This is an application in revision arising out of the following circumstances: (2) Opposite Party No. 1 brought a suit in the Court pf the Munsiff for the following reliefs: "(a) that plaintiff's title on the basis of Mourashi lease in respect of 1 Bigha of land be declared and a Decree for khas possession in respect thereto be granted against the principal defendants 1, 2, 3 and in presence of the other pro forma defendants. (b) that khas possession in respect of the land De delivered to plaintiff after measuring it by an Amin ac­cording to Town Resettlement Map and partition map or T. S. No. 36 of 1947." The trial court held that the relief claimed by the plain­tiff comes under section 7 (v) (d) of the Court-fees Act and thus the plaintiff was liable to pay court-fees on the market value of the land, and that the valuation of the suit should also have been according to the market value of the land. In the present case, the Munsiff came to the conclusion that the value of the land in suit was not Jess than Rs. 5,000/- and thus he directed that the plaint fee handed over to the plaintiff to be filed before the proper Court as the Munsiff had no jurisdiction to entertain suit valued at Rs. 5,000/-. The plaintiff went up in appeal against this order to the Subordinate Judge. The Subordinate Judge has come to the conclusion •that the suit was for a declaration with consequential relief for possession and is covered by section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court-fees Act and the valuation of the suit thus will be the value put by the plaintiff for the purpose of jurisdiction. The court-fee should also be paid on the value put by the plaintiff in his plaint. He thus came to the conclusion that the decision of the trial court was wrong. He set aside the order of the trial court and re­manded the case to the Munsiff for an enquiry as to the proper value of the suit land. The court-fee should also be paid on the value put by the plaintiff in his plaint. He thus came to the conclusion that the decision of the trial court was wrong. He set aside the order of the trial court and re­manded the case to the Munsiff for an enquiry as to the proper value of the suit land. The view taken by the Subordinate Judge was that even though under section 7 (iv) (c) the plaintiff is entitled to put his own Valuation, he was not entitled to put arbitrary valuation and the Court could hold an enquiry to ascertain whether the valua­tion put by the plaintiff was an arbitrary one or not. In this view of the matter he remanded the case for en­quiry by the Munsiff. Against this order of the Subordinate Judge, the present application in revision has been filed in this Court. (3) The main point taken by Mr. P. Choudhury for the petitioners is that section 7 (v) (d) of the Court-fees Act applies to this case and not section 7 (iv) (c). The rele­vant portion of section 7 (iv) (c) reads as follows: "to obtain a declaratory decree or order, where consequential relief is prayed." Section 7 (v) (d) provides: "In suits for the possession of land, houses and gardens - according to the value of the subject-matter; and such value shall be deemed to be- XX XX XX XX XX (d) where the land forms part of an estate paying revenue to Government, but is not a definite share of such estate and is not separately assessed as above mentioned - the market value of the land." It is true that in the relief claimed the plaintiff has asked for a declaration that he is entitled to the property under a permanent lease and then has asked for posses­sion. But in order to ascertain whether the suit is one covered by section 7 (v) (d) or S. 7 (iv) (c) of the Court-fees Act, it will have to be seen as to what the real nature of the suit is. In order to see whether the relief of declaration was necessary the entire claim will have to be examined. But in order to ascertain whether the suit is one covered by section 7 (v) (d) or S. 7 (iv) (c) of the Court-fees Act, it will have to be seen as to what the real nature of the suit is. In order to see whether the relief of declaration was necessary the entire claim will have to be examined. In cases where the plaintiff could not ask for possession without asking for a declaration, the suit would be one .for declaration with consequential relief for possession and not a suit simply for possession, in cases where it is not necessary to get a declaration of any sort and the only thins which is necessary for the plaintiff is to ask for possession, the suit will be one for posses­sion under section 7 (v) (d) and not for a declaration with consequential relief for possession. If in every case the guiding factor is only the relief claimed by the plain­tiff, then in order to bring the suit under section 7 (iv) (c) the plaintiff, even though he may be entitled to posses­sion, may include in the suit a relief for declaration and treat the relief for possession as consequential to his relief for declaration. It will be necessary at this stage to consider some of the cases relied upon. Mr. Choudhury for the Defendants-Petitioners has referred to the case of Venkatasiva Rao v. venkatanarasimha Satyanarayanamurthy, reported in AIR 1932 Mad 605. Reliance .is placed on the following passage at 611 of the report: , "Even whether the suit was one for a declaratory decree and also for possession, it has been held by this Court that suits for possession having