Judgment P.B.Gajendragadkar, J. (1) THIS appeal by special leave aries oat of an industiral dispate .between the Appellant Hamdard Dawakhana Wakf and the respondents, its workmen. On 20/04/1961 the Chief Commissioner, Delhi, referred two items of dispute between the parties to the adjundication of the industiral tribunal at New Delhi. These items were in regard to the claim for additional bonna made by the respondents for the year 1969 and in regard to the grievance made by them in respect of the diamissal of Shamsul Zaman. The tribunal haa ordered that the appellant abonid pay to each and every workman of the Hamdard Dawakbana who worked In the calendar year 1959 additional bonaa equivalent to the one-third of his earninga by way of basic wagea for the said year. It haa also held that the order of dismissal passed against Shamaal Zaman was unjustified and so. It has directed the appellant to reinstate him in service without break In the continuity of his service. Back-wages daring the period of hia dlamlaal have, however, not been allowed to the workman. In the present appeal, the appellant ohallenges the correctness and propriety of both the directions given by the award. (2) HAMDARD Dawakbana, the appellant, was originally established in a modest way in 1906 by Hakim Haflz Abdal Majld. It was then manufacturing and selling Indigenous _taiple and compound medicines. On the death of Hakim Haflz Abdul Majld, his heirs conducted the aald business till 1948. On or about 28 Auguat 1948, the aald heirs and successors settled the said business with all its assets, goodwill, etc., including the trade marks, on an Irrevocable wakf with the object that the income from the said trust should be utilized for the advancement, reform and development of the indegenous system of medicine and for affording medical, educa tion and social relief to deserving people In the country. (3) UNDER the terms of the wakf, the business is to be managed by at least one and no more than two mutawallis Provision is made for the remuneratlon of the said mutawallis. The said remuneration la in addition to the " khandani " income. These mutawallis have to be appointed from the heira and successors of the settlors. The net profits of the appellant are determined under Cl. The said remuneration la in addition to the " khandani " income. These mutawallis have to be appointed from the heira and successors of the settlors. The net profits of the appellant are determined under Cl. 83 of the wakfnama , the terms and conditlons of the wakf require that the appellant should set apart oneeight of the net profits towards the reserve fund; one-fourth of the balance la to be apent for the personal and family benefit of the aettlora-It la called khawbanl income; the balance of three-fourths ie to be apent on objects of charity and general and public utility as well as for the Individual and collective needs of the community and the country. (4) IT appears that in or about 1968, the appellant framed a scheme for the payment of bonus to Its employees, and in acoordance with the aald acheme, about Ra. 70,000.00 have been paid by the appellant to the respondents for the relevant year. The respondents, however, urged that the appellant was as industry within the meaning of the industrial Disputes Act and that under the full bench formula they were entitled to much larger amount of bonus for the relevant year. That la bow the dispate about the bonaa arose between the parties. (5) IN deciding this dispute, the tribunal has applied the full bench formula, baa made deductions In respect of four prior charges and baa held that the available surplus for the relevant year Is Ra. 6,12,600. Out of this available surplus. It baa ordered that a lakh of rupees should be paid by the appellant to the reapondenta by way of additional bonus. In other words, the tribanal thought that the total amount of bonue to which the respondents were entitled waa Rs. 1,70,000.00. (6) ON behalf of the appellant, the leaned Solloltor-General contended that the trbunal waa In error in awarding to the appeliant by way of prior charge Ra. 68,000.00 only under the heading "Incometax" for the relevant year. In other words, the tribanal thought that the total amount of bonue to which the respondents were entitled waa Rs. 1,70,000.00. (6) ON behalf of the appellant, the leaned Solloltor-General contended that the trbunal waa In error in awarding to the appeliant by way of prior charge Ra. 68,000.00 only under the heading "Incometax" for the relevant year. He contends that the amount of Ra, 68,000.00 thus allowed la in reapeot of the income of the appellant which la actually taxable; a part of the Income la not taxable because it has been dedicated to charity, and BO, It is urged that in the notional working of the formula, the appellant la entitled to claim by way of Incometax an amount which would normally have been taxable in respect of the whole of the taxable profits earned by the appellant. The fact that a part of the profits would not be taxed la irrelevant for the parpose of the formula. This point was, however, not raised before the tribunal and we do not think It would be right to allow this point to beraised for the first time la appeal: as the tribunal has pointed out, the amount of Rs. 68,000.00 haa been allowed by It because that is the amount which the appellant claimed In that behalf before the tribunal. The