ORDER :- Cri. R. P. 250 of 1961 is filed by the second accused in Calendar Case 110 of 1960 on the file of the Additional First Class Magistrate, Ernakulam and Cr. R. P. 270 of 1961 is by the first accused. 2. The first accused was a clerk in Aspinwall Company (Private) Limited, Fort Cochin (hereinafter referred to as the Company). The second accused was a dealer supplying coir yarn to the company. The charge against the first accused was that on 22-4-58 he made a false entry of Rs. 371.25 instead of Rs. 123.75 for the value of one bale of coir yarn supplied by the second accused to the company; secondly that he made an entry of Rs. 77.18 against the correct amount of Rs. 74-91 being the skeining allowance; and thirdly that he made a false entry in the final statement of accounts of contract No. 24, that Rs. 1348.87 had been carried over to contract No. 13 which in fact was not done and thereby dishonestly induced the company to part with Rs. 1598.64 in favour of the second accused. The accused were tried by the Additional First Class Magistrate. The first accused was found guilty and convicted for the offence of cheating under S. 417 I. P. C., and also for falsification of accounts punishable under S. 477-A I. P. C. The second accused was convicted for abetment of the abovesaid offences. The appeals filed before the Sessions Judge of Ernakulam having proved unsuccessful, the accused have come up to this court in revision. These two revision petitions were heard together and as they arise out of the sane judgment, one common order is passed in respect of these two revision petitions. 3. A few facts have to be stated to understand the case. The first accused, as stated already, was a clerk in charge of the coir yarn purchase department in the company and the second accused was a dealer who used to supply coir yarn to the company. PW. 1 Thomas Kurian was the Executive Assistant of the company, P. W. 7 Mr. Hopkins was the general Manager and Pw. 9 Mr. Peacock was the manager of the coir yarn department. Since 1949 the first accused had been a clerk in the company. PW. 1 Thomas Kurian was the Executive Assistant of the company, P. W. 7 Mr. Hopkins was the general Manager and Pw. 9 Mr. Peacock was the manager of the coir yarn department. Since 1949 the first accused had been a clerk in the company. The second accused had executed several contracts for the supply of coir yarn in his own name as well as in the name of some others. When contracts are concluded the first accused gets the signature of the dealer in the contract forms. He maintains the coir yarn dealers' account book, and the details of the contract are entered in that book. In pursuance of the contract the dealer unloads the coir yarn. The yard clerk takes an estimate of the out-turn and enters in the register the net quantity less wastage. After initialling it, the register is passed on to Mr. Williams. He inspects the yarn, forms his own estimate and after making corrections, if any, sends it to the first accused. On that the first accused makes an advance payment to the dealer. He calculates the advance payment at the rate of Rs. 5/- less per candi, totals it up and prepares a katcha receipt initialling. He then enters all the details in the coir yarn dealers' account book. For the advance to be paid he prepares a cash voucher and initials it and after obtaining the dealer's initials he sends the katcha receipt, the dealers' account book and the cash voucher to either Pw. 1 or to Mr. Peacock. They are supposed to verify it and after their approval it is sent back to the first accused and cash payment is made to the dealer by the cashier. The yarn is then processed in the yard. For each katcha receipt, a pucca receipt is prepared at the yard. After the entire yarn relating to the contract is thus unloaded and processed a pucca receipt is sent to the first accused and on receipt of the same the first accused will consolidate tlig same and tabulate it as per the grade. 4. In the present case we are concerned with contract No. 24 of 1958. The name of the dealer shown in the contract is that of one K. N. Sanku. The contract Ex. P 1 is signed by the 2nd accused for and on behalf of the said K. N. Sanku. 4. In the present case we are concerned with contract No. 24 of 1958. The name of the dealer shown in the contract is that of one K. N. Sanku. The contract Ex. P 1 is signed by the 2nd accused for and on behalf of the said K. N. Sanku. The Katcha receipt Ex. P2 was issued for the yarn delivered in pursuance of the contract, the grade quantity etc., are mentioned in the katcha receipt. The left side portion of the receipt is filled up by the yarn clerk Pw. 6 Issac. The right side portion of the receipt is prepared by the first accused and below the receipt, there is an entry to the effect that it has been entered in the dealers' account book and the said endorsement is initialled by the first accused. The right half portion of Ex. P2 beginning from the heading 'estimated out-turn' has been prepared by him. Ex. P-2 is dated 10-2-58. On 15-2-58 some more yarn had been taken to the yard by the second accused in respect of which the katcha receipt Ex. P3 is issued. An advance amount