that it involves no public purpose. 11. IT is now well settled that the existence of a public purpose for requisition under the Act is justiciable before a court of law (vide Satya Natayan v. State of West Bengal (4) 61 C. W. N., (1957) 420). From the facts disclosed in the affidavit-in-opposition it is difficult for me to hold, without more, that the requisition was for a public purpose. From the facts disclosed in the affidavit-in-opposition it is difficult for me to hold, without more, that the requisition was for a public purpose. The purpose disclosed in the affidavit-in-opposition of the Land Acquisition Collector was the purpose of providing accommodation for the Naranarayan Institute of Culture. But that institution was already in occupation of the requisitioned portion of the premises. The Land Acquisition Collector in his affidavit-in-opposition does not say why it became necessary to requisition the portion of the premises of which the Institute was already in occupation as a tenant. Naranarayan Ghose, opposite party No. 4, in his affidavit-in-opposition, however, states as follows:- "some time in August, 1958, the opposite party No. 5, Sunil Das Gupta, (son of the petitioner) threatened to oust the school from the premises and even broke the lock of the bath room causing tremendous inconvenience to the girl students and the staff for which a criminal case under s. 144 Cr. Pro. Code was started and he was restrained under sec. 144 for two months. Being apprehensive of the threatening attitude of the said Sunil Das Gupta and his attempts to cause inconvenience to the staff and more particularly to the girl students by preventing them from using the bath room which was exclusively used by the school, and in order to save the school from ruination the deponent approached the Government to requisition the portion of the premises in which the school was running. " 12. MR. Chakravarty, learned Government Pleader, himself relied on the said passage of the affidavit-in-opposition of Naranarayan Ghose, as disclosing the true reason behind the requisition. That falsifies the reason for the requisition, namely, securing accommodation for the Institute as disclosed in the affidavit-in-opposition of the Land Acquisition Collector. If the real reason for the requisition was helping a tenant private body in its quarrel with the landlord, the purpose of requisition cannot be a public purpose. This is all the more so, because I am not sure, on the materials before me, who was actually at fault in the quarrel. On the materials before me I am also not satisfied that the Naranarayan Institute of Culture is not a private profit-making concern. I cannot, therefore, hold that the requisition for its purpose was a public purpose. Mr. On the materials before me I am also not satisfied that the Naranarayan Institute of Culture is not a private profit-making concern. I cannot, therefore, hold that the requisition for its purpose was a public purpose. Mr. Chakravarty strenuously argued that the order for requisition was made on November, 7, 1958 and the Rule was obtained on September 22, 1959. This delay, he contended, disentitled the petitioner from obtaining any relief by way of a high prerogative writ. This argument ignored the fact that the son of the petitioner, Sunil Das Gupta, claiming to be a tenant of the first degree of the disputed premises moved against the order as far back as May 12, 1959 and obtained a Rule being Civil Rule No. 1455 of 1959. In that Rule the petitioner was made a party respondent, on September 21, 1959, without prejudice to any other application which the petitioner may make. Thereafter she made the present application on the very next day. For the reasons aforesaid I do not make much of the argument based on delay. In the facts and circumstances of the case I cannot sustain the order of requisition. I, therefore, command the respondents Nos. 1 to 3 not to give further effect to the order and also formally to derequisition the disputed premises. Since the order of requisition is set aside, it is not necessary for me to deal with the order for reconstruction of the bath room. That order becomes ineffective with the setting aside of the order for requisition. Let a Writ of Mandamus accordingly issue. This Rule is made absolute with costs to be paid by respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 to the petitioner-hearing fee being assessed at five gold mohurs.