DAVE, J.—This is an appeal by accused Tejsingh against the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ajmer, dated the 20th February, 1961, whereby he has been convicted under sec. 392IPC and sec.19(f) of the Indian Arms Act and sentenced to two years and six months R. I. respectively. 2. The prosecution story against the appellant was that on 16th January 1960, one Panchu Bhil was going from his village, Sarwad, to his father-in-laws place at village Mewda. While he was on his way to Mewda, he met P. W. Debi Bhil and then both of them proceeded together in the latters cart. The story proceeds that when they had advanced a little further and had arrived near the boundary of village Bilia, appellant Tejsingh asked them to stop the cart. It is said that he came running to them and snatched away the gun which was in the possession of Panchu. Panchu tried to put up resistance but the appellant was able to snatch away the gun from him. According to the prosecution, Panchu received one injury on his back when he struggled with the appellant in order of retain his possession over the gun. After Panchu was deprived of his gun, he and Debi Bhil came back to their village, Sarwad, and lodged a report at the police station at about 5 P. M. The police registered a case under sec. 392 I.P.C. and recovered the gun from the possession of the appellant on the next day in the morning. After completing the investigation, the appellant was challaned in the court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Kekri, for offences under sec. 394 I.P.C. and sec. 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act. 3. In the committing magistrates court the appellant denied having snatched the gun from Panchu or its recovery from his possession. His version was that when he was grazing his sheep at the outskirts of village Bilia, he saw one person bringing a cart towards the sheep and so he asked him not to injure them. That fellow, however, did not listen to him and advanced the cart with the result that the leg of one sheep was broken. The accused and his companions Gokul Gujar and Nanda Gujar then stopped him and asked him to give compensation for the injury caused to the sheep. That fellow, however, did not listen to him and advanced the cart with the result that the leg of one sheep was broken. The accused and his companions Gokul Gujar and Nanda Gujar then stopped him and asked him to give compensation for the injury caused to the sheep. That person promised to give compensation, but since he had no cash in hand he delivered the gun. According to the accused, he refused to take delivery of the gun, but his companions Gokul Gujar and Nanda Gujar took the gun, because that person told them that he would take away his gun in the evening after paying the compensation. That fellow returned in the evening with the Sub-Inspector to whom the gun was given by Gokul Gujar. Thus, according to the accused, the gun was given by the complainant himself to Gokul Gujar to assure him that he would come to the village in the evening and take it away after giving compensation for the injury caused to the sheep. The magistrate still thought that a prima facie case was made out against the accused and so he was committed to the court of the Sessions Judge, Ajmer. The case was, however, tried by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. The prosecution examined 7 witnesses in the trial court. The accused stuck to the same version which he had given in the committing magistrates court. The trial court came to the conclusion that the offences under sec. 392 I.P.C. and sec. 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act were proved against the accused and so he was convicted and sentenced as mentioned above. 4. It is urged by learned counsel for the appellant that his client was quite innocent and that a false report was made against him by Panchu Bhil in order to avoid his responsibility to give compensation to the accused for causing injury to his sheep. It is pointed out that the first information report was made by the complainant in the evening after some delay and deliberation, and still, the name of P. W. Debi, who was later set up as an eye-witness, was not mentioned therein. On the contrary, the name of Panchu Bagaria was given in that report but he was not examined by the prosecution in the trial court. On the contrary, the name of Panchu Bagaria was given in that report but he was not examined by the prosecution in the trial court. He was examined by the prosecution in the committing court and since he did not support the prosecution, he was given up at the stage of the trial. It is contended by learned counsel that the story which was put forward by Panchu Bhil in the first information report was thus not supported by any evidence and that the trial court had committed an error in relying upon the statement of P. W. Debi. It has been further argued that the appellant had no intention to steal the gun and his conviction under sec. 392 I.P.C. was not well founded. 5. As regards offence under sec. 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act, it is urged by learned counsel for the appellant that the prosecution witnesses Madan Singh (P. W. 3) and Kalyan (P. W. 4) had not supported the prosecution story and that the trial court had committed an error in relying upon the sole testimony of head constable Jaichand Rai (P. W. 5), who was interested in making out a false case against the appellant. In the alternative, it has been urged that even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that the gun was handed over to P. W. 5 by the appellant, it should not have been presumed that he had taken possession of the gun with an intention to possess it. He had no guilty intention to deprive the complainant Panchu Bhil of his gun. At the most it may have not formed that Panchu Bhil might have threatened the appellant with the use of gun when he was reprimanded for injuring the sheep and the appellant might have taken away the gun from his possession in order to disarm him and to protect himself. It is contended that under these circumstances the trial court ought not to have held that the appellant was in possession of the gun without a licence, because the appellant never meant to keep the gun in his possession and it was given away to the police officer at the earliest opportunity. 6. It is contended that under these circumstances the trial court ought not to have held that the appellant was in possession of the gun without a licence, because the appellant never meant to keep the gun in his possession and it was given away to the police officer at the earliest opportunity. