JUDGMENT B. Dayal, J. - I have had the advantage of seeing the judgment prepared by my learned brother, Takru, J. with which I entirely agree. I only wish to add some words of my own in support of the conclusion arrived at in his judgment. 2. In the proviso to Sec. 48(2) (b) (vi) the important words to be noted are "explaining the conduct on account of which it is proposed to take action against him." Thus the opportunity which has to be afforded is with regard to the conduct in respect of which `action is proposed to be taken', and not those which were taken into consideration by the Government for satisfying itself that the President should be removed. If the intention was that the opportunity to explain the conduct should relate to the whole conduct which satisfies the Government, then the words would have been "explaining the conduct on which the Government was satisfied," or words to that effect. I, therefore, entirely agree that the notice given to the President to explain a particular conduct need not embrace the whole conduct which has satisfied the Government, but may include only some of it which the Government thinks is good enough to support his removal and may, in case of necessity, give a fresh notice subsequently in respect of other conduct. 3. Under Sec, 48(3) the suspension order can be passed "against whom action is proposed under sub-Sec. (6) of clause (b) of sub-Sec. (2) " For the passing of the suspension order, therefore, it is not a condition precedent that an explanation should have been called from the Present. As soon as it is proposed to take action for his removal, he can be suspended. This order therefore is not dependent upon either the issue of or contents of the notice or otherwise demanding explanation. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the proposal to take action only comes into existence with the notice asking for explanation. I am unable to agree with this contention. The language used is "against whom action is proposed." This only means `against whom it has been decided to take action.' The explanation may be asked later on but as soon as that decision is reached, the suspension order can be passed. I am unable to agree with this contention. The language used is "against whom action is proposed." This only means `against whom it has been decided to take action.' The explanation may be asked later on but as soon as that decision is reached, the suspension order can be passed. This suspension order continues "until the proceedings are over." Such proceedings can only be over, either by the actual removal of the President or by the final decision not to proceed with his removal on the basis of the satisfaction which resulted in the proposal to remove him. Thus in a case where an explanation has been called in respect of some of the conduct only, and it is ultimately found that that conduct was not sufficient for his removal, the Government may immediately start proceedings in respect of other matters which had not either deliberately or inadvertently been included in the previous notice, and in that case the proceedings will continue even after the fresh notice for explanation has been issued and the suspension order passed originally will continue. The Government not having dropped the proceedings for his removal, it cannot be said that the proceedings are over. Takru, J. - 4. The following two questions have come before us, on a reference by Mathur, J., on account of a conflict in view in Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. State Industrial Tribunal, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1381 and Bhagwan Das Barnwal v. The State of U.P., 1956 A.L.J. 409. (1) Does the jurisdiction of the State Government under Sec. 48(3) of the U.P. Municipalities Act, to place under suspension a President, depend upon the contents of the show cause notice? Is the order of suspension invalid if the show cause notice served on the President lacks in material particular and the facts as stated therein do not amount to gross misconduct in the discharge of his duties? (2) Can the State Government rely on material extraneous to the show cause notice, in satisfying the Court that it was prima facie satisfied that the President was guilty of gross misconduct in the discharge of his duties, in other words, the order of suspension is valid and infra wires even though the notice does not contain full particulars? 5. (2) Can the State Government rely on material extraneous to the show cause notice, in satisfying the Court that it was prima facie satisfied that the President was guilty of gross misconduct in the discharge of his duties, in other words, the order of suspension is valid and infra wires even though the notice does not contain full particulars? 5. Both these questions have arisen in a petition which has been preferred by Sri Babu Lal Sharma under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the order of suspension and the charge-sheet, dated the 18th November, 1961, and for the issue of a writ of mandamus commanding the State of Uttar Pradesh, not to give effect to the said order of suspension and not to proceed on the basis of the aforesaid charge-sheet. 