Modi, J.—This is a reference by a learned Single Judge and arises out of a revision which was pending before him in an application under the Arbitration Act, which has admittedly not been finally decided by the trial court. 2. In view of the conclusion at which we have arrived as regards the competence of this reference, it is necessary to set forth a few facts:— On the 22nd of February, 1957, an application was made by Nathmal Bubna, respondent here, with a prayer that the award made by one Fateh Chand Paliram Jhunjhunuwala in a dispute between him and the petitioners here, who were opposite parties in the trial court, be declared to be invalid, illegal and inoperative and should, therefore, be set aside. This application was made under sec. 33 of the Arbitration Act. Along with this application a further application was also made on the same day under sec. 14(2) of the Arbitration Act praying that the arbitration agreement and the award be sent for from the said arbitrator and that he be ordered to file the same in court. These applications were inter alia opposed by the petitioners as barred by time and as being non-maintainable. It was contended in this connection that the application for the filing of the award had been made after 90 days of the date of the service of the notice of the making of the award and was, therefore, barred by Art.l78 of the Limitation Act and further that the application for the setting aside of the award was not maintainable because such an application could only be made under Art. 158 within 30 days of the service of the notice of the filing of the award which award had never been filed and the filing whereof was barred by time. Thereafter, the opposite party here withdrew its application under sec. 14(2) of the Arbitration Act and maintained that it was unnecessary to get the award filed in court under sec. 14(2) of the Act as it was attacking the award as a nullity and all that it wanted to be done was that the award should be summoned by the arbitrator as evidence for the purposes of Art, 33 of the Arbitration Act. It was also contended that for a purpose like that no limitation had been provided under the Limitation Act. It was also contended that for a purpose like that no limitation had been provided under the Limitation Act. In these circumstances, the two questions which arose before the trial court were, whether the application filed by the opposite party under sec. 33 of the Arbitration Act was maintainable and whether it was not barred by time. The learned trial Judge held that the application filed by the opposite party before him was one under sec. 33 of the Arbitration Act challenging the validity of the arbitration agreement and the award and praying (for setting aside of the award, and, therefore such an application was governed by Art. 181 of the Limitation Act and not by Art. 178. He further held in this connection that an application for setting aside an award was not dependent on an application for filing the award, and that all that was necessary was that the award should have been before the court, before it was called upon to set it aside and as the petitioner before him had himself subsequently produced the award, the bar of Art. 158 or Art. 17B would not arise, and the application filed before him for setting-aside the agreement as well as the award was maintainable. In this view of the matter, the learned Judge fixed a date for the summoning of the arbitration agreement and for further proceedings in the case. A revision was then filed by the petitioners here against the aforesaid order which came for disposal before a learned Single Judge which has resulted in the present reference. 3. A preliminary objection was raised before the learned Single Judge that the revision was not maintainable inasmuch as the points decided by the trial Judge against the petitioners before the High Court could well be raised in an appeal which could be brought to this Court under sec. 39(1)(vi) of the Arbitration Act. This objection seems to be apparently based on a Full Bench decision of this Court in Purohit Swarup Naran Vs. Gopi Nath (1) although no direct reference thereto has been made in the order of reference. The question which was, therefore, posed by the learned Judge in this connection was whether the final order which may be passed by the trial court on the application under sec. 33 would be appealable to this Court under sec. 39(l)(iv) of the Arbitration Act ? The question which was, therefore, posed by the learned Judge in this connection was whether the final order which may be passed by the trial court on the application under sec. 33 would be appealable to this Court under sec. 39(l)(iv) of the Arbitration Act ? In order to answer this question the learned Judge after a consideration of a number of sections of the Arbitration Act and the nature of the questions raised by the dispute between the parties came to the following conclusion :— "In accordance with the opinion expressed by me above all the grounds on which the award is attacked in the present case including the grounds relating to the invalidity of the arbitration agreement fall under sec. 30. If the trial court holds that the award is invalid and sets it aside or holds that it is valid and refuses to set it aside an appeal would lie against its order under sec. 39(1} (vi) and no revision application would be entertainable at this stage." Even so, the learned Judge thought fit to refer a number of questions to a larger Bench and this is how the present reference has come before us. The questions put by the learned Judge are as follows: — 1. Is the filing of an award or its signed copy necessary before it can be set aside by the court ? 