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the State has very candidly conceded that after a careful perusal of the record of the trial court he finds himself unable to support the conclusions arrived at by the trial court. 7. I have also carefully gone through the judgment of the trial court and its record. It may be observed atonce that the learned Judge seems to have approached the decision of the case from a wrong angle. The first question for determination before him was whether the appellant had robbed complainant Panchu Bhil of the gun which he was carrying on the date of occurrence and he should have next determined whether the appellant was knowingly in possession of the gun without a licence. Instead of deciding the first point first, the learned Judge took up the second question first and his decision on the first point was then influenced on account of a wrong decision having been taken on the second point. It is rather surprising that the learned Judge relied upon the statement of P. W. Debi in order to find support for the statement of the complainant and even though Panchu Begaria was not produced by the prosecution, his non-production was justified by him. 8. The perusal of the first information report (Ex. P.) shows that it was made at police station, Sarwad, at 5 P.M., while the occurrence was said to have taken place at about 10 A.M. In that report, it was stated by the complainant that he was going from Sarwad to village Mewda, that in the way he met one Rajput, who was grazing his sheep and that when he went near him, the said Rajput accosted him and asked him to stop. As soon as he stopped, the accused caught hold of his gun. The complainant told him that the gun was loaded and the accused should not try to snatch it, but, even then, it was snatched away from his possession. As soon as he stopped, the accused caught hold of his gun. The complainant told him that the gun was loaded and the accused should not try to snatch it, but, even then, it was snatched away from his possession. When the complainant requested the accused to return the gun, he refused and gave him a lathi blow on his back. Thereafter, Panchu Bagaria of village Balia came to the site and told the complainant that he should not run away and he would get his gun restored to him. Panchu Bagaria then went to the accused and after talking with him told the complainant that he (accused) was not prepared to return, it. Thereafter, he came to the police station to make the report. It is clear from the perusal of this report (Ex. P1) that the complainant made no mention about the presence of P.W. Debi at the site or about his company. If P.W. Debi had met the complainant in the way and if they had gone together, there was no reason for the complainant to omit his name. It is also significant that P.W. Debi was a resident of the same village as the complainant. The complainant has also admitted that he was his relation, being his mothers sisters husband. It is not easily understandable that the complainant could have failed to mention the name of P.W. Debi if he were really in his company at the time of occurrence. It is thus obvious that Debis name was introduced by him later on when he was examined by the police under sec. 161 Cr. P.C. 9. In his statement before the police (Ex. D1) it was stated by the complainant for the first time that he had met Debi in the way when he was cutting trees and he proposed to him that they should go together and they will shoot some rabbits in the way. The complainant further stated that when both of them reached near village, he noticed a rabbit and so he got down from the cart and proceeded towards the rabbit in order to shoot it. It was at this time that the accused accosted him and so he went back and seated himself in the cart. It is clear that this story about shooting a rabbit was not mentioned in the first information report at all. It was at this time that the accused accosted him and so he went back and seated himself in the cart. It is clear that this story about shooting a rabbit was not mentioned in the first information report at all. The complainant denied having given this story to the police when he was examined in the committing magistrates court and when his attention was invited to Ex. D1, his explanation was that he had not given such a statement before the police. P.W. 5 Jaichand Rai, however, who had recorded that statement (Ex. D1), stated in the trial court that the complainant had given such a story and that his denial of that version was wrong. It is thus clear that the complainant was not a witness of truth and he was giving different statements at different stages. There was no reason for P.W. 5 Jaichand Rai to introduce such a story falsely in Ex. D1 if the complainant had not given that story before him. In the first information report the only witness cited by the complainant at the time of occurrence was Panchu Bagaria. It appears that when he was examined in the committing magistrates court, he did not support the complainant and therefore he was given up at the stage of trial in the court of the learned Additional Sessions Judge. As pointed out above, it is clear that P.W. Debi was not present at the time of occurrence and the trial court had committed an error in relying upon him when his name was not mentioned in the first information report. Panchu Bagaria was also not produced in the trial court and thus there was the solitary evidence of complainant Panchu Bhil. If a complainant is found to be a witness of sterling character, it may be possible to base the conviction of the accused on his sole testimony, but it appears in the present case that complainant Panchu Bhil, far from being a witness of sterling character, is a person on whom no reliance can be placed, since he has not stuck to one version. He gave one story in the first information report, another one before the police and a third one in the committing magistrates court-. He gave one story in the first information report, another one before the police and a third one in the committing magistrates court-. He could not reconcile those different versions when he was examined in the trial court and, under these circumstances, the trial court ought not to have placed implicit reliance upon him. The statement of the complainant having been found to be unreliable, it cannot be said definitely in what circumstances the gun was taken over by the accused from his possession. It may be stated here that implicit reliance cannot be placed on the version given by the accused also. Neither Gokul Gujar nor Nanda Gujar have been produced by him. If the gun was taken over by Gokul Gujar and if it were produced by him before the police officer, there was no reason why the name of the accused was introduced in his place. The prosecution has, however, to tand on its own legs and the conviction of the accused under sec. 392 I.P.C. cannot be maintain d because of the weakness of the defence. As suggested by learned counsel for the appellant, it cannot be ruled out that there might have been some quarrel between the complainant and the accused and the accused might have snatched the gun from the complainants possession in order to disarm him and save his own life. The prosecution has failed to bring the guilt of robbery home to the accused and therefore his conviction under s. 392 IPC cannot be maintained. 