Judgment :- 1. This Revision Petition has been filed by the accused in C.C. 358/60 on the file of the Sub Divisional Magistrate of Quilon. The prosecution was started on a private complaint launched by Pw. 1, the Director of a limited concern by name "N.C. John & Sons Ltd.," Alleppey. The accused was the Manager of the said concern at its Mangad branch. The firm deals in coir business. The head office used to send money to the branch managers to purchase coir from local customers. They had to maintain proper accounts of the monies received and expended in the purchase of coir. For July 1960 Pw.1 noticed that the accused was neither sending coir nor statements of accounts to the head office and suspecting that there was something wrong, he visited the branch office on 18-8-1960. The accused was not available and the office was closed. Pw. 2 the watch-man could give no information about his whereabouts and Pw.1 gave information to the Kundara Police Station. The police registered a case and had the room opened and seized the account books maintained in the office and entrusted the same to the complainant. After investigation no charge sheet was laid by the police and so Pw.1 filed a private complaint. 2. The specific charges against the accused were that on 31-12-59 the accused was entrusted with a sum of Rs. 2,500/- duly acknowledged by him, but in Ext. P2 the Day Book kept by him in the Branch office only a sum of Rs. 2000/- was entered as having been received and thereby he had misappropriated Rs. 500/-. Again on 25-1-1960 the accused had received a sum of Rs. 15,000/- by telegraphic transfer through the Quilon branch of the Travancore Bank and acknowledged its receipt to the head office, but in Ext. P2 he had entered only Rs. 10,000/- and thus misappropriated the balance of Rs. 5000/-. Thirdly, on 25-4-60 the accused admittedly received a sum of Rs. 50/- from the head office, but the amount was not at all entered in the account book. Charges were framed against him for criminal breach of trust and falsification of accounts. 3. The accused when questioned admitted that he had received these amounts, but according to him he had properly accounted these amounts in Ext. D2, an account book maintained by him in the office. Ext. Charges were framed against him for criminal breach of trust and falsification of accounts. 3. The accused when questioned admitted that he had received these amounts, but according to him he had properly accounted these amounts in Ext. D2, an account book maintained by him in the office. Ext. P2, according to the accused, was only a rough book kept by Pw. 5 a clerk employed in the office for amounts entrusted to him by the accused. The learned Magistrate rejected this explanation of the accused and found him guilty of the offences charged and convicted him. On appeal to the Additional Sessions judge the conviction and sentence were confirmed and the accused has taken up the matter in revision. 4. As stated already there is no dispute regarding the entrustment of the monies to the accused. The only question that remains to be considered is whether the accused could be said to have misappropriated the amounts and falsified the accounts. Ordinarily, if a person receives money which he is bound to account for and does not do so, he is prima facie guilty of the offence. Where money is entrusted for a particular purpose the owner cannot know that it has been misappropriated until the person to whom it has been entrusted fails to account for it. In the case in Krishna Kumar v. Union of India (AIR. 1959 SC. 1390) it is stated: "It is not necessary or possible in every case to prove in what precise manner the accused person has dealt with or appropriated the goods of his master. The question is one of intention and not a matter of direct proof but giving a false account of what he has done with the goods received by him may be treated a strong circumstance against the accused person. In the case of a servant charged with misappropriating the goods of his master the elements of criminal offence of misappropriation will be established if the prosecution proves that the servant received the goods, that he was under a duty to account to his master and had not done so. If the failure to account was due to an accidental loss then the facts being within the servant's knowledge, it is for him to explain the loss. If the failure to account was due to an accidental loss then the facts being within the servant's knowledge, it is for him to explain the loss. It is not the law of this country that the prosecution has to eliminate all possible defences or circumstances which may exonerate him. If these facts are within the knowledge of the accused then he has to prove them. Of course the prosecution has to establish a prima facie case in the first instance. It is not enough to establish facts which give