Judgment :- 1. This is a Revision Petition filed by the accused who has been convicted by the Munsiff - Magistrate of Quilandy for an offence punishable under S.19(c) of the General Sales Tax Act - Act XI of 1125 - (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The accused is a grocery merchant in Kollam Bazaar in Quilandy. On 7-9-1960 Pw.1, the Intelligence Officer, Agricultural Income Tax and Sales Tax, North Zone, Kozhikode, with his two Inspectors Pws. 2 and 3 and his Peon Pw. 4 visited the shop of the accused. Certain books of account were produced and they were inspected. There was a Godrej Almirah kept in the shop. On suspicion that the almirah might contain some account books, Pw.1 wanted the accused to open the almirah for his inspection. He also wanted the accused to show his godowns and open them for his inspection. The accused refused to comply with the request. So a formal notice demanding compliance was issued. The accused refused to accept the notice and it had to be served by affixture. Even then the dealer would not open the almirah for inspection and so Pw.1 had to return without inspecting. The accused was therefore, prosecuted. 2. The accused denied commission of the offence and stated that Pw.1 never asked him to open the almirah or asked him to point out the godowns, that the almirah was in fact not locked at all and that a false case had been foisted on him due to personal enmity. The Accountant of the accused was examined as the only witness for the defence. The learned Magistrate rejected the defence evidence, believed the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution and found that the accused had prevented or obstructed inspection as contemplated under S.17 (2) of the Act and convicted the accused of the offence charged and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 50/-. As the sentence is non-appealable this Revision Petition has been filed. 3. That Pw.1 visited the shop, that demand was made to open the almirah for inspection and it was refused has been amply proved by the prosecution. The witnesses have been believed by the courts below and in revision it is not open to the petitioner to challenge this finding. 3. That Pw.1 visited the shop, that demand was made to open the almirah for inspection and it was refused has been amply proved by the prosecution. The witnesses have been believed by the courts below and in revision it is not open to the petitioner to challenge this finding. I have also scrutinised the evidence and I find no reason to differ from the conclusions reached by the learned Magistrate. 4. The learned defence counsel has raised two contentions. Firstly, that what the officers wanted to do was really to exercise the power of search which they did not possess under S.17 of the Act and so the accused was not bound to obey the illegal order, and secondly even if the accused failed to comply with the request it would not amount to "preventing or obstructing" within the meaning of S.19 (c). It is true that the Act has not empowered the officers to effect a search of the premises. If the officers wanted to search they could only move the police officers for a search of the premises or by obtaining a search warrant. But there is no doubt that the officers have the right under S.17 (2) of the Act to inspect the accounts and registers maintained by dealers, the goods in the possession and their officers, shops, godowns etc., and under S.17 (3) the officers have been invested with the power of entry into any shop for the purposes referred to in sub-section (2). 5. In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-sections (1) and (2) of S.17, the Government by notification H3-15451/57/PD dated 2-11-1957 have authorised the Intelligence Officers and Intelligence Inspectors to inspect at all reasonable times the accounts and registers maintained by dealers in the ordinary course of their business, the goods in their possession and their officers, shops, godowns etc., where the accounts, registers or goods belonging to any dealer are expected to be found. It is by virtue of this power that Pw. 1 with his Inspectors went to the shop of the accused. They examined the account books which had been produced by the accused from the table and a box in the shop. There was an almirah in the shop. It is by virtue of this power that Pw. 1 with his Inspectors went to the shop of the accused. They examined the account books which had been produced by the accused from the table and a box in the shop. There was an almirah in the shop. Pw.1 suspected that accounts and registers may be found in that and asked the accused to open the almirah and make it available for inspection which he had a right to demand. The accused refused to do so and therefore Pw.1 made a written demand. There is no reason to doubt the evidence of Pws.1 to 4. 6. Now the only question that arises is whether the act of the accused would amount to 'prevention or obstruction' of inspection in contravention of S.17. The learned counsel would argue that in the absence of any evidence that the accused blocked access to the almirah or that he did any overt act, it could not be said that there was any obstruction and a case of non-co-operation in not having given facilities to inspect would not amount to obstruction. The learned counsel has pointed out certain decisions arising out of prosecution, under S.186 of the Penal Code. I may in this connection refer to the decision of this court in Raman Namboodiri v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Manjeri (1958 KLT. 79), where it was stated: "To constitute an offence punishable under S.186 of the Penal Code the prosecution has to make out that the accused voluntarily obstructed a public servant in the discharge of his public functions. But the rigour of this section has been considerably diluted and even taken away by the corresponding provision in Cl. (c) of S.15 of the Sales tax Act. To attract this clause it is sufficient that an officer authorised under S.14 has been prevented or obstructed from entering the shop and conducting the inspection contemplated by S.14. It is not necessary that force or violence should have been used in preventing or obstructing such entry or inspection. All that is necessary is that the entry or inspection should have been effectively prevented or obstructed." I am in respectful agreement with this view. 7. It is not necessary that force or violence should have been used in preventing or obstructing such entry or inspection. All that is necessary is that the entry or inspection should have been effectively prevented or obstructed." I am in respectful agreement with this view. 7. S.19 (c) speaks not only of obstruction but also of prevention and I have no doubt in my mind that what the accused did in this case was, at any rate, "preventing" the right of inspection under S.17 (2), which would amount to an offence under S.19(c) of the Act. The conviction and sentence of the accused are, therefore, correct and call for no interference. The Revision Petition is dismissed. Dismissed.