ORDER P.K. Tare, J. This is an application for leave to file Letters Patent appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent of this High Court. The applicant filed a suit for a declaration that the first respondent, who claimed to be his illegitimate issue was not so and was not entitled to any maintenance either in pursuance of an order of the criminal Court or otherwise. On behalf of the defence, an objection had been raised about limitation. It was alleged that the suit was barred under Article 120 of Schedule 1 of the Limitation Act. The second question involved was whether the defence succeeded in fastening the paternity of the child on the appellant. The Courts below held that the suit was within time, and that the plaintiff was not entitled to claim a declaration as the defence succeeded in establishing that the first respondent was an illegitimate child of the applicant. This Court affirmed both the findings of the Courts below. It is to be noted that the question of limitation involving a point of law has been decided in favour of the applicant, while the question of fact about the paternity of the child has been decided against him. How leave is sought to the ground that this case involves an important question of law to the effect that the evidence on record is insufficient to fasten the paternity of the first respondent on the applicant. In this connection it is to be noted that the law on the point is well settled by the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Privy Council and their Lordships of the Supreme Court. In the judgment, this Court came to the conclusion that the case does not attract the dictum laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Barendra Lal Boy Chowdhury v. Smt. Haridasi Debi and Others LR 41 IA 11 and Damusa and Another v. Abdul Samad and Others LR 46 IA 140. It was further held that the case does not warrant an interference at the second appellate stage on the principle laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, in Arjan Singh v. Kartar Singh, (1951) 2 SCR 258 and in Kakumanu Peda Subbayya and Another Vs. Kakumanu Akkamma and Another, . It was further held that the case does not warrant an interference at the second appellate stage on the principle laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, in Arjan Singh v. Kartar Singh, (1951) 2 SCR 258 and in Kakumanu Peda Subbayya and Another Vs. Kakumanu Akkamma and Another, . On the other hand, this Court came to the conclusion that the dictum laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in AIR 1934 112 (Privy Council) and in H. A. Morine v. London Loan Assets Ltd. and Others AIR 1934 PC 127 and by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Deity Pattabhiramaswamy v. S. Banymayya and Others AIR 1959 SC 57 , Raruhasingh v. Achalsingh and Others AIR 1961 SC 1097 and Sri Sinna Ramanuja Jeer and Others Vs. Sri Ranga Ramanuja Jeer and Another, was attracted; and consequently this Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the finding of fact. It is not the applicant's contention that there is no evidence, whatsoever, to support the conclusion of the Courts below. But, what is contended is that the evidence on record is insufficient to fasten the paternity of the first respondent on the applicant. This can hardly be a question of law; much less a substantial question of law so as to warrant the grant of leave for filing Letters Patent appeal. Even if there be some material on record to support the finding of fact of the Courts below, that is enough, and the fact whether the evidence on record is sufficient to warrant the conclusion cannot be termed a question of law. It is to be noted that leave for filing Letter Patent appeal is not to be granted as of routine. On previous occasions, the grant of leave lightly has met with the utmost disapproval, not only at the hands of the Judges of this Court, but also the Judges of other High Courts. I may further observe that if leave is not to be lightly granted by the Court, it is equally the duty of the members of the Bar, and particularly the senior members not to seek leave irresponsibly. I only propose to refer to the oases disapproving of the grant of leave lightly. I may further observe that if leave is not to be lightly granted by the Court, it is equally the duty of the members of the Bar, and particularly the senior members not to seek leave irresponsibly. I only propose to refer to the oases disapproving of the grant of leave lightly. It is to be remembered that a counsel not only owes a duty to his client to put up his case in the best possible manner; but also owes a duty to the Court to enable it to arrive at a correct decision. In Asarfi Mander and Others Vs. Karu Mander and Others, a Division Bench consisting of Courtney Terrell C, J. and Agarwala J. made the following observations regarding grant of leave to file Letters Patent appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent of that High Court:- Speaking for myself, I venture to think that 'leave to appeal' is given somewhat too lightly and without reference to the precise phrase of the Letters Patent that the Judge must certify that the case is a fit one for appeal. A certificate