Judgment :- 1. There is ample evidence in this case to show that a lorry belonging to the appellant 1st defendant and driven by the employee, the 2nd defendant, in the course of his employment, ran into the rear of a stationary bus belonging to the plaintiff State Government which had stopped on the proper side of the road, namely, the left side, to get down a passenger causing damage to the bus and injury to two passengers in it as a result of which one of them, Kuttan Pillai by name, died in hospital later in the day. The lorry was grossly overloaded, in fact it was carrying twice the weight it was authorised to carry; its brakes were on test found to be defective; and the evidence is that it was driven at excessive speed. All this evidence was entirely uncontradicted, the defendants adducing no evidence whatsoever in proof of their contention that the collision was occasioned by the bus having been abruptly stopped without any manner of warning the oral evidence given by the 1st defendant on this matter is clearly hearsay since he was admittedly not present. It is thus obvious that the accident was caused by the negligence of the 2nd defendant; and, the 2nd defendant's tortious act being in the course of his employment under the 1st defendant, both the defendants are liable in damages to the plaintiff. 2. The plaintiff claimed damages under two heads: (1) a sum of Rs. 407-12 4 on account of the expenses incurred for repairing the bus, and (2) a sum of Rs. 1200/- paid by the plaintiff to the widow of Kuttan Pillai who died as a result of the accident. The first item is clearly proved by the evidence of pws. 7 and 8 and the bill, Ext. F, issued by pw. 7 as the manager of the workshop which effected the repairs. That the appellant 1st defendant is liable in respect of this item can scarcely be disputed, and it was rightly decreed by the court below. The only question then is whether the court below was right in decreeing the second item, namely, the sum of Rs.1200/-pud to the widow of Kuttan Pillai. 3. I do not think it was. That the appellant 1st defendant is liable in respect of this item can scarcely be disputed, and it was rightly decreed by the court below. The only question then is whether the court below was right in decreeing the second item, namely, the sum of Rs.1200/-pud to the widow of Kuttan Pillai. 3. I do not think it was. The payment to Kuttan Pillai's widow was a purely voluntary payment made on compassionate grounds it is not the case of the plaintiff State Government that they were bound by any law to pay it. That being so, it seems to me obvious that there was no causal connection at all between the wrongful act of the defendants and this particular item of damage. The wrongful act of the defendants provided the occasion for, but was not the cause of, the damage. The case seems to fall exactly within the decision in Admiralty Commissioners v. S. S. Amerika (1917) Appeal Cases 38) where the damages claimed were refused on the score of remoteness. With regard to this, Salmond says in his book on Torts, Twelfth Edition at page 739: "Remoteness in such a case does not depend on whether the actus interveniens of the plaintiff is in any way negligent, unreasonable, or otherwise improper, but is based merely on the fact that it is voluntary (that is to say, not under the compulsion of any legal obligation) and that the loss thereby caused is intentional on the plaintiff's part." In his speech in that case Earl Loreburn said: "I also think that the damages sought are not in any way recoverable, because they represent sums of money which the appellants were not legally required to pay." No doubt the plaintiff State Government's conduct in making the payment is commendable, but it can scarcely expect the defendants to pay for its good deed. The following observations of Lord Sumner in the case just referred to (at page 60 of the report) are very much to the point: "Injury is the gist of any action of negligence; if the negligence docs no damage no action lies. In the present case the sums claimed were paid to widows and other dependants of the drowned men under Admiralty Regulations which expressly declare that these arc compassionate payments, and granted of grace and not of right, both in kind and in degree. In the present case the sums claimed were paid to widows and other dependants of the drowned men under Admiralty Regulations which expressly declare that these arc compassionate payments, and granted of grace and not of right, both in kind and in degree. True that in such cases they are always made, and most properly made, but none the less the money claimed was lost to the Exchequer directly because the Crown through its officers was pleased to pay it. The collision was the causa sine qua non; the consequent drowning of the men was the occasion of the bounty; but the causa causans of the payment was the voluntary act of the Crown." I have no doubt that the payment in this case was most properly made, but the causa causans of the payment was not the negligence of the defendants but the voluntary act of the plaintiff. 4. The case in Attorney-General v. Vaile-Jones (1935) 2 K. B. page 309) has been cited on behalf of the plaintiff. But that was a case where, if the expenses claimed as damages had not been borne by the plaintiff they could have been recovered from the plaintiff by the victims of the accident as damages, and it was on this very ground that the case in Admiralty Commissioners v. S. S. Amerika (1917) Appeal Cases 38) was held to be inapplicable. 5. In the result I allow the appeal in part and decree the plaintiff's suit for the sum of Rs. 407-12 4 with interest thereon at six per cent per annum from the date of the suit and proportionate costs both here and in the court below. For the rest I dismiss the suit, but without costs.