JUDGMENT M. C. Desai, C.J. - The only question raised before our brother Broome was whether respondent No. 1 was entitled to adhivasi rights even though he was not in occupation or possession. His name was entered as in possession of the land in dispute in the records of 1356F, but what is contended on behalf of the appellant is that he was not in actual possession and that consequently he could not get adhivasi rights. But this is not what Sec. 20(b) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act lays down; under it the mere entry of occupancy in the records of 1356F, is enough to entitle the person to adhivasi rights and it does not require him to be in actual possession or occupation in addition. It seems that the legislature was anxious to obviate the necessity of an elaborate enquiry into a highly disputable question of possession which would arise in innumerable cases. An entry in a village record is a tangible thing and visible on the face of it, whereas possession is an intangible thing to be inferred from circumstances and right to possession is a matter of law. Presumably the legislature in order to save time and energy of Courts relied upon a mere entry and did not insist upon actual possession; otherwise much time and energy of Courts would have been wasted in thousands of enquiries into the questions of possession and the right to possession. 2. The Act makes a clear distinction between, (1) occupation or cultivatory possession, (2) right to possession and (3) being recorded as occupant. Section 12 refers to land which "was in the personal cultivation" of a thekadar; what a thekadar should prove in order to claim rights of a hereditary tenant tinder this section is that he was in personal occupation of the land; obviously an entry recording him to be in cultivatory possession would not be enough. Similarly Sec. 13(2) refers to land "in the personal cultivation of the thekadar." Sec. 14(1) speaks of possession of mortgagee and of his right to hold or possess the land after the enforcement of the Act. Sec. 14(2) and Sec. 15 confer certain rights upon certain persons on account of their having the land in their personal cultivation on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting. Sec. 14(2) and Sec. 15 confer certain rights upon certain persons on account of their having the land in their personal cultivation on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting. Sec. 16 confers hereditary tenant's rights upon a person "who was recorded as occupant of any land" in a record and "who on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting, was in possession of the land or was entitled to regain possession thereof", or who was recorded as occupant of any land in the record of rights prepared for 1356F, and who on the date immediately preceding was in possession of the land. This provision makes clear the following matters :- (1) Recording as occupant is quite distinct from being in possession, (2) where being in possession is required in addition to being recorded as occupant the legislature has expressly provided for it, (3) a person can acquire rights on the basis of his being recorded as occupant even though he be out of possession, and (4) being recorded as a tenant is being recorded as occupant. The reference in Sec. 16(i) to a person's being entitled to regain possession shows that he might have been out of possession even though he was recorded as occupant. A person can be in cultivatory possession or occupation either (1) in his own right, whether as a proprietor or a tenant or a sub-tenant or a mortgagee or thekadar, or (2) as a licensee of a person belonging to any of the above classes or (3) as a trespasser, i.e. having no right to be in possession. Possession of the first and third kinds only is recorded in the record of rights prepared under Sec. 32 (e) of the Land Revenue Act, possession as a licensee, whether as an agent or servant (marafatdar) or as a co-sharer (sajhidar) is recorded in the khasra but not in the khatauni because it is not under a right independently of a licence. A person belonging to class (1) only is entitled to regain possession if he has deprived of it and consequently section 16(i) must refer to entry as occupant of a person having a right to be in possession. A person belonging to class (1) only is entitled to regain possession if he has deprived of it and consequently section 16(i) must refer to entry as occupant of a person having a right to be in possession. This is made clear by the explanation to Sec. 16, which excludes from its scope land recorded in the names of persons holding it as grove-holders, ex-proprietary tenants, occupancy tenants, hereditary tenants, fixed rate tenants, land free grantees and sub-tenants. But for this express exclusion, all these persons would be persons recorded as .. occupants of the land within the meaning of Sec. 16. In the remarks column of a khasra if the person whose name is recorded against a plot of land in any other column, is out of possession and a trespasser is in possession, an entry called dawedar kabiz entry is made in the remarks column; this person also can be said to be recorded as occupant of the land. But an entry as occupant of