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1962 DIGILAW 373 (MAD)

Ammalla Koteswara Rao, In re. v. .

1962-11-30

BASI REDDY, MOHAMED MIRZA

body1962
JUDGMENT Basi Reddy, J.- The accused in this case, Ammalla Koteswara Rao, has been convicted of the murder of a man called Boginedi Peddanna and has been sentenced to death by the Sessions Judge of Guntur. The offence is stated to have been committed on 19th March, 1962, in the village of Anantharappad near the tobacco barn of P.W.2 (Parchuri Bodiah alias Chinna Hanumaiah). The manner of attack was by stabbing with a big knife (M.O.1), described by one of the witnesses as a knife generally used for cutting goats and fowls. It has a blade of about 8” in length. The victim died at about 8-00 p.m. on the same day in the Government General Hospital, Guntur, where he had been removed for treatment. The case for the prosecution is simple and is as follows: The deceased Peddanna was a Mala and was residing in Malapalle about 1½12; furlongs from Anantharappad. The accused is also a Mala and reside in Malapalle close to the house of the deceased. There are a number of tobacco barns belonging to the ryots of the village. During the tobacco season some of the ryots were engaging the deceased for supervising their barns and each of them was paying him Rs. 50 or Rs. 60 per month. The deceased in his turn was employing someone else to assist him in the supervision of the barns. In the year 1961, he deceased who had been engaged to supervise the barns of P.W. 6 and one Narra Veeraiah, had in his turn engaged the accused to work under him. One night, he accused had slept away and had not attended to the barn as he should have done with the result that the temperature inside the barn had gone down and there was a possibility of the tobacco inside getting spoiled. The deceased took the accused to task for that and actually beat him on the head with a shovel. P.W. 9 who was present then at the barn interfered and pacified them, and it would appear that the accused continued to work under the deceased for the rest of the season without any further hitch. During the next season, that is in the year 1962, the deceased was engaged by P.Ws.2, 8 and another to supervise their barns. P.W. 9 who was present then at the barn interfered and pacified them, and it would appear that the accused continued to work under the deceased for the rest of the season without any further hitch. During the next season, that is in the year 1962, the deceased was engaged by P.Ws.2, 8 and another to supervise their barns. The deceased did not employ the accused to assist him during that season but instead he employed a new person by name Tirupalu. Because of that, it is alleged by the prosecution, the accused bore a grudge against the deceased and that was the motive which impelled him on the material day i.e., on 19th March, 1962, to attack the deceased. On the morning of 19th March, 1962, P.W.2 along with his two sons and two daughters was attending to the folding of dry tobacco near his barn. The deceased was also there at that time. P.W.3, another ryot of the village, had gone to meet P.W.2 in order to go to the fields. He was also helping P.W.2 and his children in folding tobacco. While so, P.W.8 whose tobacco barn, cattle-shed and pandal are near P.W.2's barn, finding that his she-buffalo was ill and was not eating fodder went and brought one Kadiyala Ramaiah to treat the buffalo. The latter said that the buffalo was suffering from ‘vatham’and went to fetch medicine. As it was necessary to catch hold of the buffalo and keep it steady while the medicine was being administered, P.W.8 requested P.Ws.2, 3, 4 and the deceased to go and help him. All of them agreed and went to the pandal of P.W.8. The medicine was duly administered by Kadiyala Ramaiah and thereafter P.W.8 went away leaving P.Ws.2, 3, 4 and the deceased, who all sat for sometime in P.Ws.8 pandal chatting. After a little while the deceased got up and went towards the barn of P.W.2 to put charcoal in the oven. P.Ws.2, 3 and 4 continued sitting in P.Ws.8's pandal. All of a sudden they heard the deceased crying out “I am dying. Koteswara Rao, what sin I have committed”e P.Ws.2 and 3 turned round and actually saw the accused stabbing the deceased on his chest with a knife and running away. P.W.4 however did not see the accused stabbing the deceased because his view was obstructed by a wall. All of a sudden they heard the deceased crying out “I am dying. Koteswara Rao, what sin I have committed”e P.Ws.2 and 3 turned round and actually saw the accused stabbing the deceased on his chest with a knife and running away. P.W.4 however did not see the accused stabbing the deceased because his view was obstructed by a wall. According to P.Ws.2 and 3, the deceased then staggered backwards a few paces and fell in the pandal of P.W. 8, bleeding profusely from the injuries. P.Ws.2, 3 and 4 then gave chase to the accused but were unable to overtake him. After they had lost sight of him, they went to Malapalle to see if the accused had gone to his house. Not Hiding him there, on information, they went to the house of P.W.7. There P.W.7 told them that the accused had come a short while before, drank water and gone away. P.Ws.2, 3 and 4 were then going back into the main village. At the temple they saw the deceased still alive being taken in a ‘doli’ to the hospital at Guntur. It was past mid-day then. Thereafter P.Ws.2, 3 and 4 went away on their business. That in substance is the account given by P.Ws.2 and 3, who were examined by the prosecution as direct witnesses to the occurrence. They are respectable ryots of the village. Nothing was brought out in the cross-examination of these witnesses to show that they had the slightest motive to give false evidence against the accused. Their presence near the scene of the occurrence is satisfactorily explained by them and the story told by them appears tobe natural and true. Although no suggestion was made to them in cross-examination that there was any ill-feeling between them and the accused, yet in his statement under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code, the accused alleged that P.W.2 owed him some money and as he was pressing for re-payment, P.W.2 had beaten him, and that was the reason why P.W.2 had given false evidence. He did not allege anything against P.W.3 even in his statement