JUDGMENT V. Bhargava, J. - This Special appeal has arisen under the following circumstances. Two cross suits were instituted, one of them being the suit out of which the present special appeal has come up before us. That suit was instituted by the plaintiff respondent against the defendants appellants and the defendants respondents for recovery of a sum of Rs. 31,000. The claim arose out of a contract for supply of goods. It is not necessary to go into further details of the nature of the dispute in the suit because the special appeal has arisen out of some proceedings that took place during the pendency of the suit which has not yet been decided by the trial court. On Ist November 1954, the plaintiff respondent applied for an order under Or. XI, R. 12, C.P.C. for discovery. On that application, the court made an order that information of the application be given to the defendants and 6th November 1954 be fixed for orders. Copy of that application was actually served on the counsel for the defendants on Ist November 1954. The application came up for orders before the court on 6th November 1954 when the court ordered the defendants to comply within ten days. On 16th November 1954, when those ten days were expiring, an application was made on behalf of the defendants by their counsel for two weeks time to comply with the order. That application was allowed. In the suit itself 19th November 1954 had been fixed as the date for framing issues. That date was adjourned to 3rd January 1954 at the request of the plaintiff respondent on the basis of an application made on 18th November 1954. Then on Ist December 1954 the application for discovery came up for fresh orders because the defendants had not given discovery upto that date. On that date, the counsel for the defendants made a statement that he had heard nothing from the defendants or from the senior counsel and hence no steps could be taken. On the 2nd December 1954, the plaintiff respondent moved an application praying that the defence of the defendants be struck off under Order XI, R. 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Copy of this application was given to the same counsel for the defendants who had made the statement on 1st December 1954 mentioned above. On the 2nd December 1954, the plaintiff respondent moved an application praying that the defence of the defendants be struck off under Order XI, R. 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Copy of this application was given to the same counsel for the defendants who had made the statement on 1st December 1954 mentioned above. This application came up for orders before the court on 3rd December 1954, though it does not appear from the record that 3rd December 1954 was fixed as the date for passing orders on this application. On that date, the court allowed the application and struck off the defence and further directed that the suit was to proceed ex parte against the defendants. Then 6th January 1955 was fixed for hearing of the case. The defendants moved an application for review of the order dated the 3rd of December 1954 on 3rd January 1955. That application was rejected on 7th February 1955. The defendants also filed an appeal to this Court against the order striking out the defence and directing the suit to proceed ex parte which had been passed on 3rd December 1954. That appeal came up before a learned single Judge of this Court and the learned single Judge dismissed that appeal. The present special appeal is directed against the order of the learned single Judge. 2. When this special appeal was heard by us, a preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the respondent that this special appeal was incompetent as it was directed against an order of a learned single Judge which did not amount to a `judgment' within the meaning of that word as used in Cl. 10 of the Letters Patent of the Allahabad High Court. The appeal is no doubt filed under Chap. VIII, R. 5 of Rules of Court, but that provision only reproduces the right of appeal granted by Cl. 10 of the letters patent of the Allahabad High Court which, though abolished, are still available to be used for purposes of interpretation in view of the United Provinces High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948. 3. Mr. Misra learned counsel for the respondent relied, for the purposes of the scope of the word `judgment' as used in Cl. 10 of the letters patent of the Allahabad High Court which, though abolished, are still available to be used for purposes of interpretation in view of the United Provinces High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948. 