Judgment :- 1. The main question in this Civil Revision Petition is whether the petitioner's acceptance of the compensation amount awarded by the Telegraph Authority under proviso (d) to S.10 of the Telegraph Act without protest at the time of such receipt would disentitle him from making an application before the District Judge under S.16 (3) disputing the sufficiency of the compensation. The lower court is of opinion that the receipt of the compensation without at least a protest is a bar to the application. 2. The argument of the learned advocate of the Electricity Board, the respondent before me, is two-fold. Firstly, he contends that the principle embodied in the second proviso to S.31 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act should be applied to a petition under S.16 (3) of the Telegraph Act. For the reasons I shall give hereinafter I am not inclined to accept this contention. 3. Under the Land Acquisition Act a complete scheme or code of procedure is laid down conferring powers on the Collector to enquire into measurements, value and claims and also to grant an award after such enquiry. The persons interested are given notice and are entitled to make their objections and the Collector is bound to hear and decide those objections. The Collector has then to make an award, which shall be filed in his office, and that award shall be final and conclusive, but for certain exceptions. Thereafter, any person interested who has not accepted the award is given the right to apply in writing to the Collector requiring that the matter may be referred for the determination of the Court. After making such detailed provisions regarding the enquiry and reference by the Collector, the first two provisos to S.31 (2) lay down that any person may receive such compensation under protest and that no person who has received the amount otherwise than under protest shall be entitled to make an application to the Collector requiring him to refer the matter to the Court. 4. 4. Under the Telegraph Act, proviso (d) to S.10 merely lays down that in the exercise of the powers conferred on the Telegraph Authority by the section, he shall do as little damage as possible, and when he has exercised those powers in respect of any property, shall pay full compensation to all persons interested for any damage sustained by them by reason of the exercise of such powers. Strictly speaking, no procedure is laid down under this section for hearing objections or for deciding disputes. It may even be argued that the Telegraph Authority is not bound to hear any objection by any person interested. Thus, in the absence of any procedure for the Telegraph Authority to hear objections and fix the compensation, it will be inequitable (and there is no warrant for it either) to apply the provisions of the provisos to S.31 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act so as to deprive a party interested of his right under S.16 (3) to apply before the District Judge. 5. The second contention of the learned advocate of the Board is that even in S.16 (3) there is sufficient indication that the dispute must have arisen before the Telegraph Authority, that is, earlier than the application under that sub-section before the District Judge. He points out that the wording of S.16 (3) is that 'if any dispute arises concerning the sufficiency of the compensation to be paid under S.10, clause (d).' He lays stress on the expression 'to be paid', by which he means that the compensation contemplated under that sub-section is not the compensation actually paid, but it is the compensation that is to be paid in the future. Basing on this he develops his argument that the dispute regarding such amount to be paid in the future must have arisen earlier and that it could therefore have only been before the Telegraph Authority. The expression 'to be paid' need not necessarily mean that the amount is to be paid in the future. The expression may as well mean the compensation 'payable' under S.10, clause (d). The expression 'to be paid' need not necessarily mean that the amount is to be paid in the future. The expression may as well mean the compensation 'payable' under S.10, clause (d). If in a case where the compensation given by the Telegraph Authority has been accepted without any protest and from the circumstances of the case, for example the long delay in moving the Court or such other factors, the Court comes to the conclusion that the person interested did not dispute regarding the sufficiency of the compensation and the application was only an after-thought or that he waived his right, the Court may disallow the application under S.16 (3). But, to lay down a general proposition that by the acceptance of the compensation amount without protect the person loses his right of filing the application under S.16 (3) is not warranted by the provisions of the Telegraph Act. It may also be remembered in this connection that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not to be readily inferred; but such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or at least clearly implied, (vide Secretary of State v. Mask & Co., AIR. 1940 P. C. 105). 6. In this view, I hold that the opinion of the learned District Judge that the petition is not maintainable is erroneous. The petitioner will file a valuation statement and the case will be posted for further consideration thereafter. Allowed.