under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code. He did not allege anything against P.W.3 even in his statement under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code. In the first place this version that P.W.2 owed the accused any money, was not put to P.W.2 whilst he was in the witness-box, and the story that P.W.2, who is a well-to-do ryot owed money to a wage-earner like the accused, and on account of that had perjured himself in a capital case, is too far-fetched to deserve serious consideration. We have no hesitation in agreeing with the trial Judge, who had the advantage of seeing and hearing these two witnesses in the box, that their evidence is true and can be safely acted upon. In addition to the evidence of these two witnesses, there is the evidence of a circumstantial nature implicating the accused in the crime. (After discussing the further evidence in the case, his Lordship proceeded): The accused denied all the circumstances appearing in the prosecution evidence and professed ignorance of the crime. He alleged that he was arrested at his house at 8 p.m. on 29th March, 1962 and that he had not given any statement to P.W.21, nor had he produced the knife from the drain. In the face of the unimpeachable and conclusive evidence adduced by the prosecution, the plea of the accused is unavailing. All the aforesaid pieces of evidence proved by reliable evidence, establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and we are in agreement with the learned trial Judge that the accused is guilty of the offence of murder. We therefore confirm the conviction of the accused under section 302, Indian Penal Code. There remains the question of sentence. The learned Sessions Judge has imposed the sentence of death on the ground that there are no extenuating circumstances in the case. But, in our view, the approach to the question of punishment should be somewhat different. The theory that where there are no extenuating or mitigating circumstances, it is incumbent upon the Court to impose the sentence of death, stems from the assumption that the sentence of death is the normal punishment for the offence of murder and the lesser sentence of imprisonment for life is the exception. The theory that where there are no extenuating or mitigating circumstances, it is incumbent upon the Court to impose the sentence of death, stems from the assumption that the sentence of death is the normal punishment for the offence of murder and the lesser sentence of imprisonment for life is the exception. This view was based on sub- section (5) of section 367, Criminal Procedure Code, as it stood before the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1955 (Act No. XXVI of 1955), and it provided: “If the accused is convicted of an offence punishable with death, and the Court sentences him to any punishment other than death, the Court shall in its judgment state the reason why sentence of death was not passed:” (The sub- section contained a proviso which is not material for the present purpose). This sub- section has, however, been substituted by a new sub- section by Art No. XXVI of 1955, and in the new sub-section, the main clause of sub- section (5), as extracted above, has been omitted. The result is that by virtue of the provisions of section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, the Court is now allowed full discretion to award the sentence of death or the lesser sentence of imprisonment for life for the offence of murder. That being the legal position now, the view that the extreme penalty is the normal sentence and the mitigated sentence is the exception, does not hold water. It can no longer be said that death is the normal punishment for murder, and the view formerly held by Courts in India that it is not for the judge to ask himself whether there are reasons for imposing the penalty of death but he should ask himself whether there are reasons for abstaining from doing so, has lost its validity. It seems to us that the correct approach to this question is that upon a conviction for murder, the Judge should ask himself the question, “Are there any aggravating circumstances in this case which imperatively call for the exact:.on of theextreme penaltye” If, in a given case, there are such circumstances, it is his bounden duty to award the capital sentence in the larger interest of society. It is not the province of the Judge to question the wisdom of the policy of the law. It is not the province of the Judge to question the wisdom of the policy of the law. He should not allow caprice or sentiment to sway his discretion. If, on the other hand, circumstances, of an aggravating nature are absent in a given case, the Judge would be justified in imposing the lesser of the two punishments prescribed by law viz., imprisonment for life. The mere fact that a human life has been taken, cannot in itself be an aggravating factor calling for the extreme penalty for the simple reason that, if death is not caused with the requisite intention or knowledge, the offence would not amount to murder. Viewed from this angle, it must be held that the instant case does not present any aggravating circumstances. The prosecution was unable to prove any proximate or immediate motive for the crime. The motive suggested by the prosecution referred to something that had happened a year before the offence, but it is hardly likely that the accused would have nursed a grievance for a whole year and suddenly attacked the deceased on that fateful day. Something must have happened in between, which he record of the case does not disclose. It may be that it was a chance encounter between the accused and the deceased and the attack itself was sudden and unpremeditated. The eye-witnesses saw only the last stage of the incident on hearing the cry of the deceased. What had immediately preceded that, and what motive had really prompted the accused to launch such a ferocious attack on the deceased in the middle of the day, are all left in the dark. We therefore, consider that the lesser of the two sentencesprescribed by section 302, Indian Penal Code, would meet the ends of justice in this case. We accordingly set aside the sentence of death passed by the lower Court and instead, impose on the accused the sentence of imprisonment for life. His appeal is allowed to this extent. A.B.K.-----Appeal partly allowed. Sentence altered to life imprisonment.