Judgment :- 1. This Second Appeal has been referred by the Single Judge to the Division Bench as he thought that there was some conflict in the rulings which may govern the decision of this case. The facts of the case are briefly as follows: The suit was for redemption of a mortgage evidenced by Ext. A executed by one Thommen Cheria, the father of the plaintiff and 4th defendant in favour of the 2nd defendant, after setting aside a sale held in execution. The 1st defendant was the owner of the properties. He executed a kanom in respect of these properties in favour of four strangers. Thommen Cheria purchased the right from one of the kanomdars and mortgaged the same under Ext. A to the 2nd defendant for Rs. 1,000/-. The 1st defendant, instituted a suit O.S. No. 41098 claiming michavaram in respect of these properties. Thommen Cheria was the 7th defendant in that suit. He was impleaded as the assignee of the kanom right from one of the kanom-holders. It was alleged by the plaintiff that in execution of the decree in O.S. 41098 the kanom right in the property was sold and was purchased by the 1st defendant and that at the time of the execution sale Thommen Cheria was dead. The exact date of the death of Thommen Cheria was alleged in the plaint to be on 19-4-1113. The execution sale took place on 19-12-1113, and the sale was confirmed on 18-1-1114. Ext. II is the sale certificate. After the sale the 1st defendant transferred the property to one Koshi under Ext. D. Koshi in turn transferred that right to the 2nd defendant under Ext. E. It is common ground that if Thommen Cheria died on 19-4-1113 and that if the legal representatives of Thommen Cheria were not impleaded in execution to represent the estate of Thommen Cheria that sale would not bind the estate of Thommen Cheria. 2. The contentions of the defendants were that there was no evidence to show that Thommen Cheria died on 19-4-1113, and that the plaintiff was not entitled to impeach the validity of the sale in this suit as that was a matter relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree in O.S. No. 41098. 2. The contentions of the defendants were that there was no evidence to show that Thommen Cheria died on 19-4-1113, and that the plaintiff was not entitled to impeach the validity of the sale in this suit as that was a matter relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree in O.S. No. 41098. They also contended that the plaintiff and the 4th defendant were impleaded as legal representatives of Thommen Cheria on 1-3-1117 and it was after they were impleaded that the property was delivered over through court. In any event they contended that the suit was not maintainable and prayed for the dismissal of the same. 3. The trial court came to the conclusion that Thommen Cheria died on 19-4-1113, and that the sale was not a nullity, even though the heirs of Thommen Cheria were not impleaded, but as the 2nd defendant was a trustee for the plaintiff of the right purchased by him under Ext. E, the plaintiff was entitled to redeem the properties. The lower appellate court, on appeal, held that there was no evidence to show that Thommen Cheria died on 19-4-1113, that the 2nd defendant was not a trustee of the plaintiff by virtue of his purchase under Ext. E, and that the plaintiff had no right to redeem. Therefore, that court dismissed the suit, reversing the decree of the trial court. It is against this decree that this appeal has been filed by the plaintiff. 4. The main submission of learned counsel for the appellant was that Thommen Cheria died on 19-4-1113 and that as the legal representatives of Thommen Cheria were not impleaded before the court sale that sale was a nullity. He also submitted that the finding of the lower appellate court that there was no evidence to show that Thommen Cheria died on 19-4-1113 is erroneous. In the view which we are going to take in this appeal it is not really necessary to decide the question when Thommen Cheria died. It is common ground that if Thommen Cheria died on 19-4-1113, then as held in AIR. 1936 Madras 205 the sale of his interest in the property was a nullity as no legal representatives were on record at the time of the sale. It is common ground that if Thommen Cheria died on 19-4-1113, then as held in AIR. 1936 Madras 205 the sale of his interest in the property was a nullity as no legal representatives were on record at the time of the sale. If that be so, counsel for the respondents contended that the present suit instituted even if treated as one for a declaration that the sale is void and for redemption of the property is barred under S.47 of the Civil Procedure Code. 5. We think that the contention is sound. If execution sale was a nullity so far as Thommen Cheria was concerned, the plaintiff, as legal representative of Thommen Cheria should have prayed for a declaration to that effect in execution of O.S. 4/1098. A prayer for declaration that the execution sale is null and void is really a question relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree in O.S. 41098, and therefore it ought to have been agitated in execution of that decree and not by a separate suit. Under S.47 a party to a suit or his representative is so obliged. 