JUDGMENT Sadasivayya, J.- The two respondents in these two Criminal Appeals are the hotel keepers in Bangalore. Each of them had made an application for the renewal of the licence of his hotel. These applications for the renewal of the licences had been made under the provisions of the City of Bangalore Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), read together with the relevant bye-laws framed under the Act. It is undisputed that the applications for renewal of the licences had not been made on or before 1st of March, as required in rule 5 of bye-law No. 36. The renewal of the licences had been sought for, in each of these two cases, for the year 1961-62. Therefore, under the said rule, the applications for renewal had to be made on or before 1st of March, 1961. But. in each of these two cases the application for renewal was actually made, by each of the two respondents, on 26th April, 1961. Therefore, some correspondence took place between each of the two respondents and the authorities of the Corporation. For the purposes of the present case, it may not be necessary to refer to the details of that correspondence; it is enough to state that by the communication dated 27th July, 1961 and marked as Exhibit D-5, the Health Officer of the Corporation intimated the refusal of the request for the renewal of the licences. Each of the two respondents was prosecuted, separately, for running a hotel without a licence. The charge was to the effect that each of the respondents had committed an offence under section 286 read together with 376(1) of the Act. The learned Magistrate stated that as the Municipal Corporation had not either refused or granted the licences within 45 days after the receipt of the application for renewal, the applications must be deemed to have been granted, under sec ion 385 (10) of the Act. In consequence of having taken such a view, the Magistrate acquitted the accused in the two cases. It is against that acquittal, that the present two appeals have been filed by the Municipal Corporation. In consequence of having taken such a view, the Magistrate acquitted the accused in the two cases. It is against that acquittal, that the present two appeals have been filed by the Municipal Corporation. Sri Satyanarayana, the learned Advocate appearing for the appellant in these two cases contends that the lower Court was wrong in taking the view that the provisions of sub- section (10) of section 385 of the Act, would be applicable to an application which had not been made within the time prescribed in rule 5 under bye-law 36. His argument is that an application for renewal which has not been made within the time prescribed under the said rule 5 , is not a valid application and that, therefore, sub- section (10) of section 385 of the Act would not be applicable to such an application. The short point for determination in these two appeals, therefore, is as to whether applications for renewal of licences which have not been made within the time prescribed, will be entitled to the benefit of the provisions of section 385 (10) of the Act. The argument of Sri Nanjunda Sastry who has appeared for the respondents in these two appeals is, that merely on the ground of not having been made within the time prescribed under the said rule 5 of bye-law 36, such an application cannot lose its essential character and that it does not cease to be an application for renewal of a licence. His contention is that in spite of the fact that such an application was not made within the prescribed time, the applicant would be entitled to claim the benefit of section 385(10) of the Act and that if an order either granting or rejecting that application was not communicated to that applicant within 45 days, the application should be deemed to have been allowed for the period for which the renewal had been sought. In support of his argument that a renewal could be made even in the case of an application which had not been filed within the prescribed time, Sri Nanjunda Sastri drew our attention to sub- section (6) of section 385 of the Act. In support of his argument that a renewal could be made even in the case of an application which had not been filed within the prescribed time, Sri Nanjunda Sastri drew our attention to sub- section (6) of section 385 of the Act. That sub- section runs as follows: ‘(6) When any licence or permission is suspended or revoked, or when the period for which it was granted or within which application for renewal should be made has expired, whichever expires later, the grantee shall for all purposes of this Act, or any rule or bye-law made under it be deemed to be without licence or permission until the order suspending or revoking the licence or permission is cancelled or subject to sub- section (10) until the licence or permission is renewed, as the case may be.” Taking into consideration that portion of the above sub- section which will be relevant for the purposes of an application for renewal of a licence, what this sub section means is that when the period within which application for renewal should be made has expired, the grantee shall, for all purposes of the Act, or any rule or bye-law made under it be deemed to be without licence, subject to sub- section (10) until the licence is renewed. The fact that this sub- section also includes an application for renewal made after the expiry of the prescribed period, repels the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant to the effect that such an application is either an invalid application or that it is not an application at all in the eye of law. When sub- section (6) clearly contemplates the renewal of a licence even in a case where the application for a licence has been made after the expiry of the prescribed period, there is no good reason to exclude such an application from the benefit of the provisions of sub- section (10) of section 385 of the Act. When sub- section (6) clearly contemplates the renewal of a licence even in a case where the