land does not mean only such an entry. Of course when such an entry is made, only the person in respect of whom it is made would be the person recorded as occupant; the other persons whose names are recorded in other columns of the khasra, even though they may have a right to be in possession, cannot be said to be recorded as occupants for the simple reason that they are not in occupation or physical or cultivatory possession. Possession is exclusive; two persons claiming adversely to each other cannot be in possession at the same time and if a person is recorded as dawedar kabiz, only he is to be deemed to be recorded as occupant and not other persons, whom he has dispossessed, even though their names are also recorded in some columns. Even if they have a right to regain possession and, therefore, may be said to be in legal possession, they are not in physical or cultivatory possession and the entry of their names, which would have been an entry recording them as occupants if there had been no dawedar kabiz entry in the remarks column, ceases to be such an entry when another person is recorded as occupant. Just as two persons claiming adversely to each other cannot be in occupation at the same time, so also there cannot be two entries recording two different persons as in occupation of the same land. Sec. 18 confers bhunzidhari rights upon certain persons possessing or holding land in a certain capacity and having a transferable right. Sec. 19 confers sirdari rights upon certain tenants who held land on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting. Sec. 20 confers adhivasi rights upon two sets of persons. Cl. (a) is of persons who, on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting, were tenants of sir or sub-tenants barring those dealt with earlier. Cl. (b) includes every person who "was recorded as occupant . . . . in the khasra or khatauni of 1356F. or who was on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting entitled to regain possession thereof under Cl. (c) of sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 27 of the United Provinces Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1947, or . . . . of any land to which Sec. 16 applies, in the khasra or khatauni of 1356F but who was not in possession in the year 1359F." Sec. 20 is subject to the provisions of Secs. 18 and 21. Sec. 20 (b) is very clumsily drafted; Cl. (b) (i) deals with a person who was recorded as occupant or who was entitled to regain possession, and Cl. (b) (ii) starts with the words "of any land to which Sec. 16 applies" and it is left to be determined whether they are to be read with "recorded as occupant" or with "entitled to regain possession," which are the only words with which they can be read. There is difficulty in reading them with "recorded as occupant" because of the intervening clause "or who was on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting entitled to regain possession thereof under Cl. (c) of sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 27 of the United Provinces Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1947" One cannot skip over this clause and read them with the earlier clause. There is difficulty also in reading them with "was entitled to regain possession" be-cause they are put in Cl. (ii) whereas those words appear in Cl. (i). If they were to be read with those words, Cl. There is difficulty also in reading them with "was entitled to regain possession" be-cause they are put in Cl. (ii) whereas those words appear in Cl. (i). If they were to be read with those words, Cl. (i) should have consisted only of a provision relating to a person recorded as occupant and clause (ii) should have consisted of a provision relating to a person who was entitled to regain possession under Sec. 27 or of any land to which Sec. 16 applies. Further, Sec. 16 does not by itself confer any right on any person to regain possession; on the other hand it itself deals with a person who was entitled to regain possession before its enactment. The words have got to be read with one set of the words or the other and it seems better to read them with the words "was recorded as occupant," because there would be far less difficulty in doing so than in reading them with the words "was entitled to regain possession." Interpreting this clause of Sec. 20 in this manner one finds that adhivasi rights are conferred upon a person recorded as occupant even though he might not have been in possession in 1359F. A person who was not in possession in 1359F, might not have been in possession in 1356F, also and even then he would be entitled to adhivasi rights. The provision excluding the persons who became bhumidhars or asamis shows that otherwise they also would have been entitled to adhivasi rights; this means that an entry as occupant includes an entry as occupant as a tenant or under lawful title. Explanation (II) providing that where an entry referred to in Cl. (b) has been corrected before the date of vesting, or under the Land Revenue Act, the entry so corrected shall prevail, confirms that an entry will prevail even though incorrect and that the legislature intended to act upon entries regardless of the question of their