JUDGMENT T.C. Raghavan, J. 1. The 2nd defendant in O. S. No. 660 of 1122 on the file of the court of the District Munsif of Perumbavoor is the appellant before me. Respondents 1 and 2 as plaintiffs filed the suit for recovery of possession of certain properties after setting aside a decree and the court sale etc. that followed. The second appeal relates only to 45 cents in Sy. No. 130/7, the parties having settled their differences regarding the other properties. The trial court held that the suit was barred by limitation under Art. 9 of the Travancore Limitation Act, though it held on some of the other issues in favour of the plaintiffs and in that view it dismissed the suit. On appeal by the plaintiffs, the lower appellate court reversed the said decision and decreed the suit as prayed for. In second appeal the 2nd defendant canvasses the correctness of that decision. 2. The main point for consideration in the second appeal is whether Art. 9 of the Travancore Limitation Act is a bar to the suit. Other questions have also been argued in the case ; but on those questions both the lower courts agreed in their findings, which are in favour of the plaintiffs ; and I do not think there is much scope for coming to a different conclusion on those issues in second appeal. Therefore, I would concentrate my attention only on the question of limitation, on which the lower courts themselves differed in their conclusions. 3. A few facts necessary for understanding this question may be briefly narrated. Sy. No. 130/7 belonged to one Kumaran Thampi, who was the karnavan of the plaintiff's tarwad. He executed a hypothecation bond mortgaging 47 cents in the north east portion of the survey number in favour of one Narayanan Kunji. That mortgage right was purchased in court auction by one Isshaac Kathanar and he filed O. S. No. 850 of 1105 on the file of the Perumbavoor Munsif's Court on the mortgage document. Plaintiff's mother was the 4th defendant therein and their grand mother was the 2nd defendant. A decree followed against the hypotheca and the assets of deceased Kumaran Thampi. Plaintiff's mother died during the execution of that decree and the plaintiffs were themselves brought on record as additional defendants 12 and 13. Plaintiff's mother was the 4th defendant therein and their grand mother was the 2nd defendant. A decree followed against the hypotheca and the assets of deceased Kumaran Thampi. Plaintiff's mother died during the execution of that decree and the plaintiffs were themselves brought on record as additional defendants 12 and 13. With them on record and having their grandmother as their guardian, the hypotheca was sold and another 45 cents from the same survey number were attached as part of the assets belonging to Kumaran Thampi and sold in execution of the decree. The suit, out of which the second appeal has arisen, was for setting aside that sale and for recovery of possession of the 45 cents and the suit was filed after the plaintiffs, who were minors at the time of the sale, became majors. Be it also noted that the suit was filed more than one year after the 1st plaintiff became major and within three years of his attainment of majority. The objection regarding limitation is that the suit, having been brought more than one year after the attainment of majority of the 1st plaintiff, was hit by Art. 9 of the Travancore Limitation Act. 4. Article 9 of the Travancore Limitation Act is different in wording from the corresponding Art. 12 in the Indian Limitation Act. The relevant portions of the two Articles may be noted. The relevant portion of Art. 9 of the Travancore Limitation Act runs: "9. To set aside any of the following sales: (a) Sale in execution of a decree of a Civil Court by whomsoever brought on any ground other than that the judgment-debtor or his family or tarwad had no right, title and interest in the property sold. One year When the sale is confirmed, or would otherwise have become final and conclusive had no such suit been brought." Similarly the relevant portion of Art.12 of the Indian Limitation Act reads: "12. To set aside any of the following sales: (a) Sale in execution of a decree of a Civil Court. One year When the sale is confirmed, or would otherwise have become final and conclusive had no such suit been brought." 5. To set aside any of the following sales: (a) Sale in execution of a decree of a Civil Court. One year When the sale is confirmed, or would otherwise have become final and conclusive had no such suit been brought." 