JUDGMENT Jagdish Sahai, J. - This case has come to us on a reference made by our brother Mukerji on 2-9-1962. The facts giving rise to this second appeal are very brief. The appellant Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan obtained a decree for arrears of rent against the respondents in the year 1953 under the provisions of the U.P. Tenancy Act (hereinafter referred to as the Tenancy Act). At the time of the execution of the decree the Tenancy Act had already been repealed by the U.P. Zamindari. Abolition and Land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The question therefore that engaged the attention of the first court as also of the lower appellate court was whether the decree obtained by the appellant could be executed by the lease of the plots held by the respondents as prayed for by the decree holders. 2. Sec. 7 of the Act so far as is relevant for our purposes reads: "Nothing contained in this Chapter shall in any way affect the right of any person....... (b) to recover any arrears of rent, cesses, sayar or other dues which accrued before the date of vesting and the same shall, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, be recoverable as heretofore by the person entitled thereto: Provided that no decree for an arrear of rent or order for ejectment in default of an arrear of rent shall be executed by ejectment of the judgment-debtor from his holding: In the present case execution is not sought by the ejectment of the judgment-debtor from his holding. All that is prayed for is that the holding of the judgment-debtor be leased out for such period as the executing court considers proper to satisfy the decree. The effect of Sec. 7 is to continue the applicability of the provisions of the Tenancy Act with regard to the execution of the decrees passed under that Act subject to the condition that the mode of ejectment of the holding will not be available to the decree-holder. In other words, the provisions relating to the execution of the decrees in the Tenancy Act have been bodily lifted and placed in the Act subject to the exception already mentioned above. 3. In other words, the provisions relating to the execution of the decrees in the Tenancy Act have been bodily lifted and placed in the Act subject to the exception already mentioned above. 3. Sec. 252 of the Tenancy Act, so far as is relevant for our purposes, reads as follows :- * * * Under the provisions of the aforesaid section the decree could have been executed by the lease of the holding of the judgment-debtor for a period not exceeding six years and by virtue of Sec. 7 of the Act that could be done even now notwithstanding the repeal of the Tenancy Act. 4. On behalf of the respondents Mr. D.N. Srivastava has strenuously urged that the application of Sec. 252 of the Tenancy Act would be inconsistent with the scheme of the Act. In other words, what is contended is that a lease or sub-lease is not contemplated by the provisions of the Act. Alternatively it has been submitted that since there is no provision in the Act for the ejectment or dispossession of the per-son to whom the holding would be leased out and inasmuch as he is likely to claim Asami rights after the period for which the land is given to him has expired, this mode of execution results in a situation which would be inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. We are unable to agree with either of the two submissions. In the first place, no provision has been brought to our notice under which a person being given lessee rights for a fixed period under the provisions of Sec. 252 of the Tenancy Act read with Sec. 7 of the Act could acquire Asami rights. The only provision on which the learned counsel could rely is Sec. 21 of the Act. In none of the clauses of that provision the case of a person granted lease under the provisions of Sec. 252 of the Tenancy Act would fall. Apart from it Sec. 21 of the Act clearly provides that the material date for the conferment of Asami rights is the one immediately preceding the date of vesting. 5. In none of the clauses of that provision the case of a person granted lease under the provisions of Sec. 252 of the Tenancy Act would fall. Apart from it Sec. 21 of the Act clearly provides that the material date for the conferment of Asami rights is the one immediately preceding the date of vesting. 5. In the present case if leasehold rights are given in respect of the holding of the judgment-debtor to the decree-holder or to any other person he would come in occupation of the holding only on the date on which the lease is executed in his favour and the date of his occupation cannot be stretched back to the date `immediately preceding the date of vesting.' Consequently we are unable to see how the lessee under Sec. 252 of the Tenancy Act would in the present case, become an Asami. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the fear expressed by the learned counsel for the respondents is unfounded. In that view of the matter it is not necessary for us to examine whether or not under the provisions of Sec. 202 of the Act the lessee would be liable to ejectment. 