correctness. The most important and common respect in which an entry as occupant would be incorrect is that the person was not in occupation at all; if this entry has not been corrected in the manner mentioned in Explanation (II), it will prevail over the fact of the non-occupation of the person. The most important and common respect in which an entry as occupant would be incorrect is that the person was not in occupation at all; if this entry has not been corrected in the manner mentioned in Explanation (II), it will prevail over the fact of the non-occupation of the person. Sec. 21 confers Asami rights upon persons belonging to certain clauses, who on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting "occupied or held land"; this provision makes a distinction between occupying land and being recorded as occupant by selecting the former words in place of the latter words used in the immediately preceding section and also in its own sub-Sec. (2). The result of this survey of provisions of the Act is that if a case is governed by Sec. 20(b) (i), first limb, the person will get adhivasi rights, regardless of whether he was actually in occupation or not and whether he had a right to be in occupation or not. If he was not required to be in occupation at all, it stands to reason that the question whether he had a right to be in occupation or in what capacity or under what right he was in occupation cannot arise at all. Occupation in any capacity or right, or even without a right, is always better than non-occupation and, if non-occupation is not a hurdle in the way of acquisition of adhivasi rights, occupation without a right can still less be a hurdle. 3. Judge-made Law on this question is very confusing and some of the decisions are irreconcilable. In Nanak Chand v. Board of Revenue, 1955 A.L.J. 408 Agarwala, J., Chaturvedi, J. concurring, observed at page 411: "It seems to us that clauses (b) (i) and (b) (ii) of Sec. 20 do not require the proof of actual possession in the year 1356F. What they require merely is the entry of a person's name as an occupant in the Khasra or Khatauni of 1356F. The words of the section are clear. (Every person who was recorded as occupant in the Khasra or Khatauni in 1356F. What they require merely is the entry of a person's name as an occupant in the Khasra or Khatauni of 1356F. The words of the section are clear. (Every person who was recorded as occupant in the Khasra or Khatauni in 1356F. etc.) The words are not `every person who was an occupant in 1356F:' not are the words "every person who was recorded as an occupant in the year 1356F, and who was also in possession in that year.' There is no warrant for introducing words in the section which are not there. This conclusion is reinforced by what is stated in Explanation II.": We are in full agreement with these observations. The learned Judges dissented from the Board of Revenue's view expressed in Pirthvi Pal Upadhya v. Hardeo Bhar, 1955 A.L.J. (Rev.) 95 and, rightly, if we may say so with respect. 4. In Mahant Parshotam Das v. Prem Narain, 1956 A.L.J. 484 Mootham, C. J. and Agarwala, J. held that adhivasi rights could not be acquired under Sec. 20(b) by a person who had been let into possession by a receiver appointed by a Court during the pendency of a litigation, even though he was recorded as occupant, the reason assigned being that his occupation was as an agent or licensee of the receiver. The learned Judges relied upon a prior decision of this Court to the effect that this provision applies to persons who are recorded as occupants in their own right, whether as tenants or as trespassers, and net to persons recorded the occupation as agents or licensees. The entry relied upon in the case was of occupation "under an arrangement with Damodar Swarup receiver." What the learned Judges meant was that the entry was not of occupation by the person claiming adhivasi rights at all but of occupation by the receiver; they did not lay down that a person may not get adhivasi rights, even though he is recorded as occupant. It may not be easy to agree with their implied view that the entry was not one of occupation, but the question that arises in the instant case is not whether there was an entry recording respondent No. 1 as occupant or not. That he was recorded as occupant is admitted and, therefore, there is nothing in Parshotam Das v. Prem Narain, 1956 A.L.J. 484 which would help the appellant. That he was recorded as occupant is admitted and, therefore, there is nothing in Parshotam Das v. Prem Narain, 1956 A.L.J. 484 which would help the appellant. In Jagdish Prasad v. Board of Revenue, 1956 A.L.J. 317 also decided by Agarwala and Chaturvedi, JJ. it was held that an entry of occupation as a sajhidar or marfaldar is net an entry of occupation within the meaning of Sec. 20(b). Though the learned Judges relied upon the observations of the Judicial Committee in Surisetti Butchayya v. Parthasarathy Appa Row, 48 I.A. 387 that "It is to be observed the word is `occupancy' and not `possession'" and that "an owner may in one sense be in possession of his estate by the receipt of rent from the tenants of that estate but not occupancy," they confused `occupancy' with `possession,' dealt