JUDGMENT 1. This is a defendant's special appeal against a judgment of a learned Single Judge by which the learned Single Judge allowed a second appeal, set aside the judgment of the lower appellate court and restored the decree of the trial court, decreeing a suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent for the ejectment of the defendant-appellant. 2. The appellant was a tenant of the respondent in an accommodation in the city of Kanpur. The respondent instituted a suit for the ejectment of the appellant on 20th February, 1947, mainly on two grounds, viz., that the defendant had raised certain constructions changing the nature of the structures let out to it and that the landlord needed the premises for his own personal use. When the suit was instituted, the U.P. (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Ordinance, 1946 (U.P. Ordinance No. III of 1946) was in force. In view of the provisions of sub-Secs. (c) and (g) of Sec. 3 of the Ordinance, the suit filed by the respondent against the appellant on the two grounds mentioned above was maintainable without any permission of the District Magistrate. The Ordinance had been in force with effect from 1st October, 1946. While the suit was still pending in the trial court, the U.P. (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, (U.P. Act III of 1947) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was published in the official gazette on March 1, 1947, after having received the assent of the Governor and the Governor-General. Sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. I of the Act provides that the Act shall he deemed to have come into force on the 1st day of October, 1946, which was the date when the Ordinance mentioned above had originally come into force. Sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 18 of the Act re-pealed the Ordinance No. III of 1946 and sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 18 of the Act provides that the provisions of the Ordinance shall be so read and construed as if they were amended by the Act in such manner as not to be inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. Sec. 3 of the Act laid down certain restrictions on the right to institute suits for eviction of tenants. Sec. 3 of the Act laid down certain restrictions on the right to institute suits for eviction of tenants. The material change brought about by the Act, which is relevant for the purpose of deciding this appeal before us, was that a suit for eviction of a tenant on the ground that the landlord needed the accommodation for his own personal use was no longer maintainable. On the other hand, a suit could be maintained if permission was obtained from the District Magistrate for institution of the suit. The findings of fact, which have become final, dis entitled the respondent from obtaining the decree for eviction of the appellant on the first ground mentioned above viz., that the latter had raised certain constructions changing the nature of the structures let out to it. It was held that no such material changes had been effected by the appellant. That point, being concluded by findings of fact, did not come up for decision again before the learned Single Judge in the second appeal, and, consequently, we are also not concerned with that ground in this special appeal. 3. The second ground, on which ejectment was sought in the plaint when the suit was instituted on 20th February, 1947, was, as we have mentioned earlier, that the landlord needed the premises for his own personal use. Before the suit could be decided, the Act came into force. The respondent, therefore, applied to the District Magistrate for permission. Such permission was granted on the 25th of August, 1947, by the Additional District Magistrate, Shri Hadi Hasan. The trial court, in dealing with this ground, held that the permission, which was granted by the Additional District Magistrate (Shri Hadi Hasan) on 25th August, 1947, was invalid because it was given on a ground mentioned in clause (c) of sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 3 of the Act. The trial court, in dealing with this ground, held that the permission, which was granted by the Additional District Magistrate (Shri Hadi Hasan) on 25th August, 1947, was invalid because it was given on a ground mentioned in clause (c) of sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 3 of the Act. He was of the view that the District Magistrate or any officer holding delegated powers from the District Magistrate could not give any permission on any of six specific grounds, mentioned in sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 3 of the Act and the suit, on these grounds, could be filed without any permission from the District Magistrate, so that, if the District Magistrate gave any permission on those grounds, it would have to be specifically proved in the criminal courts." The trial court, however, decreed the suit on the first ground that the appellant had raised constructions and made a material alterations to the accommodation which rendered it liable to eviction. The appellant, therefore, went up in first appeal and the first appellate court disagreed with the trial court on the first point. That court, as we have mentioned earlier, recorded findings of fact that there had been no raising of such constructions or material alterations as would render the present appellant liable to eviction under Sec. 3 of the Act without the permission of the District Magistrate. That view taken by the first appellate court justified the setting aside of the order of the trial court by the plaintiff-respondent sought to support the decree of the trial court by relying on the second ground which had been rejected by the trial