JUDGMENT A.P. Srivastava, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and has come to us on a reference made by Mr. Justice Oak. The petitioner and the first two respondents were candidates for the office of Pradhan of Gaon Sabha Mataundh, tehsil and district Banda. The first respondent was duly declared elected. The petitioner then filed an election petition under Sec. 12-C of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act. The petition was presented before the sub-Divisional Officer not by the petitioner personally but by his duly appointed counsel Shri Vireshwar Singh, Vakil, Banda. A preliminary objection was raised that the petition was likely to fail as it had not been properly presented. The Tribunal accepted the objection and dismissed the election petition. The petitioner then filed a writ petition in this Court challenging the correctness of the view taken by the Tribunal. He contended that the dismissal of the election petition on the ground that it had not been presented by the petitioner personally was illegal. He, therefore, wanted that the order of the Tribunal dismissing the election petition be quashed by a writ of certiorari. He also claimed a writ of mandamus directing the Tribunal to proceed to decide the petition on merits. When this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution was taken up for hearing by Mr. Justice Oak, he found that in support of the view he had taken the Sub-Divisional Officer (Tribunal) had relied on a decision of Mr. Justice Mathur in Smt. Premlata v. Rajendra Pati, 1959 A.L.J. 741. In that case Mr. Justice Mathur had laid down that rule 24(2) of the Panchayat Raj Rules required the presentation of an election petition before the Sub-Divisional Officer by the candidate in person. On behalf of the petitioner reference was made to a Division Bench decision in Ganpat Singh v. Election Tribunal, Mainpuri, 1960 A.L.J. 48 Mr. Justice Oak thought that the decision of Mr. Justice Mathur required reconsideration in view of the later decision of the Division Bench in Ganpat Singh's case, 1960 A.L.J. 48. As that could be done only by a Division Bench he referred the case to a Division Bench. That is how the case has come to us. 2. Election petitions are filed under section 12-C of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act. As that could be done only by a Division Bench he referred the case to a Division Bench. That is how the case has come to us. 2. Election petitions are filed under section 12-C of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act. Rules have been framed under the Act in connection with election petitions and are to be found in Chapter 1-F of the Panchayat Raj Rules. Cl. (2) of R. 24 provides, "The application may be presented by any candidate in whose favour votes have been recorded or whose nomination paper was rejected or by any 10 or more electors of the Sabha." Clause (1) of R. 25 provides, "Subject to the provisions of the Act and the Rules contained in this Chapter, every election petition shall be tried by the Sub-Divisional Officer, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to the trial of suits." Then follows the proviso with which we are not concerned. 3. Two questions arise for our consideration. The first is whether it is required by Cl. (2) of R. 24 that an election petition must be presented personally by the petitioner. The second is if the rule required personal presentation whether omission to present the petition personally is fatal to the petition or whether it is only a curable irregularity. 4. As we read Cl. (2) of R. 24 we do not find any thing in it requiring the candidate to Present the petition personally. The sub-rule authorises the presentation of a petition not only by one candidate but also by 10 or more electors. It is difficult to conceive that the rule making authority intended that 10 or more persons should join together in the physical act of presenting a petition: Had it been the intention to require the presentation of a petition in a particular manner some words would have been used in the sub-rule to make that intention clear. It appears to us that sub-R. (2) does not deal with the manner of presentation at all. It only indicates the class of persons who are entitled to challenge an election by filing an election petition. 5. Three considerations appear to have weighed with Mr. Justice Mathur in Prem Lata's case, 1959 A.L.J. 741. They were, 1. It appears to us that sub-R. (2) does not deal with the manner of presentation at all. It only indicates the class of persons who are entitled to challenge an election by filing an election petition. 5. Three considerations appear to have weighed with Mr. Justice Mathur in Prem Lata's case, 1959 A.L.J. 741. They were, 1. There are provisions in the Panchayat Raj Act in which a distinction has been made between a party and an agent and where both are intended to be entitled to do any thing both the words are, used e.g. Sec. 81 of the Act and Rules and 4-H and 18 of the Rules. In R. 18 specific provision has been made for the presenting of a nomination paper by a candidate or his agent. If the rule making authority had a similar intention in respect of election petitions it would have used similar language in Rule 4-H. 2. Under the Civil Procedure Code presentation is generally permitted through a duly authorised agent. In case of pauper suits and appeals however personal presentation is specifically required. Under R. 25 the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are applicable to election petitions but the Code applies only from the stage the trial of the petition begins. Presentation of the election petition is done at a pre-trial stage. The provision of the Code about presentation will therefore not apply so far as presentation is concerned. 