Judgment :- 1. This civil revision petition is directed against an order refusing amendment of the plaint. The suit was for a declaration of the plaintiff's title to and possession of the property described in the schedule annexed to the plaint and for a perpetual injunction restraining the defendant, the State, from dispossessing him. The case put forward was that the property was part of old survey Nos. 34/9, 342 and 40/1 of Elathoor Amsom, Perumthuruthu Desom, which he had purchased in 1940, that he and his predecessor-in-title were in possession of the same for over 75 years, that it was wrongly surveyed as part of R. S. No. 183/3 of Talukulathur Desom in resurvey and that the wrong survey proceedings could not affect his title. The amendment sought to be made was that the disputed property lay between his holding and the river and that it was an accretion to his property to which he became entitled as riparian owner. The court below dismissed the application holding that the proposed amendment would bring in a new cause of action and that the same could not be allowed as such a case was not put forward in the notice under S.80, Code of Civil Procedure, sent by the plaintiff before the institution of the suit and that the application was a belated one. 2. It was urged on behalf of the petitioner that the cause of action was not altered by the proposed amendment and all that the plaintiff wanted to add was an additional ground for declaring his right to the property. I do not think the argument can be accepted. 3. Cause of action has been defined as every fact which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to the judgment of the court, in other words, .the bundle of facts which it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove before he can succeed in the suit. As stated earlier the position taken in the plaint was that the land in dispute was part of his registered holding but what is sought to be alleged by the amendment is an entirely different one, namely, that though it is not part of his registered holding which he purchased in 1940 it is land to which he is entitled as riparian owner. This is totally inconsistent with the case pleaded in the plaint and, if the amendment is allowed, the character of the suit will be changed, introducing a new cause of action. 4. There is also the effect of S.80 of the Code of Civil Procedure to be considered. In Bhagadchand Dagadusa v. Secretary of State (AIR. 1927 P. C. 176) it was held that S.80 was express, explicit and mandatory and admitted of no implication or exception. No doubt, Beaumont, J., held in Chandudal v. Government of Bombay (AIR. 1943 Born. 138) that the section should he construed with some regard to common sense and to the object with which it appears to have been passed. Counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision in Dinbai v. Dominion of India (AIR. 1951 Born. 72) where Chagla, C. J., held that S, 80 must be construed in a liberal way in favour of the' subject and so long as proper notice is given to Government as to the nature of the suit and the facts on which the plaintiffs rely for obtaining the relief which they seek in the suit, the Court must be satisfied that there is proper compliance with the provisions of S.80. That decision has no application to the facts of this case. What the plaintiff had stated in the plaint in that case was that an order of requisition and a later order of acquisition were not bonafide. What was sought to be added by way of amendment was another ground to show that the action of the government was not bonafide. The facts here are entirely different as the claim of title as riparian owner was not alleged in the notice. If the proposed amendment is allowed it will amount to a clear violation of S.80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5. This question came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Dhian Singh Sobha Singh v. Union of India (AIR., 1958 SC. 274) and it was held: "The Privy Council, no doubt, laid down in Bhagchand Dagadusa v. Secretary of State (AIR. 1927 P. C. 176) that the terms of this section should be strictly complied with. That does not however mean that the terms of the notice should be scrutinised in a pedant manner or in a manner completely divorced from commonsense. 1927 P. C. 176) that the terms of this section should be strictly complied with. That does not however mean that the terms of the notice should be scrutinised in a pedant manner or in a manner completely divorced from commonsense. As was stated by Pollock C. B. in Jones v. Nichollas. (1844) 13 M & W 361, "We must import a little commonsense into notices of this kind." "Beaumont, C. J., also observed in Chandu Lal Vadilal v. Government of Bombay, ILR.1943 Born. 128: 'One must construe S.80 with some regard to commonsense and to the object with which it appears to have been passed...." There was a later case on the same point, State of Madras v. C. P. Agencies (AIR. 1960 SC. 1309). The Supreme Court referred to the dictum of the Judicial Committee in Bhagchand Dagadnsa v. Secretary of State (AIR. 1927 P. C. 176) as laying down the law correctly. In that case the point raised by the State of Madras was that it was not clear from the notice whether the plaintiff's claim was based on a contract for the payment of godown rent or on the footing of damages for use and occupation of the plaintiff's godown. It was held on the facts that the claim on the basis of use and occupation was included in the notice under S.80. The decisions of the Supreme Court reported in AIR. 1957 SC. 357 and 363 are not applicable, as the facts here are entirely different. 6. It has also to be stated that the suit was filed in 1953 in the Principal Munsiff's Court, Calicut, the present number having been given when the suit was transferred to the Additional Munsiff's Court. The plaint was amended twice during this period of nine years. It is not alleged why the plaintiff omitted to include this claim in the original plaint. The application for amendment was brought only after the final hearing of the suit. I do not consider this a bonafide application for amendment of the plaint. 7. It follows that the order of the court below must be confirmed. The civil revision petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Dismissed.