been specifically provided for by S. 7 (v), the suit has to be valued accord­ingly and court-fee paid under the provisions of that sub-section." He has next referred to the case of Ramkhetawan Sahu v. Bir Surendra Sahi, reported in AIR 1938 Pat 22. Reli­ance is placed on the following passage at page 26 of the report: "We now approach the merits of the two cases respectively. The question in issue is whether the suit falls within S. 7, Para, (iv) (c), or within Para, (v), Court-fees Act. Reli­ance is placed on the following passage at page 26 of the report: "We now approach the merits of the two cases respectively. The question in issue is whether the suit falls within S. 7, Para, (iv) (c), or within Para, (v), Court-fees Act. Section 7, Para, (iv) sets forth different classes of suits........” It would seem that there is much misunderstanding in India as to the legal meaning of the word "declaration" as applied to a remedy to be granted by a Court. The habit has grown up of describing a suit for possession of property as being a suit "for a declaration of title to­gether with a decree for possession of the property m .suit," and the ward "declaration" has been used to mean would more correctly be described as the finding of fact necessary before the decree for possession can be granted. In every suit for possession the plaintiff can­not succeed unless he proves the facts necessary to establish his title, but the real remedy which he seeks is a decree for delivery of possession. The distinction bet­ween the remedy sought and the finding of fact necessary to justify the granting of that remedy may be simply test ed by considering whether the plaintiff obtaining an order for possession but having been refused a formal "declara­tion" in the decree could come to the appellate court with a complaint that he had not received the whole of the remedy for which he had asked. If the appellate Court is in a position to tell the plaintiff that the remedy of possession is all that the plaintiff is entitled to ask and that the so-called "declaration" claimed- in the plaint I is merely a finding, of the Court set forth in the judgment as distinct from toe decree, the jurisdiction1 for granting I the remedy, then the so-called "declaration" claimed in the plaint is not a declaration at all." I am in complete agreement with the principle enunciated above in the Patna case. (4) The next case referred to is the case of Waman Vinayak v. Narayan Hari, reported in AIR 1946 Bom 363. .Reliance is made on the following passage at page 364 of the report : "Mr. (4) The next case referred to is the case of Waman Vinayak v. Narayan Hari, reported in AIR 1946 Bom 363. .Reliance is made on the following passage at page 364 of the report : "Mr. Dharap on behalf of the applicant-defendant has contended that in this case the declarations sought by the plaintiff, viz., a declaration that tire document in ques­tion was illegal and that the plaintiff was the owner of: the property in question, were unnecessary, and that, there­fore, the suit being substantially one for possession, it should be valued under S. 7 (v) of the Act. According to the defendant 1, the valuation of the three houses in, suit should be taken as between Rs. 10,000 and Rs. 12,000 and the valuation of the land in suit at Rs. 300, so that if this valuation be accepted, the suit must, according to Mr. Dharap's contention, be valued at a figure, above the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Second Class Subordinate Judge. We think that this contention must be upheld." The principle deducible from this case is that the plaints has got to be considered as a whole and if the consequential relief which the plaintiff claims is one for possession and it is not necessary for him to claim declaration Before he gets a decree for possession, the relief for" declaration is redundant and the suit is in essence a suit -for possession and is covered by section 7 (v). If, how ever, the declaration is necessary to give relief to the plaintiff and this relief for possession cannot stand with1 out a relief for declaration, the case will be one covered by section 7 (iv) (c). In the revision petition the substance of the plaint is set out. The plaintiff's case was that on the 24th February, 1947 a Mourashi Mokrari lease was executed is favour of the plaintiff by the proforma defendant No. 4 in respect of the suit land. Pro forma defendant No. 4, according to the plaintiff, was the karta of the joint family and as such was entitled to execute the lease in favour of the plaintiff. The defendants never entered into possession of the land. It is also alleged in the plaint that the defendant Nos. Pro forma defendant No. 4, according to the plaintiff, was the karta of the joint family and as such was entitled to execute the lease in favour of the plaintiff. The defendants never entered into possession of the land. It is also alleged in the plaint that the defendant Nos. I and 2 purchased certain land from pro forma Defendant No. 6 in Dag No. 744, but they :have no title to the property under that purchase. It is also stated that the defendant No. 3 has not been give in partition any land in Dag No. 11 and that he has get no right to the property in suit. (5) Mr. Choudhury appearing for the opposite party has strongly relied upon the case of Prabhat Chandra Choudhury v. Sm. Sulochana Choudhurani, reported in AIR 