3. Mr. Misra learned counsel for the respondent relied, for the purposes of the scope of the word `judgment' as used in Cl. 10 of the Letters Patent of the Allahabad High Court, mainly on the view expressed in two decisions of the Supreme Court contained in Asrutnati Debi v. Rupendra Deb, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 198 and State v. Dr. V.A. Maharaj, 1962 A.L.J. 819 and on the views expressed by this Court in Vishnu Pratap v. Revati Devi, A.I.R. 1953 Allahabad 647 and S.G. Beads Factory v. Shri Dhar, A.I.R. 1960 Allahabad 692 = 1960 A.L.J. 387. He considered it unnecessary to make reference to decisions of other High Courts such as the Calcutta, Nagpur and Madras High Courts which have been noticed either in the decisions of this Court or the decisions of the Supreme Court mentioned above. On an examination of these cases, we find that, so far as the Supreme Court is concerned, that Court has not yet given its decision as to the actual scope of the word `judgment' as used in Cl. 10 of the Letters Patent of the Allahabad High Court or Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay, Calcutta and Madras High Courts. The Supreme Court in the two cases cited above took notice of the interpretation that had been placed on this word `judgment' by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Tuljaranz v. Alagappa, I.L.R. 35 Mad. 1 and the interpretation placed on that word by the Calcutta High Court in The Justices of the PRace for Calcutta v. The Oriental Gas Co., (1872) 8 Being. L.R. 433 and Hadjee Ismael v. Hadjee Mahommad, (1874) 13 Beng. L.R. 91 and by the Nagpur High Court in Manohar v. Baliram, I.L.R. 1952 Nag. 471. When noticing these views their Lordships of the Supreme Court, in both the decisions, held that the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in the case mentioned above had attributed a wider meaning to the word `judgment' while a narrower meaning had been attributed to it by the Calcutta and the Nagpur High Courts. 471. When noticing these views their Lordships of the Supreme Court, in both the decisions, held that the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in the case mentioned above had attributed a wider meaning to the word `judgment' while a narrower meaning had been attributed to it by the Calcutta and the Nagpur High Courts. In both the cases, their Lordships, on the facts of those cases, were of the view that the decisions arrived at by their Lordships followed both from the views expressed by the Madras High Court, and the Calcutta and Nagpur High Courts. In the case of Asrunati Debi v. Rupendra Deb, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 198 their Lordships held that whether the meaning of the word `judgment' accepted by the Madras High Court or that accepted by the Calcutta High Court be applied, in either case, the order which was in dispute in the case before them did not amount to a judgment. On the other hand in the subsequent case of State v. Dr. V.A. Maharaj, (1874) 13 Beng. L.R. 91 : 1962 A.L.J. 819 their Lordships held that the particular order in question in that case was a judgment, whether the meaning of that word accepted by the High Court of Madras is applied or that accepted by the Nagpur and the Calcutta High Courts is applied. In these circumstances their Lordships of the Supreme Court refrained from resolving the difference between the views expressed by these High Courts. It has appeared to us that, so far as we are concerned since we can get no guidance from the decisions of the Supreme Court as to which of the two views is to be preferred, we have to fall back upon decisions of our own Court, and on this point we find that we have to follow the majority view expressed in the Full Bench decision in S. G. Beads Factory v. Shri Dhar, A.I.R. 1960 Allahabad 692 : 1960 A.L.J. 387. In that case, the majority judgment was delivered by Mootham, C.J. with whom Dayal, J. fully concurred. After discussing the Supreme Court decision in the case of Asrumati Debi v. Rupendra Deb, (1874) 13 Beng. In that case, the majority judgment was delivered by Mootham, C.J. with whom Dayal, J. fully concurred. After discussing the Supreme Court decision in the case of Asrumati Debi v. Rupendra Deb, (1874) 13 Beng. L.R. 91 : 1962 A.L.J. 819 and after taking notice of the various other decisions Mootham, C. J., in the last paragraph of his judgment, expressed the view that, on the wider meaning given to the word `judgment', a judgment deciding an appeal from an order allowing or refusing to grant an interim injunction order during the pendency of a suit must be held to be a judgment within the meaning of that word as used in Cl. 10 of the Letters Patent of the Allahabad High Court. At the same time he said: "If the narrower view of the meaning of the word `judgment' be correct such an order when made by a judge of a High Court in India exercising original jurisdiction would not be appealable." Thus Mootham, C.J. in his judgment indicated that this Court was accepting the wider meaning of the word `judgment' as laid down by the Madras High Court in the case of Tuliaram v. Alagappa at least in so far as the decision of single judge in appellate jurisdiction is concerned, and we consider that this being the view of a Full Bench of this Court it is not open to us to differ from it. 4. The view of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court which was thus accepted by the Full Bench of this Court was discussed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in their decision in the case of Asrumati Debi v. Rupendra Deb, (1874) 13 Beng. L.R. 91 : 1962 A.L.J. 819 where they quoted from various parts of the judgment of the Full Bench in that case. The quotation was from the judgment of Sir Arnold White, C.J. One portion quoted was as follows: "The test seems to me" thus observed the learned Chief Justice, "to be not what is the form of the adjudication, but what is its effect on the suit or proceeding in which it is made. The quotation was from the judgment of Sir Arnold White, C.J. One portion quoted was as