This is an appeal against an order of the Commissioner, Ajmer dated 31.10.60, whereby the appellants appeal was dismissed in default. The facts of the case are these. The appellant was defendant in the suit giving rise to this appeal wherein the plaintiffs had sued him for trespass and had prayed for his ejectment with damages. The trial Court decreed the suit for ejectment, but the claim for damages was rejected. From this order both parties appealed, the plaintiffs seeking the decree for damages as well and the defendants praying for the setting aside the decree of ejectment against them. The learned Commissioner, Ajmer heard both the appeals together and disposed of them both by a single judgment pronounced on 31.10.60. The plaintiffs are no longer interested in pursuing their claim for damages and have rested content with the order of the learned Commissioner, but the defendant Bhoora has come up before us against the aforesaid order dated 31.10.60. The learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of the appeal before us. He contends that the order of the learned Commissioner can be deemed to have been passed either under sub-sec.(2) of sec. 235 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act or under the provisions of rule 17 of Order 41 C.P.C. and in both the cases the order would not be appealable. We find no force in this contention. As regards the suggestion that the Order was passed under sub-sec. 2 of sec. 235 of Rajasthan Tenancy Act, we can say without hesitation that it is factually wrong. The suit was admittedly one for ejectment of the trespassers and the trial Courts decision was clearly a decree. A first appeal from decree comes up to the Commissioner under sec. 224 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act and not under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 225 of that Act. Therefore the learned Commissioner was sitting under sec. 224 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act and the bar of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 225 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act is not at all applicable or operation in this case. Taking up the alternative contention of the learned counsel that impugned order is one falling under Rule 17 of order 41, even if we assume it in his favour, the order if not appealable would be revisable. (2) of sec. 225 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act is not at all applicable or operation in this case. Taking up the alternative contention of the learned counsel that impugned order is one falling under Rule 17 of order 41, even if we assume it in his favour, the order if not appealable would be revisable. Thus even in this case our jurisdiction to test the decision with regard to its legality would still be there. For these reasons we overrule the preliminary objection without expressing any firm opinion at this stage as to under which provision of law the impugned order was made and pass on to consider its merits. Out task of examining the merits of this order would be facilitated if we reproduce the whole order of the learned Commissioner so far as it relates to the appellants appeal before him. Fortunately, the order is fairly brief and is as follows:— "In appeal No. 76/1 of 1958 Bhoora vs. Prem Singh the counsel for the appellant was not permitted to argue the case as he did not pay the costs to the respondents Prem Singh etc. which was fixed under order dated 10.10.60. The arguments of the counsel for the respondents were heard in regard to that application for costs. "Since the appellants were not heard as described above, they were treated as absent and the appeal preferred by them is consequently dismissed in default and the appellant will pay costs to the respondents." Now the perusal of the above4 order makes it clear that notwithstanding the fact that on the 31.10.60 when the appeal was called on for hearing the counsel for Bhoora appellant was present he was treated as absent as the cost awarded against mm on 10.10.60 were not paid. We have therefore naturally referred to the proceedings held on 10.10.60. From the order sheet of this date we gather that the costs in question Were not as a matter of fact awarded on 10.10.60, but on an earlier date i.e. 6.9.60. Now what happened on 6.9.60 (we have referred to the order sheet recorded on that date) was that Bhoora was present in the Court, but his counsel was absent and Bhoora prayed for an adjournment of the case to a further date. This adjournment at the request of Bhoora was granted on the condition of payment of Rs. Now what happened on 6.9.60 (we have referred to the order sheet recorded on that date) was that Bhoora was present in the Court, but his counsel was absent and Bhoora prayed for an adjournment of the case to a further date. This adjournment at the request of Bhoora was granted on the condition of payment of Rs. 20/- as costs to the opposite party. And in its terms the order clearly indicated that payment of costs would be condition precedent to per-mit Bhooras counsel to Participate in the hearing of appeal on the next date fixed i.e. 10.10.60. We would like to concede here and now that order was a perfectly correct order fully warranted by sub-rule 2 of Rule 1 of O. 17 of the C.P.C. and it also follows that the Court would have been fully justified in dismissing the appeal on 10.10.60 in the event of the failure of payment of costs till 10.10.60. But what happened on 10.10.60 is really responsible for the complications that have arisen in this case. On 10.10.60 according to the order sheet of that date Shri Vidya Bhushan counsel for Bhoora appearing so far did not come to the court and in his place Shri S.N. Parikh, who is also representing him before us, appeared. Shri