2. Is it necessary for the above purpose that the award should be filed in court in the manner provided in sec. 14(2), that is (a) at the instance of a party or under the directions of the court, (b) by the arbitrator or under his authority ? 3. Is it necessary that before an application for setting aside an award is made, the award or its signed copy is duly filed subsequently during the course of the proceedings to set it aside ? 4. Do the words "or is otherwise invalid" in clause (c) of sec. 30 of the Act embrace an objection which challenges the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement ? 5. (a) Does the Arbitration Act distinguish between an application for setting aside an award and an application for the adjudgement of an award to be a nullity ? 4. Do the words "or is otherwise invalid" in clause (c) of sec. 30 of the Act embrace an objection which challenges the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement ? 5. (a) Does the Arbitration Act distinguish between an application for setting aside an award and an application for the adjudgement of an award to be a nullity ? (b) If not, does it contemplate that all applications challenging an award must be applications for setting aside the award which are governed by Article 158 of the Limitation Act ? 4. At the very out-set of the arguments before us, the same preliminary objection has been strenuously raised by learned counsel for the opposite party as was raised before the learned Single Judge. The contention is that the questions which have been decided by the trial court against the petitioners here could well be made the subject matter of an attack by them in any appeal which would lie and might be brought to this Court from the final order passed by the trial court in this case, and, that being so, the conclusion was irresistible on the view taken by the Full Bench in Purohit Swarup Narains case (supra) that the revision which was filed by the petitioners was incompetent, and it was further contended that, in that state of circumstances, any reference by the learned Single Judge was and should be held to be incompetent. It was further stressed in this connection that the learned Single Judge himself had come to the conclusion that an appeal would lie against the final order of the trial court in the present case under sec. 39(1) (vi) of the Arbitration Act to this Court and, therefore, no reference in such circumstances was competent. 5. We have considered this contention with all the care which it deserves and feel constrained to hold that it is well-founded. The basic questions which fall for consideration in this connection are whether the final order to be passed by the trial court could be challenged in appeal to this Court, and further whether the questions which have been decided against the petitioners by the trial court could be made the subject matter of contest in that appeal. The test by which we should answer the second of these questions, as provided by Purohit Swarup Narains case (1), is to be found in sec. The test by which we should answer the second of these questions, as provided by Purohit Swarup Narains case (1), is to be found in sec. 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That section, leaving its immaterial portion, reads as follows. "Save as otherwise expressly provided, no appeal shall lie from any order made by a Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction; but, where a decree is appealed from, any error, defect or irregularity in any order, affecting the decision of the case, may be set forth as a ground of objection in the memo randum of appeal." The question, therefore, is whether the decision of the trial court on the points decided by it against the petitioners are such that it can be properly postulated of them that they affect the decision of the case on the merits. We have no doubt that both the questions, namely, of limitation and of the maintainability of the application are questions which do affect the decision of the case in that manner. In fact, as we look at the matter, there cannot be two opinions on this aspect of the case. 6. The other question which remains to consider is whether the final order passed by the trial court in the case would be appealable to this Court. This question, in our opinion, need not present any formindable difficulty. The application filed by the opposite party in connection with the impugned arbitration agreement and the award is to have them set aside. That being so, we consider the controversy whether this application really falls under sec. 30 or sec. 33 of the Arbitration Act to be of more or less of an academic nature. The prayer of the opposite party definitely is that the award be set aside. That prayer has either to be granted or refused by the trial court to decide the application; and once it is so decided, we are unable to see how such an order could be held to fall outside the ambit of sec. 39(1)(vi) of the