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Allahabad High Court · body

1962 DIGILAW 26 (ALL)

Juthan Singh v. Badri

1962-01-31

W.BROOME

body1962
JUDGMENT W. Broome, J. - These two connected writ petitions are directed against orders passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer of Chandoli (District Banaras) on 13-3-1954, allowing an application under Section 232 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act that had been filed by opposite-parties 1 and 2, and against the subsequent orders of the Additional Commissioner, Banaras, and of the Board of Revenue confirming that decision. 2. The basic facts are admitted. Opposite-Parties 1 and 2 were recorded as occupant of the land in suit in the year 1356 Fasli and acquired Adhivasi rights therein by virtue of Sec. 20(b) of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. In 1359 Fasli, however, the petitioners were in possession of the land, opposite-parties 1 and 2 having been ejected in execution of a decree obtained against them by the landholder under Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act. The petitioners therefore claim adhivasi rights under Section 3 of the U.P. Land Reforms (Supplementary) Act, 1952. 3. The question is which of the rival sets of adhivasis is entitled to hold possession of the land in suit. The view taken by the S.D.O., the Additional Commissioner and the Board of Revenue is that the Adhivasis who obtained their rights under Section 20 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act have a preferential claim as against those who claim Adhivasi rights under the subsequent Act of 1952. It seems to me, however, that this view is fundamentally wrong. If the subsequent Act of 1952 creates rights that conflict and are inconsistent with rights created by the earlier Act of 1950, the provisions of the earlier Act must be treated as having been repeated by the later Act to the extent of that inconsistency. A perusal of Secs. 2 and 3 of the Supplementary Act of 1952 will show moreover that the rights conferred by Section 3 of that Act were meant to override any rights to possession that might have accrued to other persons earlier. A perusal of Secs. 2 and 3 of the Supplementary Act of 1952 will show moreover that the rights conferred by Section 3 of that Act were meant to override any rights to possession that might have accrued to other persons earlier. This Act is declared to apply to all land (other than grove-land) of which any person has become Bhumidhar or Sirdar under Section 18 or 19 or Adhivasi under Section 20 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and provides that any person in actual cultivatory possession of such land in 1359 Fasli, who is not already Bhumidhar, Sirdar, Adhivasi or Asami, shall become Adhivasi (or Asami, as the case may be) and shall be entitled to all the rights conferred on an Adhivasi (or an Asami) by the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The Supplementary Act thus contemplates a situation where there is land in which one person has become Adhivasi under Section 20 of the earlier Act but which is in the actual possession of another person in 1359 Fasli; and in such circumstances it gives the rights of Adhivasi (involving the right to retain or regain possession of the land) to that second person. I am satisfied therefore that a person acquiring Adhivasi rights under the U.P. Land Reforms (Supplementary) Act, 1952, is entitled to possession of the land in preference to a person who acquired Adhivasi rights in that land under Section 20 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. 4. On behalf of the contesting respondents, however, reliance is placed on the saving clause comprised in Section 6 of the U.P. Land Reforms (Supplementary) Act, the relevant portion of which runs as follows :- "6. Nothing in this Act apply to any land in respect of which - (1)............................. (ii) a decree for possession had been passed and become final on or before the said date (i.e. 30-6-1952)." In the present cases it is admitted that decrees for possession under Section 180 were passed against opposite parties I and 2 in respect of the land in suit in the year 1950, which became final before 30-6-1952; and it is argued that by virtue of the above-quoted section no Adhivasi rights can accrue under Sec.3 of the Supplementary Act in respect of this land. 5. 5. It has to be conceded that on a superficial reading of Section 6 of the Supplementary Act the acquisition of Adhivasi rights by the petitioners would seem to be barred by the decrees for possession obtained earlier against opposite-parties 1 and 2 in respect of this land. I am satisfied, however, that the words used in Cl. (a) (ii) of Section 6 are not to be construed in such a wide fashion as to include decrees for possession obtained against all the sundry, for to do so would lead us into patent absurdity. Even a decree passed 50 years earlier, against some other party who is no longer interested in the land at all, would according to that interpretation operate as a bar to the acquisition of Adhivasi rights by the actual occupant in 1359 Fasli; and I find it impossible to believe that this result could ever have been intended by the Legislature. In my view sub-Cl. (a) (ii) of Section 6 must be construed as referring only to decrees for possession obtained against the person who claims to be entitled to adhivasi rights under Sec. 3. This interpretation has the advantage of being in consonance with the avowed objects and reasons for which the Supplementary Act was passed, viz. to protect persons in cultivatory possession of land who have been removed been or are being forcibly evicted. The Act was meant to protect the rights of those in danger of being evicted by force, but made an exception (in Sec. 6) to exclude from its purview those who were being evicted in regular legal proceedings. 6. I conclude, therefore, that the petitioners are entitled to possession of the land in suit as Adhivasis under Section 3 of the U.P. Land Reforms Act and that Sec. of the Act does not operate as a bar to their acquisition of such rights, no decree for possession having been passed against them. 7. These petitioners are accordingly allowed with costs against the contesting respondents, and the orders of the S.D.O., the Additional Commissioner and the Board of Revenue, dated 13-3-1954, 6-7-1955 and 24-3-1956 respectively are quashed.