10. New coming to the charge under sec. 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act, it may be pointed out that P.W. 3 Madan Singh and P.W, 4 Kalyan, who are witnesses to the recovery of the gun, have gone hostile to the prosecution and although they have admitted their signatures on the recovery memo Ex. P2, they have stated at the same time that they could not say if the gun was recovered from the possession of the appellant. The trial court has observed that these two witnesses appeared to have changed their statements in order to oblige the appellant. I agree with the trial court that the statement of P.W. 5 Jaichand Rai in this respect is more reliable and it appears from his statement that he had recovered the gun from the appellant and nobody else. The trial court has observed that these two witnesses appeared to have changed their statements in order to oblige the appellant. I agree with the trial court that the statement of P.W. 5 Jaichand Rai in this respect is more reliable and it appears from his statement that he had recovered the gun from the appellant and nobody else. This witness does not seem to have minced matters and he has frankly admitted that he did not take out any search of the accused. He only called him and when he was interrogated about the gun, it was produced before him by the appellant. By that time, the appellant was not even arrested by the witness. Thus, I believe P.W. 5 when he says that the gun was handed over to him by the appellant, but at the same time it appears that P.W. 5 did not take pains to find out in what circumstances the appellant had come in possession of the gun. He has not even stated what explanation was given by the accused when the gun was produced by him. It also appears from his statement that he reached village Bilia, where the appellant was residing, on the very day of the occurrence after dark. Next morning, when the appellant was questioned, he handed over the gun to him. The question which arises for determination is whether under these circumstances it may be said that the accused had committed an offence under sec. 19(f) of Arms Act. As discussed above, the circumstances of this case do not show if the appellant had taken over possession of the gun from the complainant in order to own it or keep it in his possession, but it was taken in order to protect himself from the use of that weapon by the complainant. If the appellant had atonce preceded to the police station and produced the gun before a police officer, it could not be urged with any justification that he had contravened the provisions S. 14 of the Indian Aarms Act, simply because he took the gun from the complainant, brought it to p. station and was in actual physical possession of it for a short time. In Norendra Nath Vs. The State (1) it was observed that "the concept of possession under the Penal Code which is fully discussed in the Calcutta F. B. decision of Emperor Vs. In Norendra Nath Vs. The State (1) it was observed that "the concept of possession under the Penal Code which is fully discussed in the Calcutta F. B. decision of Emperor Vs. Fatehchand Agarwalla, 44 Cal. 477, is........not necessarily the same as the concept of possession under the Arms Act." It was further observed that "possession as a test or an element of a crime must be of such character as can relate to the fundamental principle of mens rea in criminal jurisprudence. The animus must be there and the mens rea must be there. Unless these notions are specially excluded by any statute under consideration they are basic tests which must be satisfied before a person can be said to have committed a crime whose basis is possession. It is this element of intention of consciousness or knowledge, which must be established and must be present as a fact before possession under the Arms Act can be said to constitute an offence. It does not matter whether such possession is actual or constructive or physical or mediate or immediate or direct or exclusive or joint or concurrent. Corpus without the animus is ineffective. I respectfully agree with the view taken by the learned Judge in the above-cited case. A temporary possession for a very short duration without an intention to own or possess the gun does not seem to be contemplated by sec. 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act. I am satisfied that in the present case the appellant took physical possession of the gun not because he intended to own or keep it in his possession but under circumstances in which he could not help taking over that weapon in his possession. Whatever may be the reason of the quarrel between the appellant and the complainant, when the appellant found that the latter was armed with a gun, that it was loaded as admitted by the complainant himself, that it could be effectively used against him and end his life, he was not altogether unjustified in disarming the complainant and taking that weapon into his own possession. He handed over that weapon to the police officer as soon as he was interrogated about it on the very next morning. Under these circumstances, the trial court was not justified in convicting and sentencing the accused under sec. 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act. 11. The appeal is therefore allowed. He handed over that weapon to the police officer as soon as he was interrogated about it on the very next morning. Under these circumstances, the trial court was not justified in convicting and sentencing the accused under sec. 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act. 11. The appeal is therefore allowed. The conviction and sentence of the appellant both under sec. 392 I.P.C. and sec. 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act are set aside and he is acquitted of both the charges. The appellant is on bail and need nor surrender.