3. Election law is a special branch of law. Proceedings arising out of election petitions are treated as quasi-criminal proceedings. The provisions relating to election petitions have, therefore, to be strictly interpreted. 6. These considerations are in no way conclusive in favour of the view taken by our learned brother. It is true that in the Panchayat Raj Act as well as in the rules framed thereunder a distinction had been made sometimes between a party and his agent by both the terms being mentioned together but wherever that has been done it has been done with some particular purpose in view. Sec. 81 of the act was enacted with the obvious purpose of excluding lawyers from representing parties. Sec. 81 of the act was enacted with the obvious purpose of excluding lawyers from representing parties. That is why it was provided in that section that a party to a civil, criminal or revenue case may appear before a Nyaya Panchayat either in person or by such servant (not being a tout) partner, relation or friend (duly authorised in writing) by him as the Nyaya Panchayat may admit as a fit person to represent him. All possible persons who could be allowed to represent a party were mentioned in the section exception was made in respect of a tout expressly of a lawyer by deliberate omission. The necessity for enumerating the kind of persons who could be allowed to represent a party arose because the intention was to exclude the class which was not being mentioned. 7. R. 4-H does not provide for presentation of a claim or objection in any particular manner. It only says that a claim or objection shall be addressed to the Panchayat Inspector and made in a form which may be specified by the Director. It is to be filed in duplicate. Any number of claims or objections may be filed by any person. There is nothing in the rules to indicate that the claim or objection cannot be field through an authorised agent. Rule 18 relates to the presentation of nomination papers. At the stage at which nomination papers are field provisions like those of the Civil Procedure Code are not applicable. It, therefore, became necessary to provide how nomination papers were to be presented. Difficulties may have arisen if in each case the prospective candidate was personally required to present the nomination paper. The rule making authority, therefore, expressly provided in R. 18 that it could be field through an agent also. The mere fact that express provision for the nomination paper being field through the agent was made in this rule cannot, in our opinion, lead to the conclusion that in the case of an election petition presentation through an agent was necessarily excluded. 8. Election law is certainly a special branch of law and so far as corrupt practices are concerned it can not be disputed that proceedings about them have been treated as quasi-criminal proceedings. These considerations appear to be immaterial so far as the question of presentation of an election petition is concerned. 8. Election law is certainly a special branch of law and so far as corrupt practices are concerned it can not be disputed that proceedings about them have been treated as quasi-criminal proceedings. These considerations appear to be immaterial so far as the question of presentation of an election petition is concerned. On their basis it cannot be insisted that the presentation must be made personally even though there is nothing in R. 24(2) itself necessitating that requirement. 9. Under R. 25 the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are to apply as for as possible to the trial of election petition. Order 3 R. 1 of the Code authorises all things which can be done by a party to be done through an authorised agent. If, therefore, a petitioner could present the petition personally there is no reasons why he should not be able to do so through an agent. The argument that the Code applies to the trial of a petition only and its provisions cannot apply to the presentation of the petition is not convincing because the term `trial' appear to be wide enough to cover the entire course of the petition from the stage of presentation to that of the final disposal. 10. Under the U.P. Town Areas (Conduct of Election of Chairman) Rules, 1953 a question arose in Ganpat Singh's case, 1960 A.L.J. 48 whether the personal presentation of an election petition by the petitioner was necessary under R. 47. The question was answered in the negative. The provisions of R. 47 appear to be parimateria with the provisions of Cl. (2) of R. 24. The relevant portion of R. 47 reads, "Election petitions will be presented by only those persons who were candidates for an election against which election petition is filed." Interpreting this rule it was laid down that, "In our opinion there is no sufficient ground for placing this restricted interpretation on this sub-rule. We think that the primary object of Sub-R. (1) of R. 47 is to define, and thereby limit, the class of person who can challenge an election. We think that the primary object of Sub-R. (1) of R. 47 is to define, and thereby limit, the class of person who can challenge an election. Its purpose is to make clear that the validity of an election can be questioned only by a candidate