follows: "The test seems to me" thus observed the learned Chief Justice, "to be not what is the form of the adjudication, but what is its effect on the suit or proceeding in which it is made. If its effect, whatever its form may be, and whatever may he the nature of the application on which it is made, is to put an end to the suit or proceeding so far as the Court before which the suit or proceeding is pending is concerned, or if its effect, if it is not complied with, is to put an end to the suit or proceeding, I think the adjudication is a judgment within the meaning of the clause." In a later portion of their judgment their Lordships of the Supreme Court explained the decision of Sir Arnold White, C. J. further by laying down: "According to White, C.J., to find out whether an order is a `judgment' or not, we have to look to its effect upon the particular suit or proceeding in which it is made. If its effect is to terminate the suit or proceeding, the decision would be a `judgment' but not otherwise. As this definition covers not only decisions in suit or actions but orders in other proceedings as well which start with applications, it may be said that any final order passed on an application in the course of a suit, e.g., granting or refusing a party's prayer for adjournment of a suit or for examination of a witness, would also come within the definition. This seems to be the reason why the learned Chief Justice qualifies the general proposition laid down above by stating that "an adjudication on an application, which is nothing more than a step towards obtaining a final adjudication in the suit, is not a judgment within the meaning of Letters Patent." This view of the Madras High Court was approved by the majority of Judges in the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of S.G. Beads Factory v. Shri Dhar, A.I.R. 1960 Allahabad 692 : 1960 A.L.J. 387. That test, if applied to the case before us, would lead to no other result except that the order now in appeal before us is a judgment for purposes of Cl. That test, if applied to the case before us, would lead to no other result except that the order now in appeal before us is a judgment for purposes of Cl. 10 of the Letters Patent of this Court. The order made by the learned single Judge finally disposes of the appeal which was pending in this Court so that it completely terminated the proceeding which was before him and in which the order was made. It was not an order on any application which might have been nothing more than a step towards obtaining a final adjudication in the appeal. It was exactly similar in nature to the order which came up for consideration before the Full Bench in the case cited above. In that case, the appeal decided by the single Judge was directed against an order of the lower court granting a temporary injunction. That appeal was dismissed by the learned single Judge. The order of dismissal was held to be a judgment because it had completely disposed of the appeal pending before him. The Full Bench further held that the grant or refusal of an interim injunction could cause substantial loss to the party adversely affected by the order and the refusal to grant this provisional relief may result in the suit becoming largely infructuous. This consideration which weighed with the Full Bench in that case exists also in the case before us. Here also, the order under appeal is an order striking out the defence of the defendants appellants and the defendants respondents; and if this order is given effect to, it would cause substantial loss and injury to the defendant appellants and defendant respondents. The striking out of the defence has the effect of making the defence taken by the defendants entirely infructuous and not merely largely infructuous. The result would be that the suit would be decreed against the defendants without their having an opportunity to defend it or of getting an opportunity to prove their own rival version on contested points. Thus the wider view taken by the Madras High Court and accepted by this Court in the Full Bench case mentioned above clearly negatives the preliminary objection taken on behalf of the plaintiff respondent that the special appeal is not maintainable. 5. In this connection, we may take notice of the submission made by Mr. Thus the wider view taken by the Madras High Court and accepted by this Court in the Full Bench case mentioned above clearly negatives the preliminary objection taken on behalf of the plaintiff respondent that the special appeal is not maintainable. 5. In this connection, we may take notice of the submission made by Mr. Misra on behalf of the plaintiff respondent that, if the interpretation of the word `judgment' given by the Madras High Court which has been accepted by the Full Bench of this Court and which we are inclined to accept were correct, then the Supreme Court could not have held in the case of Asrurnati Debi v. Rupendra Deb, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 198 that the order in question in that case was not a judgment within the meaning of that word as used in clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court. In that case, the order in question was an order made on an application under clause 13 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court praying that a suit filed in the court subordinate to