statement filed by the appellant shows that this was the amount to which the appellant made a olalm by way of Inoometax. The learned solicitor-General has invited our attention to the fact that In the petition for special leave It baa been urged under Para. II that the tribunal did not consider the position with regard to the tax on the quaml Income and that a sum of Rs. 6,20,000.00 abould have been allowed under that Item as a prior charge. No doubt, It was sought to be suggested that this point bad been argued before the tribunal and bad not been considered by It. We do not think that this suggeatlon is well founded. The award of the tribunal clearly shows that in respect of the amount of In" cometax claimable by the appellant, there was no dispute between the parties; the appellant claimed a specific amount of Re. 68,000.00 and the respondents, agreed to It. That is why the tribunal baa allowed the said Item without discussing any other aspect of the matter. The award of the tribunal clearly shows that in respect of the amount of In" cometax claimable by the appellant, there was no dispute between the parties; the appellant claimed a specific amount of Re. 68,000.00 and the respondents, agreed to It. That is why the tribunal baa allowed the said Item without discussing any other aspect of the matter. Therefore, we do not think the appellant can in fairness be allowed to take this new point which was not agitated before the tribunal, BO far as bonus for 1969 is concerned. (7) THE next contention is in respect of the notional normal depreolatlon. The tribunal IMM allowed ond®r tlw Item of depreciation an amount of B®. 1,06,785, whereas the Mtlonal normal depreolatlon under the Incometax Act would be Rs. 22,867.00. The tribunal thought that sinoe the former (110096 IMM) bea Brown be the appellant Its profit and loss account. It abonid not be permitted to olalm any higher amount by way of depreolatlon. It haa alao observed that there waa no satisfactrory proof of the fact that the amount of notional normal depreolatlon would be of the order of Rs. 2,22,867.00. In our opinion, both the reasons given by the tribunal are not well-fouded, It la well aettled that In making the calculatlons under the Pull bench formula, what industrial adjudication has to take into account la the notional normal depreolatlon and not the actual depreolatlon. In the profit and loas account. It la the actual depreciation that would be ahown and not the notional normal depreolatlon and so, the fact that the former depreolatlon has been shown In the profit and loas aooonnt cannot be held to be a factor against the appellant, inregard to the finding of the tribunal that there was no satisfactory proof about this notional depreciation. It appears that the tribunals attention was not drawn do the evidence on this point. Rashid Ahmed who is the accountant of the appellant produced Bxe. M. 10 to M. 14. Exhibit M. 12 deals with the figures of depreolatlon. Rasbid Abrnad stated that he had got the said exhibits prepared on the basis of the accounts and be added that the depreolatlon bad been calculated according to the Inoometax Act, Thia statement 6 not been challenged In cross-examinatlon. Therefore, It Is not right to say that tiM calculation about depreolatlon bad not been proved satisfactorily. Rasbid Abrnad stated that he had got the said exhibits prepared on the basis of the accounts and be added that the depreolatlon bad been calculated according to the Inoometax Act, Thia statement 6 not been challenged In cross-examinatlon. Therefore, It Is not right to say that tiM calculation about depreolatlon bad not been proved satisfactorily. The witness who prepared those calculations bad sworn to their correctness and his statement In that behalf has not been subjected to cross-examine lion. Therefore, we are satisfied that the tribunal was in error in not allowiny the appellant the amount of Rs. 2,22,867.00, by way of notional normal depreolatlon. That being so, the available surpins which has been found by the tribunal to be Rs. 6,12,698.00 is reduce to Rs. 3,96,616.00. Roughly, the available surpins can be taken to be Rs. 4 lakhs. (8) THAT raises the (ineitlon as to the division of this MrpiQS between the appellant and the respondents. TIM award of the tribunal shows that It gave the respondents about one third of the available surplus determined by It. The learned Solicitor-General contends that In deciding the question of distribution of the available surplus,, we should bear in mind the fact that a voluntary gratuity scheme which la discretionary with the applleant bae been Introduced by the appellant and be suggests that the fact that the quami Income Is required to be utilized for charitable purposes may also be borne In mind. Having regard to all the circumstances, we think that It Is not necessary to disturb the proportion adopted by the tribunal In dividing the available surplus between the appellant and the respondents. We would accordingly direct that In addition to about Rs. 70,000.00 which has been paid by the appellant to the respondents by way of bonus lor the relevant year, It should make a further payment of Rs. 63,000.00 In that behalf. There has been some dispute before us as to the total amount of the wage bill of the respondents. We would, therefore, avoid making any reference to the number of months In directing the payment of bonus. The