court. The first appellate court held that the appeal before him arose out of a suit which had been instituted prior to the commencement of the Act and, consequently, the provisions of Sec. 3 of the Act could not he applied to this suit. The court also, therefore, disregarded the permission contained from the Additional District Magistrate, Shri Hadi Hasan, and held that no question of obtaining the permission from the District Magistrate prior to the filing of the suit could arise. Since the first appellate court took this view, the question that had to be considered by if was whether the suit could he decreed on one or more of the grounds mentioned. Since the first appellate court took this view, the question that had to be considered by if was whether the suit could he decreed on one or more of the grounds mentioned. in Sec. 3 of the Act in view of the provisions of Sec. 15 of the Act. The court then proceeded to record findings of fact to the effect that the plaintiff-respondent had failed to prove the existence of any of the grounds mentioned in Sec. 3 of the Act, so that the plaintiff-respondent was held not to be entitled to a decree for eviction of the appellant. The appeal was, therefore, allowed and the suit of the plaintiff-respondent was dismissed. 4. The plaintiff-respondent then came up in second appeal to this Court and the learned single Judge, who heard the second appeal, framed an issue and remanded it for a finding to the first appellate court. The learned single Judge was of the opinion that it was necessary to consider the effect of the permission which had been obtained from the Additional District Magistrate on the 25th of August 1947, but its effect could only be considered provided it was held that the permission was validly obtained. That question arose because, in the lower courts, there was a contest whether Shri Hadi Hasan (Additional District Magistrate) was or was not competent to grant permission under Sec. 3(1) of the Act. The issue remanded to the first appellate court was in the following words :- "Whether the plaintiff has obtained any valid permission to sue under Sec. 3 of the U.P. Act III of 1947 ?" The first appellate court recorded a finding answering this issue in favour of the plaintiff-respondent, holding that the permission granted by Shri Hadi Hasan on 25th August, 1947, was valid. This finding was accepted by the learned single Judge in the second appeal and, in fact, no attempt was made by the defendant-appellant to challenge that finding. On behalf of the defendant-appellant the point urged was that the permission haying been obtained on 25th August, 1947, subsequent to the institution of the suit, it was of no avail to the plaintiff-respondent and no decree could, therefore it passed for eviction on the basis of permission. On behalf of the defendant-appellant the point urged was that the permission haying been obtained on 25th August, 1947, subsequent to the institution of the suit, it was of no avail to the plaintiff-respondent and no decree could, therefore it passed for eviction on the basis of permission. The learned single Judge did not accept this contention of, defendant-appellant and held that the permission having been obtained under sub-Sec. 3(1) of the Act during the pendency of the suit, it was a good permission so that the requirements of Sec. 3 of the Act were complied with and the suit could be decreed. On this vested the learned single Judge allowed the second appeal, set aside the judgment of the first appellate court and restored the decree passed by the trial court. Consequently, the defendant-appellant has come before us in this special appeal. 5. Shri G.K. Sahai, appearing on behalf of the defendant-appellant, did not challenge before us the validity of the permission granted in favour of the plaintiff-respondent by Shri Hadi Hasan under Sec. 3(1) of the Act but he urged that, in view of the provisions of sub-Sec. 13) of Sec. I of the Act read with sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 18 of the Act, this suit filed on 20th February, 1947, must be deemed to he a suit instituted after the commencement of the Act and not a suit pending at the time of the commencement of the Act and any permission obtained later on after the institution of the suit would not validate the proceedings. In our opinion, the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that this suit was a suit which must be deemed to have been instituted after the commencement of the Act has to be accepted. The suit, as we have mentioned earlier, was instituted on 20th February, 1947. The Act was, no doubt, published in the gazette dated 1st March, 1947, and was not, in fact, in existence on 20th February, 1947, but, under sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. I of the Act, the Act had to be deemed to have come into force on the 1st day of October, 1946. By a fiction of law, therefore, the date of commencement of the Act became the 1st of October, 1946, and did not coincide with the date of publication which was 1st March, 1947. By a fiction of law, therefore, the date of commencement of the Act became the 1st of October, 1946, and did not coincide with the date of publication which was 1st March, 1947. The Act being deemed have come into force on the 1st of October 1946, a suit instituted on 20th February, 1947, must be deemed to be lit instituted after the commence of the Act. This is the logical fusion which follows from the provisioning clause contained in sub-Sec. of Sec. 1 of the Act. Further, under Sec. (2) of Sec. 18 of the Act, the provisions of the U.P. (Temporary) control of Rent and Eviction Ordinance Act III of 1946 had to be so read and construed as if they were amended by that in such manner as