that High Court be transferred to the High Court to be tried in its extraordinary original civil jurisdiction. A Judge of the High Court sitting singly allowed the application so that thereafter the suit was to be tried in the High Court in its extraordinary original civil jurisdiction. It was this order which according to their Lordships of the Supreme Court, did not amount to a judgment even within the wider meaning given to that word by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court. Mr. Misra's submission was that that particular order completely terminated the proceeding which was pending before the Calcutta High Court in which that order was made viz. the proceeding initiated by the application for an order under clause 13 of the Letters Patent of that High Court, and yet their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that that order did not amount to a judgment. the proceeding initiated by the application for an order under clause 13 of the Letters Patent of that High Court, and yet their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that that order did not amount to a judgment. His submission was that we should, in these circumstances, infer that the Supreme Court did not approve the view of the Madras High Court that an order would be a judgment if it has the effect of putting an end to the suit or proceeding pending in the court in so far as the court be lore which it was pending was concerned and even if it be an order which is not a step towards obtaining a final adjudication in that proceeding. We are unable to accept this submission because we cannot accept any interpretation of a decision of the Supreme Court which would make the judgment therein self-contradictory. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court themselves clearly stated that they were refraining from expressing any opinion as to the correctness of the view taken by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court, and when they have specifically said so, we cannot possibly infer that in applying that view they were accepting an interpredation of the word `judgment' which was different from that given by the Madras High Court and were rejecting that definition. It appears to us that the reason why the Supreme Court held that an order on an application under clause 13 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court was not a judgment even within the meaning of that word as laid down by the Full Bench, of the Madras High Court was that the proceeding initiated by that application was not treated as a separate and distinct proceeding like an appeal. It was treated as a proceeding in the suit itself which was already pending in a subordinate court. The only prayer in the application was that the suit should be transferred to the High Court to be tried on its extraordinary original civil side and the order made was merely that the suit was to stand transferred for trial in the High Court. The result of the order was that the suit which was pending in the subordinate court became pending in the High Court. The result of the order was that the suit which was pending in the subordinate court became pending in the High Court. It appears that, in these circumstances, the Supreme Court considered that the proceedings initiated for transfer were in the nature of proceedings in the suit itself which continued to remain pending and were not separate and independent proceedings which could have been held to have been concluded finally by the order directing transfer of the suit. In our case, the position is entirely different and is similar to the position in the case which came up before the Full Bench in S. G. Beads Factory v. Shri Dhar, A.I.R. 1960 Allahabad 692 : 1960 A.L.J. 387. In both these cases the appeals which were decided by the single Judges of this Court were entirely independent proceedings initiated here for the purpose of obtaining decisions from this Court as to the correctness or incorrectness of orders passed by the subordinate court and, as a consequence, for having those orders either confirmed, revered or modified. When the single Judges disposed of those appeals, they completely disposed of those independent proceedings initiated in this Court by filing the appeals. 6. We may add, however, that it has appeared to us that, even if the narrower meaning given to the word `judgment' by the Calcutta and the Nagpur High Courts be accepted, we would still have to hold that the present order in appeal before us is a judgment within the meaning of clause 10 of the Letters Patent of this Court. The test laid down by the Calcutta and the Nagpur High Courts was first expressed in the judgment of Couch, C. J. in the case of The Justices of the Peace for Calcutta v. The Oriental Gas Co., (1872) 8 Being. L.R. 433 as follows : "We think `judgment' in clause 15 means a decision which affects the merits of the question between the parties by determining some right or liability. It may be either final, or preliminary, or interlocutory, the difference between them being that a final judgment determines the whole cause or suit and a preliminary or interlocutory judgment determines only a part of it, leaving other matters to be determined." In the subsequent Calcutta Case of Hadjee Ismael v. Hadjee Mahommed, (1872) 8 Beng. It may be either final, or preliminary, or