Judgment :- 1. Both the lower courts have concurrently found that the petitioner is not entitled to benefits of Act XXXI of 1958 and he canvasses the correctness of that decision in revision. 2. There was a compromise decree in a suit on a mortgage, pending which other properties were also attached. Under the compromise decree the petitioner was to pay Rs. 3600/- on or before 30th March 1957 and the respondent, in the event of such payment, was to give up the balance. By the same decree a charge on the attached properties was also created. The petitioner failed to pay the amount in accordance with the compromise; but he filed an application under Act III of 1956 and he was allowed to pay the decree debt in instalments under the provisions of that Act. Subsequently, when Act XXXI of 1958 came into force, the petitioner sought relief under that Act. Both the lower courts, as already observed, refused relief under the later Act on the grounds that the petitioner was not an agriculturist as he paid basic tax of over Rs. 150/- per year and that the debt covered by the decree was one coming within S.11 of the later Act and therefore he should deposit in court one half of the mortgage amount before he claimed relief under that Act. 3. After Amending Act II of 1961 the payment of basic tax is no bar to claim relief under Act XXXI of 1958. Therefore the first objection, which weighed with the lower courts, no more subsists. 4. Regarding the second objection Mr. K. C. John, the petitioner's learned counsel, brings to my notice a Division Bench ruling of this Court, to which I was a party, namely M. K. Kuruvilla v. M. S. Joseph (1960 KLT. 1207) in which it has been held that S.11 applies only to subsisting mortgages and in a case like the present one, where a decree has already been passed on the basis of the mortgage and the mortgage has thus merged in the decree, the provisions of that section do not apply. On the authority of this ruling the second objection, which found favour with the lower courts, has also to be overruled. 5. On the authority of this ruling the second objection, which found favour with the lower courts, has also to be overruled. 5. During the course of discussion at the Bar a decision of Raman Nayar, J. in Variathu alias Pothen v. Ayyappan (1961 KLJ.1018) has been brought to my notice. In that case a judgment-debtor under a decree for balance of purchase money filed an application for relief under Act III of 1956 and it was allowed, as that Act applied to such debts also. Subsequently after the coming into force of Act XXXI of 1958, it was sought to be contended that since such a liability as was covered by that decree was excepted under S.2 (c) (vii) of the later Act, the debtor should not be given even the relief, which he was given under Act III of 1956. This contention was repelled by Raman Nayar, J. and thereafter he observed: "Exception is taken on behalf of the judgment debtor to my earlier statement that the decree debt in question is one to which the provisions of Act XXXI of 1958 do not apply. It is said that the inclusion of debts due under Act III of 1956 in the definition of "debt" in Act XXXI of 1958 means that such debts are debts within the meaning of Act XXXI of 1958, even if they come within any of the exclusions in the definition. But the exclusions in clauses til to (xi) of S.2 (c) are in the nature of provisos to the definition in the body of the section, and the inclusion of a debt due under Act III of 1956 is in the body of the section. Therefore the provisos apply also to debts under Act III of 1956, and, it is not as if the inclusion of such debts is in the nature of a proviso to the exclusions in clauses (i) to (xi)." This shows that a debt, for which relief could be had under Act III of 1956, if it fell within any of the exclusions under S.2 (c) of Act XXXI of 1958, could not be considered as one for which relief could be had under Act XXXI of 1958. 6. Another decision of Mathew, J. in Ramal Ammal Lekshmi Ammal v. Velayudhan Pillai Krishnan Nair (S. A. No. 1249 of 1960) has also been brought to my notice. 6. Another decision of Mathew, J. in Ramal Ammal Lekshmi Ammal v. Velayudhan Pillai Krishnan Nair (S. A. No. 1249 of 1960) has also been brought to my notice. There also for a debt for the balance of purchase money a decree was passed and the debtor was allowed to pay the decree debt in instalments under Act III of 1956. Subsequently he claimed relief under Act XXXI of 1958 and Mathew J. allowed that prayer. He observed: "S. 26 of Act 31 of 1958 gives vested right to the judgment-debtor to pay off the amount in instalments. The definition of the word 'debt' in Act 31 of 1958 also indicates that any debt or balance of a debt due at the commencement of Act 31 of 1958 can be paid in instalments irrespective of the nature of the debt." The passage extracted above is directly in conflict with the passage extracted from the judgment of Raman Nayar, J. It appears that the earlier decision of Raman Nayar J. has not been brought to the notice of Mathew J. (Incidentally I may observe that the name of Mr. K. K. Mathew also appears among the counsel appearing for one of the parties before Raman Nayar J.). As pointed out by Raman Nayar J. the inclusion of a debt or balance of a debt under Act III of 1956 in the definition of debt in Act XXXI of 1958 is. in the body of the section and the exclusions in clauses (i) to (xi) are in the nature of provisos to that definition in the body of the section. Therefore the exclusions in clauses (i) to (xi) have the effect of taking away such debts from the debts included in the body of the section; and in that view I agree with Raman Nayar J. 7. In this situation I would have referred this case to a Division Bench, if this involved the aforesaid question. But in this case the debt is not one excluded under clauses (1) to (xi) of S.2 (c) and that point does not arise here. Therefore, I am not referring this case to a Division Bench. 8. In the result the Civil Revision Petition is allowed, the orders of the lower courts are set aside and the petition is remanded to the trial court for disposal in the light of this judgment. Therefore, I am not referring this case to a Division Bench. 8. In the result the Civil Revision Petition is allowed, the orders of the lower courts are set aside and the petition is remanded to the trial court for disposal in the light of this judgment. The parties are directed to bear their respective costs throughout. Allowed.