JUDGMENT M.S. Menon, J. 1. The petitioner in O. P. No. 765 of 1960, the Trichur District Cooperative Bank, is the appellant before us. That petition, which has been dismissed, sought a writ of mandamus directing the District Collector of Trichur to make a reference to the District Court of Trichur under S.17 of the Cochin Land Acquisition Act, 1070. The controversy in respect of which the reference was sought related to the amount of compensation awarded to the Bank by award No. 567 of 1957. 2. The award is dated 17-7-1957. The application for reference is Ext. C dated 12-11-1958. It was dismissed by the District Collector on the ground that it was barred by limitation by Ext. D dated 1-10-1959. 3. The period of limitation provided by S.17 for a case like the one before us is six months from the date of the award. The expression "the date of the award" came up for consideration in AIR 1961 SC 1500 . The Supreme Court said that it should not be construed in a literal or mechanical way and that it means "the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively." 4. The word "award" is not defined in the Act. S.10, however, gives an indication as to what it should contain when it says that the officer concerned "shall make an award under his hand of-- (i) the true area of the land ; (ii) the compensation which in his opinion should be allowed for the land provided that the amount awarded shall not exceed the amount claimed ; and (iii) the apportionment of the said compensation among all the persons known or believed to be interested in the land, of whom, or of Whose claims, he has information, whether or not they have respectively appeared before him." 5. S.11 of the Indian Land Acquisition Act, 1894, corresponds to S.10 of the Cochin Land Acquisition Act, 1070. S.11 of the Indian Land Acquisition Act, 1894, corresponds to S.10 of the Cochin Land Acquisition Act, 1070. In AIR 1932 PC 102 the Privy Council said: "As their Lordships read the Act (the Indian Land Acquisition Act, 1894) the duty of the Collector under S.11 of the Act, is to make an award in regard to three matters, viz., (1) the area of the land included in the award; (2) the total compensation to be allowed for that land, and (3) the apportionment of that compensation among all the persons interested in that land." 6. S.11 of the Cochin Land Acquisition Act, 1070, provides that the officer concerned "shall give immediate notice of his award to such of the persons interested as are not present personally or by their representatives when the award is made." Ext. A dated 22-8-1957 is a notice invoking the section and issued under it. 7. Counsel for the appellant submitted that Ext. A does not indicate the area of the land comprised in the acquisition and is defective on that account. Ext. A shows that the whole of survey plot No. 298/2A was being acquired and that, in a notice to the owner of the plot, should be adequate and sufficient. 8. In Ext. B dated 4-9-1957 the appellant referred to Ext. A, the number of the survey plot and said : "The amount ordered to be paid to the Bank is Rs. 69,070/15 and interest only. Since the value of all improvements including the compound well is not seen included and adequately valued, the amount ordered under the award may be paid under protest." It is contended that this communication should be construed as an application for a reference under S.17 of the Act. We find it impossible to accede to the contention. Ext. B is nothing else or other than a request for a payment under protest of the amount awarded to the appellant for the land acquired. 9. Ext. C is definitely an application for a reference under S.17. It does not say that it is a continuation of Ext. B or any other earlier communication. 10. Ext. C, as already stated, is dated 12-11-1958. And even if we assume that the appellant's knowledge of the award dates only from the date of Ext. B, 4-9-1957. Ext. C is an application filed out of time and barred by limitation. 11. B or any other earlier communication. 10. Ext. C, as already stated, is dated 12-11-1958. And even if we assume that the appellant's knowledge of the award dates only from the date of Ext. B, 4-9-1957. Ext. C is an application filed out of time and barred by limitation. 11. Paragraph 5 of Ext. C says : "The award was received by the petitioner only on 29-10-1958." The reference is apparently to the receipt of the certified copy of the award for which the appellant had applied on 4-9-1957. 12. The question is whether the appellant is entitled to an exclusion of the time spent in obtaining a certified copy of the award. 1959 KLJ 562 is an authority for the proposition that such exclusion is not possible. The conclusion was affirmed in 1960 KLJ 963 . 13. According to the appellant the knowledge of the award emphasised by the Supreme Court in AIR 1961 SC 1500 is knowledge of the entire contents of the award, that such contents will include the grounds on which the award is based and limitation should hence be considered as running only from the date on which the certified copy was obtained. In this connection our attention was also drawn to R.3(6) of the Rules framed under the Cochin Land Acquisition Act, 1070, which says that the award shall be drawn up in the form given in that rule. One of the headings in the form prescribed is: "Award and the ground there for". 14. The award of which knowledge should be brought home can only be an award as prescribed by S.10 of the Act. Full knowledge of such an award was brought home to the appellant at least by Ext. A dated 22-8-1957. And such being the case we cannot but uphold Ext. D, the decision of the Collector dismissing Ext. C as barred by limitation. 15. This case has every appearance of being an unfortunate case. The appellant may have really desired a copy of the award for deciding the further course of action, and may have really believed that the time taken to obtain a copy will be excluded from the computation of the period of limitation. But as emphasised by Lord Greene, M. R., in 1945 (2) All. The appellant may have really desired a copy of the award for deciding the further course of action, and may have really believed that the time taken to obtain a copy will be excluded from the computation of the period of limitation. But as emphasised by Lord Greene, M. R., in 1945 (2) All. ER 425 statutory limitation is not concerned with merits, once the axe falls it falls, and a defendant who is fortunate enough to have acquired the benefit of a statutory limitation is entitled to insist upon his strict rights. 16. The appeal fails and is dismissed. No costs.