Judgment :- 1. These second appeals arise from three suits for redemption of mortgages. A common question arises in all the three cases, viz., whether the plaintiffs are members of Swaroopathu tarwad which mortgaged the properties involved in the three suits. The defendants contended that the mortgages were executed by Easwari Madhavi, the last surviving member of Swaroopathu tarwad, that on her death the tarwad became extinct and that the plaintiffs have no right to the property. The plaintiffs' case was that they were adopted into that tarwad pursuant to a Royal Neet and as such they are entitled to redeem the properties. The three second appeals were heard together. 2. S. A. No. 840 of 1960 may be considered first. The property mortgaged is Sreepandaravakai land and it was demised to Swaroopathu tarwad on Kudumbapporuthi tenure. The main contentions of the defendants in second appeal were that the Royal Neet on which the plaintiffs relied was not properly proved, that they were therefore not entitled to redeem the properties, that the suit was barred by limitation and adverse possession and that the michavaram claimed could not be allowed. The courts below have concurrently held against the defendants and decreed the suit in terms of the plaint. Defendants 1 and 11 have preferred this second appeal. 3. The main point raised on behalf of the appellants is that the Royal. Neet was not proved in the case. The plaintiffs produced Ext. P-5 dated 15 41074 as copy of the Dattuneet. The copy was issued by the officer-in-charge of the Palace Office on 14 11956. It is not disputed by the appellants that a Royal Neet is not a public document. The argument was that the Officer who issued the copy was not a public officer and that the copy granted by that officer should not be treated as a certified copy admissible in evidence under S.77 of the Evidence Act. 4. Before the Constitution of India came into force the Maharaja of Travancore was the supreme head of that State. The Palace Office was thus the office of the Head of the State. After the Constitution, the Maharaja of Travancore was appointed as Raj Pramukh of the State of Travancore-Cochin and the executive power of the State of Travancore-Cochin vested in him. The Palace Office was thus the office of the Head of the State. After the Constitution, the Maharaja of Travancore was appointed as Raj Pramukh of the State of Travancore-Cochin and the executive power of the State of Travancore-Cochin vested in him. The copy was issued at the time when the Maharaja of Travancore was the Raj Pramugh of the State and the Palace Office was the office of the executive head of the State. The office which issued the copy was thus a public office. I do not see any reason for holding that the officer-in-charge of that office is not a public officer for purposes of S.76 of the Evidence Act. 5. Counsel for the appellants urged that there was some reason for suspecting the authenticity of the Neet as it was not in the form given in M. P. Joseph's book on Marumakkathayam Law. The author has extracted a Royal Neet issued several years before the date of Ext. P-5. There is no prescribed form for issuing such Neets and the fact that Ext. P-5 is not in conformity with the form of another Neet is no reason to doubt its authenticity. It was also pointed out that no Adiara appears to have been received, by the Maharaja for issuing this Neet. It was customary to receive a percentage of the value of the properties of the tarwad to which adoption was made at the time of issuing such Neets. However, the absence of the levy of adiara is not a test of the genuineness of Neet. It was pointed out in Kanaldcu Nelalcanda Menon v. Neelan Padmanabhan (6 T. L. R.108) that it was not obligatory to receive adiara. It was observed: "It is admitted that in several cases, neets of adoption are often granted by His Highness the Maharajah without any payment of fees, and sometimes without the payment of 'adiara'fees on the whole estate of the tarwad; and that the payment of these fees is not the indispensable condition precedent to the confirmation by the sovereign of this State, of adoptions made in the families of Malayalies. This being so, the non-payment of fees on the. value of certain property cannot really affect the validity of the Royal grant (Neet). Moreover to call the 'Adiara' the consideration for the grant, is wrong. This being so, the non-payment of fees on the. value of certain property cannot really affect the validity of the Royal grant (Neet). Moreover to call the 'Adiara' the consideration for the grant, is wrong. It is analogous to a'Masar' which is paid as a token of allegiance to the Sovereign, and has no connection whatever with the exercise of prerogative." I may in this connection observe that on the strength of this adoption, the plaintiffs sued for and obtained decrees for redemption of other mortgages executed by the Swaroopathu tarwad. Exts. P-7 and P-8 are copies of the judgments in two of such suits. These decisions have not the force of res judicata, as the parties were different, but these are relied on to show that the plaintiffs successfully asserted their right on the strength of the adoption set up in this case. In the circumstances, I do not see any reason to come to a conclusion different from that reached by the courts below. 6. Another point urged was that at the time the trial commenced, the defendants had filed an application praying that the issue relating to the plaintiffs' right to redeem be determined first and that they be allowed to adduce evidence on the other issues after the determination of this question. This application was allowed. However, all the issues were disposed of together. It was therefore urged that the. defendants could not get adequate opportunity to adduce evidence regarding the plea of adverse possession and limitation. It appears from the judgment of the trial court that the court took up for consideration all the issues deliberately and not as a result of any inadvertence. It was stated that notwithstanding the order, the defendants had adduced evidence on the question of adverse possession also and that there was no need to postpone consideration of the other issues. The view taken by the trial court is correct. The plaintiffs having established their right to redeem the defendants must be held to be in possession of the property as mortgagees. No doubt, they had a contention that they had purchased the property in execution of a decree but the first defendant admitted that what was purchased was only the mortgage right. Some documents were also produced to show that some steps were taken against them under the Land Conservancy Act for recovering possession of the property. No doubt, they had a contention that they had purchased the property in execution of a decree but the first defendant admitted that what was purchased was only the mortgage right. Some documents were also produced to show that some steps were taken against them under the Land Conservancy Act for recovering possession of the property. These documents were filed to prove the plea of adverse possession and limitation. As pointed out by the courts below, these are inconclusive especially as it is admitted that the defendants were not evicted. It was also admitted by them that they have never been paying tax for the property. They continued in possession as mortgagees and no question of limitation or adverse possession can arise. 7. The only other question was whether the claim for recovery of michavaram could be allowed. There was no contention that michavaram had been paid so that there was no need to adduce evidence on this point. The appellants are not therefore entitled to a remand for fresh consideration of the other issues. 8. No other point arises in this case, and the second appeal must therefore fail. 9. S. A. No. 812 of 1960. The mam point in this second appeal is whether the adoption is proved. For the reasons stated above I hold that the certified copy of the Neet is admissible and that the adoption has been proved. 10. There was a further contention that when the case came up for examination of parties the defendants wanted the examination of other witnesses to be postponed. There was no specific order allowing this, and the applicant was directed to be reported for orders after the parties were examined. This prayer does not appear to have been pressed after the parties were examined. For these and other reasons stated in S. A. No. 840 of 1960 the prayer for remand cannot be allowed. This second appeal also must fail. 11. S. A. No. 1338 of 1960: The only point for decision in this second appeal is whether the plaintiffs have proved the fact of adoption. For the reasons stated earlier I hold that the certified copy of the Neet is admissible and that the plaintiffs have established their right to redeem the property. 12. In the result, I confirm the concurrent decrees in the three suits and dismiss the three second appeals with costs. Dismissed.