Judgment :- 1. This is an application on behalf of the State for the grant of sanction under sub-section (3) of S.339 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the prosecution of the respondent for the offence of giving false evidence. The respondent accepted the tender of pardon under S.337 Cr. P. C., in a case where he along with three others was prosecuted for the murder of one Rayan. The respondent gave a statement under S, 164 Cr. P. C., before the Sub-Collector of Malappuarm, pw.1 admitting that he had participated along with the other persons in the commission of the offence. Ext. P 2 is the statement recorded under S.164 Cr. P. C. After pardon was granted he was examined in the commiting Magistrate's Court. Then he stuck on to the version given by him in Ext. P 2. That statement is Ext. P. 17. When examined in the Sessions Court he went back on his earlier statements. Ext. P.18 is his deposition in the Sessions Court. The learned Sessions Judge acquitted the accused in that case. After the case was over the Public Prosecutor certified that in his opinion the respondent had wilfully given false evidence and gone back on the condition upon which pardon was tendered. He was, therefore, prosecuted for the said offence and the trial resulted in acquittal. 2. There can bo no manner of doubt that the two statements. Ext. P.17 given before the committing Magistrate and Ext. P.18 given before the Sessions Court, are mutually contradictory so that one of them must necessarily be false. Still the prosecution of the respondent, the approver in the case, cannot follow as a matter of course and that is why the legislature has provided that the sanction of the High Court must be obtained before such a prosecution can be entertained. 3. The considerations which would weigh with the court in granting such sanction, have been indicated in a number of cases. In Emperor v. Waryum Singh (AIR. 1924 Lah. 90), it was held that a witness, who is in any way induced to make a false statement in connection with a capital charge, should be allowed every possible locus penitential but where contradictory statements have been made on different occasions sanction cannot be refused unless there be something to show that the approver made the statement alleged to be false under undue influence. This view has been followed in other cases. In Emperor v. Prabhu (AIR. 1937 Lah. 551), it was held by Din Mohammad J. that the High Court is not bound to accord sanction in every case that is brought to its notice under S.339 (3) Cr. P. C. The discretion vested in the High Court under this provision must be exercised with extreme caution and if the circumstances point to the conclusion that the incriminating statement made by the approver was not true, it would be opposed to public policy to prosecute and punish the approver for perjury. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Ningappa Ramappa Kurbar v. Emperor (AIR. 1941 Bom. 408) held: "Where therefore a person has resiled in the Sessions trial from his statement under S.164 Cr. P. C. it is absolutely essential that the court should make up its mind whether it was the statement before the Magistrate under S.164 or the statement subsequently made in court which is false. If the statement in court was false then in the interests of justice there should be a prosecution; but supposing it was the statement under S.164 which was false a.prosecution would not be expedient in the interests of justice. No doubt, a man making a statement on oath before a Magistrate under S.164 should speak the truth; but if he does not, the least he can do is to tell the truth when subsequently he goes into the witness box. To prosecute a man who has resiled from a false statement made under S.164 is to encourage him in the belief that it pays to tell a lie and stick to it. It is far better that a man should escape punishment for having made a false statement under S.164 than that he should be induced to believe that it is to his interest, however false the statement may have been, to adhere to it, and thereby save himself from prosecution. The danger of such a course leading to the conviction of innocent persons is too great to be risked. If the non-prosecution would result in abandoning the practice of taking statements under S.164, it will not be a bad thing." The same view has been taken in the case in State v. Dial Singh (AIR. 1958 Punjab 310). The danger of such a course leading to the conviction of innocent persons is too great to be risked. If the non-prosecution would result in abandoning the practice of taking statements under S.164, it will not be a bad thing." The same view has been taken in the case in State v. Dial Singh (AIR. 1958 Punjab 310). The headnote reads as follows: "The discretion vested in the High Court under the provisions of S.339 (3) to accord sanction to prosecute an approver for perjury must be exercised with extreme caution. Ordinarly it should be exceedingly difficult for an approver to give positive evidence as to his having made the incriminating statement under undue influence or as a result of coercion by the police. It sometimes happens that, when an investigating officer is confronted with a weak case, he in his misplaced zeal attempts to bolster it by getting hold of an approver; and if there is any such indication, in the circumstances of a particular case, sanction ought not to be given under sub-section (3) of S.339 for the prosecution of the approver." 4. I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed in these cases. The discretion thus vested in this Court by S.339 (3) Cr. P. C., to sanction the prosecution of an approver for the offence of giving false evidence must be exercised with extreme caution. It appears to me that when this court is asked to exercise the powers vested in this court by the enactment referred to above, the cardinal question for consideration would be whether the confession and the incriminating statement made by the approver were or were not true. If the circumstances point to the conclusion that the confession and the incriminating statement were not true, the irresistable inference must be, that those statements were put into the mouth of the approver by some one by inducement or by threat and, in such a case, it would be opposed to public policy to prosecute and to punish an approver for the offence of giving false evidence, when as a matter of fact he did not voluntarily make the incriminating statement. On the other hand, if it appears that the confession and the incriminating statement represented the true state of facts, and the approver in collusion with the accused resiled from the statement previously made by him, his subsequent statement must be false and in such a case it is not only desirable but expedient to order his prosecution for giving false evidence. 5. The learned Sessions Judge in the case in which the accused was prosecuted for the offence of murder has observed as follows: T. W. I's evidence also affords grounds for believing that he (the accused) was coaxed to the pardon since he was brought before pw.1 thrice and on all those occasions pw.12 (Circle Inspector, Manjeri) was also with him the accused)." 6. I have carefully considered all these circumstances and I am not satisfied that the confession and the statement made by the respondent in the court of the committing Magistrate were true and voluntarily made. It is unnecessary to enter into a detailed examination of the evidence in the case as it had been carefully considered by the learned judge on two occasions and the learned judge has expressed his opinion that he was not impressed with the evidence and found the accused not guilty and acquitted him. 7. Accordingly I am of the view that this is not a case in which sanction should be granted under Sub-section 3 of S.339, Cr. P. C., for the prosecution of the respondent and I dismiss the petition.