6. Before I proceed to answer the questions posed above, a few admitted facts which will be of help in the answering of those questions, may be stated. The petitioner is a duly elected President of the Municipal Board, Aligarh, since sometime after the last general election of members to that Board in October, 1957. In July, 1961, the petitioner received a notice, dated the 4th July, 1961, from the State Government - the respondent - containing four charges, and requiring him to show cause why he should not be removed from the Presidentship of the Municipal Board, Aligarh, under Sec. 48(2) (a) and Sec. 48(2) (b) (vi) of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 - hereinafter called the Act - on account of any one or more of the said charges. Along with that notice he also received an order of suspension dated the 4th July, 1961 under Sec. 48(3) of the said Act. The petitioner thereupon filed a petition in this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, praying for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the aforesaid notice and order, and for a writ of mandamus directing the State Government not to interfere with the petitioner's right to function as a duly elected President of the Municipal Board. In addition to the aforesaid writs, the petitioner also prayed for the stay of the order of suspension pending the disposal of his petition. That petition was admitted, and the operation of the order of suspension was staved. In addition to the aforesaid writs, the petitioner also prayed for the stay of the order of suspension pending the disposal of his petition. That petition was admitted, and the operation of the order of suspension was staved. The petition was ultimately allowed by Mathur, J. on the 7th November, 1961, and the impugned notice and order were quashed. Thereafter on the 18th November, 1961, another show cause notice similar in terms to the previous one, but containing seven other charges, was served on the petitioner along with all order of suspension under Sec. 48(3) of the Act. The present petition is directed against the aforesaid show cause notice and the proceedings which have been initiated against him on the basis thereof, including the order of suspension dated the 18th November, 1961. 7. In this petition we are concerned only with Sec. 48(2) (b) (vi) and Sec. 48(3) of the Act. These sections in so far as they are material for the present purpose, read thus :- "48(2) The State Government may, at any tune if it is satisfied : ........ (b) that the President has - (vi) been guilty of gross misconduct in the discharge of his duties remove him from office Provided that before removing him from office under this sub-section the State Government shall give him an opportunity of explaining the conduct on account of which it is proposed to take action against him and shall, in the event of taking such action, place on record the reasons therefor ..." "48(3). The State Government may place under suspension a President against whom action is proposed under sub-clause (vi) of clause (b) of Sub-Sec. (2) until the proceedings are over and where a President has been so suspended, he shall not for so long as the order of suspension continues be entitled - (a) to exercise the powers or perform the duties of a President imposed upon him by or under this Act or any other enactment for the time being in force, and (b) to take part in any proceedings of the board." 8. Both the questions referred to us are inter-connected and concern the interpretation of the two sections quoted above. Both the questions referred to us are inter-connected and concern the interpretation of the two sections quoted above. A plain reading of those sections shows that after the State Government has satisfied itself that a President has been guilty of gross misconduct in the discharge of his duties, it can remove him from office, provide that before taking that action it must give the President an opportunity of explaining the conduct on account of which it is proposed to remove him from office. Further, that the State Government has the discretion to place under suspension a President against whom action is proposed under Sec. 48(2) (b) (vi) until the proceedings in connection with the proposed action are over. Now, the proposed action of removal under Sec. 48(2) may be based upon a number of instances of gross misconduct on the part of the President in the discharge of his duties and the answer to the first question therefore depends upon whether there is anything in principle or in these sections which expressly or by necessary implication imposes upon the State Government the duty to mention all the instances on which its satisfaction as regards the proposed action is based in the show cause notice under Sec. 48(2) (b) (vi); for if not, the quashing of a show cause notice on the ground that the instances stated therein do not amount to gross misconduct on the part of the President in the discharge of his duties, would not automatically have the effect of invalidating the order of suspension also. In that event the State Government may justify its satisfaction as regards the proposed action and the order of suspension, by reference to further and better particulars of the instances on which the first show cause notice was based, or it may support them on instances other than those mentioned in the original show cause notice. I have read both these sections carefully, hilt find nothing therein, which can be held to fetter the discretion of the State Government in this regard. The Legislature by not placing any restriction on the aforesaid discretion of the State Government clearly intended to give the latter a free hand in the matter, subject only to the general rule that the discretion should not be exercised arbitrarily or mala fide. The Legislature by not placing any restriction on the aforesaid discretion of the State Government clearly intended to give the latter a free hand in the matter, subject only to the general rule that the discretion should not be exercised arbitrarily or mala fide. The State Government is, therefore, entitled, in the