Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal filed on behalf of the State against the order of acquittal passed by the Second Class Magistrate of Trichur. The accused in the case was prosecuted for an offence under S.52 and 54 read with S.19 (iv) of the Kerala Police Act, 1960 (Act 5 of 1961) for contravention of the restrictions and regulations made in regard to the use of the sound amplifiers in notification No. F1-478/60 dated 3-5-1960 and for having disobeyed the directions given by the police officer Pw.1 to stop the working of the sound amplifier. 2. On 29-12-61 the accused was found using a sound amplifier and playing recorded speech delivered by Rev. Fr. Vadakkan in the Thozhilali Office causing obstruction to the traffic and creating public nuisance. S.19 (iv) enacts that; "The Superintendent of Police may as occasion requires, subject to any order or direction, if any, issued by the District Magistrate xxx xxx xxx xxx (iv) prohibit or regulate the use of music or sound amplifiers ... in any street or public place and in any private place if their use may cause annoyance to neighbours." 3. The learned Magistrate acquitted the accused on the ground that no order has been made under S.19 (iv) of the Kerala Police Act and the notification Ext. P-3 issued by the Superintendent of Police under S.23 (f) of the Travancore-Cochin Police Act cannot be considered as a valid notification, since S.70 (1) of the Act has repealed the Travancore-Cochin Police Act, 1951 and Clause.3 of the section has not preserved or kept alive the notifications passed under the repealed enactment, because the saving clause does not speak of notifications. 4. The question that arises for decision in this appeal is whether the notification Ext. P3 could under S.70 Clause.3 be deemed to have been prescribed, made, conferred and issued under the Kerala Police Act. S. 70 clause (3) reads as follows: "All rules prescribed, appointments made, powers conferred and orders and certificates issued under the enactments referred to in sub-section (1) shall, so far as they are consistent, with this Act, be deemed to have been respectively prescribed, made, conferred and issued hereunder." 5. In the present case the notification Ext. S. 70 clause (3) reads as follows: "All rules prescribed, appointments made, powers conferred and orders and certificates issued under the enactments referred to in sub-section (1) shall, so far as they are consistent, with this Act, be deemed to have been respectively prescribed, made, conferred and issued hereunder." 5. In the present case the notification Ext. P. 3 was issued by the Superintendent of Police in exercise of his powers delegated to him under the Travancore-Cochin Police Act and the order issued by him became a law in force and is saved even though the Travancore-Cochin Police Act has been repealed. 6. I would, in this connection, refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara (AIR. 1951 SC. 318), wherein it was held that a notification containing an order made in exercise of powers given by the Bombay Excise Act has the force of law as if it were made by the Legislature itself. 7. A similar question arose in the decision in Edward Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Ajmer (AIR. 1955 SC. 25). The question before their Lordships of the Supreme Court was whether the notification issued under S.94 (3) of the Government in India Act, 1935 could be said to be a law in force within the meaning of Art.372 (1) of the Constitution. It was contended before them that the order (notification) issued by the Central Government under S.94 (3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 could not be regarded as law in force, within the meaning of Art.372. A distinction was sought to be made in this connection between an 'existing law' as defined in Art.366 (10) and 'law in force' under Art.372, and it was contended that though an 'order' can come within the definition of 'existing law' it cannot be included within the expression 'law in force' as used in Art.372 of the Constitution. Their Lordships rejected this contention in these terms: "We do not think that there is any material difference between an 'existing law' and 'a law in force'. Quite apart from Art.366 (10) of the Constitution, the expression 'Indian Law' has itself been defined in S.3(29) of the General Clauses Act, as meaning any Act, ordinance, regulation rule, order or bye-law which before the commencement of the Constitution had the force of law in any province of India or part thereof. Quite apart from Art.366 (10) of the Constitution, the expression 'Indian Law' has itself been defined in S.3(29) of the General Clauses Act, as meaning any Act, ordinance, regulation rule, order or bye-law which before the commencement of the Constitution had the force of law in any province of India or part thereof. In our opinion, the words 'law in force' as used in Art. 372 are wide enough to include not merely a legislative enactment but also any regulation or order which has the force of law. We agree with Mr. Chaterjee that an order must be a legislative and not an executive order before it can come within the definition of law'. We do not agree with him, however, that the order made by the Governor-General in the present case under S.94 (2) of the Government of India Act is a mere executive order." 8. The decision makes it plain that where an authority is given power to exercise legislative functions by means of an order such an order is legislative in its nature. It, therefore, follows that Ex-P3 is saved by clause (3) of S.70 of the Kerala Police Act. The view taken by the learned Magistrate, is therefore, unsustainable and the order of acquittal passed on this mistaken view has to be set aside. The accused has, therefore, contravened the provisions contained in Ex-P3 and is guilty of the offence charged. The accused is, found guilty and is convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 25/-, in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one week. Time for payment of fine one month from this date. Appeal is allowed. Allowed.