6. A prayer for a declaration that a sale in execution is a nullity for want of representation of the estate of a judgment-debtor is a prayer, which, if allowed goes to the root of the validity of an execution sale; and therefore, we think that it is a matter which relates to the execution. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that if the sale is a nullity the plaintiff suing for redemption can ignore it. The prayer in the plaint was for setting aside the execution sale held in O.S. 4/1098, and for redemption. It is common knowledge that if, in law, a sale is void and therefore non est, the prayer to set aside the sale is a superfluity which a court is entitled to ignore and to proceed as if it is a prayer for a declaration that the sale is void. We are perfectly in agreement with the submission of counsel when ha argues that a void sale need not be set aside and that even without the sale being set aside, a suit for redemption will lie. It is because we agree with his submission on this point, that we do not refer to the; several rulings cited by him. We are perfectly in agreement with the submission of counsel when ha argues that a void sale need not be set aside and that even without the sale being set aside, a suit for redemption will lie. It is because we agree with his submission on this point, that we do not refer to the; several rulings cited by him. But the question really is whether it is necessary for the court trying the suit for redemption to adjudicate upon the question of the validity or otherwise of the sale. If it is necessary for that court in the first instance to adjudicate upon the question whether the sale is void or not before passing upon the further relief of redemption claimed by the plaintiff, it stands to reason to hold that there must be either an express or implied adjudication on that question. Plaintiff's contention is that it is open to the court trying the suit for redemption to make the) declaration that the sale of the equity of redemption is void and therefore inoperative to convey any interest to the auction-purchaser and grant the relief of redemption. Now this is precisely what is prohibited by S.47 CPC. The fact that the prayer is only for a declaration of nullity and not for setting aside a voidable sale is no ground for holding that it is not a matter relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. We hold that in the final analysis all judgments are for declaration of pre-existing rights of parties. "A judgment of a Court is an affirmation by the authorised societal agent of the State speaking in the name of the law and the state, of the legal consequence attending, a proved or admitted state of facts. It is the determination or the sentence of law that a legal relation does or does not exist. The power to render judgments, the so called "judicial power", is the power to adjudicate upon contested or adverse legal rights or claims, to interpret the law, and to declare what the law is or has been ... It is the determination or the sentence of law that a legal relation does or does not exist. The power to render judgments, the so called "judicial power", is the power to adjudicate upon contested or adverse legal rights or claims, to interpret the law, and to declare what the law is or has been ... By so doing, it necessarily confers upon the successful party certain powers and privileges, its recording gives an official certification to a pre-existing legal relation (or establishes a new one on pre-existing grounds), and it affords authoritative protection and guaranty to be challenged, endangered or contested rights." (See Judicial Relief for Peril and Insecurity by Edwin Borchand (45 Harward Law Review, Page 793 at 797 and 798). "A judgment has in general nothing whatever to do with the means of enforcing the liability which it declares. Certain consequences do indeed flow from it, - as the right to issue execution, the attaching of a lien upon land, - but these are no part of the judgment, nor is it concerned with directions for making its sanction effective. It is, as already stated a bare assertion." (See Black on Judgments Vol. I page 4). We think that a court by its judgment certifies the fact that "right existed thereto for, merely converting a right theretofor unenforceable into one now enforceable." We emphasize this aspect as to the declaratory character of order or judgment just to repel the point raised by learned counsel for the appellant that if the sale is a nullity no application for declaration of its nullity is necessary in execution and that it is only when the prayer is to set aside a voidable sale that an adjudication by court is required. A prayer for a declaration that execution sale is a nullity is as much a relief sought in court as a prayer for setting aside a voidable sale. The mere fact that in the latter case the court is giving an affirmative relief is no reason why we should forget the essential character of the judicial function which the court is performing in both cases. The mere fact that in the latter case the court is giving an affirmative relief is no reason why we should forget the essential character of the judicial function which the court is performing in both cases. If the essence of that