with the ingredients of possession, observed that "one essential element of immediate possession or `occupancy' is the exclusive control over a thing with the intention of appropriating to oneself the exclusive use thereof" and laid down that a servant or agent in possession of a thing is a mere custodian and not an occupant because he has not the intention of exclusive user of it and controls it for the benefit of his master or principal. The actual decision can be defended on the ground that though a Marfatdar or Sajhidar is actually cultivating the land he is not only not in possession but also not in occupation and that the entry recording his name as that of the cultivator is not one of occupation contemplated by Sec. 20(b). A tenant can always get the land forming part of his tenancy cultivated by a relation, or by a servant, or by an agent, whether exclusively or jointly with him; the legislature does not compel a tenant to cultivate the land with his own hands, without any assistance from another person. Therefore, it can well be assumed that the legislature by enacting Sec. 20(b) did not intend to deprive a tenant of his rights and to confer adhivasi rights upon the person by whom, or with whose help, he got the land cultivated, as was his right. Bearing this intention in mind one could have no difficulty in saying that the entry of occupation contemplated is an entry of own occupation and not of another occupation. Bearing this intention in mind one could have no difficulty in saying that the entry of occupation contemplated is an entry of own occupation and not of another occupation. When land is cultivated by a Marfatdar or a Sajhidar, it is the person on whose behalf, or with whom he cultivates it, is deemed to be in occupation and not he. 5. This principle, however, was carried too far by Chaturvedi and Mehrotra, JJ. in R.S. Dubey v. Board of Revenue, 1957 A.L.J. 548 when they held that an entry of possession as a mortgagee was an entry of possession as a licensee and, therefore, not an entry as occupant. A mortgagee is in occupation in his own right; though he derives the title through the mortgage, he holds possession in his own right and to the exclusion of all including the mortgagor. During the subsistence of the mortgage (assuming it to be usufructuary mortgage) the mortgagor has no right to take possession from the mortgagee and the mortgagee, even if he has to account for the profits in the final settlement, appropriates the profits to himself and has not to make them over to the mortgagor. He is not the mortgagor's servant or agent and it cannot be said that the mortgagor is in occupation through him. The mortgagee's position is not at all different from that of a tenant, who also derives his title to be in possession from his landlord. Actually a mortgagee, who is recorded as an occupant, does not get adhivasi rights, because it is Sec. 14 and not Sec. 20(b) that is applicable to him. Under Sec. 14 he, with effect from the date of vesting, ceases to have any right to hold or possess the land and, if he was in personal cultivation of it, either the mortgagor will be deemed to be in possession of it, or he will become a hereditary tenant, depending on circumstances. Incidentally this section distinguishes between a right to hold or possess and personal cultivation. The special provision in Sec. 14 relating to mortgagees must supersede the general provision in Sec. 20(b). Incidentally this section distinguishes between a right to hold or possess and personal cultivation. The special provision in Sec. 14 relating to mortgagees must supersede the general provision in Sec. 20(b). As the mortgagee has ceased to have any right to hold or possess the land since the date of vesting and the mortgagor has become its bhumidar, or the mortgagee has been conferred rights of a hereditary tenant, or has lost all rights of occupancy and has become liable to ejectment on a suit of the Gram Sabha, it means that he could not have acquired adhivasi rights on the ground that he was recorded as occupant. Adhivasi rights are denied to him, but because of the provisions of Sec. 14, and not because his being recorded in possession as a mortgagee does not amount to his being recorded as occupant within the meaning of Sec. 20(b). A person recorded to be in possession as a dar-shikmi is a person recorded as occupant, vide Swami Prasad v. Board of Revenue, 1960 A.L.J. 241 in which a Full Bench of this Court through Srivastava, J. rejected the contention that a person recorded as occupant must have rightful claim to the land and emphasised that the only thing required by Sec. 20(b) is that he must be recorded as occupant. The learned Judge pointed out that all that is required is that the person is recorded to be occupying or having the actual user of the land "on his own behalf," that he may or may not have any interest in it and that he may be even a trespasser. He approved of R. S. Dubey's case on the ground that the mortgagee, on account of the mortgage in his favour being void, was no better than an agent or licensee of the mortgagor and that his "occupation was really that of his principal." 