should not be granted merely on the ground that a point of law arises in the ease as might be the ease in dealing with admissions of second appeal. The judgment in this CASE gives no indication of any apprehension by the learned Judge that his view might be mistaken or that it was arrived at after some difficulty, or as indication that he felt that his view of the law might possibly require confirmation by a larger tribunal. I venture to suggest that learned Judges, in exercising the responsibility Revision to them by the Letters Patent to bear appeals singly, might remember that it IB only when a case presents some difficulty and in which the Judge really feel that the matter before him requires further consideration by a larger Court that 'leave' should be granted. If a Judge decides the case with confidence that should, be an indication that it is not a fit case for appeal, and if he accepts the responsibility which is coast upon him by the Letters Patent his decision will be final. A Division Bench consisting of Mya Bu and Sharpe JJ. in Ma Lon and another v. Ma Mya May AIR 1939 Bang. A Division Bench consisting of Mya Bu and Sharpe JJ. in Ma Lon and another v. Ma Mya May AIR 1939 Bang. 59 made the following observations on the question of grant of leave for filing Letters Patent appeal: In the order of Dunkey J, granting a certificate under clause 13 of the Letters Patent in this appeal there is no indication as to the point or points on which the case was considered to deserve consideration in the Letters Patent Appeal. Therefore, the learned advocate for the appellants asked us to allow him to go into the evidence for the purpose of showing that the findings of facts (i. e, that execution of the deed by Daw Pon was not proved) arrived at by the learned Judge in his judgment on review were erroneous. For the purpose of disposing of this request, but without in any manner suggesting that in an order granting a certificate under clause 13 of the Letters Patent the point or points for consideration should always be indicated, I desire to point out that in my experience the practice of this Court is to grant such certificates only in cases in which doubtful questions of law or procedure exist which deserve reconsideration, and this practice is sound in principle in view of the fact that questions of fact cannot constitute valid grounds even of a second appeal under the Code. In the present case, :it is manifest that after a thorough reconsideration of the evidence on the record end coming to the same conclusion upon the question of execution of the deed of gift by Daw Pon us the trial Court, Dunkly J, cannot be regarded as having considered that a further consideration of the question of fact turning on the evidence was needed. In my opinion this proper principle to adopt is that, after two Courts have properly considered the evidence and come to a concurrent finding upon an issue of fact, it is not the function of the Court hearing a Letters Patent appeal to try the issue upon the evidence over again. A Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court consisting of Sir Gilbert Stone C. J. and Bose J. (as he then was) in Ganpatrao and others v. Sheikh Badar and Others 1939 NLJ 246 : AIR 1939 Nag. 193 : ILR 1941 Nag. A Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court consisting of Sir Gilbert Stone C. J. and Bose J. (as he then was) in Ganpatrao and others v. Sheikh Badar and Others 1939 NLJ 246 : AIR 1939 Nag. 193 : ILR 1941 Nag. 460 made the following observations:- This Letters Patent Appeal comes before us in rather unusual circumstances. The learned Judge who granted leave did not hear the appeal but refused to admit. As a rule one does not on motion hearing refuse to admit a second appeal unless one is satisfied that there is no case made out by the applicant. If one is so clearly satisfied as to refuse even to admit the appeal it is difficult to see how the learned Judge felt justified in granting leave to file a Letters Patent Appeal which leave is only given as a rule where there is a point of law of difficulty and importance about which the learned Judge entertains a doubt. Subsequently the same Division Bench in AIR 1943 23 (Nagpur) made still stronger observations regarding grant of leave for filing Letters Patent appeal too lightly. I can do no better than to reproduce the observations of the learned Judges;- We wish to add a word with regard to Letters Patent Appeals generally. Mr. Mangalmurti has given us a very clear and a very short argument and has thereby saved much of oar time. Nevertheless we think that it is not sufficiently appreciated that leave to appeal should not be lightly given. There has been a difference of opinion among the different High Courts as to the limits, and it is doubtless very difficult to lay down a herd and fast rule. It has been indicated in Bombay that leave should not be given unless the point in dispute is of great public importance or great private importance such as would justify an appeal to the Privy Council. It has been indicated in Madras that no hard and fast rule can be laid down but that there must be some limit is obvious from the fact that leave is required and from the further fact that