JUDGMENT Jagadisan, J.- A writ of certiorari is prayed for in this petition. The prayer is to call for the records connected with the order in R.P. No. 130 of 1959-60, dated 3rd December, 1959 on the file of the Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax, Board of Revenue, Madras, and to quash the said order. The Commissioner passed the order in the purported exercise of his jurisdiction under the Madras Agricultural Income-tax Act, which we shall refer to as the Act in this judgment. The following is a brief summary of the events that culminated in the order. The petitioner is a company, registered under the Indian Companies Act, owning a tea estate and having its registered office at Sholayar, Coimbatore district. The Act was originally entitled “The Madras Plantation Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1955.” The change in title was introduced by the amendment Act of 1938 which came into force on 1st April, 1958. The petitioner became liable to tax under the Act for the assessment year 1955-56. The Act came into operation from 1st April, 1955. The petitioner was following the calendar year as the accounting year tor purposes of levy of income-tax. But for the assessment year 1955-1956 in respect of its agricultural income, it submitted accounts for the financial year and the result was that the accounting year, for its first assessment, was the year ending 31st March, 1955. In other words the petitioner was assessed to agricultural income-tax tor the assessment year 1955-1956 in respect of ‘the previous year 1st April, 1954 to 31st March, 1955. Thereafter, the subsequent assessments were, of course, based upon the financial year, which the petitioner had chosen as ‘the previous year. But we may point out even at this stage that it may not be correct to say that the petitioner opted for the financial year instead of the calendar year as under the provisions of the Act, to which we shall refer later, it is the assessee who chooses or adopts another period of twelve months like the calendar year. But we may point out even at this stage that it may not be correct to say that the petitioner opted for the financial year instead of the calendar year as under the provisions of the Act, to which we shall refer later, it is the assessee who chooses or adopts another period of twelve months like the calendar year. Finding it inconvenient and difficult to have two different ‘previous years’, one in respect of the Indian income-tax Act and the other for purposes of the Agricultural Income-tax Act, the petitioner who will be referred to as the assessee preferred an application to the commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax, Madras, on 30th April, 1959, praying that the Commissioner may determine ‘the previous year’ as a period of twelve months consisting of the calendar year. The reason set out by the petitioner in his petition for this change of the previous year from the financial year to the calendar year is thus set out: “That your petitioner submits that in view of the fact that the accounting year of the Company is the calendar year, it will be more convenient for the purpose of assessment under the Madras Plantations Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1955, if the petitioner is allowed to vary their ‘previous year’ from the 12 months ending March to the period ending December to bring it in conformity with the accounting year of the Company.” By order, dated 17th November, 1959, the Commissioner permitted the change but imposed certain conditions. The order was in these terms: “I therefore direct that for the assessment year 1959-1960 the income for the period of 12 months ending on 31st March, 1959, will be submitted, but for the assessment year 1960-61, the income for the period of 9 months from 1st April, 1959 to 31st December 1959 will be submitted. From assessment year 1961-62 onwards, the income for the period of 12 months ending on the 31st December preceding ( i.e., for each calendar year preceding) will be submitted. I hereby direct that the above orders may be given effect to by virtue of the powers given to me under section 2 (t) (ii) of the Madras Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1955.” This order is clearly unexceptionable. I hereby direct that the above orders may be given effect to by virtue of the powers given to me under section 2 (t) (ii) of the Madras Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1955.” This order is clearly unexceptionable. For the assessment year 1960-61 only a broken period of 9 months from 1st April, 1959 to 31st December, 1959, can be taken as the period of 1st January, 1959, to 31st March, 1959 is included in the assessment year 1959-60. For the assessment year 1961-62 naturally the calendar year of 1960.is wholly included. Needless to say, the assessee was satisfied with this order as what all he prayed for was only a change over from the financial year to the calendar year. This order did not fasten upon him any burden by way of tax for any additional period. But on 3rd December, 1959, the Commissioner passed a further order. It is now conceded that this order was issued by him suo motu. The Commissioner was of the opinion that further conditions should be imposed on the assessee before the change over can be effected. The relevant portions of this order are as follows:- “I consider that the following conditions should also be imposed on the petitioner before the change in the accounting year can be agreed to and in order that there may be no escape of income liable to tax. I direct that the following condition also be imposed before the change in the accounting year is given effect to. The company shall, while submitting its return for assessment year 1960-61, in addition to submitting the income for the period of 9 months from 1st April, 1959 to 31st December, 1959, also agree and submit for assessment in the