of Rs. 3500/- had been paid to the second accused under the cash receipt Ex. P4. The said receipt was prepared by the first accused. The second accused signed it on behalf of K. N. Sanku and received the amount. A similar advance of Rs. 6500/- was paid to the second accused on 15-2-1958 under the cash receipt Ex. P5. The first accused has prepared the receipt and the 2nd accused has signed the receipt when the cash was paid to him. Ex. P7 is the pucca receipt prepared in the place of, the katcha receipt Ex. P2 and Ex. P8 is the pucca receipt prepared in the place of the katcha receipt Ex. P3. On the basis of the above receipts a final out-turn statement for contract No. 24 is prepared. Ex. P9 is that statement which was prepared by the first accused's assistant one Gopinathan. 5. Ex. P-10 is the coir yarn dealers's account register. On page 71 of that book we find the details of the contract No. 24. It is written in the name of K. N. Sanku and the particular entry is marked as Ex. P10 (a). Ex. P9 is that statement which was prepared by the first accused's assistant one Gopinathan. 5. Ex. P-10 is the coir yarn dealers's account register. On page 71 of that book we find the details of the contract No. 24. It is written in the name of K. N. Sanku and the particular entry is marked as Ex. P10 (a). The grade, quantity in bales rate per candy and the total value of the yarn supplied are entered therein. The first item relates to the supply of one bale of yarn which is in grade No. 41. The value noted against it is for receipts of one candy of yarn at the rate of Rs. 247.50. In the last column in respect of the first item, the total value of one bale of coir is shown as Rs. 371.25. Two bales make one candy. So for half of a candy the price shown is Rs. 371.25, whereas the actual value which ought to have been put is only Rs. 123.75. Thus an excess amount of Rs. 247-50 has been shown against the supply of coir yarn in grade No. 41. In view of the above excess amount, there is a rise in the skeining allowance which is shown as Rs. 77.18 whereas the actual skeining allowance ought to have been less by Rs. 2.27. The amount covered by Ex. P-10(a) has been finally settled on 224-58 and a copy of the account had been delivered to the second accused in the handwriting of the first accused. The original had been issued to the second accused and Ex. P-11 is the carbon copy of the same and it contains the signature of the second accused. Ex. P-11 and its original are in the hand-writing of the first accused. In Ex. P-10(a) as well as in Ex. P-11 an amount of Rs, 1348-87 shown as the balance due by the dealer is shown as transferred to contract No. 13. Contract No. 13 is at page 70 of Ex. P-10 and is marked as Ex. P-10 (a). That contract is also one executed by the second accused in the name of K. N. Sanku. We find from Ex. P-10 (b) that no such entry had been made towards the contract No. 13. Because of the false entries made under the contract Nos. 13 and 24 the company sustained a loss of Rs. P-10 (a). That contract is also one executed by the second accused in the name of K. N. Sanku. We find from Ex. P-10 (b) that no such entry had been made towards the contract No. 13. Because of the false entries made under the contract Nos. 13 and 24 the company sustained a loss of Rs. 1598.64 which consists of Rs. 1348.87 which was not carried forward to the account No. 13, Rs. 247.50 which was the excess amount entered into the account Ex. P-10 (a) as the first item as against the supply of 41 grade coir yarn and Rs. 2.27 being the excess skeining allowance. Contract No. 13 had also been settled on 22-4-58. That account shows that a balance of Rs. 698.16 was payable to the second accused under contract No. 13 and an endorsement is made that the amount is carried forward to contract No. 115. The details of contract No. 115 are found at pages 74 and 76. 6. In February 1959 the loss was detected when the accounts were scrutinized. A departmental enquiry was conducted against the first accused on 19-2-59. The first accu'sed gave a statement Ex. P-16 before P.W. 9 who conducted the enquiry. On 24-2-59 another statement Ex. P-17 was given by the first accused. On 20-2-59 the first accused was placed under suspension and on 26-2-59 he was dismissed from service. P.W. 7 the General Manager of the company has given evidence that a show.cause notice was issued to the first accused and Exs. P-26 and P-27 are the explanations given by him. P.W. 8 who is an Assistant of 'Fraser and Ross', Chartered Accountants, Madras conducted a special audit of the dealers' accounts of the company and on the basis of the audit report P.W. 7 Hopkins sent a complaint Ex. P-28 to the Circle Inspector of Police, Mattancherry. A case was registered by P.W. 10 the Sub-Inspector of Police. On 13-3-1959 the first accused was arrested. The second accused surrendered before the District Magistrate and was released on ball. 7. When questioned under S. 342, Cr. P. C., the first accused admitted having written and initialled all the relevant entries. When specifically questioned he also admitted that the price of one bale entered by him was Rs. 371.75 instead of Rs. The second accused surrendered