interlocutory, the difference between them being that a final judgment determines the whole cause or suit and a preliminary or interlocutory judgment determines only a part of it, leaving other matters to be determined." In the subsequent Calcutta Case of Hadjee Ismael v. Hadjee Mahommed, (1872) 8 Beng. L.R. 433 the views again expressed by Counch, C. J. as quoted by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of State v. Dr. V. A. Maharaj, (1874) 13 Beng. L.R. 91 are as follows : "It is not a mere formal order, or an order merely regulating the procedure in the suit, but one that has the effect of giving a jurisdiction to the Court it otherwise would not have. And it may fairly be said to determine some right between them, viz., the right to sue in a particular Court, and to compel the defendants who are not within its jurisdiction to come in and defend the suit, or if they do not, to make them liable to have a decree passed against them in their absence." The quotation of the Nagpur High Court judgment noticed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the same case was as follows : "A judgment means a decision in an action whether final, preliminary, or interlocutory which decides either wholly or partially, but conclusively in so far as the Court is concerned, the controversy which is the subject of the action. It does not include a decision which is on a matter of procedure, nor one which is ancillary to the action even though it may either imperil the ultimate decision or tend to make it effective. The decision need not be immediately executable per se but if left untouched, must result inevitably without anything further, save the determination of consequential details, in a decree or decretal order, that is to say, an executive document directing something to be done or not to be done in relation to the facts of the controversy. The decision may itself order that thing to be done or not to be done or it may leave that over till after the ascertainment of some details but it must not be interlocutory having for its purpose the ascertainment of some matters or details prior to the determination of the whole or any part of the controversy." 7. The decision may itself order that thing to be done or not to be done or it may leave that over till after the ascertainment of some details but it must not be interlocutory having for its purpose the ascertainment of some matters or details prior to the determination of the whole or any part of the controversy." 7. In the case before us, the result of the order which was made by the trial court was that the entire written statement filed on behalf of the defendants was struck off and treated as if it was no longer a part of the record. There was the further order that the suit was to proceed ex parte. Under Order XI rule 21, C.P.C. the language of the subsequent order should have been that the suit was to proceed as if it had not been defended, and not that the suit shall proceed ex parte. Even if the order had been passed in this correct language, the result of the order as a whole was that the right of the defendants to contest the suit was taken away by the order made by the trial court. The right to contest the suit is a valuable right, and that right was denied to the defendants right upto the conclusion of the suit. No doubt some further proceedings had to be taken in the suit because even in the undefended suit, the decree could only be passed by the trial court after calling upon the plaintiff to prove by evidence the necessary facts required to be proved for a decree being granted in favour of the plaintiff. The mere fact that the court had to take these further proceedings did not, however, protect the right of the defendants to obtain a decision not only on the pleadings put forward on behalf of the plaintiff in the plaint but also on pleadings put forward in the contest filed by the defendants through their written statement. The mere fact that the court had to take these further proceedings did not, however, protect the right of the defendants to obtain a decision not only on the pleadings put forward on behalf of the plaintiff in the plaint but also on pleadings put forward in the contest filed by the defendants through their written statement. The effect of striking out the defence was that the pleas taken in the written statement were to be ignored altogether and, to the extent that they contained pleas on which the burden of proof would have lain on the defendants and in respect of which no pleadings need having been included in the plaint by the plaintiffs, those pleadings were to be totally ignored by the court thus denying to the defendants the right to substantiate those pleadings without any investigation as to their correctness. In this particular case, we actually looked up the written statement filed on behalf of the defendants. As an example we may mention that, while meeting the pleading put forward as to the terms of the contract in dispute, the defendants in their written statement had alleged that there was a condition that Kattha to the extent of one lakh was to be sold at market rate by the plaintiff in order to recover the advance made by him whereas the rest of the liattha was to be sold by the plaintiff with the previous sanction of the defendants. The sales were to be made in accordance with the agreement and the previous instructions of price and time as given by the defendants. There was the further plea that, since the plaintiff could not sell even at the market rates as they had been given definite instructions by the defendants not to sell below the rates given by them, the plaintiffs were net entitled to any of the charges mentioned in para. 5 of the plaint as all those sales, excepting the sales covering one lakh, were below market rate, and were unauthorised. There was no need for the plaintiff initially to put any pleading in the plaint meeting this case which was subsequently put forward in the defence filed by the defendants. 