interests of expediency and convenience, and in order to avoid bewildering the President in his defence by calling upon him to explain too many instances simultaneously, to pick and choose out of the instances of gross misconduct on which its satisfaction to take the proposed action is based, and to mention in its show cause notice to the President only the instances thus selected. In doing so, the State Government does not, in my opinion, forfeit its right to serve another show cause notice based on other instances of gross misconduct or even on the same instances fortified by additional facts and circumstances which might have been inadvertently omitted from the earlier show cause notice, should the first show cause notice be found to be defective. Now if I am right in the view expressed above, then the quashing of a show cause notice issued under the proviso to Sec. 48(2) (b) would not result in invalidating the order of suspension also - which, as stated above, is not only anterior to the show cause notice but may be based on instances other than those mentioned in the show cause notice - unless it was conceded by the State that all the instances of gross misconduct on which its satisfaction was based, were mentioned in the original show cause notice. On the language of these sections, therefore, I am unable to hold that the validity of the suspension order must in all cases depend upon the validity of the show cause notice. 9. The construction which I have sought to place on the question of the State's satisfaction under Sec. 48(3) of the Act receives direct support from the observations made by the Supreme Court in Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. State Industrial Tribunal, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1381. In that case the constitutionality of Sec. 3 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. (No. XXVIII of 1947) and the validity of two general orders passed thereunder were challenged. In that case the constitutionality of Sec. 3 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. (No. XXVIII of 1947) and the validity of two general orders passed thereunder were challenged. Section 3 of that Act in so far as it is relevant for the present purpose was in these terms : "If, in the opinion of the State Government it is necessary or expedient so to do for securing the public safety or convenience, or the maintenance of public order or supplies and services essential to the life of the community, or for maintaining employment, it may, by general or special order. make provisions-- * * * (c) for appointing industrial courts; (d) for referring any industrial dispute for conciliation or adjudication in the manner provided in the order; * * * (g) for any incidental or supplementary matters which appear to the State Government necessary or expedient for the purposes of the order; * * * Repelling the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant -that there must be a recital in the order that the condition precedent to the exercise of the statutory power has been fulfilled, and that the omission of such recital in the order is a defect which cannot be cured by an affidavit filed in the, proceedings and the order would be void ab initio, the Supreme Court held : "The power to pass an order under Sec. 3 arises as soon as the necessary opinion required thereunder is formed. This opinion is naturally formed before the order is made. If therefore such an opinion was formed and an order was passed thereafter, the subsequent order would be a valid exercise of the power conferred by the section. The fact that in the notification which is made thereafter to publish the order, the formation of the opinion is not recited will not take away the power to make the order which had already arisen and led to the making of the order. The validity of the order therefore does not depend upon the recital of the formation of the opinion in the order but upon the actual formation of the opinion and the making of the order in consequence. The validity of the order therefore does not depend upon the recital of the formation of the opinion in the order but upon the actual formation of the opinion and the making of the order in consequence. It would therefore follow that if by inadvertence or otherwise the recital of the formation of the opinion is not mentioned in the preamble to the order the defect can be remedied by showing by other evidence in proceedings where challenge is made to the validity of the order, that in fact the order was made after such opinion had been formed and was thus a valid exercise of the power conferred by the law. The only exception to this course would be where the statute requires that there should be a recital in the order itself before it can be validly made." 10. It is true that the aforesaid observations were made in connection with the construction of a section of another Act, but the principle enshrined therein apply, in my opinion, with equal force to the satisfaction which the State Government forms before initiating proceedings for the removal of the President under Sec. 48(2) (b) (vi) of the Act. In this view of the matter, I am satisfied that the State Government is not precluded from showings that its satisfaction as regards the proposed action, i.e. the removal of the President and the order of suspension is based on other instances of gross misconduct in the discharge of his duties or on the same instances coupled with facts and circumstances other than those mentioned in the first show cause notice. 11. On behalf of the petitioner four contentions were advanced of which two may be described as main contentions and two as subsidiary contentions. 