MEHROTRA, C. J.: This is an appeal by Jowala Prosad Agarwalla, Partner Agarwalla Saw Mills, Bijni, under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compenstion Act (Act No. VIII of 1923). (2) The Respondent made an application under the Workmen's Compensation Act before the Com­missioner for Workmen's Compensation, on the allegation that he was a workman employed by the opposite party Jowala Prosad Agarwalla and was originally engaged in the Saw Mill of the opposite party working on the machine for about four years. Thereafter he fell sick and took leave for about three months and resumed to his duties in the month of Magh, 1365 B. S. On resumption the opposite party engaged the applicant in their log and timber handling and transporting job on Railway wagons at Railway sidings near the Railway Station at Bijni. On the 27th Baisakb, 1365 B. S., corresponding to 11th of May 1959, the applicant received personal injury in course of his employ­ment. In the application there is a statement to ,the effect that more than ten persons are employed and working in the different premises of the laid Mills during the preceding twelve months. In para­graph 2 of the petition it is stated that the applicant sustained the following injuries, namely: "A. Loss of thumb - 25 percentage of loss of earning capacity B. Loss of index finger - 10" invalid) The applicant claimed his monthly wages at Rs. 80/- Rs. 60/- as wages and the balance for free quarter and fuel. On these facts the applicant claimed compensation of a consolidated sum of Rs. 1,176/-. The present appellant filed objections. The case taken up by the opposite party-appellant was that the applicant-respondent was never engag­ed nor worked in the saw mills of the opposite party either at machine or at any place. He also denied the fact that the applicant fell ill and was given f three months' leave. According to the allegation of the appellant, the opposite party had forest coupes and generally for truck loading of timbers in the forest and some times wagon loading of some such timber on a contract basis there was a Sardar and he engaged casual labourer for the same. It was the Sardar who engaged the applicant as a casual labourer in truck loading and wagon loading, and, thus, the applicant-respondent was not a workman employed by the appellant. It was the Sardar who engaged the applicant as a casual labourer in truck loading and wagon loading, and, thus, the applicant-respondent was not a workman employed by the appellant. (3) Mainly the point raised by the present appellant was that the applicant-respondent was not a workman within the meaning of the Work­men's Compensation Act and was thus not entitled to any compensation. It was further urged that the amount of compensation claimed by the appli­cant was not correct. The Commissioner after con­sidering the evidence produced before him came to the conclusion that the applicant-respondent was e workman within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. He further found that the ap­plicant's wages were Rs. 60/- per month. On that basis the Commissioner held that the applicant was entitled to Rs. 882/- as compensation. The Com­missioner came to the conclusion that the applicant-respondent lost his thumb and he was thus entitled to 25 per cent of the total amount. In the case of index finger, according to Schedule I attached to the Workmen's Compensation Act, hereinafter called 'the Act', he was entitled" to 10 per cent. On that basis the Commissioner held that the applicant was entitled to 35 per cent of the earning capacity y amounting to Rs. 2,520/-. (4) In the present appeal, two main points hare been urged. It is firstly contended that the Com­missioner erred in calculating the amount of com­pensation. The workman is entitled to compensa­tion as provided for in Section 5 and Schedule I of the Act. Schedule I lays down the list of in­juries deemed to result in permanent partial dis­ablement. One of the items in this list is loss off thumb, and, if there is loss of thumb, the workman is entitled to 25 per cent of the loss of earning capacity. In case of loss of index finger, the work­man is entitled to 10 per cent of the loss of earn­ing capacity. It is not disputed that if there was a loss of thumb the workman would have been entitled to 25 per cent of the loss of earning capaci­ty. It also cannot be disputed that if there was a loss of the index finger, the workman was entitled to 10 per cent of the loss of earning capacity. It is not disputed that if there was a loss of thumb the workman would have been entitled to 25 per cent of the loss of earning capaci­ty. It also cannot be disputed that if there was a loss of the index finger, the workman was entitled to 10 per cent of the loss of earning capacity. The point taken before us is that there is no evi­dence to support the finding that there was a loss of the index finger. It is further contended that even on the findings arrived at by the Commissioner it cannot be said that the applicant was entitled to 10 per cent of the loss of earning capacity on the ground of loss of the index finger. So far as the loss of thumb is concerned, it is not disputed that there was evidence on record and the Commissioner had come to the definite con­clusion on that point. In the petition, the two in­juries mentioned included the loss of index finger. In his cross-examination in Court, the applicant had stated that "it was not a fact that he lost his thumb only. Both the fingers were also completely damaged but they were not lost nor amputated" The Commissioner on consideration of the fact that the allegation in the petition about the injuries had not been expressly denied by the opposite party and also relying upon the evidence of the applicant and the circumstance that the opposite-party-appellant himself in the witness-box admitted that he saw the injuries of the finger of the applicant, came to the conclusion that the applicant was entitled to 10 per cent of his earning capacity on account of the loss of his index finger. 