5 of the plaint as all those sales, excepting the sales covering one lakh, were below market rate, and were unauthorised. There was no need for the plaintiff initially to put any pleading in the plaint meeting this case which was subsequently put forward in the defence filed by the defendants. When the written, statement was filed and these pleadings were put forward, issues would have been framed on the basis of these pleadings in accordance with the rules of procedure, and then the burden of proof on those issues would have lain on the defendants. The effect of striking out the entire defence was that these pleadings were to be totally ignored by the court, no issues were to be framed about it and, on the subsequent trial of the suit as an undefended suit, the court would have no occasion to go into facts set forward in these pleadings. Thus the effect of striking out the defence is that the controversies sought to be raised by the defendants as to the rights which were claimed by the parties in the suit itself become finally determined against the defendants inasmuch as at no subsequent stage of the suit could the defendants seek to obtain a decision on those controversies. We have cited only one instance of the pleadings from the written statement as it does not appear necessary to us to examine how many similar pleadings stood struck off by the order striking off the defence. This one example is enough to show that the effect of the order made by the trial court was to finally determine party the controversy between the parties. Since an order striking out the defence involves determination, at least of parts, of the controversy between the parties, such an order was made separately appealable under the Code of Civil Procedure. This one example is enough to show that the effect of the order made by the trial court was to finally determine party the controversy between the parties. Since an order striking out the defence involves determination, at least of parts, of the controversy between the parties, such an order was made separately appealable under the Code of Civil Procedure. The appeal having been decided by the learned single Judge, if there was no further appeal, the effect of the order would be that, when the suit is subsequently proceeded with, it would not be open to the defendants to take these pleas before the lower court and resist the decree on these grounds, nor would it be open to the defendants to challenge the decree passed by the trial court on such grounds in an appeal against the decree itself, assuming that, in a suit treated as undefended, the defendants would have a right to come up in appeal to this Court against the decree. It is thus clear that the order which was passed by the lower court did have the effect of finally determining part of the controversy between the parties as to the rights in dispute in the suit, so that the test laid down by the Courts placing narrower interpretation on the word `judgment' is also satisfied in the present case. 8. We may add that our view that the order of the learned single Judge amounts to a `judgment' within the meaning of that word used in Cl. 10 of the Letters Patent of this Court finds direct support from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State v. Dr. V.A. Maharaj, (1874) 13 Beng. L.R. 91 : 1962 A.L.J. 819. In that case an order quashing an assessment had been made by a learned single Judge of this Court in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. Subsequently the Governor issued an Ordinance which granted to the parties to those proceedings a right to have the order reviewed. In the affidavit which was filed in the application for review, it was alleged that the impugned assessment had been validated under the Ordinance and the applicants had the right to have the order of the single Judge reviewed in the light of the provisions of Sec. 6 of the Ordinance. In the affidavit which was filed in the application for review, it was alleged that the impugned assessment had been validated under the Ordinance and the applicants had the right to have the order of the single Judge reviewed in the light of the provisions of Sec. 6 of the Ordinance. The assessee contesting the review application denied that the applicants had any such right. The learned single Judge dismissed the application for review. It was held that that order of dismissal amounted to a judgment as the appellants' statutory right to have the order of the High Court reviewed was denied and put in issue before the High Court. It will thus be seen that the Supreme Court in that case held that a right to obtain a decision from a Court on a matter in controversy is itself such a right that