6. In Kanta Pandey v. Banarsi Chaube, 1960 A.L.J. (Journal Section) 34 Bishambhar Dayal, J. distinguished between an entry as a tenant and an entry as occupant, but, with respect, it may be pointed out that if the tenant is shown by the entry to be in occupation, it does not cease to be an entry as occupant. In Kanta Pandey v. Banarsi Chaube, 1960 A.L.J. (Journal Section) 34 Bishambhar Dayal, J. distinguished between an entry as a tenant and an entry as occupant, but, with respect, it may be pointed out that if the tenant is shown by the entry to be in occupation, it does not cease to be an entry as occupant. As we said earlier, it would cease to be an entry as occupant only if the tenant was not in occupation and somebody else, whether his sub-tenant or a trespasser, was in occupation. 7. In Ram Krishna v. Bhagwan Baksh Singh, 1961 A.L.J. 301 Tandon and Misra, JJ. distinguished between `occupation' and `possession,' saying that a trespasser may be in occupation but not in possession. We are not called upon to decide in this case whether a trespasser is in possession or not. It is enough that he is in occupation, because an entry recording him as occupant would then be enough. 8. Sec. 20 came in for discussion by the Supreme Court in Upper Ganges Sugar Mills v. Khalil-Ul-Rahman, 1961 A.L.J. 27. The facts in the case were that a company, which was given a theka expiring in 1355F., continued in possession thereafter and was ordered to be eject. ed under the U.P. Tenancy Act not-withstanding its plea that it had become a hereditary tenant. It preferred an appeal and, during its pendency, execution of the decree was stayed and it continued in possession and its name remained to be recorded in the village papers. During the pendency of the appeal in the Board of Revenue the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act came into force and in the Board of Revenue it claimed to have acquired adhivasi rights under Sec. 20 (b), on account of its having been entered as occupant in the records of 1356F. The Supreme Court held that it was recorded as occupant within the meaning of Sec. 20(b), even though it had no title to be in occupation. It is to be noted that its occupation in 1356F. was not in dispute at all and that consequently there arose no question (before the Supreme Court) of the necessity of actual occupation in addition to the entry of occupation. It is to be noted that its occupation in 1356F. was not in dispute at all and that consequently there arose no question (before the Supreme Court) of the necessity of actual occupation in addition to the entry of occupation. Therefore, first because the Supreme Court went into the question whether it had a right to remain in occupation or not, it cannot be said that such an enquiry is necessary in every case. It was not argued before, and therefore was not held by, the Supreme Court that, if it was not essential for the person to be actually in occupation, it was irrelevant to consider whether he had a right to be in occupation. Wanchoo, J., who delivered the judgment of the Supreme Court, said at page 29 that `occupant' is not a term of art and, in the absence of a definition in the Act, it must be given "its ordinary dictionary meaning which is `a person in occupation'." He then observed, with reference to Swami Prasad v. Board of Revenue, 1960 A.L.J. 241 that "The only limitation that has been placed by judicial decisions on this meaning is that the person should be in occupation in his own right and not on behalf of someone else."; He only referred to the limitation; he did not approve of it. When he next said "So long therefore as a person has been in occupation in his own right" He only meant that, assuming that the limitation was rightly placed on the meaning, the person would be entitled to adhivasi rights. The company was in occupation in its own right and not as a servant or agent of another. Nanak Chand's' case, 1955 A.L.J. 408 was referred to by the Supreme Court in connection with the contention that its occupation as a thekedar was not the occupation contemplated by Sec. 20(b) and the learned Judge observed that it was not necessary to consider the correctness of the decision that it was not required that the person recorded as occupant should have been in actual possession also. The learned Judge passed by Nanak Chand's' case, 1955 A.L.J. 408, because it was not concerned with the nature of possession, but without considering whether its decision that actual occupation was not necessary did not by itself obviate the necessity of an enquiry into the nature of occupation. The learned Judge passed by Nanak Chand's' case, 1955 A.L.J. 408, because it was not concerned with the nature of possession, but without considering whether its decision that actual occupation was not necessary did not by itself obviate the necessity of an enquiry into the nature of occupation. He proceeded to observe that Sec. 20 (b) only spoke of a person being recorded as occupant and said nothing as to the nature of the occupation and that it was a matter which must always be decided on other evidence as the entry does not contemplate recording of the possession in the sense of its being on behalf of the person recorded or on someone else's behalf. An entry of occupation may contain