assessment year 1960-61, the income derived during the three months period from 1st January, 1954 to 31st March, 1954, which period would have been included for the purpose of assessment year 1955-56, had the Company originally followed the calendar year for the purpose of Madras Plantations Agricultural Income-tax Act also. I hereby direct that the change in the accounting year may be accepted and recognised by the Agricultural Income-tax Officer, Coimbatore-1, if the Company accepts the conditions imposed by me in my order, dated 17th November, 1959 and in this order.” What provoked the subsequent order is reasonably clear. I hereby direct that the change in the accounting year may be accepted and recognised by the Agricultural Income-tax Officer, Coimbatore-1, if the Company accepts the conditions imposed by me in my order, dated 17th November, 1959 and in this order.” What provoked the subsequent order is reasonably clear. If the assessee had adopted the calendar year for the first assessment year 1955-56, he would have paid tax on the income of the calendar year 1954, that is 1st January, 1954 to 31st December, 1954. Actually, however, the petitioner having chosen the financial year as the previous year paid tax only for the twelve months commencing from 1st April, 1954 and ending with 31st March, 1955. According to the Commissioner the assessee gained an advantage by opting for the financial year in not having suffered tax for the three months commencing from 1st January, 1954 and ending with 31st March, 1954. In his view, the imposition of a condition upon the assessee compelling him to pay tax for that period, 1st January, 1954 to 31st March, 1954, would be proper and just if it is to have the benefit of a change from the financial year to the calendar year. It is not necessary for us, in the view which we propose to take, to examine the propriety or reasonableness of the further condition imposed by the Commissioner by his latter order, dated 3rd December, 1959. It is however fairly plain that the latter order modifies the terms of the previous order substantially and it can be legitimately said that the order, dated 3rd December, 1959, is one by way of review of the earlier order. It is however fairly plain that the latter order modifies the terms of the previous order substantially and it can be legitimately said that the order, dated 3rd December, 1959, is one by way of review of the earlier order. The definition of ‘previous year’ under the Act is contained in section 2 (t) which reads: “ ‘Previous year’ means- (i) the twelve months ending on the 31st day of March next preceding the year for which the assessment is to be made or, if the accounts of the assessee have been made upto a date within the said twelve months in respect of any year ending on any date other than the said 31st day of March, then, at the option of the assessee, the year ending on the day to which his accounts have so been made up: Provided that, if the option has once been exercised by an assessee, he shall not exercise it again so as to vary the meaning of the expression ‘previous year’ as then applicable to him except with the consent of the Agricultural Income-tax Officer and upon such conditions as he may think fit; or (ii) such period as may be determined by the Commissioner in the particular case of any person or class of persons.” As we have already pointed out, it cannot be said that the assessee opted for the financial year during his first assessment for the year 1955-56, as the rule is that the financial year is the “ previous year “, unless the assessee chooses another period of twelve months not ending with 31st of March, of any year. The assessee's present claim for a change was apparently not one under section 2 (0 (i) as an application under that provision could be made to the Agricultural Income-tax Officer. What the petitioner sought for at the hands of the Commissioner is the exercise of his power under section 2 (t) (ii). The assessee's present claim for a change was apparently not one under section 2 (0 (i) as an application under that provision could be made to the Agricultural Income-tax Officer. What the petitioner sought for at the hands of the Commissioner is the exercise of his power under section 2 (t) (ii). Learned counsel for the petitioner raised two contentions before us: (i) The Commissioner had no power to vary the terms of his first order, suo motu, as he had no inherent power of review ; nor has such a power been granted by the statute ; (ii) even if he had such a power he acted in violation of principles of natural justice in passing the order without notice to the petitioner and without hearing him and that therefore the order is bad. The learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the Commissioner submitted that the Commissioner's powers and duties in the matter of fixation of ‘the previous year’ were administrative and not quasi-judicial, and that there is no prohibition under the Act restraining the Commissioner from passing suitable and just orders from time to time. He further submitted that the rules of natural justice do not govern administrative actions like the one in question. We have to examine, first, the question whether the proceedings before the Commissioner were administrative or quasi-judicial in character. This is not a case relating to a decision of a body, on a lis between two contestants one opposing the other. A claim under the Act was put forward by the assessee and that was dealt with in a particular manner by the Commissioner, the statutory authority. Undoubtedly, the interests of the petitioner have been prejudicially affected by the impugned order. An assessment to tax under the Act is a quasi-judicial proceeding. It is a determination of a liability of a subject to tax in accordance with the statute ; and there can be no levy of tax except in accordance with law. In making the