JUDGMENT P.T. Raman Nayar, J. 1. This second appeal arises out of a suit brought under Order XXI, rule 63 of the Code. 2. In O.S. 796 of 1100 of the Munsiff's Court, decree against one Mytheenkunju Kurup, the father of the present defendants 1 to 3. After the decree, Mytheenkunju Kurup died; his legal representatives, the present defendants 1 to 3, were impleaded in execution as additional defendants; and the property now in suit which originally belonged to Mytheenkunju Kurup but which he had gifted in separate portions to defendants 1, 2 and 3 under Ext. D3, dated 20th Dhanu 1094 M.E. (3rd January 1919) was attached on 17th Edavom 1113 M.E. (30th May 1938). By Ext. D6, dated 2nd Mithunam 1118 M.E. (16th June 1948) the part of the suit property which is the subject matter of this appeal was sold by defendants 2 and 3 to the 4th defendant, and on 21st Mithunam 1121 M.E. (5th July 1946), three years after his purchase and eight years after the attachment), on the very day on which the property was notified for sale in execution, the 4th defendant and his wife, the 5th defendant, (the latter being interested in that portion of the suit property which is not the subject matter of this appeal) presented a claim under Order XXI, rule 58 of the Code which was entertained despite the proviso to sub-rule (1) of that rule, and, what is worse, was allowed on 21st Mithunam 1121 M.E. despite rule 59 which requires the claimant to show that at the date of the attachment he had some interest in, or was possessed of, the property attached (which the claimants in this case obviously could not have had, the purchase on which their claim was based being long after the attachment) and despite rule 61 which requires the court to disallow the claim where (as was undisputedly the case here) the property was in the possession of the judgment-debtor as his own property at the time it was attached. The plaintiffs thereupon brought the present suit under Order XXI, rule 63 of the Code. That suit has been concurrently decreed by the courts below so far as the subject-matter of this appeal is concerned, subject however to a prior charge in favour of the 4th defendant; and defendants 4 and 5 have come up with this second appeal 3. The plaintiffs thereupon brought the present suit under Order XXI, rule 63 of the Code. That suit has been concurrently decreed by the courts below so far as the subject-matter of this appeal is concerned, subject however to a prior charge in favour of the 4th defendant; and defendants 4 and 5 have come up with this second appeal 3. The ground on which the courts below decreed the suit seems to me clearly unsustainable. It is this: The gift under Ext. D3 consisted of Mytheenkunju Kurup whole property, and, therefore, under section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, defendants 1 to 3 who were the donees are personally liable for the debts due by the donor, Mytheenkunju Kurup, at the time of the gift to the extent of the property comprised therein. This might be a good ground for decreeing a suit brought against defendants 1 to 3 on the score of their personal liability as universal donees. But, I fail to see how such a liability can be fastened upon them in execution proceedings, where the decree itself imposes no such liability and where they have been brought on record only as legal representatives of the judgment-debtor. It is only the liability of the judgment-debtor under the decree that can be enforced against them; and that only to the extent of his property in their hands. And so long as the decree does not make them liable, it cannot be executed against property which belonged to them and not to the judgment-debtor at the time of the latter death. Indeed, no attempt has been made on behalf of the plaintiffs to support the decree of the courts below on the ground on which it was based. 4. It is however claimed that the decree can be supported on other grounds. The first is that the claim should have been summarily rejected under the proviso to Order XXI, rule 58 (1) and that in any case it should have been disallowed under rules 59 and 61. That no doubt would have been a good ground to take in the claim proceedings; it is scarcely a ground that can be taken in a suit under Order XXI, rule 63, the scope of which is far wider than that of an investigation into a claim under rule 58. That no doubt would have been a good ground to take in the claim proceedings; it is scarcely a ground that can be taken in a suit under Order XXI, rule 63, the scope of which is far wider than that of an investigation into a claim under rule 58. For, under rule 63, the title of the parties to the property in dispute has to be investigated; and if, in reality, the property is not liable to be proceeded against in execution of the decree, it is little use to say in such a suit that, if the court and the counsel had read their provisions of Order XXI, rules 55 to 61 at the time of the claim proceedings, the claim would have been disallowed. 5. The second ground on which it is said that the decree can be supported is that the purchase of the 4th defendant being after the attachment, that purchase will avail him nothing in view of section 61 of the Civil Procedure Code. At first sight this sounds plausible. But, a little thought reveals that it is an entirely fallacious argument. What can be attached under section 60 is the property of the judgment-debtor or property over which he has a disposing power which he may exercise for his own benefit; and what is actually attached is not the physical property but the interest of the judgment-debtor in the property. As Varadachariar, J. put it in Diravyam v. Veeranan Ambalam A.I.R. 1939 Mad. 702 at 706, "An attaching decree-holder attaches not the physical property but only the rights of the judgment-debtor in the property."