before the District Magistrate and was released on ball. 7. When questioned under S. 342, Cr. P. C., the first accused admitted having written and initialled all the relevant entries. When specifically questioned he also admitted that the price of one bale entered by him was Rs. 371.75 instead of Rs. 123.75, but he stated that he did not wilfully make these wrong entries and it was only a clerical error. He stated that he had entered that the balance amount due was transferred to contract No. 13, but it was not done due to oversight. Regarding the statements given by him at the enquiry he stated that they are not voluntary statements. The second accused admitted that he was the person who conducted the business on behalf of K. N. Sanku and that he had accepted the payments under these contracts for and on behalf of Sanku. He would have it that he had not either abetted or instigated the first accused in the commission of any offences. 8. An argument has been raised that there has been misjoinder of charges and that on that account the whole trial is vitiated. According to the defence offences in respect of three different items of cheating cannot be clubbed together with the offence of falsification of accounts. The prosecution case is that in collusion with the second accused the first accused had cheated the company by showing higher amounts as due to the second accused and helped him in drawing such inflated amounts and thereby they had committed the offence of cheating and falsification of accounts. It will thus be seen that these series of acts are so connected together as to form part of the same transaction and when more offences are committed by the same person he could be charged with and tried at one trial for every such offences. Under S. 239, Cri. P. C., persons accused of different offences committed in the course of the same transaction and the persons accused of abetment of the offence could all be tried together. No objection can, therefore, be taken to the charges framed by the Court. Under S. 239, Cri. P. C., persons accused of different offences committed in the course of the same transaction and the persons accused of abetment of the offence could all be tried together. No objection can, therefore, be taken to the charges framed by the Court. Even otherwise under S. 537 (b) no finding, sentence or order shall be reversed or altered on appeal or revision of account of any error, omission or irregularity in the charge including any misjoinder of charges, unless such error has in fact occasioned a failure of justice. The learned counsel for the accused has not been able to satisfy me that the accused had, in any way, when prejudiced in the conduct of his defence or that any failure of justice had been occasioned. 9. Coming to the question of the guilt of the accused, I shall take up the case of each of the accused separately. As far as the first accused is concerned, that incorrect entries had been made leading to the loss of money to the company has not been disputed. The only question that would arise for decision is whether the plea put forward by the first accused that the false entries admittedly made by him were accidental and unintentional or whether they were done by design with the full knowledge that he was helping the second accused and causing wrongful loss to the company. To negative the case of the first accused that the entries were not accidental but were intentional the prosecution has proved certain other similar entries made by the first accused in respect of the accounts of the second accused. P.W. 8 an assistant of Fraser and Ross, Chartered Accountants, Madras who conducted the special audit of the dealers' accounts of the company has presented a report Ex. P-29. He has given evidence that he had gone through the accounts closely and he has given 9 instances in respect of the contracts in the name of the second accused, K. N. Sanku and K. Krishnan where the quantitative figures in the dealers' accounts book had been inflated and an excess amount of Rs. 14,968.71 was paid by the company. He has given evidence that he had gone through the accounts closely and he has given 9 instances in respect of the contracts in the name of the second accused, K. N. Sanku and K. Krishnan where the quantitative figures in the dealers' accounts book had been inflated and an excess amount of Rs. 14,968.71 was paid by the company. The learned Magistrate in paragraph 30 of the judgment has referred to these entries as follows : "In contract No. 231, in the name of A2, 2 bales have been recorded as 12 bales, in the dealers' account book, thereby resulting in an excess credit of Rs. 1150/- and a single skeining allowance of Rs. 10.25. In contract No. 78 in the name of K. N. Sanku, 9 bales received has been recorded as 19 bales thereby resulting in an excess credit of Rs. 1075/- and a single skeining allowance of Rs. 9.50. In contract No. 230 in the name of A2, the first landing of 46 bales received has been taken as 56 bales, resulting in an excess credit of Rs. 1,487.50. In the same contract another 30 bales received has been taken as 46 bales, resulting in an excess credit of Rs. 2,300/-. Again in the same contract, 