assessment the competent authority owes a duty to act judicially. Kunnathat Thathanni Moopilnari etc. v. State of Kerala1. The power of the taxing authority lies within the four corners of the Act and the power can be exercised only after due notice to the assessee and after hearing his objections to the proposed underlying tax laws in general and we assume that it is incontrovertible. Kunnathat Thathanni Moopilnari etc. v. State of Kerala1. The power of the taxing authority lies within the four corners of the Act and the power can be exercised only after due notice to the assessee and after hearing his objections to the proposed underlying tax laws in general and we assume that it is incontrovertible. Turning to the Act with which we are now concerned, it is obvious that the fixation of the ‘previous year’ is an essential sine qua non to assessment. What is brought to tax is only the income of ‘the previous year. ‘The structure of ‘the previous year’ is an integral part of the assessment from which it cannot be dissociated. The fact that the subject of the ‘previous year’ can be determined in an independent proceeding apart from the proceeding relating to computation of income would not, in our opinion, make the determination anytheless a limb of the assessment. If this is the true position, and we conceive it to be so, the Commissioner's function in this behalf is quasi-judicial in character. Citation of authorities on this topic is perhaps unnecessary. Few problems are more difficult, than to ascertain whether an act of a Tribunal or authority is administrative or quasi-judicial. There is no unfailing test to distinguish between the two kinds of acts. A “ lites inter partes ” is a fair indication of the functioning Tribunal being quasi-judicial. The obligation to hear the party or parties, and the duty to collate evidence, and apply any statute or rule and to arrive at a decision are elements in a quasi-judicial act and are foreign to the scope of an administrative act. The following statement of D. M. Gorden in 49 Law Quarterly Review at pages 107-108 commends itself to us as laying down the correct rule of distinction between the two: “Judicial Tribunals must treat legal rights and liabilities as pre-existing, because such Tribunals declare themselves bound by a fixed objective standard ; they profess not to confer rights or impose liabilities themselves, but only to do what is dictated by law. But administrative Tribunals, which act upon policy and expediency, themselves dictate what is politic and expedient; they are not concerned with pre-existing rights and liabilities, but themselves create the rights and liabilities that they enforce. But administrative Tribunals, which act upon policy and expediency, themselves dictate what is politic and expedient; they are not concerned with pre-existing rights and liabilities, but themselves create the rights and liabilities that they enforce. A judicial Tribunal looks from some law to guide it, an administrative Tribunal, within its province, is a law unto itself…….” In a recent decision reported in Board of High School and Intermediate Examn. U.P. v. Ghanshyam,2 the Supreme Court has laid down the test to distinguish an administrative act from a quasi-judicial act and it is enough to refer to the following observations of Wanchoo, J:- “The principles have been summarised by Das, J., (as he then was) at page 725 ( Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani3), in these words: The principles, as I apprehend them are: (i) that if a statute empowers an authority, not being a Court in the ordinary sense, to decide disputes arising out of a claim made by one party under the statute which claim is opposed by another party and to determine the respective rights of the contesting parties who are opposed to each other, there is a lis and prima facie and in the absence of anything in the statute to the contrary it is the duty of the authority to act judicially and the decision of the authority is a quasi-judicial act; and (ii) that if a statutory authority has power to do any act which will prejudicially affect the subject ,then, although there are not two parties apart from the authority and the contest is between the authority proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it, the final determination of the authority will yet be a quasi-judicial act provided the authority is required by the statute to act judicially….. The inference whether the authority acting under a statute where it is silent has the duty to act judicially will depend on the express provisions of the statute read along with the nature of the rights affected, the manner of the disposal provided, the objective criterion, if any to be adopted, the effect of the decision on the person affected and other indicia afforded by the statute. A duty to act judicially may arise in widely different circumstances which it will be impossible and indeed inadvisable to attempt to define exhaustively.” Applying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, we are clearly of opinion that the Commissioner exercised a quasi-judicial function in passing the impugned order. The duty cast upon him was under the taxing enactment and the order passed was one in relation to assessment of tax on a subject. In our judgement it is inconceivable that such an order can at all be characterised as administrative. Is the Commissioner competent to pass the order, dated 3rd December 1959 in supersession of his earlier ordere The answer to this question would depend upon his statutory powers which should be gathered only from the terms of the enactment. The learned Additional Government Pleader was unable to point out any provision under the Act or the Rules clothing the Commissioner with such a power He however, submitted that the Commissioner had an inherent power to vary his orders from time to time, provided he was acting in conformity