'A good deal of argument is advanced before us on the word used by the appli­cant in his cross-examination that the index finger was completely damaged but was not lost and amputated. It was a permanent partial disablement of the finger and there is a clear finding to that effect. This is a question of fact and this Court will not examine the evidence on that point under Section 30 of the Act. It was a permanent partial disablement of the finger and there is a clear finding to that effect. This is a question of fact and this Court will not examine the evidence on that point under Section 30 of the Act. It is contended that the finding if at all of the Commissioner is based on the opinion of the applicant himself, which is not a relevant evidence for coming to the conclusion about the nature of the injury and loss caused to the applicant. Reliance is placed in this connection in the case of Panchanan Ghose v. Bhaggu Bari, reportedi in AIR 1950 Cal 261 . At p. 263 of the report it was observed as follows: "However, all the Commissioner had in this case were medical certificates together with his own observation. However, it is not necessary to consider this question further because it is quite clear that this order cannot possibly be sustained and must be set aside." These observations clearly show that there was no material in that case for the Commissioner to come to the conclusion about the nature of the injuries. There the whole incident was denied and the case set up was that the workman was malingering. It was not a case where the nature of the injury caus­ed to the applicant was in dispute. The learned Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court came to the conclusion that there was no material at all for the Commissioner to come to the conclusion that in fact any injury was caused to the applicant, Moreover, the point was not examined in detail as on other points the judgment of the Commissioner was held to be apparently erroneous. This case is, therefore, no authority for the proposition that the evidence of the applicant, which naturally will be in the nature of an opinion, cannot be accepted by a Court of fact. The Commissioner had, in our opinion, given sufficient reasons for coming to the conclusion that the injury to the index finger result­ed in his permanent partial disablement and thus it was a loss of index finger within the meaning of Schedule 1 of the Act and the petitioner was entitl­ed to 10 per cent of the loss of his earning capacity. (5) The main point urged is that the petitioner was not a workman within the meaning of the Act. (5) The main point urged is that the petitioner was not a workman within the meaning of the Act. 'Workman' has been defined as follows: "Section 2(n)- 'Workman' means any person (other than a person whose employment is of a casual nature and who is employed otherwise than-for the purposes of the employer's trade or business> who is: (i) a railway servant as defined in section 3 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 (IX of 1890), not permanently employed in any administrative, dis­trict or sub-divisional office of a railway and not employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II, or (ii) employed on monthly wages not exceeding four hundred rupees, in any such capacity as in specified in Schedule II. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Any person who is either a railway servant as defined in Sec. 3 of the Indian Railways Act and not permanently employed in any administrative, district or sub-divisional office of a railway and not employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II or who is employed on monthly wages not exceeding four hundred rupees in any capacity as specified in Schedule I will be a work­man. In the present case, the applicant does not claim to be a railway servant. He claims to be a workman under Clause (ii). Section 2(n)(ii) is attracted when the person is employed on monthly wages not exceeding four hundred rupees in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II. Two things are necessary to constitute a workman -firstly, that he should not be employed otherwise than for the purpose of the employer's trade of business, and, secondly, that he must be employed on monthly wages not exceeding four hundred rupees in any such capacity as specified in schedule II. The contention of the appellant is that the applicant was not employed for the purpose of the employer's trade or business. It is further contended that the applicant was not employed in any of the capacities specified in Schedule II and thus he was not a workman at all. It is further contended that the present appellant is not the em­ployer inasmuch as the work of loading was given on contract to the Sardar and the applicant was employed by the Sardar. It is further contended that the present appellant is not the em­ployer inasmuch as the work of loading was given on contract to the Sardar and the applicant was employed by the Sardar. It was the Sardar who was the employer of the applicant. So far as the contention of the appellant that the applicant was not working in any of the capacities specified in Schedule II 'is concerned, the answer is that the ap­plicant comes under Clause (xxvi) of Schedule II of the Act. Clause xxvi reads as follows: "(xxvi) employed in the handling or transport of goods in, or within the precincts of: (a) any warehouse or other place in which .goods are stored, and in which on any one day of the preceding twelve months ten or more persons have been so employed, * * * * * * The Commissioner has referred to the statement of the opposite party-appellant himself