its denial by an order would make that order amount to a judgment. In the present case, we have already indicated earlier that the effect of the order of the trial court was to deny to the defendants the right to contest the suit and to substantiate their defence, and the denial of that right, on the principle laid down by the Supreme Court, would make an order of denial a judgment under Cl. 10 of the Letters Patent. The order of the trial court itself satisfies the requirements of a `judgment', the order made in appeal by the learned single Judge would all the more be a judgment for the purposes of Cl. 10 of the Letters Patent. Thus, even if the tests laid down by the Courts which have taken a narrower view of the word `judgment' is applied, the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents must fail, and consequently we reject it. 9. On the merits we think that this is a case where the power of striking out the defence has been used by the learned Judge of the trial court in a manner which was not appropriate or correct. The facts enumerated by us earlier show that it was for the first time on 1st of November 1954 for the first time directing the defendants to comply. The facts enumerated by us earlier show that it was for the first time on 1st of November 1954 for the first time directing the defendants to comply. The documents in respect of which discovery was sought were not and could not be expected in the knowledge of the counsel representing the defendants in the suit and yet only ten days' time was granted for discovery. This time was granted after notice of the application to the counsel only, and not to the defendants themselves. The defendants were residing at Dehradun while this litigation was pending at Kanpur at a distance of hundreds of miles. On the 16th November 1954 an application for further time was made by the counsel and the application itself shows that the counsel made that application for further time without having so far been able to get in touch with the defendants. No doubt, in the subsequent proceedings, an affidavit was filed by one of the defendants that he had sent instructions to the counsel to obtain further time but it appears to us that this application on 16th November 1954 could not have been in pursuance of those instructions. If any such instructions were sent it seems that they were never received by the counsel, and it was on his own responsibility that he, in the interest of his clients, made this application for further time. When applying for further time, he asked for two weeks only presumably because he expected that he would be able to get in touch with his clients and enable them to comply with the order of the court within those two weeks. It appears from the subsequent statement made by the counsel on 1st December 1954 that once again he was unable to get any response from the defendants. He in fact stated that he had heard nothing from the defendants or their senior counsel and that consequently he was unable to take steps. The case put forward by the defendants at the subsequent stage was that most of them were outside Dehradun and they did not receive communication from their counsel at Kanpur so that they were unable to take necessary steps to comply with the order of the court. The case put forward by the defendants at the subsequent stage was that most of them were outside Dehradun and they did not receive communication from their counsel at Kanpur so that they were unable to take necessary steps to comply with the order of the court. After the counsel for the defendants had in his statement given on 1st December 1954, expressed his inability to take steps, the plaintiff respondent in a hurry moved an application on 2nd December for an order striking out the defence under Or. XI, R. 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Notice of this application was again given to the same counsel, on 2nd December 1954, i.e., the day on which the application was moved, who had been unable to obtain instructions from the client. It does not appear from the record that, after notice of this application was served on that counsel, the court fixed any particular date for hearing of that application. The fact that the record did not contain any such order was brought to our notice by learned counsel appearing for the defendants appellants, and learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff respondent did not meet this assertion by pointing out to us any order fixing 3rd of December 1954 as the date for hearing of that application. 