application for a licence has been made after the expiry of the prescribed period, there is no good reason to exclude such an application from the benefit of the provisions of sub- section (10) of section 385 of the Act. The said sub- section (10) runs as follows: — “ (10) The acceptance by the corporation of the pre-payment of the fee for a licence or permission or for registration shall not entitle the person making such pre-payment to the licence or permission or to registration, as the case say be, but only to refund of the fee in case of refusal of the licence or permission or of registration; but an applicant for the renewal of a licence or permission or registration shall, until communication of orders on his application, be entitled to act as if the licence or permission or registration had been renewed; and, save as otherwise specially provided in this Act, if orders on an application for licence or permission or for registration are not communicated to the applicant within forty-five days after the receipt of the application by the commissioner, the application shall be deemed to have been allowed for the year or for such less period as is mentione d in the application and subject to the law, rules, bye-laws, regulations and all conditions ordinarily imposed.” The first part of sub- section (10) provides that acceptance by the corporation of the pre-payment of the fee does not entitle the person making such pre-payment to the licence or permission or to registration, on account of which such pre-payment has been made; in case of refusal of his prayer, he becomes entitled only to the refund of that fee. With this part we are not concerned in the present case. The second part deals with an applicant for the renewal of a licence or permission or registration; it is provided that until the communication of orders on his application, such applicant will be entitled to act as if the licence or permission or registration had been renewed. With this part we are not concerned in the present case. The second part deals with an applicant for the renewal of a licence or permission or registration; it is provided that until the communication of orders on his application, such applicant will be entitled to act as if the licence or permission or registration had been renewed. The third part of the sub- section states that save as otherwise specially provided in the Act, if orders on an application for licence or permission or for registration are not communicated to the applicant within 45 days after the receipt of the application by the Commissioner, the application shall be deemed to have been allowed for the year or for such less period as is mentioned in the application. It was suggested by Sri Satynarayan that the third part of this sub- section would not be applicable to applications for renewal and that it would be applicable only to applications for licence or permission or for registration. It seem; to us, that there is no justification to take such a narrow view of the language in this part of the sub-section. The second part of this sub- section which specifically refers to an applicant for the renewal of a licence, permits him to act as if the licence had been renewed. The latter part of sub- section (6) which envisages the renewal of a licence even in cases where an application for renewal has been made after the expiry of the prescribed period, has been made subject to sub- section (10). It does not stand to reason as to why such a narrow construction should be placed on the language of the third part of sub- section (10) as to exclude therefrom an application for renewal of licence. On the otherhand, when the provisions of sub- section (6) of the Act are taken into consideration along with the second part of sub- section (10), it becomes clear that the provision in the last part of sub- sub- section (10) will be applicable, not merely to an application for licence or permission or for registration, but also to an application for the renewal of a licence or permission or for registration. To take any other view of the matter would be, in our opinion, to unduly restrict the beneficial provisions of this sub- section and to place a construction which may lead to much inconvenience and hardship. As pointed out by Sri Nanjunda Sastri in the course of his arguments, an applicant for the renewal of a license, will be a person who will already have invested in the business venture for which he seeks the renewal of the license; the fact that he had already been granted license for a prior period, is proof that he had complied with the requirements of the Act and the Rules and Bye-laws applicable to that particular kind of business. The need to safeguard the interests of such an applicant, in the event of the concerned authority not passing any orders on his application within the prescribed time, will be as great, (if not greater) as in the case of a person making an application for the first time for a licence or permission or for registration. Therefore, we are satisfied that the expression “an application for licence or permission or for registration” in the latter part of sub- section (10) includes also an application for renewal of a licence, permission or for registration. From what has been stated above, it is clear that in the case of each of the respondents in these two appeals, no order on the application for renewal of the licence, having been communicated to the applicants within 45 days after the receipt of the application by the Commissioner, the application for renewal of the licence must be deemed to have been allowed for the year for which the renewal had been prayed for. When it is deemed under the law that the renewal of the licences had been allowed, the prosecutions on the ground that they had been running the hotels without licences, could not succeed. In the result, the acquittals by the learned Magistrate in both these cases are correct. Both these appeals are dismissed. S.V.S.-----Appeals dismissed.