and has rightly pointed out that the appellant admitted that they used to send the slippers outside and if the wagon was not available, they were stored at the railway sidings. That being so, the railway siding is a place in which the goods were stored and the ap­plicant was employed in the handling or transport of the goods. Under those circumstances, the ap­plicant was working in the capacity as enumerated in Schedule II. It has also been urged that in any case the sidings were so far away from the mills that the applicant cannot be said to be working within the precincts of the factory. As we have already pointed out, the goods of the saw mills were stored in the railway siding and if the appli­cant was employed in the handling or transport of goods at the place where they were stored, he will come under the category specified in Schedule II. The Commissioner also considered the case from the point of view - whether it can be said that the applicant was working for the purpose of the industry of the employer. The Commissioner came to the conclusion that the work of loading wagons at the railway station was so inter-connected with the industry of the appellant that it could be said that the applicant was working for the purpose of the industry or business of the appellant. The Commissioner came to the conclusion that the work of loading wagons at the railway station was so inter-connected with the industry of the appellant that it could be said that the applicant was working for the purpose of the industry or business of the appellant. It is very strongly contended by the appellant that the Sardar was an independent contractor and under the terms of the agreement the Sardar was responsible for the loading work and he had to provide labour for that purpose. As such, the argument was that the work of loading and unloading was a separate business carried on by the Sardar in his own right and it did not form integral part of the business carried on by the present appellant. It is further contended that it was the Sardar who could be regarded to be the employer of the applicant and not the present appellant. Both the questions are, in our opinion, inter connected. If the business of loading is a part of the business of the present appellant, even though the applicant might have been engaged by the Sardar he will yet be the emplovee of the present appellant. The Commissioner, in our opinion, rightly (stated that the agreement was not proved to have been signed by the present workman. But even if that agreement is to be looked into it only gives a Bright to the Sardar to supply labour. As we have said, the agreement by itself does not show that the work of loading and unloading was a business of the contractor and it was taken out of the busi­ness of the appellant. Moreover, the question as to who is the employer is a question of fact depend­ing upon the circumstances and evidence on the record and when there were circumstances and evi­dence before the Commissioner for a finding we under section 30 of the Act cannot go into that question of fact (6) A number of authorities have been cited by the appellant in support of his contention. Re­ference is made to the cases of Rabia Mahomed Tahir v. G. I. P. Railway, reported in AIR 1929 Bom 179; Karnani Industrial Bank Ltd. v. Ranjan, reported in AIR 1933 Cal 63; Arumugham v. Nagammal reported in AIR 1949 Mad 462; Masenu v. Gampala Narasamma, reported in AIR 1952 Mad 169 ; and, Municipal Board, Almora v. Jasod Singh, reported in AIR 1960 All 468 . The facts in these cases are entirely different. The question as to who is the employer of a workman will depend upon the evidence in each case and it will be for the Court of fact to draw the inference from the evidence. In some of these cases the question arose whether the independent contractor was an employer of the workman or it was the principal on whose behalf the contract was given was the employer. As we have said, in each case it will be a question of evidence on record. The case taken up by the appellant here was that the appli­cant was never employed in the mills. The appli­cant was employed only for the purpose of loading from his forest coupe by the independent contractor, who was entrusted with that business wholly. That case was not accepted by the Commissioner and from the evidence the Commissioner came to the conclusion that the applicant was employed by the appellant and that he was working in the capacity enumerated in Schedule II of the Act for the pur­pose of the business of the appellant. That is a finding of fact. (7) It is lastly contended that one of the neces­sary ingredients of the worker within the meaning of the Act is that at the place where the worker is said to have been working ten or more persons should be working within twelve months of the accident. There was a clear allegation in the peti­tion itself that more than ten persons were work­ing at each of the precincts of the factory including the place of siding. There was no express denial of the fact that more than ten persons were working at the railway siding. The case taken up by the appellant was that the applicant was not the em­ployee of the appellant at all. There was no express denial of the fact that more than ten persons were working at the railway siding. The case taken up by the appellant was that the applicant was not the em­ployee of the appellant at all. Under those cir­cumstances if the Commissioner accepted the case of the applicant and held him to be a workman on the finding that all the necessary ingredients had been satisfied, there is no reason ,to hold that the Commissioner did not consider the necessary element of the workman in deciding the question. (8) In any view of the matter, there is no force in this appeal and it is dismissed with costs. (9) DUTTA, J. : I agree. Appeal dismissed.