S.N. Parikh instead of paying the costs in terms of the order passed on the previous date i.e. 6.9.60, addressed an argument to the court that since Shri Vidya Bhushan was a counsel for the minors he should not be made to pay the costs, in other words he pleaded with the Court to cancel the order as regards the costs made on 6.9.60. The learned Commissioner heard Shri Madan Singh the counsel for the respondents in reply to Shri S.N. Parikhs arguments and passed an order to say that having heard the arguments of the counsel we (the court) do not feel it proper to insist on the payment of costs today. Shri Vidya Bhushan himself is also not present, and it is regretted that this is owing to his fathers death and the case was adjourned for the next date i.e. 31.10.60 when the impugned order was passed. Shri Vidya Bhushan himself is also not present, and it is regretted that this is owing to his fathers death and the case was adjourned for the next date i.e. 31.10.60 when the impugned order was passed. We are not aware as to under what provisions of law the Commissioner heard the arguments as respects the levying of costs from the counsel of a minor, nor we have been shown at the bar any law which would authorise a court to rescind, revoke, modify, review or cancel a "condition precedent" order of adjournment on a subsequent date. One view dan be that once an order of that nature was passed, it must have its own course without subsequent interference by the same court. But we feel it would be nearer justice to assume that in view of the principles of fair play, equity and justice the court has inherent power to change its previous orders as respects costs, though it was intended to operate as a condition precedent order on the date it was made. And if we are correct in this assumption we would be correct in assuming that after hearing the arguments of the counsel of parties on 10.10.60, the learned Commissioner was atleast, thinking in terms of reversing or modifying his order, if he felt so inclined. Naturally if the arguments of Shri Parikh did not prevail him, he could have again dismissed the suit with reference to his order dated 6.9.60. But the learned Commissioners order dated 31.10.60 does not show at all that the learned Commissioner ever gave any consideration to that aspect of the case. On the contrary his impugned order appears to be clearly based on the conclusion that non-payment of the costs awarded on 6.9.60, and not on 10.10.60 as mentioned in his order was tantamount to a default in appearance and notwithstanding the fact that Shri Vidya Bhushan was present, he proceeded to dismiss the case in default. Now we feel, it is here actually that learned Commissioner went into a grievous error of law, presumably having misdirected himself. We next proceed to given reasons for this view of ours. An order of dismissal for default has to be passed on the date the plaintiff or the appellant commits the default, provided on that date the case is called on for hearing. We next proceed to given reasons for this view of ours. An order of dismissal for default has to be passed on the date the plaintiff or the appellant commits the default, provided on that date the case is called on for hearing. In the instant case, according to our view the case was not called on for hearing, but for the decision of the issue raised by Shri Parikh on 10.10.60 the decision on which the court had deferred till the next date i.e. 31.10.60. If the court on that had come to the decision that Shri Perikhs argument had failed to impress him, he should have made this decision known to Shri Vidya Bhushan. Shri Vidya Bhushan, should have then be asked to indicate whether or not he was still prepared to pay the costs, as time against him to comply with that order had not run out and he would have been well within his rights to pay the costs immediately before the hearing of the appeal started. We therefore cannot come to any conclusion, but that Shri Vidya Bhushan had not yet committed default and the learned Commissioners order was passed in anticipation thereof. If this view is correct, there was no foundation to rest the learned Commissioner order of dismissal for default and we can only hold that for this manifest error the order of the learned Commissioner stands vitiated. We have also considered, although this point was not argued before us whether the learned Commissioner could have passed (correctly) his order under the provisions of O. 17, r. 2, or O. 17 r. 3. Without entering into any leanthy discussion of the implication and effect of these two provisions of law we could say that none of these provisions of law could be called in aid of the impugned order. Under O. 17, Rule the adjournment should have been a "generally granted" adjournment. But the adjournment in question was clearly granted at the specific request of the appellant. An order under O. 17, r. 3 could have been passed, but it certainly could not have been one of dismissal in default. Therefore examined from all possible angles we find that order of the learned Commissioner is not sustainable or maintainable. We construe the order as having been made under r. 17 of O. 41 C.P.C. and hold it to be revisable. Therefore examined from all possible angles we find that order of the learned Commissioner is not sustainable or maintainable. We construe the order as having been made under r. 17 of O. 41 C.P.C. and hold it to be revisable. Thus we treat Shri Bhooras memorandum as an application in revision and for the reasons given above, we accept this revision, set aside the order of the learned Commissioner. The case would go back to the same court, with the direction that a fresh decision in accordance with the law would be passed bearing in mind our above observations.