3rd of December 1954 was the very next day after the presentation of the application for striking out the defence. On that date, in a hurry the order was made striking out the defence and ordering the case to proceed ex parte. It was made on the ground that the defendants had failed to comply with the order for discovery of documents and their counsel had made a statement that they had no instructions. In passing this order, the trial court clearly ignored the principles which have been accepted by almost all Courts for dealing with such a situation. An order striking out the defence is an order of a very drastic nature which very seriously curtails the rights of a party. Such an order is to be made not merely because there has been an accidental default in complying with the order made by the court but only in the interest of justice where the court feels satisfied that the party defaulting had been acting deliberately or had been reticent. A Division Bench of this Court in Sharma and Co. Such an order is to be made not merely because there has been an accidental default in complying with the order made by the court but only in the interest of justice where the court feels satisfied that the party defaulting had been acting deliberately or had been reticent. A Division Bench of this Court in Sharma and Co. v. Kedar Nath, I.L.R. 1954 (2) All. 153 held: "Such orders should be rare and only in cases where a party had been guilty of deliberate disobedience and no such orders should be passed without first giving the party an opportunity to show cause so that he may, if he so desires, mend his ways." Even by other High Courts, as well as in other cases of this Court, it has been held that this penalty should only be imposed in the case of wilful default and should be applied in extreme cases as a last resort when default is wilful, and not the result of mere negligence. Learned counsel appearing for the defendants appellants in this connection drew our attention to the views expressed by the various High Courts in a series of cases whereas no case to the contrary was cited before us by learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff respondent except the case of Arya Insurance Co. v. Lala Channoolal, A.I.R. 1957 Allahabad 400. That case was decided by a learned single Judge of this Court and all that it laid down was that the issue of a notice before exercising powers of striking out the defence under Or. XI, R. 21 of the C, P. C. was not necessary in all cases. That decision being a decision of a learned single Judge cannot be given much weight in view of the decisions of Division Benches of this Court and the decisions of various other High Courts. Further, in the case before us, we think that it was a minimum requirement in the interest of justice that not only should notice have been given of the application for striking out the defence but an adequate opportunity should have been afforded to the defendants to show cause, or in the alternative to comply with the requirement of the court, and mend their ways. The facts disclosed by us show that, even initially, the default in complying with the orders of the court had taken place because the appellants counsel in Kanpur had not been able to get in touch with them properly. There was already a fairly good reason and explanation for the failure of the defendant in complying with the order of the court about discovery of documents. At the later stage, when the application for striking out the defence was made it was clearly necessary, in the circumstances, to direct notice of the application to be served on the defendants themselves, instead of serving the notice on the counsel by delivering copy of the application to him. The Court was aware of the fact that the counsel was not getting instructions from the client. Strictly in law it was permissible to serve notice by delivering copy on the counsel, but in the circumstances that existed that was not very fair to the defendants. Further, even if notice was served on the defendants' counsel, the court should have seen that the counsel was given adequate time to reply to that application after getting in touch with his clients. The court, on the other hand, having had copy delivered on the 2nd of December 1954, proceeded to pass the drastic order of striking out the defence the very next day the 3rd of December 1954. The interval of one day was so short that it was impossible for the counsel to get in touch with the defendants and to obtain instructions from them to meet the application, or to rectify, or mend, or to explain their conduct. The hurry with which the orders were passed, clearly leads to the conclusion that, in fact, the order was made without affording proper opportunity to the defendants to which they were entitled, and was, therefore, an improper order. 10. As a result we allow this appeal and set aside the order of the learned single Judge and the order of the trial court dated the 3rd of December 1954. The result of our setting aside the order is that the application dated the 2nd of December 1954 again becomes pending. It will now be for the trial court to pass fresh orders on that application after giving an adequate opportunity to the appellants to show cause against it. The result of our setting aside the order is that the application dated the 2nd of December 1954 again becomes pending. It will now be for the trial court to pass fresh orders on that application after giving an adequate opportunity to the appellants to show cause against it. The trial court, in dealing with the application, will keep in view our remarks as to the principles which are to be applied when passing an order of such a serious nature as striking out the defence. It will of course be opened to the trial court to impose such conditions as to costs or otherwise which that court might consider fair if that court dismisses the application and permits the defendants to comply with the order of discovery of documents. In the circumstances of this case we direct the parties to bear their own costs of this special appeal, as well as of the appeal before the learned single Judge.