at that election whose name is on a certain list or whose nomination paper has been rejected; it does not, in our view, prescribe the manner in which the election petition is to be presented. Unless there is something in an enactment which shows that a certain act must be performed by a particular person, or the nature of the act is itself such that it can be performed only by that person, that act can ordinarily be done by a duly authorised agent. If it had been the intention that a petitioner must personally present his election petition it would have been a very simple matter for the rule making authority to make provision to that effect and so put the matter beyond doubt; as it has done, for example, in Cl. (36) of the U.P. Municipalities (Conduct of Election of President and Election Petition), 1955, where it is expressly provided that an election petition shall be presented in person by the petitioner or, if there are more than one petitioner, by any one or more of them. "That has not been done, and we do not consider that Or. 47 requires the petitioner to present his petition in person. Such a construction may result in a petitioner who is incapacitated by accident or illness from presenting a petition at all, for it is a common ground that the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act have no application to the presentation of a petition under the Town Area Act." These observations appear to be applicable with equal force to the case of the presentation of an election petition under the Panchayat Raj Act also. 11. On the first question we are, therefore, clearly of opinion that Cl. (2) of R. 24 of the Panchayat Raj Rules cannot be interpreted as requiring that an election petition must be presented personally by the petitioner. 12. Even if it is held that it is necessary for an election petition to be presented personally too much importance cannot be attached to such a requirement. Defective presentation has always been held to be a curable irregularity. 13. 12. Even if it is held that it is necessary for an election petition to be presented personally too much importance cannot be attached to such a requirement. Defective presentation has always been held to be a curable irregularity. 13. In connection with the presentation of plaints it was held in Wali Mohammad Khan v. Ishaq Ali Khan, A.I.R. 1931 Alld. 507 at p. 511 = 1931 A.L.J. 777 by a Special Bench, "But even if it does (require personal presentation) we are clearly of opinion that the commission to apply with this provision would be a mere irregularity and not an absence of jurisdiction. The Court receiving a plaint which has not been properly presented would have jurisdiction to dismiss it and pass orders on it. It would not be acting without jurisdiction if it did so." 14. The question whether an application for execution which was not properly presented was or was not in accordance with law and could save limitation was considered in detail by a Full Bench in Kanhaiya Lal v. The Panchayati Akhara, I.L.R. 1949 Alld. 973 = 1949 A.L.J. 105 and it was laid down (we are quoting from the head note) "An application for execution which is in all other respects in order, and which has been admitted and registered by the executing court, is to be considered to have been made in accordance with law within the meaning of Article 182(5), Indian Limitation Act, 1908 even though it has been handed over to the Munsarim by a lawyer who holds no Vakalatnama for the decree-holder. Even if the presentation be not strictly in accordance with law, the defect is a mere irregularity and does not vitiate the application." 15. The same view was taken by a Full Bench of Andra Pradesh High Court in Satya Narayan v. Venkata, A.I.R. 1957 A.P. 172 and also by the Rajasthan High Court in Govind Singh v. Deoraj, A.I.R. 1958 Rajas 128. 16. Even in respect of a pauper application which is specifically required under Or. 33, C.P.C. to be presented personally a Full Bench in Kundan Sugar Mills v. The Indian Sugar Syndicate, 1959 A.L.J. 398 held that the rule relating to presentation could not deprive a limited liability company from the advantage of Or. 33 on the ground that it was not physically possible for the company to present the application in person. 17. 33, C.P.C. to be presented personally a Full Bench in Kundan Sugar Mills v. The Indian Sugar Syndicate, 1959 A.L.J. 398 held that the rule relating to presentation could not deprive a limited liability company from the advantage of Or. 33 on the ground that it was not physically possible for the company to present the application in person. 17. In Ganpat Singh's case, 1960 A.L.J. 48 it was observed that omission to present an election petition under the U.P. Town Area (Concept of Election of Chairman) Rules, 1953 was only an irregularity. In Shiv Narain v. Deputy Director, A.I.R. 1959 Alld. 487 it was held in respect of an objection under the Consolidation of Holdings Act that the physical act of presentation was not of much importance and defective presentation was at the most a curable irregularity. 18. It follows from what we have said above that the Tribunal when it rejected the petitioner's petition for want of proper presentation acted against the law and committed an error of law which is liable to be quashed by a writ of certiorari. The petition, therefore, succeeds. The order dismissing the petition is quashed. The petition will now go back to the Tribunal for consideration on merits. But in the circumstances there will be no orders as to costs.