10 bales have been taken as 14 bales, and the excess credit given has amounted to Rs. 565/-. In the same contract at another landing 10 bales have teen taken as 15 bales and this has resulted in an excess credit of Rs. 693.75. Single skeining allowance of all these landings, was in excess by Rs. 45.05. In contract No. 101, in the name of A2, 11 bales, have been taken as 21 bales, thereby resulting in an excess credit of Rs. 1,275/-. Single skeining allowance of that also is over-stated by Rs. 11.39. In contract No. 282 in the name of K. Krishnan, 7 bales received have been taken as 17 bales and this has resulted in an excess credit of Rs. 1,325/-. In contract No. 156, in the name of K. Krishnan, nothing has been received, but yet a credit of Rs. 6346.16 has been given to him in respect of 50 bales. In contract No. 130, in .the name of A-2, the quantity received is 12 bales, that is taken as 11 bales in the dealers' account book, resulting in a short credit of Rs. 128.75. 6346.16 has been given to him in respect of 50 bales. In contract No. 130, in .the name of A-2, the quantity received is 12 bales, that is taken as 11 bales in the dealers' account book, resulting in a short credit of Rs. 128.75. The witness says that so far as the errors in, recording quantities are concerned there were such errors only in contracts which are mentioned in schedule No. 2 which have been dealt with by A2. The witness further deposes to 2 instances of adjustments. In contract No. 13, the total number of bales comes to 54. That seems to have been altered to 44, after making some sort of an erasure therein. If it is totalled as 54, the stocks may not agree with the stock list taken at the end of the year. This 54 is therefore adjusted as 44. Another adjustment made is in respect of contract No. 231, wherein two bales received are taken as 12 bales. Thus in contract No. 231, the accused Al seems to have made an adjustment by 10, the shortage in contract No. 13, the value being the same. In contract No. 230, in the name of A2, the total quantity received comes to 96 bales, but the payment has been made for 141 bales, the excess in quantity being 35 bales. This had been adjusted in contract No. 27 of one Uthaman. Therein the total bales received is 190. That seems to have been altered and taken as 155. Here also there seems to be some erasure. The value remains unaltered, but the quantity has been adjusted." 10. The learned counsel for the first accused has argued that this evidence is inadmissible and ought not to have been considered in coming to the conclusion about the proof of these specific charges. Here also there seems to be some erasure. The value remains unaltered, but the quantity has been adjusted." 10. The learned counsel for the first accused has argued that this evidence is inadmissible and ought not to have been considered in coming to the conclusion about the proof of these specific charges. Section 15 of the Evidence Act reads as follows : "When there is a question whether an act was accidental or intentional, or done with a particular knowledge or intention, the fact that such act formed part of a series of similar occurrences, in each of which the person doing the act was concerned, is relevant." Under S. 15 of the Evidence Act the prosecution may adduce evidence of criminal acts other than those charged without waiting for the accused to set up the specific defence calling for rebuttal and defence of similar acts to show intention. When the act in question forms part of a series of similar occurrences, evidence of similar facts is admissible to prove intention or knowledge of the person and to rebut the defence of accident, mistake etc. The principle on which evidence of similar acts is admissible is not to show that because the defendant has committed one crime, he would therefore be likely to commit another, but to establish the animus of the act, and rebut by anticipation, the defences of ignorance, accident, mistake or other innocent states of mind. 11. In Makin v. A. G. for New South Wales, 1894 AC 57, Lord Herschell stated the law on the subject with great lucidity and two principles were laid down : "(1) It is undoubtedly not competent for the prosecution to adduce evidence tending to show that the accused has been guilty of criminal acts other than those covered by the indictment, for the purpose of leading to the conclusion that the accused is a person likely from his criminal conduct or character, to have 'committed the offence for which he is being tried. (2) On the other hand, the mere fact that the evidence adduced tends to show the commission of other crimes, does not render it inadmissible if it be relevant to an issue before the jury, and it may he so relevant if it bears upon the question whether the acts alleged to constitute the crime charged in the indictment were designed or accidental or to rebut a defence which would otherwise be open to the accused." The principles laid down in the above case were re-affirmed in a later case. In Srinivasmall v. Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 135, on a charge of having sold an article at a price exceeding the controlled price and of abetment, evidence of similar sales to other persons shortly before or after the period covered by the charge was held admissible Under S. 14 to prove the intention. Archbold in his Criminal Pleadings (30th Ed. p. 366) has stated that : "Where the gist of the alleged offence is fraud, intent is material, and evidence of other similar offences is admissible to prove intent." 12. It, therefore, follows that the evidence in respect of other entries made by the first accused in the dealers' account pertaining to the 2nd accused is admissible. It would throw a flood of light on the working of the mind of the first accused and would falsify the case put forward by him that the discrepancy was due to a pure clerical mistake. No such mistake is seen to have been committed in the account of any other dealer and the mistake has resulted in large sums of money being paid over by the company to the 2nd accused. The first accused is a responsible servant of the company, who had been there from 1949 onwards and Pws. 1, 7 and 9 had placed implicit trust in him. Their's was only a cursory glance of the accounts fully trusting that the first accused would have done his duty trustfully. It is only because they trusted the correctness of the account put up before them by the first accused that they happened to pass the accounts allowing the second accused to draw the amounts. There can be, therefore, no doubt that the first accused is guilty of cheating and of falsification of the accounts. 13. The prosecution has also proved the statements of the first accused given in the enquiry. Ex. There can be, therefore, no doubt that the first accused is guilty of cheating and of falsification of the accounts. 13. The prosecution has also proved the statements of the first accused given in the enquiry. Ex. P-31 are the answers given by the first accused at the enquiry. The first accused has admitted therein that the second accused had approached him for loans and it was with a view to help him that he had made such false entries in the account. An argument was raised that the statements are hit by S. 24 of the Evidence Act. No circumstances are elicited from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that there had been any inducement or threat or that the first accused had been made to believe that he would gain an advantage by making the confession. Pw. 7 has given clear evidence that the statement was voluntary and I agree with the Courts below that the statement had been voluntarily made. The conviction of the first accused is, therefore, unassailable and has only to be confirmed. 14. Coming to the second accused the charge against him was that he abetted the first accused in the commission of the abovesaid offences. A person is said to abet the doing of a thing when he instigates any person to do that thing or engages with one or more persons in a conspiracy or intentionally aids by any act or illegal omission the doing of that thing. There is no evidence to prove that he instigated the first accused to commit the offence or that he engaged with him in any conspiracy for doing so or that he intentionally aided the commission of the offence. It is true that the person who stood benefited by the falsification of accounts is the second accused and that probably would be strong ground for suspicion that he is also privy to the crime, but in the absence of any evidence either direct or circumstantial from which an inference could be made, the charge of abetment cannot be made out. The Courts below had made use of the confessional statement of the first accused against the second accused. Under S. 30 of the Evidence Act the Court may take into consideration such confession not only against the maker but against any other person who has been tried along with him. The Courts below had made use of the confessional statement of the first accused against the second accused. Under S. 30 of the Evidence Act the Court may take into consideration such confession not only against the maker but against any other person who has been tried along with him. The confession under S. 30 cannot take the place of evidence against the co-accused or supplement evidence otherwise insufficient. The section only means where there is evidence against the co-accused sufficient, if believed, to support his conviction then the kind of confession described in S. 30 may be thrown into the scale as an additional reason for believing that evidence. It is only if there is substantive evidence against the accused and there is some lingering doubt that the confession of a co-accused may be taken into account to set the doubt at rest. Here in this case beyond the confession of the first accused there is no other evidence to fasten the guilt on the second accused. The learned Public Prosecutor fairly conceded that even though there might be suspicion, there is not enough legal evidence to sustain the conviction of the second accused. In the result the conviction and sentence passed on the first accused is confirmed and his revision petition is dismissed. The conviction and sentence passed on the second accused is set aside and his revision petition is allowed. His bail bond will stand cancelled. Order accordingly.