Modi, J.—This is an appeal by the State against an order of acquittal by the Magistrate 1st Class, Bundi, dated 29th March, 1962. 2. The facts leading up to this appeal are just a few and simple— The respondent Bhoja was prosecuted under sec. 7(iii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act on 5th February, 1960 in the court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Bundi. The accused, was, however, acquitted by the said Magistrate by his order dated the 13th March, 1961 on the ground that the prosecution was bad for want of proper sanction under sec. 20 of the said Act which was a condition precedent to the validity of the prosecution. Thereafter, a fresh complaint was filed by the same complainant on the same facts against him in the court of the first Glass Magistrate, Bundi after obtaining proper sanction from the local authority concerned. This was done on the 19th of September, 1961. The Magistrate acquitted the accused holding that a fresh trial of the accused was barred by the provisions of sec. 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is this order which is being challenged before us in the present appeal. 3. Sec. 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in so far as it is material for the purpose of this appeal, reads as follows— "403(1).—A person who has once been tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under sec.236, or for which he might have been convicted under sec. 237." As we read this section, two conditions must be satisfied before it can come into play. The first is that a person must have been tried for an offence by a court of competent jurisdiction. The second is that having been so tried he must have been convicted or acquitted of it. If these two conditions are fulfilled, then a person so convicted or acquitted cannot be tried again for the same offence nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made. If these two conditions are fulfilled, then a person so convicted or acquitted cannot be tried again for the same offence nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made. The question to determine is whether both these conditions are satisfied in the present case. It is true that the accused was acquitted, rightly or wrongly, by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate in the first instance, and,there-fore, this part of the condition may be held to have been prima facie satisfied. But so far as the other condition is concerned, we are clearly of opinion that it was not. The reason is that in this type of case it cannot be correctly held that the accused was really tried or at any rate tried by a court which was competent to do so. The incompetence of the Magistrate to deal with the accused directly flowed from the fact that there was no valid sanction lor such prosecution and, therefore, the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. It must follow as a corollary from this that the order of acquittal passed by the Magistrate being without jurisdiction was a nullity, and that being so, it was not necessary for the party aggrieved by such an order to have it set aside by appeal. This view has the support of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Yusofalli Mulla Noorbhoy Vs. The King(l). In that case the facts were these :—The accused had been previously tried and acquitted of certain offences under the Hoarding and Profiteering Prevention Ordinance (XXXV (35) of 1943). Sanction had been obtained to his prosecution from the Controller-General of Civil Supplies, who was authorised to give the same. The Magistrate held that the sanction was improper and invalid and, therefore, he proceeded to acquit the accused on that ground. Thereafter, the accused was again prosecuted for the same offences after due sanction had been obtained from the authority concerned. The Magistrate held the second prosecution to be barred by reason of sec. 403, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, since in the view of the Magistrate the accused had been previously tried and acquitted on exactly similar charges and facts by a court of competent jurisdiction. The Magistrate held the second prosecution to be barred by reason of sec. 403, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, since in the view of the Magistrate the accused had been previously tried and acquitted on exactly similar charges and facts by a court of competent jurisdiction. The Bombay High Court on appeal set aside the acquittal, and thereafter the matter was carried in appeal by special leave to the Privy Council. Their Lordships dismissed the appeal holding that the bar of sec. 403 was not attracted in the circumstances of the case and that the order of acquittal could only operate as an order of discharge and no more. Explaining the underlying object of sec. 403(1) their Lordships pointed out that before it could be attracted into application the first trial should have been before a court competent to hear and determine the case and to record a verdict of conviction or acquittal and that if the court was not so competent it was irrelevant that it was competent to try other cases of the same class, or indeed the case against the particular accused in different circumstances. Again it was contended before the Privy Council that the failure to obtain the sanction at the most prevented the valid institution of a prosecution, and that it did not affect the competency of the court to hear and determine a prosecution which in fact was brought before it. This argument was repelled, and it was observed that a court cannot be held to be competent to hear and determine a Prosecution the institution of which is prohibited by law, and that where such institution was prohibited in the absence of a proper sanction, the competence of the court to take cognizance of such a case was and would be indisputably affected. Yet another argument was raised before their Lordships based on the finality of the order of acquittal, it having not been appealed from within the period of limitation provided by the Limitation Act, but this was also rejected on the view that where the order passed by a court was a nullity, there was nothing to appeal against such an order. The same view has been followed in In re, C. Devanugraham (2) and Girraj Kishore vs. The State through Municipal Board, Agra, (3) and we need not multiply authorities. 4. The same view has been followed in In re, C. Devanugraham (2) and Girraj Kishore vs. The State through Municipal Board, Agra, (3) and we need not multiply authorities. 4. Consequently, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the bar of sec. 403 or me code of Criminal Procedure cannot apply against a fresh trial of the accused on the same facts in the circumstances of the present case, and, that the order of his acquittal in the first prosecution, in the absence of a proper sanction, having been made without jurisdiction, amounted to an order of discharge and no more, and the Magistrate was wrong in giving it a higher effect, which it was not entitled in law. 5. For the reasons mentioned above, we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the Magistrate dated the 29th March, 1962, and send the case back to him for a fresh trial in accordance with law