Judgment :- 1. The suit out of which this appeal has arisen is for recovery of a sum of Rs. 350914-8 paid under protest by the plaintiff-Company as customs-duty for export of battens at the Land Entrance Chowkey, Quilon, during the period, July to November, 1946. According to the plaintiff, neither before July 1946, nor after November 1946, was any customs-duty realised from it for export of battens which it had been regularly doing for years since 1943, as the duty was leviable only in respect of planks or logs not being manufactured goods like battens. Notice under S.80 of the Civil Procedure Code having been served claiming, in vain, refund of the amount, the plaintiff has instituted the suit to compel refund of the same. The defendant-State by its written statement put the plaintiff to prove "that the several consignments in respect of which duty was paid by them under protest and refund is now claimed were exempt from duty," and also that the suit was barred by limitation. The District Judge found the plaintiff entitled to have the refund, but dismissed the suit without costs as barred by limitation. Hence the appeal by the plaintiff and cross-objection by the State. 2. It was clearly averred in the plaint that the duty of which refund is claimed related to "non-dutiable battens exported by plaintiff". There was no specific denial of this averment in the State's written statement. The only answer was that the plaintiff should prove that the duty collected from it related to non-dutiable goods. The specification of the goods in respect of which the duty was levied as battens was not disputed in the written statement. As the averments in the plaint not specifically denied in the written statement have, under R.5 of 0.8 CPC., to be taken as admitted, it must now be assumed that the duty collected was in respect of battens. Exts. M and N are two letters by the State addressed to the plaintiff. They clearly show that battens are to be treated as manufactured goods, and non-dutiable as such. Ext. N dated March 16,1944, reads: "In continuation of this office letter ROC No. 22/44/Devpt., dated the 9th March 1944, necessary orders have been issued for manufactured goods such as packing cases in shooks, staves of cases, etc., being excluded from the purview of the notification ROC. Ext. N dated March 16,1944, reads: "In continuation of this office letter ROC No. 22/44/Devpt., dated the 9th March 1944, necessary orders have been issued for manufactured goods such as packing cases in shooks, staves of cases, etc., being excluded from the purview of the notification ROC. No. 9565/43/ Devpt., dated the 26th December 1943 regarding imposition of duty." And Ext. M dated November 3,1946 runs thus: "Government have already ordered that the notification regarding levy of export duty on planks, logs, etc., does not apply to manufactured goods, and that articles like packing cases in shooks which have only to be re-assembled after export will be treated as manufactured goods. Planks which have been worked into shape and size for packing cases and which are exported in that form to be re-assembled into cases after export will accordingly be treated as manufactured goods and not as mere planks. The necessary instructions have been issued to the Excise Commissioner." Battens exported by the plaintiff are strips of wood to be nailed at the edges of cases made by the assembly of shooks, also exported by it alongside the battens to its customers, and it is conceded that shooks exported by plaintiff have never been charged with excise duty. As battens are pieces of planks 'worked into shape and size' to be assembled into packing cases, with ready made shooks exported to consignees in detached form to save wagon space they have to be treated as manufactured goods as shooks admittedly are. That has been the view of the Government too, before July and after November 1946. The finding of the court below that the collection of excise duty by the State on battens exported by plaintiff in the period July to November 1946 was not lawful appears to be correct. 