with the provisions of the statute. The Commissioner is only a Tribunal under a special enactment and is of course not a Court. There is a specific provision under the Civil Procedure Code permitting reviews. section 114 and Order 47 of the Civil Procedure Code provide for review of orders of Court. Even the civil Courts can exercise the power of review only within the limits of these provisions and they have no inherent power, to pass orders by way of review in cases not falling within Order 47 rule 1. It is now settled law that a Tribunal, which is a creature of a statute, has no power to review its decision in the absence of specific provisions in the statute creating it. In David Nadar v. Manickavasaga Desika Ganasambandha Pandarasannathi1 a Division Bench of this Court held that the Collector has no power to review his own order refusing to interefere with an order passed by his subordinate confirming a sale for arrears of land revenue. In that case certain lands were sold for arrears of land revenue and were purchased by the plaintiff in the suit out of which arose the appeal to this Court. The sale was confirmed by the Deputy Collector and the plaintiff was put in possession. In that case certain lands were sold for arrears of land revenue and were purchased by the plaintiff in the suit out of which arose the appeal to this Court. The sale was confirmed by the Deputy Collector and the plaintiff was put in possession. Thereafter an application was made to the Collector to set aside the sale but the Collector declined to interfere. A review petition was then presented to the Collector and he passed an order cancelling the sale. The plaintiff filed a suit to recover possession of the lands purchased by him. The point for determination was whether the Collector after declining to interfere with the sale was entitled to review his own order. This Court held that he had no such power to review. David Nadar's case1, was followed by another Division Bench in Sundaram Iyengar v. Ramaswami Iyengar2. In Anantha Raju Shetty v. Appu Hegade3, the question arose whether the District Judge had power to review bis own order under section 10 of the Religious Endowments Act. It was held that a Court had no inherent power to review its own decision, unless it was passed without jurisdiction. Again David Nadar's case1, was followed. At page 164, Seshagiri Aiyar, J., observed thus: “The power to review must also be given by the Statute. prima facie a party who has obtained a decision is entitled to keep it unassailed, unless the Legislature has indicated the mode by which it can be set aside. A review is practically the hearing of an appeal by the same officer who decided the case. There is at least as good reason for saying that such power should not be exercised unless the statute gives it, as for saying that another Tribunal should not hear an appeal from the trial Court, unless such a power is given to it by statute.” The opinion of the learned Judge was that any decision of a Tribunal or Court becomes final unless a right of appeal therefrom or a right to review is specifically granted by any statute. Courtney Terrell, C.J., set out the correct legal position, if we may say so with respect, in the decision in Inder Manton v. Ramkishun4: “The ordinary principle which governs all Tribunals is that when once the Judges have signed and delivered their judgment they are functus officio and the only remedy of a person aggrieved by the judgment is to take the case to an appellate Tribunal, if an appeal is allowed by the law The provisions for review constitute an exception to the general rule which forbids a Judge from reversing or modifying his judgment when once the judgment has been pronounced and it being an exception to a general rule of principle it is only exercisable in circumstances where it is distinctly provided for by statute. No Court has any inherent power to modify judgments when once they have been pronounced subject always to this qualification that under specific rules the Court has inherent power to modify judgments and decrees to the extent of correcting merely clerical errors.” We may also refer to a decision of the Lahore High Court where a Division Bench consisting of Sir Shadilal, C.J., and Abdul Qudir, J., held that a Commissioner functioning under the Workmen's Compensation Act has no inherent power to review his previous decision. ( Karim Dad In re)1. In the light of the decisions referred to above, we have no hesitation in holding that the Commissioner had no power or jurisdiction to pass the order, dated 3rd December, 1959, purporting to be by way of imposition of further conditions on the assessee in addition to the conditions imposed by his order, dated 17th November, 1959, but in effect superseding and cancelling that order. The statute has not granted him such a power and we have held that he has no inherent power in this matter. It follows that the order of the Commissioner is wholly without jurisdiction and is null and void. The order of the Commissioner is also vitiated as it was passed behind the back of the petitioner. The Commissioner was bound to have issued notice directing the petitioner to show cause why the previous order should not be modified assuming he had cower to pass the subsequent order. The order of the Commissioner is also vitiated as it was passed behind the back of the petitioner. The Commissioner was bound to have issued notice directing the petitioner to show cause why the previous order should not be modified assuming he had cower to pass the subsequent order. This he failed to do and we would have quashed the order even on this ground alone if we had reached the conclusion that the Commissioner had the necessary power to pass the order. The Writ Petition is allowed. The rule nisi is made absolute. The respondent will pay the petitioner's costs ; Counsel's fee Rs. 150. V.S.-----Petition allowed.