facts as to the nature of possession or the title under which it is claimed, but, if, as pointed out by Wanchoo, J.. all that is required for acquisition of adhivasi rights is an entry of occupation, nothing that is added to the entry would disentitle the person to them. There is no provision in Sec. 20 to the effect that adhivasi rights will not accrue in favour of a trespasser or a servant or a licensee or a co-sharer and, therefore, the fact of the person's being a trespasser or a servant or a licensee or a co-sharer will not deprive him of adhivasi rights accrued to him by the mere entry of his occupation. If actual occupation is not essential, the nature of the actual occupation is irrelevant, and, if the nature of the actual occupation is irrelevant, the nature of the occupation recorded is equally irrelevant. It is a different matter if, on account of something added in an entry itself, or, on account of evidence produced in the case an entry, though ostensible of occupation of the person claiming adhivasi rights, is held to be an entry not of his occupation, but of somebody else's. Das Gupta, J. dissenting, stated that the correctness of Swami Prasad v. Board of Revenue, 1960 A.L.J. 241 was not challenged before the Board of Revenue, but it was not necessary for the Company to do so, because it was in occupation in its own right and not on behalf of the proprietor. He pointed out that adhivasi rights were conferred under section 20(b) upon persons who were recorded as occupants and not upon persons who were occupants. He pointed out that adhivasi rights were conferred under section 20(b) upon persons who were recorded as occupants and not upon persons who were occupants. We do not find in the judgment of the Supreme Court any declaration of law that a person recorded as occupant must also be in actual occupation and that his occupation must be, or must not be, of a certain kind. 9. The latest case on the subject is Lalta Pande v. Mahendra Nath Parade, 1963 A.L.J. 190, decided by our brother Dhavan on 9-8-1962. The facts there were that two Pande brothers were recorded in the papers of 1356F, as occupants of the land in dispute as khudkasht-holders, that they themselves claimed to be in occupation as tenants holding the land from the proprietors and that they were actually not in possession in 1356F. Several reasons were given by the learned Judge for rejecting their claim, one being that they having been recorded in occupation as khudkasht-holders could not claim adhivasi rights and another being that they themselves had pleaded that the entry was fictitious and that, consequently, they could not rely upon it. Dealing with Sec. 20(b) the learned Judge observed: "This section created a class of tillers called adhivasis and conferred on them a right to the land which they had been cultivating before the abolition of zamindari. Its object apparently was to protect the rights of persons who had been tilling the land but could not, for reasons beyond their control, show any ostensible right or title." Neither the Statement of Objects and Reasons, nor the preamble nor any provision of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act shows that the legislature intended to confer adhivasi rights upon actual tillers. If one starts with the assumption that Sec. 20(b) requires the person also to be in actual occupation, one assumes the very thing that is required to be established. The obvious object of the legislature was to confer adhivasi rights upon persons who were recorded as occupants and, in the absence of anything in the Act suggesting that the legislature intended that they should also be in occupation, to say that they must also be in occupation is nothing but usurpation of legislative powers. The legislature need not have said it expressly, but has not said it even impliedly. The legislature need not have said it expressly, but has not said it even impliedly. The learned Judge himself pointed out that the provision conferring adhivasi rights upon a person on the basis of mere existence of an entry, regardless of its correctness, is unusual; one can say that it is unusual on this ground only if it means exactly what it says. There would be nothing unusual in it if it were treated as requiring actual occupation in addition to the entry. We have already explained why the legislature could have thought of conferring adhivasi rights on the basis of a mere entry of occupation. The learned Judge further proceeded to say that the effect of the entry would be to deprive a person adversely affected of an opportunity to prove that the claimant was never in occupation at all and that the effect of literally interpreting the provision would be to deprive a person with a clear title and in actual occupation of rights. We find ourselves unable to agree. In the first place there is absolutely no question of any body's being deprived of his rights by another's being conferred adhivasi rights, or of being deprived of an opportunity to prove that he and not the other person was in occupation. If actual occupation is not relevant at all, there is no question of proving actual occupation of one party or the other and, consequently, there arises no question of its