� This observation has been cited with approval in subsequent decisions of the Madras and Travancore Cochin High Courts see for example Athinarayana v. Subramania A.I.R. 1942 Mad. 67 and Varughese v. Lonan 1952 K.L.T. 623 at 629. Therefore, what the decree-holders, namely, the present plaintiffs attached in execution of the decree they got in O.S. 796 of 1100 was not the physical property, but only the interest that their judgment-debtor Mytheenkunju Kurup had in the property and in respect of which alone they could proceed in execution against his legal representatives. Although a case was set up in the present plaint that Ext. D3 made only a testamentary disposition, that case which is clearly opposed to the terms of Ext. Although a case was set up in the present plaint that Ext. D3 made only a testamentary disposition, that case which is clearly opposed to the terms of Ext. D3 was given up in the course of the trial and the finding of both courts is that Ext. D3 operated as a transfer inter vivos and that defendants 2 and 3 have since then held the property in their own independent right and have never held it as legal representatives of Mytheenkunju Kurup. It follows that the attachment which, as I have shown, could only have been of Mytheenkunju Kurup interest in the property was of nothing. That there is no claim that can be enforced against the suit property under that attachment, and that the transfer of the property to the 4th defendant by defendants 2 and 3 cannot be affected by section 64 of the Civil Procedure Code. The law is not and cannot be that if A property is attached in execution of a decree against B, a purchaser from A after the attachment has to submit to the execution and lose the property, something which his own transferor, A would not have suffered. 6. It is argued that the transfer under Ext. D3 was in fraud of creditors and was voidable at the option of the plaintiffs under section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act. By their very act in attaching the property as belonging to Mytheenkunju Kurup the present plaintiffs avoided the transfer. Defendants 2 and 3 having slept over the attachment for over five years it must be held that the transfer under Ext. D3 was successfully avoided and that at the time of the attachment the property was in the hands of defendants 2 and 3 only as legal representatives of the judgment-debtor Mytheenkunju Kurup. That being so, the attachment was a valid attachment of the whole property since, but for the transfer under Ext. D3, it is the admitted case Mytheenkunju Kurup would have been the full owner, and, therefore, section 64 of the Civil Procedure Code comes directly into play to render the subsequent transfer of the property to the 4th defendant void as against the plaintiff. With regard to this argument it is sufficient to say that it is entirely opposed to the pleadings. The case in the plaint is that Ext. With regard to this argument it is sufficient to say that it is entirely opposed to the pleadings. The case in the plaint is that Ext. D3 made a testamentary disposition and that, even otherwise, defendants 2 and 3 were liable to satisfy the decree by reason of a direction (which was, in fact, addressed to the 1st defendant and was no more than a pious wish) in Ext. D3 that the decree should be paid. Nowhere in the plaint is it said that the transfer was voidable under section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act and that it was, in fact, avoided by the plaintiffs by their attachment of the property as Mytheenkunju Kurup property. 7. It seems to me that there is no ground on which the decree appealed against can be supported. And I might add that, in my view, section 47 of the Code would be a bar to the suit. It is well-settled that "If property is attached as the property of a deceased' judgment-debtor in the hands of his legal representative and the latter objects that it is not property of the deceased, but his own property, the case falls under this section (section 47) for, the legal representative is not setting up a jus tertii". (See Mulla C.P.C. 12th Edn page 190 and the cases referred to in the foot-note 'O therein.) Any objection by defendants 2 and 3 to the attachment would therefore have come within section 47, and, since the purchase of the 4th defendant was after the attachment, the 4th defendant is a representative of defendants 2 and 3 and therefore of the original judgment-debtor within the meaning of the section. For, as Mull says at page 186 of his book: "The term 'representative in this section includes not only' legal representatives in the sense of heirs, executors or administrators, but also representative in interest, that is any transferee of the decree-holder interest, or any transferee of the judgment-debtor interest, who so far as such interest is concerned is bound by the decree." Bhiku Mal v. Firm Ram Chandar A.I.R.1946 Lahore 134 (F.B.) is a case directly in point. 8. In the result I allow the appeal and dismiss the plaintiff suit with costs throughout.