Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal by the 4th defendant against the decree passed against the tarwad properties scheduled to the plaint on the basis of a hypothecation bond Ext. A, dated 7121123 executed by her mother as her guardian, along with her brother, the second defendant, in the case, and her father the first defendant, in favour of the first respondent Bank. The suit was resisted by the appellant on the ground that Ext. A is not supported by consideration or tarwad necessity. The court below negatived this contention and decreed the suit and hence this appeal 2. The relevant portion of Ext. A reads as follows: 3. On the basis of this statement, it was contended that even before the date of Ext. A the business was conducted on behalf of the sub-tarwad of the third defendant as the agent of Vijaya Lekshmi Textiles. Ext. A was, 'therefore, it is urged, not for starting a new business. 4. It is not clear what is meant by the word IpSpw_w at the beginning of the document which is extracted above. The first named person in Ext. A is the father. He is included as a member of the IpSpw_w referred to in Ext. A. By no stretch of imagination can it be said that such a IpSpw_w is a IpSpw_w known as a tarwad or sub-tarwad to Marumakkathayam Law. It is doubtful, therefore, whether the statement in Ext. A meant, or indicated the sub tarwad of the appellant. That it could possibly not have been the tarwad is supported by the further statement towards the end of the above extract that further amounts must be invested in the business for making it more prosperous and that it should be conducted for the IpSpw_w and for " IpSpw_w " necessity. It is also said that the name should be changed. These indicate that there was some change taking place at the time of the execution of Ext. A and the tarwad as such came into the picture only at the time of execution of Ext. A. There is not a scrap of paper to indicate that before the date of Ext. A the tarwad was associated in the trade or that the members of the tarwad had accepted it as a tarwad business. 5. A and the tarwad as such came into the picture only at the time of execution of Ext. A. There is not a scrap of paper to indicate that before the date of Ext. A the tarwad was associated in the trade or that the members of the tarwad had accepted it as a tarwad business. 5. The question for consideration is whether liabilities arising out of a venture such as the one for which Ext. A has been executed can be said to be one falling within the ordinary management of a Marumakkathayam tarwad. It seems to me well-established that in order that a tarwad may be bound by the acts of the karnavan, at times with the junction of the other adult members, the acts must be in the discharge of the duties of management of the tarwad. If a business is started which is risky and of a speculative nature, the tarwad and the tarwad properties cannot be made liable for loss or debts arising out of such business. It was so ruled in a Full Bench decision of the Travancore High Court in Sivaminatha Sastrigal v. Sankaran Nainaru (XII T. L. T. 606 XXVIII T. L. J. 27) and this has been followed in another Full Bench decision in Nedungadi Bank v. Govindan Potti (XXXI TLJ. 358). The relevant passage has been quoted by the learned judge in his judgment under appeal and it reads: "It is foreign to the recognised principles of Marumakkathayam Law that the properties of the tarwad should not be charged with liability for anything other than what is directly understood in law as tarwad necessity, that is to say, purposes within the scope of the ordinary management of the tarwad, and transactions which are attendant with grave risks or of a speculative nature cannot be classified as acts of management to the manifest advantage of the tarwad." There can possibly be no doubt that the conducting of an agency for a textile industry is not one of the purposes within the scope of the ordinary management of the tarwad. I am equally certain that such a business is attended with grave risks. The court below has said that the principle stated in the above decision "cannot be invoked here". No reasons have been assigned for saying so. I am equally certain that such a business is attended with grave risks. The court below has said that the principle stated in the above decision "cannot be invoked here". No reasons have been assigned for saying so. I see no reason why the principle should not be applied to the facts of this case. In fact, this case has to be decided on the principle stated and followed successively by two Full Benches. To the same effect is the ruling in Thankappan v. Narayanan (1952 KLT. 561). 6. On the basis of the facts of this later decision, counsel for the first respondent attempted to draw a distinction between borrowing for starting a business and the liabilities that are incurred by the tarwad during the conduct of an existing business. 7. I have already said that it is doubtful whether this business was run as a tarwad business before the execution of Ext. A. In any case if the business was a risky one and speculative in nature, the tarwad or its properties cannot be made liable for the losses of that business, the business having been started without the consent of the appellant and the other minors. I therefore hold that the 4th defendant, the plaint properties and the tarwad properties of the appellant are not liable for the plaint claim and the suit has to be dismissed against the plaint properties and the tarwad as such of the third defendant's tavazhi. I order accordingly. The first respondent will pay the costs of the appellant in this court and in the court below. The decree passed against defendants 1 to 3 by the court below is sustained.