1 shall state, and deal with, the main contentions first. 11. On behalf of the petitioner four contentions were advanced of which two may be described as main contentions and two as subsidiary contentions. 1 shall state, and deal with, the main contentions first. They are (1) that if the instances of alleged gross misconduct mentioned in the show cause notice served upon the President do not amount to gross misconduct on his part in the discharge of his duty, then the State cannot be allowed to support that show cause notice by furnishing additional evidence to justify its satisfaction as regards the proposed action and (2) that the quashing of a show cause notice automatically results in the quashing of the order of suspension also; and reliance for these contentions was placed on Bhagwan Das Barnwal v. The State of U.P. 1956 A.L.J. 409 In my opinion, the aforesaid decision does not support either of these contentions. So far as the first contention is concerned all that this decision lays down is that if, in addition to the instances of gross misconduct in the discharge of duty mentioned in the show cause notice which is served upon the President, there are other circumstances upon which reliance is sought to be placed for establishing the said gross misconduct, then those circumstances. "Ought to have been stated in the notice served upon him in order that he might have the opportunity of explaining them." This observation was made by the Bench while repelling the argument of the learned Advocate General that there were some additional circumstances in that case on which the satisfaction of the State Government was based, which coupled with those already mentioned in the notice would have shown that the conduct mentioned in the notice amounted to gross misconduct. The Division Bench, however, did not permit the State Government to prove the additional circumstances in justification of the show cause notice which had been served upon the President. It will be observed that the Bench while rejecting the argument of the learned Advocate General, carefully avoided saying that the State Government could not issue another show cause notice based on other instances of gross misconduct or on the same instances, as in the first show cause notice, supported by better particulars of the.said instances. There is thus nothing in that decision which goes against the view expressed by me above. There is thus nothing in that decision which goes against the view expressed by me above. The further question as to whether the Bench was right in rejecting the Advocate Generals contention that the State Government could supply the additional circumstances on which its satisfaction was based in the course of the hearing of the same writ petition, has not been referred to us and if is not necessary, therefore, to express any opinion thereon. 12. So far as the second contention of the learned counsel is concerned, it is true that in Bhagwan Das Barnwal v. The State of U.P. 1956 A.L.J. 409, the Bench after quashing the show cause notice also quashed the order of suspension, but as the question whether the order of suspension becomes liable to be set aside immediately on the quashing of the show cause notice, was not specifically raised and considered in that case - on the contrary it was taken for granted - I do not think, I am precluded from going into that question and in coming to a different conclusion. 13. I shall now turn to the two subsidiary contentions advanced by the petitioner's learned counsel. His first contention was that as the satisfaction of the State Government to initiate proceedings against the President under Sec. 48(2) (b) (vi) had to precede the proposed action, - including the show cause notice and the order of suspension - and as the said satisfaction could only manifest itself in the form of a charge-Sheet, embracing all the instances of gross misconduct in the discharge of duty, it was incumbent on the State Government to convey all those charges to the President, on pain of having the entire proceedings quashed in case the charges or instances mentioned in the show cause notice were found not to amount to gross misconduct of the required kind. In support of this proposition learned counsel relied upon the following observation made by the Privy Council in High Commissioner for India v. I. M. Lall, A.I.R. 1948 P.C. 131 :- "Their Lordships agree with the view taken by the majority of the Federal Court. In their opinion, sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 240 was not intended to be, and was not, a reproduction of R. 55 which was left unaffected as an administrative rule. In their opinion, sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 240 was not intended to be, and was not, a reproduction of R. 55 which was left unaffected as an administrative rule. Rule 55 is concerned that the civil servant shall he informed "of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action," and to afford him an adequate opportunity of defending himself against charges which have to be reduced to writing; this is in marked contrast to the statutory provision of "a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him." In the opinion of their Lordships, no action is proposed within the meaning of the sub-section until a definite conclusion has been come to on the charges, and the actual punishment to follow is provisionally determined on. Prior to that stage, the charges are unproved and the suggested punishments are merely hypothetical. "It is on that stage being reached that the statute gives the civil servant the opportunity for which sub-Sec. (3) makes provision. Their Lordships would only add that they see no difficulty in the statutory opportunity being reasonable, afforded at more than one stage. If the civil servant has been through an enquiry under Rule 55, it would not be reasonable that he should ask for a repetition of that stage, if duly carried out, but that would not exhaust his statutory right and he would still be entitled to represent against the punishment proposed as the result of the findings of the enquiry." 