JUDGMENT M. S. Menon, C.J. 1. The plaintiff in O. S. No. 26 of 1956 of the court of the Subordinate Judge of Parur is the appellant before us. The suit was for setting aside a sale deed, Ext. P5 dated 15-6-1122, executed by the defendants in favour of the plaintiff and for the recovery of the amounts paid in pursuance of that document. 2. The lower court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to a cancellation of the sale deed and dismissed the suit. We entertain no doubt that the decision was right and has to be sustained. 3. The only reason alleged in support of the prayer for setting aside the sale was that the plaintiff's attention was not drawn to a prior encumbrance affecting three of the seven items of property sold by the defendants, items 2, 5 and 7 of the A schedule to Ext. P5. It is not disputed that there was such an encumbrance, a simple mortgage created on 16-2-1094, and that the simple mortgage had matured into a decree, the decree in O. S. No. 53 of 1098 of the District Court of Parur. 4. The sale deed itself provides for such a contingency and the provision is not that the plaintiff may get the sale deed set aside and the consideration refunded: but that he may sue for damages and enforce the charge specifically created on the properties specified in the B schedule to Ext. P5. The relevant words are: xxxxxx 5. No fraud has been proved. Counsel for the appellant does not contend that there was fraud and that it affects the transaction. In such a case we must bear in mind the distinction made by Lord Campbell and quoted in 11 QBD 255: "In the Court below the distinction between a bill for carrying into execution an executory contract and a bill to set aside a conveyance that had been executed has not been distinctly borne in mind; with regard to the first, if there be misrepresentation or concealment which is material to the purchaser a Court of Equity will not compel him to complete the purchase; but where the conveyance has been executed ...................... a Court of Equity will set aside the conveyance only on the ground of actual fraud: and there would be no safety for the transactions of mankind if, upon discovery being made at any distance of time of a material fact not disclosed to the purchaser of which the vendor had merely constructive notice, a conveyance which had been executed could be set aside." 6. In AIR 1926 Calcutta 385 Mukerji J. said : "The law is well settled that where the purchaser discovers defects in the property before conveyance he can either rescind the contract or successfully oppose a suit for specific performance. But if the purchaser discovers material defects after the conveyance he must make out a case of fraud in order to set aside a sale." The observation was adopted in AIR 1933 Lahore 262: "It has been held that when defect in vendor's title is discovered after the execution of a conveyance and there has been no 'fraud', the vendee cannot avoid the sale, but his remedy lies merely in a suit for damages." 7. It has been suggested that there was a mutual mistake. The Transfer of Property Act, 1882, did not obtain in Travancore; but the rule of caveat emptor did, and was being applied to sales of immovable property (37 TLR 209). In 31 TLJ 162 Sankara Subba Iyer, J. said: "Under S.20 of the Indian Contract Act, an agreement is void, where both the parties to it are under a mistake as to a matter of fact essential to the agreement. When the transaction has passed from the domain of the contract into one of conveyance, as in the case where a sale deed has been executed, it is on the footing of the conveyance that the rights and liabilities of the parties thereto have to be adjusted, notwithstanding the circumstance that there is always a contract which precedes a voluntary sale. The moment that there has been a conveyance, the antecedent contract ceases to have any force of its own, entitling the parties to say that the relationship brought about by the conveyance will have to be determined on the basis of the contract which preceded it."; "So far as this court is concerned, it has been consistently taking the view that no covenant for title is implied in a sale of immovable property and that the rule of caveat emptor holds good in such cases."; and "When the sale deed states that the vendor has full rights over the property sold and purports to convey these rights, it is immaterial whether the vendor knew that he had such rights or not, as it is the duty of the buyer under the rule of caveat emptor, to make enquiries and to satisfy himself about it. If he has failed to do it, it is not open to him to say that the seller was labouring under a mistake with regard to the extent of the rights which he had over the property acquired. In other words, when there has been a conveyance, the plea is not available to a vendee, bound by the rule of caveat emptor, that the vendor was labouring under a mistake regarding the quantum of his rights over the property conveyed." 8. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.