JUDGMENT P.T. Raman Nayar, J. 1. The properties in dispute are the plots marked A, B, C, D and T in the Commissioner's plan Ext. C3, plot B and C being wet lands, plots A and D raised lands, pottas as they are called, and plot T, a tank. The appellants are in possession of these plots, the 1st appellant of plots A, D and T and the 2nd appellant of plots B and C under the leases Ext. B3 dated 5-2-1954 and Ext B2 dated 7-9-1949 from a landlord who had obtained delivery of the lands in execution of a decree for possession against his tenants and sub tenants. The 25th defendant in the suit (the 1st respondent herein) who had been impleaded on the averment that he was one of the sub tenants in possession took the decree in appeal claiming that he was entitled to fixity of tenure by reason of S.43 of the Malabar Tenancy Act. This appeal was allowed. The decree for possession was set aside. Thereupon the 25th defendant came with the present application for restitution under S.144, Civil Procedure Code and asked for delivery of the lands to him. That application has been allowed by the courts below and hence this second appeal. 2. Three grounds are urged on behalf of the appellants and all three are, as we shall presently see, untenable: (1) That the appellants are entitled to fixity by reason of S.21 read with S.43 of the Malabar Tenancy Act, (2) That the 25th defendant was not in possession of the entire land at the time of the decree or at the time of the delivery to the decree holder landlord and the burden lay on him to show that he was in possession at the relevant time, and (3) That in the event of delivery being ordered, the appellants should be paid compensation for the improvements effected by them and not left to remove the improvements if they so desire as the courts below have directed. 3. So far as the first ground is concerned it would indeed be a very strange result if a tenant for whose benefit S.43 of the Malabar Tenancy Act was enacted were to be deprived of that benefit by the simple expedient of a landlord who has obtained possession under a wrong decree, subsequently set aside, inducting other tenants on the property. (And, to proceed from the particular to the general, it would be equally strange if the right of a person, who has been dispossessed in execution of a wrong decree, to obtain restitution on the reversal of that decree, could be defeated by such an expedient). Nor does such a result follow from S.21 and 43 of the Malabar Tenancy Act, for, the two provisions read together make it clear that fixity, or, to put it otherwise, immunity from eviction, is given only to persons holding either directly, or through another person, under the person claiming eviction. It is no answer to a suit for eviction by one person to say that the defendant holds as a tenant under some other person and therefore has fixity. That cannot give the defendant fixity as against the plaintiff, and if such a suit fails it will be on account of the plaintiff's inability to prove his title, not because of any fixity acquired by the defendant. In this case the 1st appellant claims to be the holder of a kudiyiruppu, and the 2nd appellant a cultivating verumpattomdar, under the decree holder landlord; but the final decision in the suit was that the landlord was not entitled to possession as against the 25th defendant. It is only if the appellants can claim fixity under S.21 and 43 of the Malabar Tenancy Act as against the 25th defendant that they can succeed. That, as I have already shown, they cannot. Their claim is under a person who has been found to be not entitled to possession; and, since they are holders, subsequent to the wrong decree, under a person, the decree in whose favour has been reversed, on the very wording of S.144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, quite apart from any application of S.52 of the Transfer of Property Act, the appellants are bound to make restitution. 4. With regard to the second ground, it is to be noted that, in his application for restitution, the 25th defendant claimed that at the time of the delivery in favour of the landlord decree holder he (the 25th defendant) was in direct possession of the wet lands and was in possession of the pottas (including the tank) through two tenants of his. In his counter affidavit, the 1st appellant merely stated that the 25th defendant was not in possession of the entire property but made no attempt to specify which was the portion of which he was in possession and which the portion of which he was not in possession, while the 2nd appellant contended himself with the statement of law that the 25th defendant could not claim restitution of more than he originally had. The 25th defendant gave evidence to the effect that he was in possession of the p entire property at the time of the decree, as also at the time of the delivery in favour of the decree holder landlord, on the latter date through his tenants so far as the pottas were concerned. The title deeds Exts. A2 and A8 in respect of the pottas, and Exts. A4 and A5 in respect of the wet lands, prima facie support this claim and there is no evidence worth noticing to the contrary. The appellants have no case that the appeal against the decree was only in respect of a portion of the property, and, when on the appeal by the 25th defendant alone, the decree for possession was set aside in respect of the entire property (although only as against the 25th defendant) it is but reasonable to infer that the 25th defendant was in possession of the entire property. Else, the appeal would have been opposed on the ground that the 25th defendant was entitled to get a reversal of the decree only in respect of the property of which he was in possession. It is however not necessary to go into this matter at any great length, for, it would appear that, although the point was taken in the first court that the 25th defendant was not in possession of the entire property, no attempt was made before it to substantiate that, and, what is more, no such ground at all was taken in the appeal before the lower appellate court. The present attempt to resuscitate a ground which was abandoned before the courts below can scarcely be countenanced. 5. Coming to the third ground, the claim for compensation for improvements is based upon S.4 of Kerala Act 29 of 1958. The present attempt to resuscitate a ground which was abandoned before the courts below can scarcely be countenanced. 5. Coming to the third ground, the claim for compensation for improvements is based upon S.4 of Kerala Act 29 of 1958. But it seems to me that S.2(a) of the Act which says that, " 'eviction' means the recovery of possession of land from a tenant" and S.4 which says that, "every tenant shall, on eviction, be entitled to compensation for improvements made by him" necessarily imply that it is only a tenant of the person obtaining the eviction that is entitled to such compensation. In other words, A who is a tenant of B. cannot claim compensation in a suit for possession by X. In the present case the appellants can by no stretch of imagination be said to be tenants of the 25th defendant. The recovery of possession which the 25th defendant seeks is not from a tenant and is therefore not eviction within the meaning of S.2(a) of the Act. And hence, under S.4, no compensation is admissible. 6. It is said that the definition in S.2(d)(iii) serves to make the appellants tenants of the 25th defendant. But there is the concurrent finding of fact by the courts below that the so called improvements were effected by the appellants with full knowledge of the appeal filed by the 25th defendant with a view to harass the 25th defendant by making it more difficult for him to regain possession in the event of his success in the appeal. Therefore, the bona fide belief required by S.2(d)(iii) before a person who comes into possession of land belonging to another can be transmuted into a tenant is absent. 7. I dismiss the appeal with costs.