function consists in the declaration of pre-existing rights of the parties we see no reason for saying that in the case of a voidable sale it is a matter which relates to execution and therefore a suit is barred, but that in the case of a void sale a declaration of its void character is not a matter relating to execution and that even without such a declaration a suit for redemption can be instituted. Therefore we come to the conclusion that the prayer for declaration that the execution sale is void is a matter relating to execution and a period of limitation is also provided for the same under Art.181 of the Limitation Act; and if a party does not obtain the appropriate declaration from that court, the court trying a suit for redemption cannot entertain the plea that the execution sale was void, as that is what S.47 prohibits. There is also another angle from which the matter can be looked at. The void character of an execution sale may depend upon the adjudication of complicated questions of fact and law, as in this case, where it depends upon the date of the death of Thommen Cheria and the legal effect thereof. The assertion by a party that a sale is void is not determinative. The court has to go into that question and find whether the sale is void so that a party may disregard it. We think that the forum designated by the Civil Procedure Code for adjudicating the question of the void character of an execution sale is the execution court and not the court which tries the subsequent suit. The records in the execution import the verity of the sale which took place in execution of the decree. We think that the forum designated by the Civil Procedure Code for adjudicating the question of the void character of an execution sale is the execution court and not the court which tries the subsequent suit. The records in the execution import the verity of the sale which took place in execution of the decree. So long as those records stand, reason concurs with the policy underlying S.47 (the Privy Council said that the policy underlying S.47 is to check needless litigation: 11 Bengal L.R 149) in inducing us to hold that the matter must be adjudicated by the executing court, and that the application for the same must be filed within the period prescribed by Art.181 and that a party or representative of a party to suit cannot evade the operation of S.47 by not raising this question, which in essence and in substance appertains to the discharge or satisfaction of the decree. 7. This question has come up for consideration in some rulings of the Indian High Courts. In Rajagopala Aiyar v. Ramanujachariyar (AIR. 1924 Mad. 431, 437) a Full Bench of the Madras High Court has held that the question whether an execution sale is void is a matter relating to the execution of the decree and therefore under S.47 of the Civil Procedure Code, a separate suit for that purpose is barred. This is what Chief Justice Schwabe said at page 437: "That is direct authority for the proposition that, in such a case (where a sale is found to be a nullity) it is not necessary to apply to the court to set aside the sale. If it is possible for the petitioner in this case to proceed without applying to set aside the sale, he could avoid the harsh limitation imposed by Art.166. In my judgment, he can do so. He could, but for the provisions of S.47 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1908, bring a suit for possession of the property sold, and the purchaser would not be able to rely upon the court-sale as a defence, because that sale is a nullity, and the Privy Council has held that it is not necessary to take any steps to set it aside. By reason of S.47, all questions arising between parties to the suit relating to execution ought to be determined by the court executing the decree, and not by a separate suit; and it has been held that the fact that a Court purchaser is a necessary party would not prevent the application of this rule," In Lakhu v. Radhabai (AIR. 1952 Bombay 438) this question was considered by Chainani, J., as he then was. The head-note correctly sets out the gist of the decision in the case: "Assuming that the sale was a nullity, the question raised in suit was between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed and therefore the suit was barred under S.47 S. 47 should be construed liberally. The words "all questions arising" used in S.47 do not mean only such questions as are actually raised in the execution proceedings, for otherwise a party by not raising a question in execution proceedings, which then ought to have been raised, would be able to circumvent the provisions of S.47,.... The words "all questions arising" mean all questions which could properly arise or which could properly have been raised in the execution proceedings between the parties to the suit or their representatives." At page 440 the learned judge held as follows: "We shall now discuss what the legal position would be, if the sale of the suit lands is regarded as a nullity, as has been contended by Mr. Virkar on behalf of the appellants - plaintiffs, relying on the decision of Dixit, J., in Ram Ganu v. Hari Sambhu (52 Bom. L. R.358). Even then an application could have been made to the executing court to set aside the sale on the ground that the suit properties were not liable to be sold in execution of the mortgage decree and that the sale was, therefore void. Such an application falls under S.47, Civil P. C." and the final conclusion expressed by him is as follows: "In our opinion, therefore, the present suit would be barred under S.47, Civil P. C if it is held that the sale of the suit lands was a nullity." 