5. Article 8 of an earlier Travancore Limitation Regulation, which corresponded to Art. 9 mentioned above, was interpreted by a Division Bench of the Travancore High Court in Cheeru Ichira v Naryanan Kunchu (XII T. L. R. 122) as to govern also suits to set aside sales of tarwad property made in execution of a decree passed against a junior member. The decision laid down that no member of a judgment debtor's tarwad, whether the debtor be the karnavan or only a junior member, could seek to set aside a court sale of tarwad property on any ground whatever, unless he brought his suit within one year from the date of confirmation of the sale. This decision was approved in a later Full Bench decision in Narayana Pillai Bhagavathi Pillay v Velayudhan Pillai Srikantan Nair (1949 T. L. R. 14). The Full Bench decision held that no member of the judgment debtor's tarwad or family was entitled to seek to set aside the sale of tarwad property after the lapse of one year, except on the ground that the judgment debtor had no interest in the property sold. This Full Bench decision appears to have considered several other decisions as well. 6. It is quite apparent that the wording of Art. 9 of the Travancore Limitation Act is different from the corresponding Art. 12 of the Indian Limitation Act. It is also clear that the legislature in enacting Art. 9 of the Travancore Limitation Act must have had some object in deviating from the Indian statute and adopting a different wording. That purpose has been clearly pointed out by the two decisions I have already referred to and that was to protect bona fide purchasers by providing a short limit for bringing suits to set aside court sales. The resultant position after the enactment of Art. 9 of the Travancore Limitation Act appears to be that a suit to set aside any sale in execution of a decree of a civil court on any ground, other than the one mentioned in the Article, has to be brought within one year of the confirmation of the court sale. The resultant position after the enactment of Art. 9 of the Travancore Limitation Act appears to be that a suit to set aside any sale in execution of a decree of a civil court on any ground, other than the one mentioned in the Article, has to be brought within one year of the confirmation of the court sale. The only exception to this rule is the one contemplated by that Article itself and that is a suit on the ground that the judgment debtor or his family or tarwad had no right, title and interest in the property sold. Therefore, if the present suit is one which comes within that exception contemplated by Art. 9, then alone the case will be taken out of the one year rule; otherwise the one year rule hits and the suit will become barred. Thus the sole question is whether the present suit comes within that exception. 7. The decree in O. S. No. 850 of 1105, evidenced by Ext. F, shows that Sy No. 130/7 belonged to Kumaran Thampi and he mortgaged only 47 cents thereof. The mortgage was originally of the year 1092; later on it was renewed in 1093. Ext. E of 1103, evidencing a partition in the family of the plaintiffs, recites that in 1094 the property was gifted by Kumaran Thampi to one Janaky Pillai, so that after 1094 Sy. No. 130/7 became the property of Janaky Pillai, with the mortgage on 47 cents thereof at the north-east corner. The decree in O. S. No. 850 of 1105 followed in 1107 and under that decree the hypotheca was directed to be sold and the balance decree amount was directed to be recovered from the assets of Kumaran Thampi, the mortgagor. By that time Sy. No. 130/7 ceased to be the asset of Kumaran Thampi, the gift having already been made 13 years ago. In execution of that decree the suit property was attached and sold as forming part of Kumaran Thampi's assets and it is that sale that is sought to be set aside in the present suit. The ground for setting aside the sale alleged in the present suit is that the deceased Kumaran Thampi had no right in the property sold, the property being the property of the plaintiffs' tarwad. I fail to see how Art. 9 can stand in the way of the present suit. The ground for setting aside the sale alleged in the present suit is that the deceased Kumaran Thampi had no right in the property sold, the property being the property of the plaintiffs' tarwad. I fail to see how Art. 9 can stand in the way of the present suit. The ground for setting aside the sale alleged in the suit is that the judgment debtor Kumaran Thampi had no right, title and interest in the property sold, the decree being against Kumaran Thampi and his assets and the property sold being not part of his assets. Therefore, according to me, the present suit comes directly within the exception, that is contemplated by Art. 9 of the Travancore Limitation Act. 8. The further question whether the limitation is three years or 12 years is immaterial, because the suit has been brought within three years of the attainment of majority of the 1st plaintiff. 9. The result is the decision of the lower appellate court is confirmed and the second appeal is dismissed with costs.