no appeal lies from a refusal to grant leave. It has been indicated in Madras that no hard and fast rule can be laid down but that there must be some limit is obvious from the fact that leave is required and from the further fact that no appeal lies from a refusal to grant leave. We conceive that, although the Wadras view is the preferable view and although we think that it is impossible to lay down a hard and fast rule, leave should not be granted where the matter in dispute is trifling, however interesting it may be. Here the matter in dispute may, of course, be to the litigants important, and if the litigants are only poor enough we apprehend that a dispute about a rupee would be of great importance. But at the same time such a dispute should not go through four Courts; and we think that the remarks of the Civil Justice Committee relating to Revisions and the desirability of restricting litigation about small matters can be borne in mind in this connection equally in connection with Civil Revisions. There are many disputes, very important in the eyes of poor litigants, that the law, in its wisdom, says should not go through an indefinite number of Courts. We conceive for this reason:-that the more Courts you open to litigants the greater advantage you give to the man with a long purse. He can go on and until his opponent is brought to his knees, not by the strength of the rich man's case, but by the absence of money on the part of the poor litigant. Later on a Division Bench consisting of Mangalmurti and Deo JJ. in Salla v. Jainab Bi 1953 NLJ 497 : AIR 1953 Nag. 353 : ILR 1963 Nag. 932 made the following observations regarding the grant of leave by the learned single Judge. The Division Bench approved of the view of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Asarfi Mander and Others Vs. Karu Mander and Others, with the following observations:- An appeal lies under clause 10 of the Letters Patent only when 'the Judge who passed the Judgment declares that the ease is a fit one for appeal'. The Division Bench approved of the view of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Asarfi Mander and Others Vs. Karu Mander and Others, with the following observations:- An appeal lies under clause 10 of the Letters Patent only when 'the Judge who passed the Judgment declares that the ease is a fit one for appeal'. In Asarfi Mander v. Karu Mandir (3) Courtney Terrell C. J. observed:- I venture to think that 'leave to appeal' is given somewhat too lightly and without reference to the precise phrase of the Letters Patent that the Judge must certify that the case is a fit one for appeal. A certificate should not be granted merely on the ground that a point of law arises as might be the case in dealing with admissions of second appeals. The judgment in the instant case gives no indication of any apprehension by the learned Judge that his view of law might be mistaken or that the matter requires further consideration. He could not have granted leave because he decided a case not pleaded by the plaintiff. If his attention had been pointedly drawn to the plaint, the result of the appeal would have been different. The learned Chief Justice further observed : I venture to suggest that learned Judges in exercising the responsibility given to them by the Letters Patent of hearing appeals singly, might remember that it is only when a case presents some difficulty in which the Judge really feels that the matter before him requires further consideration by a larger Court that 'leave' should be granted. If a Judge decides the case with confidence that should be an indication that it is not a fit case for appeal, and if he accepts the responsibility which is cast upon him by the Letters Patent his decision will be final. We are in respectful agreement with these observations and are of the view that this was not a fit case in which leave should have been granted. We are in respectful agreement with these observations and are of the view that this was not a fit case in which leave should have been granted. In view of the principles indicated by the learned Judges constituting the Division Benches of the Patna, the Rangoon and the Nagpur High Courts, it would be too venture-some for a counsel to seek leave for filing Letters Patent appeal in a case of the present kind and it would be still more optimistic to expect this Court to grant such leave in a case, which does not involve a question of law; much less a substantial question of law on which a certificate is sought, particularly in view of the fact that the question is concluded by the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Privy Council, as also by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. This matter would not have received by anxious and careful consideration but for the fact that leave for filing Letters Patent appeal is sought as a matter of routine on several occasions by a party against whom a case happens to be decided. However, I can do no better that to emphasise the observations of the Division Benches of the different High Courts in this behalf. As a result, this application for permission to file Letters Patent appeal fails, and accordingly leave is refused. Final Result : Dismissed