Arbitration Act which clearly provides for an appeal against an order setting aside an award. That prayer has either to be granted or refused by the trial court to decide the application; and once it is so decided, we are unable to see how such an order could be held to fall outside the ambit of sec. 39(1)(vi) of the Arbitration Act which clearly provides for an appeal against an order setting aside an award. In this view of the matter, and having regard to the valuation of the subject matter of dispute before the trial court, we have no manner of hesitation in saying that the final order of the trial court, after all the issues there have been decided will lie to this Court, and as we have held above, the findings on this question which have been decided by that court against the petitioners will be perfectly capable of being contested in this Court as being questions affecting the merits of the case in the appeal before this Court. 7. The only other question which remains for us to consider is whether in these circumstances the present reference is competent, or whether we have jurisdiction to answer it. This takes us back to the Full Bench decision of this Court in Purohit Swarup Narains case(l). As we understand that decision, it clearly bars our revisional jurisdiction in a case like the present. What it has laid down is that where it is open to a party to raise a ground of appeal in the High Court under sec. 105, Civil Procedure Code, from the final decree or order with respect to any order which has been passed, during the pendency of the case, it should be held that an appeal in that case lies to the High Court within the meaning of the term in which no appeal lies thereto appearing in sec. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. And, therefore, where such an order can be challenged in the High Court under sec. 105 Civil Procedure Code in first or second appeal to it from the final decision of a suit or a proceeding, the revision must be held to be incompetent. It is only when the order in question cannot be challenged in the High Court, whether in first or second appeal or even by way of a ground under sec. 105 Civil Procedure Code in first or second appeal to it from the final decision of a suit or a proceeding, the revision must be held to be incompetent. It is only when the order in question cannot be challenged in the High Court, whether in first or second appeal or even by way of a ground under sec. 105 in appeal from the final decision of the case, that it can be said that no appeal lies to the High Court, and it is only in such cases that it can exercise its extra-ordinary jurisdiction under sec. 115 to look into the correctness of the order as required by that section. 8. We should also like to make it clear before we conclude that this full bench decision which is the leading case of our Court on the subject and which is fully binding on us makes no distinction between orders which are "merely interlocutory" and other orders passed during the pendency of a case but which in the language of the learned single Judge may be in the nature of final decisions on a part or even the main part of the case; and this decision therefore equally bars a revision as much against the one class of orders as the other, so that where a first or second appeal lies to this Court from the final order or decree of the court of first instance wherein such an order has been passed and the order is one affecting the merits of the case and which therefore could be made a ground of appeal therein, a revision against either class of orders must be held to be entirely non-maintainable. With all respect therefore we find ourselves unable to agree with the learned Single Judge in so far as his order of reference may be founded on any such distinction. 9. In the result, we can see no escape from the conclusion that the revision to this Court in the present case is altogether incompetent. If that be the conclusion to which we are inevitably driven, then it must follow that the revision must stand dismissed, and it is only a corollary from this to hold that the learned Single Judge had no jurisdiction to proceed further with the case before him and make a reference therein as he has done. If that be the conclusion to which we are inevitably driven, then it must follow that the revision must stand dismissed, and it is only a corollary from this to hold that the learned Single Judge had no jurisdiction to proceed further with the case before him and make a reference therein as he has done. Putting the whole thing from a different angle, what we would say is that when the very foundation falls, the superstructure cannot possibly survive and must fall with it. 10. For these reasons, we hold that the learned Single Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the revision or make the present reference therein, and by parity of reasoning it has to be held that we have no jurisdiction to deal with the reference in the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. The preliminary objection must therefore prevail. 11. In these circumstances, we have no alternative but to discharge the reference, and the revision must stand dismissed. Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, we would leave the parties to bear their own costs of the reference as well as the revision.