Judgment :- 1. The Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is directed against an order granting a temporary injunction. The seventh counter-petitioner in the court below is the appellant. 2. The respondent in this appeal filed a petition on 4121961 before the Subordinate Judge's Court of Quilon for settlement of his debts under S.15 of the Kerala Agriculturists Debt Relief Act, 1958. One of the debts included in the petition was a sum of Rs. 2,956- which he was liable to pay under an award of the Labour Court, Quilon, in proceedings under the Payment of Wages Act. The appellant had moved the Labour Court for relief in respect of wages due to him, and the award was passed as stated above. The award was sent to the Magistrate, Quilon, by the Labour Court for realisation of the sum. It was at that stage that this petition was filed and an interim injunction obtained ex parte. The appellant objected raising various grounds, but the objections were overruled and the interim order was made absolute. He has therefore preferred this civil miscellaneous appeal. 3. One of the points raised by the appellant is that even if the liability under the award is treated as a debt, the same having come into existence after the commencement of Act 31 of 1958 cannot be treated as a debt for the purpose of granting relief under S.15 of Act 31 of 1958. The learned judge relied on the decision in Ahamadu v. Kalyaniyamma (1960 KLT. 865) to which one of us was a party. The point which arose for decision in that case was whether the debt exempted from the scope of the definition of 'debt' in S.2 of the Act could be treated as a debt for the purpose of S.15. It was held that the word 'debt' in S.15 included certain liabilities exempted from the definition of 'debt' in S.2. The question which arises in this case, namely, whether a debt incurred after the commencement of the Act is one in respect of which a debtor may seek relief under S.15, did not arise for decision in that case. It was held that the word 'debt' in S.15 included certain liabilities exempted from the definition of 'debt' in S.2. The question which arises in this case, namely, whether a debt incurred after the commencement of the Act is one in respect of which a debtor may seek relief under S.15, did not arise for decision in that case. It was observed: "The avowed object of the Act is to provide for the relief of indebted agriculturists and the object of S.15 thereof appears clearly to be to give such debtor a discharge from all claims against him or of all his liabilities existing at the commencement of the Act." (The underlining is ours.) This makes it clear that it was not intended to bring in debts incurred after the commencement of the Act for the purpose of granting relief under S.15 to 18. The question whether exempted debts can be included in a petition for relief under S.15 came up again in Meenakskikutty Varasiaramma v. Travancore Forward Bank Ltd. (1961 KLT. 377). The question for decision in the case before us did not arise in that case either. The question which arose for decision in Premiose v. Idicula Panicker (1962) II KLR. 358, was whether a debtor who, though not an agriculturist at the commencement of the Act had become one later, was entitled to relief under S.15. It was held that he was. We do not consider it necessary to express any opinion on this point, as it does not arise here. There is however an observation to the following effect in the judgment: "The term'debt' is used in S.15 in its ordinary and natural meaning to take within its ambit all the debts of an agriculturist (vide Umbichi Ahamadu v. Kalyaniamma 1960 KLT. 865). Therefore, it is clear that when an agriculturist is claiming relief under S.15, his relief is not restricted to such debts as would come within the definition of that term, bat would comprise all his debts, including probably debts subsequent to the Act." This cannot be taken as deciding the question whether relief can be given under S.15 in respect of debts incurred after the commencement of the Act. 4. 4. S.15 (3), which provides that "the amount and other particulars of all claims against him (the debtor) at the commencement of this Act, together with the name, address and residence of his creditors" should be included in the petition, seems to indicate that the liabilities incurred after the commencement of the Act are to be excluded in proceedings under S.15. The definition of 'debt' in S 2 (c) includes only liability due from or incurred by an agriculturist on or before the commencement of the Act. This aspect was not considered by the court below. 5. Another point which has to be noticed is that the liability under an award made under the Payment of Wages Act is one which is enforced by a Magistrate under S.15 of that Act.S.15 (5) provides: (5) Any amount directed to be paid under this section may be recovered (a) if the authority is a Magistrate, by the authority, as if it were a fine imposed by him as Magistrate, and (b) if the authority is not a Magistrate, by any Magistrate to whom the authority makes application in this behalf, as if it were a fine imposed by such Magistrate." It cannot therefore be held that the appellant was taking steps to recover the amount under the award. The Labour Court sent the award to the Magistrate for recovery of the amount as if it were a fine imposed by the Magistrate. It cannot be denied that the proceedings for recovery are proceedings in a criminal court. The court below was not justified in distinguishing the decision in State v. Forest Range Officer (1959 KLT.1036) on the ground that no proceeding was pending in the criminal court. What is relevant is whether the order of injunction restrains the Magistrate from taking criminal proceedings. It is clear that it does. In this view the order of the court below cannot be supported. 6. There is yet one more ground on which the order has to be set aside. It is at the instance of the Labour Court that the Magistrate proceeds to recover the sum under the award. The Labour Court is not a party to these proceedings. In this view the order of the court below cannot be supported. 6. There is yet one more ground on which the order has to be set aside. It is at the instance of the Labour Court that the Magistrate proceeds to recover the sum under the award. The Labour Court is not a party to these proceedings. If the order is intended to restrain the Labour Court from seeking recovery of the same through the Magistrate, this amounts to violation of the rule that a court ought not to issue an injunction against one who is not a party to the proceedings before it. The mere fact that the amount ultimately may go to the appellant is no ground to justify the grant of the injunction. If part of a fine is directed by a Magistrate to be paid to the complainant in a case it does not mean that there is a debt due to the complainant. The same is the proposition in this case. 7. It follows that the order of injunction has to be set aside, and we do so. The civil miscellaneous appeal is allowed with costs. Allowed.