Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal by the plaintiffs against the decree of the lower court in a suit for setting aside an order passed by the 1st defendant in the case, the Travancore Devaswom Board, under S.2 (3) of the Hindu Religious Institutions Act 1950. The plaint schedule properties belonged to the Vaikom Devaswom and they were assigned to the tarwad of defendants 2 and 3 who are Chakyars for the performance of 'Koothu' service in the Devaswom. This grant, it is alleged, was somewhere before 1000 M.E. Subsequently in or about the year 1010 M.E. the Chackyars demised the plaint properties on kanapattom to third parties who obtained periodical renewals from time to time. The kanom right subsequently became vested in the plaintiffs by assignments. The 1st defendant on 26-4-1952 passed an order for resumption of the plaint schedule properties and other properties alleging that the properties were service inam lands, that there was default in the performance of services and that the properties were alienated by the tarwad of defendants 2 and 3. The abovesaid order was impeached by the plaintiffs in the plaint on several grounds, the most important of which were, that there was no alienation of the plaint properties as contemplated under S.28 (3) of the Hindu Religious Institutions Act 1950, and that the services were being regularly performed. They therefore prayed for setting aside the order of resumption. The 1st defendant who alone contested the suit contended that the tarwad of Chackyars had committed default in the performance of the services, that in any event the alienation of the property by the tarwad of defendants 2 and 3 had entailed a forfeiture of its rights in the property and therefore the order passed was not liable to be set aside. 2. The lower court found that there was no default in the performance of the services by the tarwad of defendants 2 and 5, but the kanapattom deed and its subsequent renewals executed by the tarwad of defendants 2 and 3 were alienations within the meaning of S.28 (3) of the Hindu Religious Institutions Act 1950 which would work a forfeiture of the right of the tarwad of defendants 2 and 3 over the properties. In that view the lower court came to the conclusion that the order passed by the Ist defendant was perfectly valid and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit. In that view the lower court came to the conclusion that the order passed by the Ist defendant was perfectly valid and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit. It is this decree which is being attacked in this appeal. 3. Counsel for the appellants argued that ;he lower court went wrong in finding that the properties were alienated within the meaning of S.28 (3) by the execution of the kanom document and its renewals by the tarwad of defendants 2 and 3. Kanom, according to him is a mode of enjoying the property and not an alienation as contemplated by S.28 (3) of the Hindu Religious Institutions Act. As no authority directly in point was placed before us, we think that we are justified in taking the view that kanom is only an ordinary mode of enjoying the property. What is prohibited by S.28 (3) is an alienation of service inam lands contrary to the past usage. Now it stands to reason that the Chackyars to whom the grant was made were not expected to take themselves to agriculture for the purpose of getting the income from the properties. The object of the grant, we take, was that the Chackyars should devote their time and talent for the purpose of performing 'Koothu' service in the Devaswom. Therefore any method ordinarily employed for enjoying the property is not prohibited under the Section. It is well-known that giving the property on kanom is one method of enjoying it. Sundara Iyer in his Malabar and Aliyasanthana Law at page 290 says: "Tenures resembling kanoms are to be met with elsewhere also but the special feature in Malabar is that kanom tenure is the ordinary mode of enjoying land with the territorial magnates so that it is regarded in much the same light as leases from year to year elsewhere." We do not think that the original kanom or its renewals as evidenced by Exts. D4 and D5 are alienations within the meaning of S.28 (3) of the Hindu Religious Institutions Act 1950. We consider that the alienation mentioned in that Section means primarily a transfer of an interest in the property and not a transfer of possession for enjoyment of the property. In Baswayya v. Muniswami (AIR. 1925 Mad. D4 and D5 are alienations within the meaning of S.28 (3) of the Hindu Religious Institutions Act 1950. We consider that the alienation mentioned in that Section means primarily a transfer of an interest in the property and not a transfer of possession for enjoyment of the property. In Baswayya v. Muniswami (AIR. 1925 Mad. 1155) it was held by Madhavan Nair, J., that it is legal for an inamdar to transfer the right to enjoy the land, burdened with public services, by way of lease for a period His Lordship was, there, following the ruling in Anjaneyalu v. Venu Gopal Rice Mills (AIR. 1922 Mad. 197) which was a decision by a Full Bench of that court in which the question which came up for consideration was whether a personal inam for public service could be sold in execution of a decree, and in considering the question whether it is liable to be sold in execution of a decree the Full Bench incidentally considered the question of alienation of inams by act of parties. It was assumed that it is open to an inamdar to transfer possession by way of lease for a period, and the creation of a leasehold interest is not in any way opposed to public policy. The fact that the kanams granted by the tarwad of the Chackyars as evidenced by Exts. D-4 and D-5 were only transfers for limited periods and were only for the purpose of enjoyment of the properties, is clear from the terms of the document's. Therefore we consider that neither the original kanom nor its subsequent renewals as evidenced by Exts. D-4 and D-5 are alienations within the purview of S.28(3) of the Hindu Religious Institutions Act 1950. Secondly they are not alienations contrary to the past usage. In the plaint the plaintiffs had definitely averred that the only method of enjoying these properties by the Chackyars was by granting kanoms of the type evidenced by Exts. D-4 and D-5. There was no specific denial of that allegation in the written statement. No evidence was also adduced by the 1st defendant to show that such a mode of enjoying the property was contrary to the past usage. D-4 and D-5. There was no specific denial of that allegation in the written statement. No evidence was also adduced by the 1st defendant to show that such a mode of enjoying the property was contrary to the past usage. If, as a matter of fact, the Devaswom had a contention that this method of transferring possession of the property was contrary to the past usage it should have let in evidence to that effect. We are inclined to take the view that in a case like this where the 1st defendant wanted to take advantage of a forfeiture and recover possession of the properties on that basis, it was for the 1st defendant to have proved the grounds of forfeiture strictly. Not having adduced any evidence to show that transfer of possession by way of kanom was an alienation contrary to past usage we are not inclined to accept the argument of learned counsel for the respondents that the original kanom or its renewals as evidenced by Exts. D-4 and D-5 are alienations contrary to the past usage. The fact that several renewals of the original kanom were executed would show that there was no permanent transfer of possession of the properties. The renewals were only for periods of 12 years, and the fact that there are no provisions in those documents for compulsory renewals strengthens the conclusion that the transfers were not intended to be permanent arrangements. In these circumstances we come to the conclusion that there was no alienation contrary to the past usage. We therefore set aside the decree of the lower court and allow this appeal with costs. 4. There is a cross-objection filed by the 1st defendant against the finding of the lower court that the plaintiffs are entitled to the value of improvements. In view of our decision in the appeal it is unnecessary to decide the point raised in this cross-objection. The cross-objection is therefore dismissed, but in the circumstances without costs. Allowed.