not to be in consistent with the provisions of the Act. In giving full effect to this provision, the conclusion that arises is that even the Ordinance will have to be read as if it permitted institution of suits without the permission of the District Magistrate only on six grounds mentioned in Sec. 3(1) of the Act. The requirement of an accommodation by a landlord for his own personal use, which was originally one of the grounds on which a suit could be instituted under the Ordinance, must, therefore, be deemed not to have been one of the grounds for validly instituting the suit because the Ordinance has to be read and construed as if its provisions were amended by Sec. 3 of the Act. The full effect of the provisions of sub-Sec. (2), of Sec. 18 read with sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 1 of the Act, in these circumstances, is that this suit instituted on 20th February, 1947, has to be deemed to be a suit which was not maintainable either under the Act as it was deemed to have come into force or under the Ordinance as it had to be read and construed as a result of amendments to be incorporated in it due to the provisions of the Act. Shri G. K. Sahai relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bombay v. Pandurang Vinayah, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 244 where their Lordships expressed their opinion about the effect of a deeming clause in the following words :- "When a statute enacts that some-thing shall be deemed to have been done, which in fact and truth was not done, the Court is entitled and bound to ascertain for what purposes and between what persons the statutory fiction is to be resorted to and full effect must be given to the statutory fiction and it should be carried to its logical conclusion." Shri Sahai's argument was that, if the deeming clause contained in sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. I of the Act is given its full effect, particularly taken in conjunction with the provisions of sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 18 of the Act, we cannot escape from the conclusion that this was a suit which was instituted after the commencement of the Act and, not having been instituted on any of the grounds contained in Sec. 3 (1) of the Act, it was not maintainable. We agree that this conclusion necessarily follows and must be accepted. It also necessarily follows that Secs. 14 and 15 of the Act cannot be applied to this case. The suit having been instituted on 20th February, 1947, it was not a case where a decree had already been passed before the commencement of the Act, so that Sec. 14 could not apply. Further, the Act having been deemed to have come into force on 1st October, 1946, the suit instituted on 20th February, 1947, cannot be held to be a suit which was pending at the commencement of the Act and, consequently, Sec. 15 of the Act would not apply. The question that, however, remains for consideration is whether a decree in the suit could be validly passed in view of a valid per-mission having been obtained by the plaintiff-respondent during the pendency of the suit on the 25th of August, 1947. 6. The question that, however, remains for consideration is whether a decree in the suit could be validly passed in view of a valid per-mission having been obtained by the plaintiff-respondent during the pendency of the suit on the 25th of August, 1947. 6. Shri G.K. Sahai, learned counsel for the appellant, has relied on a decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in Moti Lal v. Seth Mahabir Prasad, 1961 A.W.N. (H.C.), 263 in order to urge that a permission obtained from a District Magistrate under Sec. 3 of the Act after the institution of the suit will not validate the suit and will be of no avail to the plaintiff. That was a case in which the plaintiffs had applied for permission of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, which was first granted on November 1, 1946, under Sec. 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Ordinance, 1946, which was then in force. That order was, however, set aside by the District Magistrate on July 8, 1947, as having been passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate without jurisdiction. The suit was instituted on 9th January, 1947, and a second permission was obtained from the District Magistrate on 24th September 1947. Reliance was placed on the second permission from the District Magistrate on 24th September, 1947. The learned single Judge held that, under Sec. 3 of the Act which became applicable, the condition of obtaining permission of the District Magistrate referred to the right of the plaintiffs to institute the suit for ejectment of a tenant. If there be no such permission, the plaintiffs would have no right to maintain the suit. Such a permission must be antecedent to the institution of the suit and not subsequent. Clearly, the learned Judge, deciding that case, relied on the principle that an act, which was invalid on the date when it was committed, cannot be retrospectively validated by subsequent compliance with the requirement of law, non-compliance with which had invalidated the act. In that case, the first permission, which was obtained from the Sub-Divisional Magistrate on November 1, 1946, under the Ordinance, was found to be without jurisdiction, so that, when the suit was instituted on 9th January, 1947, the suit was not maintainable even under that Ordinance. In that case, the first permission, which was obtained from the Sub-Divisional Magistrate on November 1, 1946, under the Ordinance, was found to be without jurisdiction, so that, when the suit was instituted on 9th January, 1947, the suit was not maintainable even under that Ordinance. It was not instituted on any of