14. We are unable to see how this observation helps the petitioner, (1) because it does not lay down that in case one notice is found insufficient, a second notice on other grounds or on the same grounds supported by further and better particulars cannot be served, and (2) because in connection with proceedings for the removal of the President no question of affording opportunity at more than one stage is required: and that opportunity arises only when the proposed action is decided upon and the President is served with a show cause notice. The aforesaid sections do not contemplate the affording of any opportunity to the President before the order of his suspension is passed. Had the law required that, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner would undoubtedly have had force. The aforesaid sections do not contemplate the affording of any opportunity to the President before the order of his suspension is passed. Had the law required that, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner would undoubtedly have had force. In my opinion, however, neither the language of Sec. 48(3) nor the rules of natural justice require the giving of an opportunity to the President at that initial stage. I am supported in this view by the decision of this Court in Lal Ram Aliwas v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, 1955 A.L.J. 836 which lays down that :- "The suspension of a President from his office is not a case where the property or other rights under the common law of a private citizen are taken away or affected by the order. The rights here affected are not common law rights but those created by the Statute, and as such they are governed by the provisions of the Statute. Where the Statute does not grant the right of showing cause, no such rights can be claimed on principle of natural justice. Sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 48 is clear. It does not provide for any opportunity being given to the President and as such no principle of natural justice can be relied upon to entitle the President to have an opportunity of being heard before the order of suspension is passed against him." There is thus no force in this contention which must consequently be repelled. 15. Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and Sec. 7 of the Preventive Detention Act and the various decisions of the Supreme Court, given thereunder, were also pressed into service in this connection, but, in my opinion. it is unnecessary to refer to the arguments built upon those two provisions of law as they differ in language from the sections which fall for interpretation in this case. 16. The Second subsidiary contention advanced was that if some of the materials, on which the satisfaction of the State Government is based, are found to be non-existent or irrelevant then such materials would make the entire order of suspension void, as it would not be possible for the Court to predicate what the subjective satisfaction of the State Government would have been on the exclusion of those materials. Reliance for this contention was placed on Dwarka Das Bhatia v. The State of Jammu and Kashmir, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 164. The aforesaid decision undoubtedly supports the contention of the petitioner's learned counsel. But in my opinion the said decision is clearly distinguishable on facts, as in the present case the instances of conduct on which action was taken against the petitioner in the earlier occasion were not found by this Court to be non-existent or irrelevant but were found to be insufficient. An insufficient ground is not necessarily an irrelevant ground and, in no case. can it be said to be a nonexistent ground. This contention is also thus without substance and has to be rejected. 17. For the reasons stated above, my answer to the first question referred to us is in the negative, while that to the second question is in the affirmative. 18. By the Court.-18. Our answer therefore to the two questions referred to is: (1) That the jurisdiction of the State Government under Sec. 48(3) of the U.P. Municipalities Act, to place under suspension a President, does not depend upon the contents of the show cause notice. In a proper case where the Government even after discharge of the first notice proposes to and does continue the proceedings for his removal, the order of suspension does not become invalid, if the show cause notice first served on the President is lacking in material particulars and the facts, as stated there, do not amount to gross misconduct in the discharge of his duties. (2) In a case where the notice to show cause does not contain all the material which satisfies the Government, it is open to the State Government to satisfy the Court by bringing to its notice the material other than mentioned in the notice to show that the satisfaction of the Government was based on good grounds, and therefore the order of "suspension can be held to be valid even though the notice does not contain full particulars." 19. Let the papers of this case together with our answer to the two questions referred to us, be placed before the learned single Judge for disposal of the case.