Judgment :- 1. The only question argued in this case is one of limitation and prescription; and to understand the contention a few facts may be noted. 2. A Muhammadan by name Ahamed Kunju died in Karkatakam 1112 leaving his wife, the 9th defendant, and his children, the plaintiffs, and another child who died subsequently. The 1st defendant is the wife of the brother of Ahammed Kunju. Scarcely a year after the death of Ahamed Kunju his widow executed the sale deed Ex. P-3 in Mithunam 1113 regarding the suit properties left by him in favour of his brother, i. e., the husband of the 1st defendant. Thereafter, the 9th defendant married another person and left the family. In 1121 the husband of the 1st defendant transferred the suit properties under Ext. P-4 in the name of the 1st defendant. On the basis of this document the 1st defendant executed Exx. P-5 to P-8, Ex. P-5 of 1950 being in favour of stranger and the other documents in the name of relations like daughters of the 1st defendant. The suit, which gave rise to the appeal, was filed by the plaintiffs, after they attained majority, for setting aside Ex. P 3. It was contended before the lower court that the suit was barred by limitation and adverse possession. This plea has been rejected and defendants 1, 2 and 4 have come up in appeal. 3. The only question argued before me is, as already indicated, the question of limitation and prescription. The contention is that since Ex. P-3 was in 1113 and possession having also passed under that document, the rights of the minors are barred by adverse possession for over 12 years. It may be mentioned that the suit was filed only in 1956. After some discussion before me the contention has finally boiled down to this. The 1st plaintiff attained majority more than 3 years prior to the institution of the suit and therefore her rights are, at any rate, barred. Regarding the 2nd plaintiff, if she is found less than 21 years of age at the time of filing the suit, her rights will not be affected, and if it is found that she is more than 21, her rights will also be barred. This is the short point argued before me. 4. Regarding the 2nd plaintiff, if she is found less than 21 years of age at the time of filing the suit, her rights will not be affected, and if it is found that she is more than 21, her rights will also be barred. This is the short point argued before me. 4. The learned Subordinate Judge relying on an observation of Mookerjee, J. in Jagannath Marwari v. Smt. Chandni Bibi (AIR. 1921 Cal. 647) to the effect that adverse possession could not be pleaded against an infant has disallowed the contention of the appellants. A similar observation appears in another decision of the Calcutta High Court, namely Lalit Kumar Das Chaudhury v. Nagendra Lal Daft (AIR. 1940 Cal. 589). But I am afraid that such a proposition cannot be laid down as a general proposition of law as observed in Seetaramaraju v. Subbaraju (ILR. 45 Mad. 361). It cannot be stated as a general proposition that there could be no adverse possession of property, which belongs to a minor, during the continuance of the minority and the question in each case has to be decided with reference to the anterior relationship between the person taking possession and the minor and to whether any circumstances exist which would entitle the court to hold that the person who entered into possession did so under circumstances which would in law make him only an agent or bailiff of the minor. Under the Limitation Act minority does not by itself prevent time from running against the minor; in such cases only an extended period of limitation is provided. This view of the Madras High Court appears to be the acceptable view. As a matter of fact, the observations in the Calcutta decisions are casual observations, by which the learned judges do not appear to have intended to lay down any such general proposition of law. These observations cannot be dislodged from the context and pressed into service as has been attempted before me. I find that the same view has been expressed by a Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Alt. Maltibai v. Wamanrao Sheoram (AIR. 1948 Nag. 253). I am in agreement with the view expressed by the Madras High Court and the Nagpur High Court. The learned judges of the Nagpur High Court have considered other decisions as well. 5. Maltibai v. Wamanrao Sheoram (AIR. 1948 Nag. 253). I am in agreement with the view expressed by the Madras High Court and the Nagpur High Court. The learned judges of the Nagpur High Court have considered other decisions as well. 5. In the case before me the mother of the minors was in possession of the properties after the death of their father. Under the Muhammadan Law she was not the legal guardian of the properties of the minors. The brother of the deceased father knowing these facts took a sale deed from the widow without even mentioning the names of the minors. Thereafter, the widow married another person and left the household. In such circumstances, the possession of the widow and that of the brother of the deceased father of the minors were only as agents or bailiffs of the minors. At least until Ex. P-5, under which a stranger was brought into the picture, that possession cannot be construed as possession adverse to the minors. Ex. P5 was in 1950; and the suit having been filed within 12 years of that date is within time. 6. The learned advocate of the appellants points out that the case of the plaintiffs in the plaint was that they were in possession till 1123 and on this point no finding has been recorded by the lower court. He requests me therefore to get a finding on that question. In the view I have taken already that possession must be presumed to be with the minors till 1950, the finding is unnecessary and therefore I dismiss this plea. 7. The result is the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs of the Plaintiff - Respondents.