the grounds on which it could be instituted under the Ordinance without the permission of the District Magistrate. The maintainability of the suit was being urged on the basis of the permission that had been obtained on 1st November, 1946, and, that permission being without jurisdiction, the suit was invalidly instituted. It appears to us that the facts of the case before us are different inasmuch as, in the present case, when the suit was instituted, it was validly instituted in accordance with the Ordinance which was, in fact, in force on the date of suit. No permission under the Ordinance was needed by the respondent that the instituting the suit on the date with it was actually filed, so that the act in accordance with the law as it that stood. It was the subsequent charge brought about by the retrospective, application of the Act that the validity of the institution of the suit came to the affected. The fiction of law, by with the Act had to be deemed to have come into force with effect from 1st October, 1946, rendered invalid the institution of the suit which, in truth and in fact, was valid when the suit was instituted. It appears to us that a distinction must be drawn between cases where an act is invalid ab initio on the date when it is committed and then attempts is made to validate it by subsequent compliance with the law and cases where an act, which, in fact and in law, was valid at the time when it was committed, was rendered invalid by a fiction of law, making a subsequent piece of legislation retrospective in effect by deeming it to have come into force before the act was committed. In the former case, the person committing the act does it in violation of law knowingly and consciously. In the latter case, he actually complied with the law as it stood on the date when he committed the act but the valid act of his was subsequently invalidated by a legal fiction. In the former case, the person committing the act does it in violation of law knowingly and consciously. In the latter case, he actually complied with the law as it stood on the date when he committed the act but the valid act of his was subsequently invalidated by a legal fiction. In the former case, the general principle that an act, which was invalid ab initio cannot be validated by compliance with the law may be justifiably applied. We do not think that that principle can be applied to an act falling under the latter class. Where a person does an act which is valid in accordance with the law as it stands on the date when the act is committed and a subsequent law is brought into effect retrospectively with a deeming clause, as a result of which that act becomes invalid, we think that that person should, at least, possess the right to take appropriate proceedings to re-validate that act. This would be a case not of validating invalid act but of re-validating an that "which was initially valid and which was rendered invalid by a fiction of law. It would be in line with all principles equity and justice. In the present case, a suit without permission of the District Magistrate on the ground that the respondent wanted this accommodation for his own occupation was, in fact and in truth, validly instituted on that 20th of February, 1947. The Act, interpreted as a whole, would show that the intention of the legislature was to make provision for all kinds of suit; for eviction which had to be governed by the Act, Sec. 14 was enacted to permit execution of decrees which had been passed before the commencement of the Act. Sec. 15 made provision for continuance of suits pending or the date of commencement of the Act and section 3 made provisions for institution of suits after the commencement of the Act. In all cases, eviction was permitted either with the permission of the District Magistrate or on the existence of any of the grounds mentioned in Sec. 3 of the Act. In all cases, eviction was permitted either with the permission of the District Magistrate or on the existence of any of the grounds mentioned in Sec. 3 of the Act. It seems that, when provision was made in these sections, the legislature lost sight of suits of the nature of the present suit before us, in which no decree had been passed before the commencement of the Act, which were not pending on the date of commencement of the Act because, by a fiction of law, the date of commencement of the Act, was a date prior to the institution of the suit even thought the Act was actually notified on a subsequent date and which had to be treated as a suit instituted after the commencement of the Act but in fact and in truth, could not be so instituted because the Act itself came into existence subsequent to the institution of the suit having been notified at that time. It appears to us that, in view of this position, it would be fully giving effect to the intention of the legislature as gathered from the provisions of this Act itself if we were to hold that a suit instituted between the 1st of October, 1946 and 1st March, 1947, during which period the Act was not, in fact and in truth, in force but had to be deemed to have been in force by a fiction of law, must be allowed to be validated by the plaintiff's obtaining subsequent permission from the District Magistrate under section 3 of the Act as long as the suit was a valid suit when instituted in accordance with the law which was, in fact and in truth, in force on that date. In this case, therefore, we agree with the learned single Judge that the suit instituted by the plaintiff-respondent was a suit in which a decree for eviction could he passed in his favour after he had obtained a valid permission from Shri Hadi Hasan under Sec. 3 of the Act. 7. The appeal, consequently, has no force and we dismiss it with costs.