Judgment :- 1. Two questions have been referred to the Division Bench by the Single Judge who heard the appealsand they are: (1) Whether Exts. B and C have been admitted in evidence within the meaning of S.38 of the Travancore-Cochin Stamp Act (Act I of 1125) and whether that section precludes the defendant from questioning the admission of those documents. (2) If the first question is answered in the negative, whether the suit on the original causes of action is maintainable. 2. The promissory notes have admittedly been marked as Exts. B & C. We find that they have been so marked when the defendant was being cross-examined on 5th July 1956. The learned judge has initialled and has also dated the documents apart from marking them as Exts. B and C. The plaintiff, when he was examined as pw.1, referred to these documents as Exts. B & G and identified them as the two promissory notes executed in his favour by the defendant. It appears to us that the documents have thus become part of the evidence in the case. 3. But it is contended by counsel for the appellant in A. S. No. 587 of 1938 (the defendant in the case) that there is no endorsement in the documents "admitted in evidence" as enjoined by clause (d) of sub-rule (1) of E. 4 of O. XIII of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is also urged that this is a case of the judge marking the documents by inadvertence or by mistake without applying his mind to the questions involved, for, the appellant had already specifically raised the question of the inadmissibility of the documents in his written statement and an issue had also been framed in the case on this contention. 4. Dealing with the first question raised, it is clear from the wording of R.4 of O. XIII that the endorsement on the document is made after the document is admitted in evidence. Though there is no endorsement "admitted in evidence" on the documents, it is not possible to say that the documents have not been admitted in evidence. Lack of an endorsement that the document has been admitted in evidence is certainly a violation of R.4 of O. XIII but is not conclusive on the question whether the document has been admitted in evidence. Lack of an endorsement that the document has been admitted in evidence is certainly a violation of R.4 of O. XIII but is not conclusive on the question whether the document has been admitted in evidence. We had occasion to deal with a similar question in a decision reported in Ettuthara Warrier v. Kochunarayana Menon 1962 K.LT. 228. Following the Privy Council decision in Ma Pwa May v. S. R. M. M. A. Chettiar Firm AIR. 1929 P. C. 279, we then said: "The expression 'admitted in evidence' means 'let in as part of the evidence'." We have no hesitation in saying that Exts. B and G have been let in as part of the evidence in this case. 5. Passing on to the second point, we do not think that the fact that the appellant had raised the contention in his written statement that the documents are inadmissible in evidence and that an issue had been raised in the case would affect the conclusion that we have reached. The Supreme Court had to consider a similar point in the decision reported in Javar Chand v. Pukhraj Surana AIR. 1961 SC. 1655. In that case also, the contention had been raised by the defendant that the hundis in question were not admissible in evidence and an issue had also been framed on that contention. Nevertheless the documents were marked. The Supreme Court observed: "Parties to a litigation, where such a controversy is raised have to be circumspect and the party challenging the admissibility of the document has to be alert to see that the document is not admitted in evidence." The documents in that case having been admitted, it was held that it was not open to the defendants to challenge the admission. In that ease, there was an endorsement on the documents "admitted in evidence". We do not think that the decision of the case turned on that endorsement. We have already said that the omission to make such an endorsement is not conclusive of the question whether the documents have been admitted in evidence or not. On the facts & in the circumstances of this case, we hold that Exts. B & G have been admitted in evidence. 6. We have already said that the omission to make such an endorsement is not conclusive of the question whether the documents have been admitted in evidence or not. On the facts & in the circumstances of this case, we hold that Exts. B & G have been admitted in evidence. 6. Counsel for the appellant in A. S. No. 587 of 1958 invited our attention to two decisions, one of the Travancore-Cochin High Court reported in Noohu Kannu Asan v. The Travancore Forward Bank Ltd., 1956 KLT. 203 and the other of the Kerala High Court in Ahmed Pillai Meera Sahib v. Sankaran Madhavan 1957 KLT. 429. In both these cases, it was held that the documents were not admitted in evidence. In the earlier case, it is seen that the documents were marked in an interlocutory proceeding. In the latter, it was observed that the marking was without any judicial consideration. The decision of the Allahabad High Court in Lodhi v. Ziaul Haq AIR. 1939 All. 588 was distinguished. We followed this Allahabad decision in Ettuthara Warrier v. Kochunarayana Menon 1962 KLT. £28 and observed: "To hold as the respondent wants us to do that a document should not be considered as having been admitted in evidence unless the court has applied its mind to the question of admissibility from the point of view of the stamp law will involve an addition to the section of the words "after judicially considering the question of sufficiency of stamp" after the words "admitted in evidence". AIR. 1939 Allahabad 588." 7. In the light of the above, we find that the appellant is precluded by S.38 of the Travancore-Cochin Stamp Act from questioning the admission of Exts. B and C. 8. The learned Single Judge has found all the other questions arising for decision in these appeals and in the view we have taken on question No.1 it is. unnecessary to consider question No. 2 referred to us. 9. In the result, appeal, A. S. No. 587 of 1958, has to be dismissed and appeal, A. S. No. 588 of 1958, allowed and the suit decreed as prayed for. We order accordingly. The parties will bear their costs in both these appeals.