JUDGMENT N.U. Beg, J. - This special appeal is directed against the judgment of a single Judge of this Court, dated 18th September, 1962. The appellant in this appeal is Husain Abbas. There was a contest between the appellant Husain Abbas and the respondent Brij Lal in proceedings under Section 27 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. In these proceedings the Consolidation Officer as well as the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) in appeal concurrently held that Brij Lal was in possession of the land in dispute. This concurrent finding of the two Consolidation courts was upset in revision by the Deputy Director of Consolidation under Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Thereafter a writ petition was filed in this Court at the instance of Brij Lal questioning the validity of the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation under Section 48 of the Act. This writ petition was allowed by a learned single Judge of this Court by a judgment, dated 18th September, 1962, and the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation was quashed on the ground that the finding of fact arrived at by the lower Courts should not have been upset by him as it did not involve any question of jurisdiction. Dissatisfied with this judgment Husain Abbas has filed this special appeal. 2. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellant we are of opinion that there is no substance in this appeal. It has to be conceded that the finding of the lower courts was based on evidence even though it was oral. In law there is no prohibition or bar to a court accepting oral evidence in proof of possession, It cannot, therefore, be said that the finding of the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), based as it was on oral evidence, was bad in law or related to a matter of jurisdiction. The observation of the Deputy Director of Consolidation at the revisional stage shows that he was of opinion that oral evidence should not have been accepted. That, however, is not a question which related to a matter of jurisdiction and would not be a ground for interfering at the revisional stage. The view of the learned Single Judge that the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation should be quashed, therefore, appears to be a correct one. 3. That, however, is not a question which related to a matter of jurisdiction and would not be a ground for interfering at the revisional stage. The view of the learned Single Judge that the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation should be quashed, therefore, appears to be a correct one. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant has, however, urged a number of other points before us. He has urged that the oral evidence was inadmissible as there was a written sale-deed. In this connection he has relied on Section 92 of the Evidence Act. Section 91 of the Evidence Act would, in our opinion, bar only the proof of the terms of the document. We fail to see how the execution of a written sale-deed would result in making the evidence of actual possession prior to the sale-deed inadmissible. A party might have been in possession for a long time and a written sale-deed might be executed subsequently. Prior possession of such a party is not in sale-deed but is independent of it, and has nothing to do with the terms of the sale-deed. 4. The second argument of the learned counsel for the appellant was that the judgment of the Consolidation Officer and of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) in appeal was itself bad in so far as it gave a finding regarding the sirdari rights of opposite party No 1. His contention was that no Sirdari right could accrue in grove land, and that only asami rights could accrue in such land. It is not necessary for us to go into the merits of the question as we are of opinion that under Section 27 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act the provisions of the U. P. Land Revenue Act are applicable and at the stage of Consolidation proceedings, a consolidation authority is concerned solely with the question of possession. If any such erroneous finding has been given by the consolidation court, that would merely be treated as an observation and would have no binding force in law. It can be disregarded by courts of law and would not effect the rights of the appellant so far as the question of title is concerned. 5. The third contention of the learned counsel for the appellant was that the evidence on the question of possession was contradictory in certain respects. It can be disregarded by courts of law and would not effect the rights of the appellant so far as the question of title is concerned. 5. The third contention of the learned counsel for the appellant was that the evidence on the question of possession was contradictory in certain respects. Even if it be so, the evidence was consistent on the question of possession and what was believed was that Brij Lal had been in possession. In fact, the consolidation courts were concerned strictly with the possession on the date when the question arose before them and the entire evidence of the respondents was to the effect that the respondent No. 1 was in possession on that date. Any conflict on other points, therefore, would be immaterial. 6. We have discussed these points in our judgment in view of the fact that the learned counsel has urged them before us. We, are, however, of opinion that none of these points should be entertained at this stage as they do not appear to have been agitated before any of the consolidation courts at all. These points, in our opinion, should have been taken in the consolidation courts. There is no indication in the judgments of any of the three consolidation courts that any of these points which are raised for the first time before us, were agitated before them. 7. For the above reasons we are of opinion that this special appeal has no force. We accordingly dismiss it summarily.