only direction we would, therefore, give Is that the respondents should obtain from the appellant by way of additional bonus Rs. 63,000.00 for the year 1959. (9) THAT takes us to the question about the dismissal of Shamsul Zaman. We would, therefore, avoid making any reference to the number of months In directing the payment of bonus. The only direction we would, therefore, give Is that the respondents should obtain from the appellant by way of additional bonus Rs. 63,000.00 for the year 1959. (9) THAT takes us to the question about the dismissal of Shamsul Zaman. The position with regard to this dispute Is that a quarrel took place between Shamaul Zaman and Mohammad Mian on 3/06/1960, during duty hours. This quarrel disturbed the working of the establishment and was clearly against the rules of discipline laid down for the workmen In the establishment. After this quarrel took place, a chargesheet was served on Shamsul Zaman and after obtaining his explanation an enquiry was held. In this enquiry, evidence was led and the offending workman was given an opportunity to crossexamine the said evidence. After the enquiry was over, the enquiry officer made his report. He held that the Incident which took place on 8/06/1960 was not a onesided affair and that both the parties were to blame. He, therefore, recommended that the Increment of both the parties should be stopped, aa specified in the report. No doubt, be noticed that the record of Mobammad Mian was clean, whereas that of Shamsul Zaman was far from clean, Bven so, be was disposed to take the view that dismissal would be too severe a punishment In the case. After this report was submitted to the management, the manager examined the evidence and came to the conclusion that Shamsul Zaman should be dismissed. The manager accepted the recommendation of the enquiry officer in respect of Mobammad Mian and directed that his increment should be stopped for six months and that he should be warned that If such an Incident took place In future, he would be discharged from the appellants service. The tribunal has taken the view that the order thus passed by the manager terminating the services of Shamsul Zarnaa wasnot]ustlfled and so. It has directed the reinstatement of Shamsul Zaman. The Solicitor-General contends that In passing this order, the tribunal has acted beyond Its jurisdiction. The tribunal has taken the view that the order thus passed by the manager terminating the services of Shamsul Zarnaa wasnot]ustlfled and so. It has directed the reinstatement of Shamsul Zaman. The Solicitor-General contends that In passing this order, the tribunal has acted beyond Its jurisdiction. (10) IN reaching Its conclusion that the order of dimissal was unjustified, the tribunal baa been Influenced by the fact that Shamsul Zaman was an active worker In the Hamdard Dawakhana Employees Union and that the appellant did not approve of the activities of this union. There Is another union to which some of the appellants employees belong and that Is the Union Mulazaman Hamdard Dawakbana. It appears that according to the respondents, this latter union Is favoured by the appellant. The tribunal took the view that the dismissal in the present oaae amounted to victimization and It has also held that the finding of the manager Is perverse. If the finding of the tribunal that the conclusion of the manager Is perverse can be sustained, then, of course, there would be no difficulty In upholding the order of reinstatement passed by It. But we find It difficult to affirm the view taken by the tribunal that the Impugned finding of the manager la perverse. Aa we have pointed out on several occasions in dealing with Industrial dispntea of this kind, an Industrial tribunal wooldlw lustified in charaoterizing the findinff reoor* ded In the domeatio enquiry as perveraeoBly If It la abown that aaoh a finding la not Bappotf* fed by any evidennce, or is entirely oppossed to the whole body of the evidenoe adduced before It. In the present case, such a conclusion is obviously ipossiblel. Evidence has been led on both the Bides and the decision of the question as to whether Mohammad Mian was also to blame or Shamsul Zaman alone was to blame, would depend on the view that the officer concerned may take about the character of the said evidenoe. Shamsal Zamans case was that on the day in question when he went to his seat, he found that Mohammad Mian was sitting with the salary register and was looking into It. He then asked Mobammad Mian to leave his seat, but Mohammad Mian did not like 16. Then be told Mohammed Mian that he would complain about this conduct to the superior officer. He then asked Mobammad Mian to leave his seat, but Mohammad Mian did not like 16. Then be told Mohammed Mian that he would complain about this conduct to the superior officer. Thereafter he sat down In his chair but Mobammad Mian put his band on his dollar and appeared determined to pick a quarrel. He, however, controlled his anger and expostulated with him. Thus, the version of Shamsul Zaman was that Mobammad Mian was to blame. On the other band, Mobammad Mians gve a contrary version. Mohammad Mian being dumb and deaf, other employees gave evidence on his behalf. Mahmood All Khan also gave evidence which seemed to show that botb parties were partly to blame. In such a case. If the manager took the view that Shamsul Zaman was the aggressive party and