8. The same view was taken in Bansi Sao v. Devi Prasad (AIR. The same view was taken in Bansi Sao v. Devi Prasad (AIR. 1961 Patna 508) by Ramaswami, C. J., and Untwalia, J. at page 509 it is held: "It is well settled that a judgment-debtor applying for setting aside the sale or for declaring it a nullity on grounds other than those mentioned in 0.21, R.90 of the Code has to do it under S.47 and not by a separate suit. (Vide Ramlal Sahu v. Mt. Ramia (AIR. 1947 Patna 454 F. B.) and Merla Rammana v. Nallaparaju (AIR. 1956 SC. 87). This is so irrespective of the question as to whether the sale is void or voidable." 9. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider the question indirectly in Rammnna v. Nallaparaju (AIR. 1956 SC. 87) at page 92; after referring to Seshagiri Rao v. Srinivasa Rao (AIR. 1920 Madras 402), the learned judge proceeded: "... the appellant was a party to the suit, but the decree had exonerated him from liability. In execution of the decree, his three-fourths' share in the properties was sold on 26-1-1910 and purchased by the decree-holder and possession delivered to him on 16-12-1910. The appellant then filed a suit on 25-7-1911 to set aside the sale on the ground that it was in contravention of the decree and, therefore, void. An objection having been taken by the defendant that the suit was barred under S.47, the Court, while upholding the same, held that the plaint could be treated as an application under that section if it was in time as an execution application, and the question arose for decision whether the application was governed by Art.166 or Art.181, Limitation Act. It was held that as the sale was a nullity, it had not to be set aside under the law, and, therefore, the Article applicable was Art.181 and not Art.166. This statement of the law was approved by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Rajagopala Aiyar v. Ramanujachariar (AIR. 1924 Madras 431 F.B.)" This, in our view, supports the contention that a suit for setting aside a void sale will not lie and that that suit can be treated as an application for a declaration that the sale is void under S.47 & that the relevant article o the Limitation Act applicable will-be Art.181. 1924 Madras 431 F.B.)" This, in our view, supports the contention that a suit for setting aside a void sale will not lie and that that suit can be treated as an application for a declaration that the sale is void under S.47 & that the relevant article o the Limitation Act applicable will-be Art.181. Counsel ,for the appellant relied on the observations of Sinha, J., in Nani Bai v. Gita Bai (AIR. 1958 SC. 706 at 709). The exact passage on which emphasis was placed is as follows: "The plaintiff Gundi's daughter, not being affected in any way by the sale aforesaid, it is not necessary for her to sue for setting aside the sale. She was entitled, as she has done, to ignore those execution proceedings and to proceed on the assumption, justified in law, that the sale had not affected her inheritance. The suit is, therefore, not barred by Art.12 of the Limitation Act." 10. We think these observations are not controlling. The question there related to the applicability of Art.12 of the Limitation Act and no question of the bar of a suit under S.47 was considered or discussed. Nor do we think that any assistance can be derived for appellant's argument from the passage relied on from Nirodekali Roy v. Narendra Nath (AIR. 1938 Calcutta 113,116). That passage is: "Art. 166, as my learned brother has pointed out, must be confined to cases where the sale is voidable only and not void and when the execution sale is a nullity, if a party files an application under S.47 to have it pronounced a nullity or for setting it aside for safety's sake to avoid future difficulties, the proper Article would be Art.181 and not Art.166, Limitation Act." 11. We hold that a suit for a declaration that the execution sale is void and for redemption on that basis, will not lie as the same raises a question which relates to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. As we hold that the suit is barred on account of S.47 of the Civil Procedure Code, and that the suit cannot be treated as an application under that section as the period of limitation under Art.181 expired before the date of the suit, no other question arises for decision in this appeal. 12. As we hold that the suit is barred on account of S.47 of the Civil Procedure Code, and that the suit cannot be treated as an application under that section as the period of limitation under Art.181 expired before the date of the suit, no other question arises for decision in this appeal. 12. We therefore, confirm the decree of the lower appellate court though on a-different ground and dismiss the Appeal. In the circumstances we make no order as to costs. Dismissed.