Judgment :- 1. The question is whether an order for eviction made under Clause.9 of the Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order, 1950 for short, the Order can be executed under S.14 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, XVI of 1959 for short, the Act S. 36 (1) whereof repealed the Order and the statute, namely, S.13 of Travancore-Cochin Act V of 1950, under which the Order was made. Both common sense and justice require that it should, as the courts below have held it can, and I have no doubt that, despite what some might think the defective wording of S.33 (2) of the Act, that provision expressly provides for such execution. 2. S.14 of the Act runs as follows: "14. Execution of orders. Every order made under S.11 or S.13 or S.19 and every order passed on appeal under S.18 or on revision under S.20 shall, after the expiry of the time allowed therein be executed by the Munsiff or if there are more than one Munsiff, by the Principal Munsiff having original jurisdiction over the area in which the building is situated as if it were a decree passed by him: xxxxx And S.33 as follows: "33. Continuance in force of existing proceedings, orders, etc. (1) Ail proceedings commenced or deemed to have been commenced and all actions taken or deemed to have been taken under the Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order, 1950, or the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949, and pending at the commencement of this Act shall, so far as may, be deemed to have been commenced or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act and be continued subject to the provisions of this Act. (2) All orders passed or deemed or purporting to have been passed and all decisions given or deemed or purporting to have been given under the Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order, 1950, or the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949, and in which fair rent has been fixed, shall be deemed to have been passed or given under the corresponding provision of this Act and shall continue in force until they are Superseded or modified under this Act by the authority competent to do so." 3. It seems to me obvious that the second "and" in S.33 (2) "should be read distributively in the sense that the clause, "and in which fair rent has been fixed" is to be understood, as a nominative clause introducing a separate subject, as if the clause read, "and all such orders and decisions in which fair rent has been fixed" (the omission of the words "all such orders and decisions" being an I think, mistaken avoidance of repetition, the orders and decisions forming the separate subject being comprised in the orders and decisions of the earlier nominative clause) and not conjunctively as introducing an adjectival clause adding a cumulative quality to the orders and decisions earlier referred to. So also the third "and" so that the deeming clause preceding this word applies to the orders and decisions referred to in the first subject clause while the continuing clause following this word applies to the orders and decisions in which fair rent has been fixed. In other words, the consequent, "shall be deemed to have been passed or given under the corresponding provision of this Act" will attach to the antecedent, "all orders passed or deemed or purporting to have been passed and all decisions given or deemed or purporting to have been given under the Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order, 1950, or the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949," while the consequent, shall continue in force until they are superseded or modified under this Act by the authority competent to do so," will attach to the antecedent, "in which fair rent has been filed." That seems to me the only way in which sense and justice can be made of the section, and, in doing so, I do not think that any violence is being done to the rules of syntax or grammar. 4. 4. I would therefore read the sub-section thus: "All orders passed or deemed or purporting to have been pissed and all decisions given or deemed or purporting to have been given under the Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order, 1950, or the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949, shall be deemed to have been passed or given under the corresponding provision of this Act, and all such orders and decisions in which fair rent has been fixed, shall continue in force until they are superseded or modified under this Act by the authority competent to do so." To read the sub-section as the petitioner would have me read it namely, as if the clause, "and in which fair rent has been fixed" qualifies the orders referred to in the earlier part of the sub-section, in other words, as if the sub-section applies only to orders in which fair rent has been fixed would make nonsense of the sub-section. It would make the earlier portion of the sub-section otiose and meaningless. For, if it were the intention of the Legislature that the sub-section should apply only to such orders it could easily have said that orders fixing fair rent made under the repealed statutes shall be deemed to have been made under the corresponding provisions of the Act and shall continue in force. Nor is such an intention easily attributable to the Legislature, for, of the many and diverse orders which could have been passed under the repealed statutes, an order fixing fair rent is only one, and by no means the most important, and there is no reason whatsoever why such orders alone should have been singled out for being saved and continued as if they were orders under the new statute while leaving the rest to perish. Sub-section (1) of S.33 provides for the continuance of all pending proceedings commenced under the repealed statutes, as if they had been commenced under the corresponding provisions of the Act, not merely of applications for the fixation of fair rent, and surely it could not have been the intention that sub-section (2) providing for the continuing effect of orders made under the repealed statutes should be confined to orders fixing fair rent. Moreover, if sub-section (2) of S.33 were so confined subsection (1) of S.34 providing for the avoidance of certain orders of eviction passed under the repealed statutes would be meaningless, for, it would be a provision for avoiding what has ceased to exist. That latter sub-section necessarily implies that orders for eviction passed before the coming into force of the Act are enforceable. It seems to me that the reason why the controversial clause, "and in which fair rent has been fixed" singles out orders fixing fair rent for special treatment, continuing them in force only until they are superseded or modified under the Act by the authority competent to do so, is that the principles for fixing fair rent in the Act are completely different from the principles in the repealed statutes. Therefore, in the case of such orders, the Legislature wanted to provide for supercession or modification otherwise than by way of appeal or revision. And hence the clause that such orders shall continue in force until they are superseded or modified under the Act by the authority competent to do so. 5. Reading S.33 (2) as I have read it, an order for eviction made under Clause.9 of the Order is to be deemed to be an order made under S.11 of the Act, and it is therefore executable under S.14.'' 6. Had S.33 (2) of the Act not made express provision for the purpose, I think S.4 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1125 (S. 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897) would have served to make the order for eviction executable under the relevant provision of the repealed statute namely, Clause.11 of the Order. It is to be noted that the definition, "enactment" in S.2 (10) of this Act is an inclusive definition wide enough to cover the Order. There would be nothing in the Act manifesting a different intention and therefore, by reason of clause (c) of S.4 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Act, the repeal effected by the Act would not affect the order for eviction obtained under the repealed Order, and, clause (e) of this section would avail to secure a remedy by way of execution as if the repealing Act, namely, the Act, had not been passed. 7. 7. I am of the view that the courts below understood and applied the law correctly when they held that the order for eviction obtained by the respondent landlord on 13 111955 against the petitioner tenant under Clause.9 of the Order was executable under S.14 of the Act. Even if they were wrong, I do not think that the discretionary jurisdiction conferred by Art.226 and 227 of the Constitution under which the petition is brought, is to be so exercised as to correct an error of this kind by substituting an order which is manifestly just with an order which would be manifestly unjust. 8. Counsel for the respondent has another argument, namely, that he had made an application for execution, E. P. No. 193 of 1959, under the repealed Order before the Act came into force and that the subsequent applications for execution made by him are only in continuance of this first application. Therefore the execution initiated by him under the repealed Order has to be continued by reason of sub-section (1) of S.33 of the Act. In the view I am taking of sub-section (2) of this section, I think it unnecessary for me to consider this argument and I leave it to the counsel to advance it elsewhere should that prove necessary. 9. In the result I dismiss the petition with costs. Advocate's fees Rs. 250/-. Dismissed.