Mohammad Mian who is dumb and deaf was the victim. It is difficult to bold that tuch a conclusion is perverse. There is evidence on which this conclusion could be based. In deciding the question as to whether particular conclusion of fact is perverse or not, industrial tribunal. is not justified In relghing the evidence for Itself and deternining the question of the perversity of the danagers view In the light of Its own finding not the question of fact. What the tribunal is done in the present case is to reach Its van conclusion on the merite of the case in he first Instance and then address Itself to we question as to whether the contrary view ken by the manager Is perverse or not. It 8 thought that since the managers conoluan is contrary to the view which 16 Itself is clined to take, the said conclusion must be did to be perverse. In our opinion, this aproach is entirely misconceived and unend. Therefore, we must bold that the tribunal was In error In taking the view that managers conclusion was perverse (11) IN this connexion. It Is relevant; to remember that the manager has referred to the previous conduct of Shamsul Zaman. In our opinion, this aproach is entirely misconceived and unend. Therefore, we must bold that the tribunal was In error In taking the view that managers conclusion was perverse (11) IN this connexion. It Is relevant; to remember that the manager has referred to the previous conduct of Shamsul Zaman. On several occasions In the past, be had been warned; once In a case of theft, his Increment was stopped and be was transferred to another section; then he was suspended for four days for quarrelling; the manager bad also written to his father complaining against his sons conduct and be had also been warned on 3/06/1959, that If his activities continued In the manner adopted by him, the appellant would not be able to keep him In service. 16 is in the light of these blemishes In his past record that the manager ultimately decided to dismiss him. It has been urged before ns by Mr. Kisthore that the service record of Sbamsul Zaman has not been produced before the tribunal. We do not see how that makes any difference. All that the appellant was expected to do In the present proceedings was to prove that a proper enquiry bad been held before Shamsul Zaman was dismissed and that has been done by leading oral evidence and producing documentary evidence In respect of the enquiry. It had not been suggested when the oral evidence was led on behalf of the appellant that the reference to the blemished past record of Shamsul Zaman was untrue and that he had. In fact, not been warned or punished In the past. Therefore, It was not necessary for the appellant to produce the service book of Shamsul Zaman. (12) IT is then argued by Mr. Kishore that Shamsul Zaman was not given an opportunity to meet the manager though be had requested for such an opportunity. We do not think that the requirements of natural Justice made It necessary for the appellant to give Shamsul Zaman an opportunity to meet the manager. What is necessary in snob oases is that a fair enquiry should be held, and such an enquiry has been held even according to the finding of the tribunal. That being so, after the report was submitted by the enquiry officer to the manager, the manager was not bound to hear Sbamsul Zaman again. What is necessary in snob oases is that a fair enquiry should be held, and such an enquiry has been held even according to the finding of the tribunal. That being so, after the report was submitted by the enquiry officer to the manager, the manager was not bound to hear Sbamsul Zaman again. Besides, in point of fact, the manager did see Shamsul Zaman and did bear what he had to say. This has been mentioned by the manager in his own order. Mr. Kishore, however, contendes that the manager admitted in his evidence that he did not give a hearing to show what the dismissla of Shamsul Zaman at any time before he passed the order of dismissal. This statement, in that Shamsul Zaman was guilty of miscon the context, means that he did nt give a regular hearing to Shamsul Zaman; what he did was merely to see him and listen to what he had to say. We do not think that the said statement on which Mr. relies can help to establishe that the managers order is inaccurate when it says that the manager gave Shamsul Zaman an opportunity to meet him as desired by him. In the light of these facts, we do nt see how it would be possible to hold that the dismissal of Shamsul Zaman is an act of victimzation. Even if the appel lant may be favouring the rival union, the fact that Shamsul Zaman was an active worker in the union of whose activities the appellant dows not approve,doooes not oby itself show what the dismissla of Shamsual Zaman is an act of cictimization. Once it is held that Shamsul Zaman was guilty of isconduct and it is found that the said conclusion is not perverse, the dismissal of the offending workman must be upheld even though the workman may be an active worker in the union not liked by the appellant. We are making these observations on the assumption that the appllant disapproves of one union and favours the other. (13) THE result is, the appeal is partly allowed The award as to bonus is modified as indioated in the judgement and the order of reinstatement of Shamsul Zaman passed by the tribunal is set aside. There would be no order as to costs.