being deprived of an opportunity to prove its possession. Even if it had proved its possession, the other party would have been held entitled to adhivasi rights, on the ground of its being recorded as occupant. The effect of Sec. 4 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act is that from the date of vesting all estates stood transferred to, and vested in, the State free from all encumbrances. Not only were the proprietors deprived of their proprietary rights, but the tenants also were deprived of their tenancy rights. The State granted fresh tenancy rights in accordance with the provisions of the Act and nobody had a claim to any of the fresh rights. Not only were the proprietors deprived of their proprietary rights, but the tenants also were deprived of their tenancy rights. The State granted fresh tenancy rights in accordance with the provisions of the Act and nobody had a claim to any of the fresh rights. It was for the State to decide to whom to grant fresh tenancy rights and it in its wisdom, which cannot be challenged in a Court, decided to grant adhivasi rights upon persons who were recorded in a certain year as occupants. If the persons actually in occupation did not get adhivasi rights, because they were not recorded as occupants, they cannot complain that they were deprived of adhivasi rights. They were deprived of their tenancy rights by Sec. 4 of the Act and they could not complain of being deprived of adhivasi rights unless they were entitled to them under some law other than the law by which they are said to have been deprived. Later the learned Judge said that "the legal foundation of an adhivasi's rights ...... is his occupation of the land . . . . and not the entry in the record of 1356F, which is merely evidence of occupation in fact, the only evidence which the State will recognise." The learned Judge has assumed that the basis of adhivasi rights conferred upon a person is his actual occupation; this is not what the provision conferring the rights says. It is also not correct that the legislature recognised only an entry in a village record as evidence of possession; it is not the law that the entries made in a khasra and khatauni are presumed to be correct. Moreover, if an entry is the only legal evidence of actual possession, virtually the entry becomes the basis of title and no other evidence of possession can be received and, therefore, there can be no enquiry into actual possession. It is wrong to say that an entry by a patwari is a grant by the State or confers adhivasi rights. It is the legislature that confers adhi-vasi rights. It is wrong to say that an entry by a patwari is a grant by the State or confers adhivasi rights. It is the legislature that confers adhi-vasi rights. Later the learned Judge observed: "This clause was not included for the protection of tenants and others whose rights are fully safeguarded under other Section of the Act but of per-sons who had been tilling the land in their own right but could not show any better evidence of their title than an entry describing them as occupants. The word `occupant' has been advised. used and does not mean a tenant or sub-tenant who may he in possession." We find it difficult to agree. Bhumidari and sirdari rights are conferred by Secs. 18 and 19 upon persons who could prove that they held certain rights on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting. An entry of occupation is no evidence of title at all. It is true that trespassers also acquire adhivasi rights under Sec. 20 (b), but certain persons whose occupation was lawful also get adhivasi rights. Secs. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19 and 21 do not exhaustively deal with persons in occupation under a lawful title. A dar-shikmi is a person in occupation under a lawful title; he acquires adhivasi rights as held in the case of Swami Prasad. That the word `occupant' does not mean a tenant or a sub-tenant who may be in possession is against several decisions of this Court. The Pande brothers were recorded as khudkashtholders, and nobody else was recorded as in occupation, in the khasra. A khasra is a record of possession and, therefore, the entry means - it cannot mean anything else - that they were in occupation in 1356F. It was not at all necessary that the word qabiz should have been entered after their names or that their names should have been recorded in the remarks column and not in the column of tenants. So long as nobody else was recorded as in occupation the entry meant that the Pande brothers were in occupation. Somebody was in occupation and it could not be other than the Pande brothers, because only their names were recorded. 10. So long as nobody else was recorded as in occupation the entry meant that the Pande brothers were in occupation. Somebody was in occupation and it could not be other than the Pande brothers, because only their names were recorded. 10. We agree with Broome, J. that the respondent, on account of his being recorded as occupant in the village records of 1356F, was entitled to adhivasi rights and that the contrary view taken by the Additional Commissioner and the Beard of Revenue was manifestly illegal and dismiss the special appeal summarily.