rise to a suspicion and then by reason of S.106 of the Evidence Act to throw the onus on him to prove his innocence," To the same effect is the decision in Jaikrishnadas Manchardas Desai v. State of Bombay (AIR. 1960 SC. 889) where it is stated: "To establish a charge of criminal breach of trust, the prosecution is not obliged to prove the precise mode of conversion, misappropriation or misapplication by the accused of the property entrusted to him or over which he has dominion. The principal ingredient of the offence being dishonest misappropriation or conversion which may not ordinarily be a matter of direct proof, entrustment of property and failure, in breach of an obligation, to account for the property entrusted, if proved, may in the light of other circumstances, justifiably lead to an inference of dishonest misappropriation or conversion. Conviction of a person for the offence of criminal breach of trust may not, in all cases, be founded merely on his failure to account for the property entrusted to him, or over which he has dominion, even when a duty to account is imposed upon him, but where he is unable to account or renders an explanation for his failure to account which is untrue, an inference of misappropriation with dishonest intent may readily be made." 5. Now the accused's case is that the amount has not been misappropriated by him and accounts have not been falsified because the actual sums received were shown in the account book Ext. D2 which also was in the office when the police opened the office. It is true that Ext. D2 was one of the books entrusted to Pw.1 by the Police. The case of the accused is that Ext. P-2 is a rough book wherein the monies entrusted to Pw. 5 alone are entered. D2 which also was in the office when the police opened the office. It is true that Ext. D2 was one of the books entrusted to Pw.1 by the Police. The case of the accused is that Ext. P-2 is a rough book wherein the monies entrusted to Pw. 5 alone are entered. It is curious that when Pw. 6 was examined .there was no such case and he was not asked about it. The entries in the account book Ext. P2 belies this case. In every page the accused has totalled up and initialled. If it is a book kept by Pw. 5 why should the accused have totalled up and signed it. The courts below were, therefore justified in not placing any reliance on Ext. D2 which appears to have been written up at a stretch for purpose of his own, probably to hoodwink the head office. The giving of a false explanation is an element which the court can take into consideration. 6. Then again the fact of the accused closing up his business place and making himself scarce is another circumstance which will legitimately be taken into consideration in finding whether the accused had a guilty mind. In Rex. v. William (1836) 7 C and P 338) Coleridge, J., charged the jury as follows: "The circumstances of the prisoner having quitted her place, and gone off to Ireland, is evidence from which you may infer that she intended to appropriate the money; and if you think that she did so intend, she is guilty of embezzlement." Again, in Beg. v. Lynch (1854) 6 Cox CC 445) Moore, J., said: "You have further the fact that, after getting the money, the prisoner absconded and did not come back till he was in custody. You may infer that he intended to appropriate this money, and if so, he is guilty of embezzlement." 7. The conduct of the accused is also relevant. He did not appear and produce the amount received by him if he had not misappropriated the same, but what was done was the accused and his father presented a petition Ext. P22 to Pw. 6 the father of the complainant. In the petition the accused practically admitted that he had misappropriated the amount including Rs. 5000/- which is the subject matter of the charge. P22 to Pw. 6 the father of the complainant. In the petition the accused practically admitted that he had misappropriated the amount including Rs. 5000/- which is the subject matter of the charge. The learned counsel for the petitioner was at pains to show that the statement is inadmissible being hit by S.24 of the Evidence Act. That section has no application in this case. In the first place the confession has not been made to any person in authority nor is there any evidence of any inducement, threat or promise. Not a single question has been asked to Pw. 6 about any such inducement being offered by him. As agreed to in the petition, the accused assigned certain properties belonging to him to the firm towards the amount misappropriated by him. The cumulative affect of all this evidence is to prove that the amounts had been misappropriated by him and that he had falsified the accounts. The conviction is, therefore, proper and calls for no interference. The conviction and sentence are confirmed and the revision petition is dismissed. Dismissed.