6. So far as we are aware there is no provision in the Tenancy Act or the Act and none has been pointed out to us by the Learned counsel for the parties, under which the lessee would become an Asami. We are also not impressed with the argument that as there is no provision in the Act under which a person granted a lease under Sec. 252 of the Tenancy Act read with Sec. 7 of the Act can be ejected or dispossessed after the period of the lease has expired. The mode of execution by means of leasing out of the holding is not countenanced by the Act. It is however conceded that there was no such provision in the Tenancy Act either. The scheme of the Act is and that of the Tenancy Act was that after the period for which the lease has been granted has expired the right of the lessee would come to an end and his status would be that of a trespasser thereafter. For dealing with the case of a trespasser there were clear provisions in the tenancy Act and provisions exist even under the Act. For dealing with the case of a trespasser there were clear provisions in the tenancy Act and provisions exist even under the Act. We do not therefore see any ground on the basis of which we can hold that the application of Sec. 252 of the Tenancy Act would militate against the scheme of the Act and for that reason overrule the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondents. 7. We have also not been impressed with the submission of the learned counsel that the leasing out of a holding would be inconsistent with the scheme of the Act it would amount to letting. It is true that the Act not only does not countenance letting out but actually prohibits it. Our attention was invited by the learned counsel for the respondents to Sec. 165 of the Act which is in the following terms: "When a bhumidhar other than one referred to in Sec. 157 has let out his holding or any part thereof the lessee will, notwithstanding any thing contained in any law or contract or document of lease, become and be deemed to be (a) "Where the total area of the land held by him together with the land held by his family, including the land, if any, let out to him or any member of his family, does not exceed twelve and a half acres, sirdar thereof, and (b) Where the total area as aforesaid exceeds twelve and a half acres, a purchaser thereof and the provisions of Secs. 154 and 163 shall mutatis apply. But in our opinion the bar created by Sec. 165 of the Act does not operate against a lease being granted under Sec. 252 of the Tenancy Act for the simple reason that the lease under that section cannot amount to letting or sub-letting. These expressions are terms of art and are used in connection with creation of tenancy rights by land-lords or land-holders. What is prohibited is letting or sub-letting by the person holding the land and not the leasing of a holding by a competent court of law. These expressions are terms of art and are used in connection with creation of tenancy rights by land-lords or land-holders. What is prohibited is letting or sub-letting by the person holding the land and not the leasing of a holding by a competent court of law. In any case the use of the expression `notwithstanding anything contained in this Act' occurring in Sec. 7(b) of the Act results in making the general provisions contained in Sec. 165 inapplicable to the execution of the decrees under Sec. 252 of Tenancy Act read with Sec. 7(b) of the Act. The word "notwithstanding" means "without prejudice to" and obviously the effect of these words in Sec. 7(b) is to exclude the operation of other sections in the Act. We are also not impressed with the submission that inasmuch as Sec. 252 of the Tenancy Act requires the lease of the holding in favour of another person - the judgment-debtor would be deemed to have been ejected from that land. Mere temporary dispossession is not ejectment. 8. U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act does not define the word `ejectment' nor does the Tenancy Act. In Murray's "The New English Dictionary, Vol. 3 the following has been mentioned with regard to eject :- "Thrown out, the term was coined by Prof. Clifford on analogy of subject, objection to throw, to throw from within to turn out, evict (a person) from property or possession, esp. in law........" In Surisetti Butchayya v. Raja Parthasarthly Appa Row, 48 I.A. 387 the Judicial Committee observed as follows :- "An owner may in one sense be in possession of his estate by the receipt of rent from the tenants of that estate, but not occupancy." Therefore mere temporary non occupation does not amount to ejectment. All that would happen in case the holding is leased out is that the judgment-debtor would lose possession over the holding only temporarily for the period for which it is leased out by the Court. It cannot therefore be said that the effect of leasing out his holding would be his ejectment from the holding. The lessee would only have a right of occupation and cultivation with a liability to return back the holding to the judgment-debtor. It cannot therefore be said that the effect of leasing out his holding would be his ejectment from the holding. The lessee would only have a right of occupation and cultivation with a liability to return back the holding to the judgment-debtor. In other words the right of the judgment-debtor in the holding would not be lost but only temporarily suspended and all that the lessee would be entitled would be to enjoy the usufruct thereof for a limited period. 9. We are, therefore, unable to agree with this submission of the learned counsel also. For the reasons mentioned above we are of the opinion that the provisions of Sec. 252 of the Tenancy Act read with Sec. 7(b) of the Act would be applicable in this case and the decree holder would be entitled to execute his decree by having the holding or such part thereof as the executing court may consider proper leased out for such period as the execution court may determine. 10. For the reasons mentioned above we are of opinion that the courts below were in error in taking the view that the decree could not be executed. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the order of the courts below and direct that the execution shall now proceed according to law. In the circumstances of the case the parties would bear their own costs.