3. Under Art.72 of the Contract Act, 'a person to whom money has ' been paid by mistake or under coercion must repay or return it.' The evidence on record clearly shows that the plaintiff was under an obligation to deliver every month a large number of packing cases to its customers at Madurai and Tuticorin and in order to carry out the same without default it had to export from Quilon the required quantity of the finished shooks and battens therefor. As the Excise Authorities insisted on payment of customs duty before the goods were taken to the railway-yard, plaintiff had to pay the duty demanded of it. It was a clear case of payment under coercion, for without complying with the orders of the Excise authority, it would have been impossible for the plaintiff to transport the goods to Madurai or Tuticorin. In The Sales Tax Officer Banares v. Kanhaiya Lal Makund Lal Saraf (AIR. 1959 SC. 135) the Supreme Court has observed: "If it is once established that the payment, even though it be of a tax, has been made by the patty labouring under a mistake of law the party is entitled to recover the same and the party receiving the same is bound to repay or return it. No distinction can, therefore, be made in respect of a tax liability and any other liability on a plain reading of the terms of S.72 of the Indian Contract Act." The case is stronger here as the plaintiff has paid the amount under protest, under coercion. It then follows that the plaintiff is entitled to refund of the amount which the State has collected from it wrongfully as tax or excise duty. The finding of the District Judge that the 'plaintiff is entitled to the refund claimed' is right and is accepted. 4. The District Judge has found and the State's counsel here contends that the suit is beyond time. Admittedly the amounts were paid in the period July to November, 1946, and the suit had been laid only in July 1950. Counsel for the appellant plaintiff relied on Ext. S as an acknowledgment of the plaintiff's claim in this case. It reads: "Sub: Refund of duty paid under protest by Messrs. Harrisons and Crossfield Ltd. on battens despatched to Madura and Tuticorin through the Land Entrance Chowkey, Quilon. Gentlemen, With reference to the correspondence resting with your letter dated 8th July 1947 regarding the subject cited above. I write to inform you that Government have carefully gone into the matter and consider that the claim for refund of Rs. 350914 8 cannot be upheld." This letter admits receipt of Rs. 350914 8 by the State from the plaintiff -Company on battens despatched by it through the Land Entrance Chowkey, Quilon. I write to inform you that Government have carefully gone into the matter and consider that the claim for refund of Rs. 350914 8 cannot be upheld." This letter admits receipt of Rs. 350914 8 by the State from the plaintiff -Company on battens despatched by it through the Land Entrance Chowkey, Quilon. The admission of receipt of the duty on battens, which were non-excisable, carries with it by implication an admission of the legal liability to refund the same. In Maniram v. Seth Rupchand (33 I. A. 165), an admission that there were open and mutual accounts between the plaintiff and the defendant was held by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee to amount to an acknowledgment of 'liability to pay if the balance should prove to be against him'. Their Lordships approved Sitayya v. Rangareddi (ILR.10 Madras 259) where the Madras High Court had held an admission of mutual, open and current account, though coupled with an express denial of anything being due under that account, to amount to an acknowledgment of liability to pay whatever might be found due on a proper settlement of accounts. In Jainaram v. Governor-General of India (AIR. 1951 Cal. 462) Chakravarti, J. observed: "The substance of the decisions appears to be that it is not necessary that there should be a specific and direct acknowledgment of the particular liability which is sought to be enforced, but if there is an admission of facts of which the liability in question is a necessary consequence, there would be an acknowledgment within the meaning of S.19" Likewise, was the view expressed by the erstwhile Travancore High Court in Krishna Kuruppu v. Raman Pillai (XL T. L. R.200). On the strength of the above rulings, the admission of receipt of duty which was not legally due to the Government tantamounts to an acknowledgment of its liability to refund the same. This admission having been made on June 22, 1948, within three years of the first payment made by the plaintiff in July 1946, and within three years prior to the institution of the suit in July 1950, saves the suit clear of the bar of limitation. It must follow that the plaintiff is entitled to decree in this case. 5. This admission having been made on June 22, 1948, within three years of the first payment made by the plaintiff in July 1946, and within three years prior to the institution of the suit in July 1950, saves the suit clear of the bar of limitation. It must follow that the plaintiff is entitled to decree in this case. 5. In the result, in reversal of the District Judge, the suit is decreed as prayed for in the plaint, subject to the modification that interest both before and after the date of the suit will be at 5% per annum only on the principal amount. The plaintiff will have its costs both here and in the court below. Allowed.