1956 Assam 121. This case, to my mind, is distinguish­able. Here the plaintiffs had asked for a declaration of his title to certain land and for possession. They had Alleged that the land belonged to one Jagadindra Narayan Choudhury and the plaintiffs were entitled to the property inasmuch as under the custom the mother of Jagadindra flarayan Choudhury was excluded from inheritance. The plaintiffs had thus come with a case that the defendant's mother was excluded from inheritance by virtue of a cus­tom and unless the custom was established and unless the plaintiffs had sought for a declaration that in spite of the fact that ordinarily the mother will be entitled to the property she has been excluded from inheritance and thus the plaintiffs were entitled to the property, they could not have asked for possession. The declaration thus was neces­sary for the plaintiffs in order to get a relief for posses­sion. They had further asked for a declaration that they were reversioners. Thus, the case, to my mind, is distinguishable. (6) Next he has referred to the case of Zaraton Nessa v. Faizur Rahman, reported in AIR 1955 Assam 126. That as a case where the matter came up before this court In an application for grant of special leave and the question for consideration was whether the subject-matter of the suit was valued at more than Rs. 20,000/- so as to attract the provisions of section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That as a case where the matter came up before this court In an application for grant of special leave and the question for consideration was whether the subject-matter of the suit was valued at more than Rs. 20,000/- so as to attract the provisions of section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The argument was that as in the course of the trial the plaintiff had put certain valuation, he was estopped from saying that the subject-matter was valued more than what he had valued in the suit and it was held by this Court that he was not estopped. This case thus, So my mind, has no application to the facts of the pre­sent case. (7) The other case referred to is the case of Sailendra Nath Kundu v. Surendra Nath Sarkar, reported in AIR 1935 Cal 279. There the plaintiff had asked for a declaration that certain lease executed in favour of some of the defen­dants was invalid. The plaintiff had asked for possession on declaration that the title deed of the defendants was invalid. There the plaintiff could not have got possession unless he had prayed that the lease in favour of the defen­dants was invalid. In the present case, the plaintiff has asked for a declaration that the lease executed in his favour subsists and that he is entitled to possession under the aforesaid lease deed. This case is, therefore, disting­uishable. (8) The other two cases' referred to are - AIR 1930 Cal 473, Pannalal v. Abdul Gani, and AIR 1948 Cal 312, Mahammad Eshaque v. Mahammad Amin. Those were cases where the suit was admittedly under section 7 (v) (d) and the question arose as to what would be the market value of the subject-matter of the suit. It was held that market value would not be the value of the land but of the right which the plaintiff claimed in the land itself. There was no question as to whether the case fell under section 7 (iv) (c) or 7 (v) (d). (9) It is then contended that in the plaint it is set cut that the sale deed in favour of the defendants was during the pendency of the suit and thus was void and the defendants had no title to the property. But no relief has been claimed in respect of the transfer in favour of the defendants. (9) It is then contended that in the plaint it is set cut that the sale deed in favour of the defendants was during the pendency of the suit and thus was void and the defendants had no title to the property. But no relief has been claimed in respect of the transfer in favour of the defendants. It cannot thus be said that there was any relief for avoiding transfer by the defendants and as-a consequence of that the relief for possession was prayer for. The facts have got to be set out on which the plain­tiff bases his title and also according to which the defendants' possession is that of trespasser and the plaintiff has (got to ask for possession as against the defendants. (10) In my view, therefore, the decision of the lower appellate court is not correct. In the present case, sec­tion 7 (v) (d) is attracted and not section 7 (iv) (c) of ,the Court-fees Act. The question of remand, therefore, floes not arise. (11) It is then contended by the learned counsel for the opposite party that the valuation of the suit will not be the land but his right as a lessee. No such point ap­pears to have been taken before the Munsiff. The only contention raised was that it is a suit under section 7 /iv) (c) and the plaintiff was entitled to put his own valua­tion. If the case came under section 7 (v) (d), it was never contended that the market value of the lease-hold right will be Rs. 500/-, which was the valuation put by the plaintiff in his plaint. Therefore that question does not arise before me for consideration at all. (12) In the result, therefore, I allow this revision petition, set aside the order of the Subordinate Judge and .restore that of the trial court. But, in the circumstances of the case, parties will bear their own costs of this revision. /F/M/V.B.B. Revision petition allowed.